1856

(Cf. 10/55.) Carl Techen arrested again 29/1, on 30th Stieber and a colleague got a signed confession. Who had hired him? 'For a long time I have been employed as a secret agent of the Minister President, Baron von Manteuffel. I had to deliver reports to him on the situation in Potsdam and for that I received indefinite payment.' Manteuffel had hired Techen to spy on the Kreuzzeitung network including Gerlach whom he suspected of intrigues. It seems Manteuffel did not pay much so Techen went freelance and sold copies to France. (This was referred to in Bismarck's Memoirs, and he also thought Manteuffel used intelligence to profit from insider stock trading. Manteuffel also hired the secret agent Georg Klindworth, then an employee of the King of Württemberg. Palmerston also had dealings with him, cf. 10/2/64. So did Disraeli in 1858-9 over Italy. Is there a good article on this character?) Manteuffel denied everything but was not believed. Aspects of the weird affair leaked out and connections spread leading to various legal actions. It was seen as a sign that the Prussian state was in poor shape.

Letter to Gerlach: The Government's approach is making me ill. Austria is demanding we give up our independent position as a Great Power and even 'prescribes to us the forms in which we are to make our abdication'. We should be negotiating direct with England and France, not going to the conference 'as merely an arrow in Buol's quiver'. Memoirs: we were subject to 'contemptuous treatment' by Austria and this shaped later relations.

(OP) He argued to Manteuffel that a Franco-Russian alliance was desirable 'provided we jump in with both feet', it was 'the only means with which to escape the Austrian snare and domination by the medium states'. OP: later in 1856 he returned to the policy of the fulcrum. He wanted to force Austria into accepting the expansion of Prussian influence and use the fear of a Franco-Prussian alliance to push Austria and others into accepting Prussian demands. But FW could not be persuaded to do anything that would lead to a breach with Austria. These calculations lay behind his famous letters to Gerlach in which Bismarck emphasised the priority of advancing Prussian interests and Gerlach emphasised the priority of not siding with revolution.

Hinckeldey killed in duel after months of scandal rumbling on since the arrest of Rochow the previous summer. Hinckeldey was called a liar and challenged Rochow to a duel. FW did not intervene. Hinckeldey was short-sighted and couldn't fire a pistol. Rochow killed him. Rochow was arrested but released. There was revulsion in bourgeois Berlin that an effective official had been killed in such a way and tens of thousands attended his funeral. Interestingly Edwin Manteuffel told FW and Leopold Gerlach that Hinckeldey had been acting as a royal official, the affair should not have been allowed to happen, the aristocracy had become too isolated from normal society in recent years, and he advised the prosecution of Rochow. FW rejected the advice. When he learned Berliners were blaming