1854

Palmerston had opposed Russell's proposals over winter to extend the franchise. He worried about extending it to 'a great number of electors of a lower class in regards to intelligence, property and independence'. In January he warned Russell that 'A low class of electors may naturally be expected to chose a low class of representatives but even where men of a superior kind are chosen, these men insensibly and unavoidably adapt the language, the tone, and their votes, to the lowest class of electors, if that class is numerous; just as actors are led to neglect the boxes and the pit, and to play for the shilling gallery.' We will get MPs 'incapable of taking large views' for the sake of some 'fleeting popularity among the lower classes' and in defiance of 'the intelligent & respectable classes whose good opinion is most to be valued'. A few days later he added to Aberdeen that it was bad timing and 'Can it be expected that men who murder their children to get nine pounds to be spent in drink will not sell their vote for whatever they can get for it?'

Crowds gathered outside the Tower of London in the belief they would witness the imprisonment for treason of Lord Aberdeen and Prince Albert. Effigies of the two were burned. Feelings were running high viz the Eastern Crisis.

Derby denounced government policy as confused and 'discreditable', shrouded in dangerous obscurity and indecision.

Russell introduced a Reform Bill. Badly timed. Cabinet chaos. On 3 March he told Parliament further consideration was delayed, on 11 April he had to withdraw it for the rest of the session, and burst into hysterical tears during his speech.

(Gall) Letter to Manteuffel: 'I should be alarmed if we sought protection from the approaching storm by tying our neat seaworthy frigate to Austria's worm-eaten old battleship. Great crises constitute the weather which favours Prussia's growth, provided that it is fearlessly (perhaps even ruthlessly) turned to account by us. If we want to keep on growing, then we must not be afraid to stand alone with 400,000 soldiers, especially as long as the others are fighting and we can by allying with everyone of them still do better business than through a premature and unconditional alliance with so weak and dishonest a confederate as Austria.' OP (p89) Bismarck advised that Prussia should wait until Austria was committed in the east and her troops were deployed in the Balkans then suddenly present Vienna with a demand: either Prussian support against Russia in return for a secret deal establishing spheres of interest, including Austrian respect for Prussia's veto in the Diet; if refused, then Prussia attacks Bohemia.

OP: In Berlin there was confusion. The ultra-conservatives such as Gerlach were pro-Russian, Wilhelm was pro-western. The king (whose sister had married Tsar Nicholas) was erratic driven by a desire for neutrality, a fear of isolation and wanting to preserve solidarity with Austria. Tsar Nicholas said of FW, 'My dear brother-in-law goes to bed as a Russian and wakes up as an Englishman.'

To Leopold Gerlach: 'Let's have no sentimental alliances in which the wages of noble self-sacrifice must be the awareness of having done a good deed.'

John Bright MP in Commons: '[I]f this phrase of the “balance of power” is to be always an argument for war, the pretext for war will never be wanting, and peace can never be secure.'

(Barclay) FW said, 'The war that is breaking out is an unjust one on both sides. And I will not let Prussia be forced into an unjust war. Prussia should remain firmly neutral.' Gerlach was pro-Russia but given the problems of open support was prepared to support neutrality. Manteuffel leaned towards the western powers early but then supported neutrality. The Wochenblatt network challenged neutrality. On 1 March Bunsen and some of the Wochenblatt network tried to push FW but the Camarilla pushed back. On 19 April, Bunsen, aware of the pressure, asked FW to replace him and the reluctant King appointed Count Bernstorff. Bonin soon followed after a statement rejecting an arrangement with Russia, see below. Gerlach was delighted. Unknown to almost everyone, Saegert was an important factor on FW and was strongly pro-neutrality.

Palmerston circulated a paper to Cabinet on how the balance of power should be adjusted after a British victory.

Britain and France declared war on Russia. Palmerston then went quiet and focused on the Home Office for months.

British troops arrived at Gallipoli.

To Gerlach: 'The sentiment of all my colleagues here, and as far as I can see all the governments of the middle states, is one of deepest concern that the war policy of Vienna should sweep us into an engagement against Russia.'

FW renewed the defensive alliance with Austria agreed in 1851, with a mutual territorial guarantee and establishing that Austria might act in the east only in agreement with Prussia. If war came in the east, Berlin would mobilise 100-200,000 troops on the eastern frontier. Bismarck strongly opposed the treaty. Memoirs: 'At Frankfurt ... I could not avoid a feeling of shame, of bitterness, when I saw how, in face of the demands of Austria ... we sacrificed all our own policy and every independent view; how we fell back from one position to another and, under the pressure of our own inferiority, sought protection on Austria's towing-line, in fear of France and in humility towards England.'

To Gerlach re Gorchakov: 'G is a solemn, uncouth tom fool, a fox in wooden clogs, when he tries to be clever.'

(Gall p124) Bismarck had to mediate in the conflict between FW and Wilhelm, a serious crisis that 'brought the regime to the brink of crisis' says Gall but doesn't really explain what it was. Barclay explains that it arose out of the purge by FW (under the influence of the Gerlach circle) of leading elements of the Wochenblatt network including Pourtales, recently appointed under secretary of state in the FO, Bunsen (London ambassador), and Bonin (War Minister). Wilhelm was 'almost hysterical' (Barclay) in rage at his allies' dismissal. In a violent letter of 5 May, Wilhelm told his brother that advisers were trying to move Prussia 'into the Russian camp', complained at the lack of consultation, said 'I must regard Bonin's fall as directed against myself and thus, as the first officer of the army, I herewith submit a most firm protest against his release, and beseech you at this important moment to retract Bonin's dismissal immediately, for your own good, that of the army, and for your own political position', otherwise he would immediately leave Prussia and go to Baden to dissociate himself from the King's policies. This was gross insubordination. FW tried to calm the situation and didn't want it to blow up and make Prince Carl the heir, but insisted on an apology for 'you have set a very wicked example for my army and my subjects'. Wilhelm backed down and apologised.

Bismarck was obviously happy about the domestic implications but worried that the counter-effect would be a lurch towards a simple conservative solidarity of the three eastern Powers with Prussia playing third fiddle and getting nothing. Gall: His relations barely improved with Wilhelm and rumours spread in Berlin that he favoured a French alliance, even an alliance with liberalism.

He argued to the King that instead of fulfilling the April agreement, Prussia should put 200,000 in Upper Silesia. Here they could cross 'either the Russian or the Austrian borders with equal facility... With 200,000 men your majesty would at this moment become the master of the entire European situation, would be able to dictate the peace and win for Prussia a worthy position in Germany.' FW replied, 'A man like Napoleon can commit such acts of violence but not I.' FW continued to cooperate tentatively with Austria much to Bismarck's rage: must Prussia always play Leporello to the Austrian Don Juan (i.e act as servant)?

To his brother: 'That at the sound of the first shot against the Russians we shall turn ourselves into the whipping boy for the Western Powers and let them dictate to us the terms of peace while we carry the main burden of war is as clear as a school arithmetic exercise.'

(KL) Gerlach discussed with him the possibility of becoming Minister President but wrote in his diary, 'He is not completely transparent and hence unreliable.' (KL footnote #32 dates this to 1864, which I assume is a fat finger.)

Austria immediately took advantage of the deal with FW. Buol issued an ultimatum forcing Russia to withdraw troops from the Danubian principalities which Austria occupied. Tsar was enraged by Austrian ingratitude after saving her against Hungary in 1849 and then helping viz Prussia.

(JS) FJ and FW met in Teschen.

(KL) He was appointed one of 26 new members of the advisory Council of State that FW convened in Berlin.

(Gall) Prokesh summed up Bismarck's attitude as based 'not so much on love of Russia as envy of Austria, not so much on any conservative principle as on a ravenous appetite for more power in Germany'.

Disraeli letter to Lady Londonderry complaining about Derby: 'There are a thousand things which ought to be done which are elements of power, and which I am obliged to decline doing or to do at great sacrifice. Whether it be influence with the Press, or organisation throughout the country, everyone comes to me, and everything is expected from me. Tho' so many notables and magnificoes belong to the party there was never an aggregation of human being who exercised less social influence. They seem to despise all the modes and means of managing mankind. As for our Chief we never see him. His House is always closed, he subscribes to nothing tho' his fortune is very large; and expects nevertheless everything to be done. I have never yet been fairly backed in life. All the great persons I have known, even when what is called 'ambitious' by courtesy, have been unequal to a grand game. This has been my fate and I never felt it more keenly than at the present moment, with a confederate always at Newmarket and Doncaster, when Europe, nay the world is in the throes of immense changes and all the elements of power at home in a state of dissolution. If ever there were a time when a political chief should concentrate his mind and resources on the situation 'tis the present. There cannot be too much vigilance, too much thought, and too much daring - all seem wanting.

Britain, France, Austria demanded that Russia: abandon its protectorate over the Danubian Principalities, abandon its claims to be protector of Christians in Turkey, recognise the freedom of shipping on the Danube, and accept a revision of the 13 July 1841 treaties.

To Leopold Gerlach: Prussia is to be 'reduced to the role of a source of money and recruits ... without our being allowed any hand in the matter'.

Battle of the Alma, allied troops beat Russia and threatened Sevastopol.

?? Bismarck's first visit to Napoleon.

Bismarck annoys the King: his wife was ill, he left the palace to be with her. Gerlach told him this had gone down badly (Memoirs 1p161).

(OP p93) Bismarck talks to Russian attaché at Frankfurt about a Russia-Prussia alliance and encouraged the idea of a joint attack on Austria 'while she is still unprepared', while FW was negotiating the treaty with Austria. When Nicholas refused, Bismarck replied, 'Necessity will compel you to do it.' Nicholas replied that this was 'just as sad as it is possible'. The rumours that swept Berlin of his ideas strengthened his reputation for unprincipled adventures.

Battle of Balaclava, and, after a miscommunicated order in the fog of war, the charge of the Light Brigade.

Bismarck made a 'royal peer' of the Upper House.

Battle of Inkerman. After this, siege of Sevastopol.

Triple Alliance of Britain, France, Austria agreed. They invited Prussia to join them. Barclay: It was a shock to Prussia and seemed contrary to their agreement with Austria for the maintenance of peace in central Europe. FW said it was 'an infamous betrayal'.

(EF) To Manteuffel re Austria's policy: 'This Jewish mixture of cowardice, greed and impudence which characterises present Austrian policy will, when sobriety returns, bring the imperial state severe misery.'

To Kleist: 'Our foreign policy is bad for it is driven by fear. I have had nothing to do with it since September and appear to have fallen a bit into disgrace, at least I have become rather dispensable.'

Derby denounced the government's handling of the Crimea war: 'The fatal words “too late” had adhered to the whole conduct of the war.' On 19/12 The Times dropped its support for Aberdeen and denounced the mismanagement of the expedition.

Bismarck-Gerlach: Re the 2/12 Treaty, 'I would absolutely not join the coalition, because everybody will see that we did it out of fear and conclude that the more they frighten us, the more they get from us. Decorum alone forbids it in my view ... The moral is that in all German cabinets from the tiniest to the greatest, fear is the only thing that determines decisions; each is afraid of the other, all are afraid of France.'

Bismarck-Gerlach: 'Three days ago I got a letter from Manteuffel which made me very happy. He too thinks that we should not join the 2 December ... As long as we show relaxed self- confidence, the others will have respect for us. As soon as we betray fear, they will use this ignoble weakness and try to increase and exploit it... In order to fill the Federal states with sufficient fear, as they have of Austria, we have to show ourselves capable, if others make us desperate, to join with France and even Liberalism. As long as we behave well, nobody takes us seriously and then all go where the threat is greater.'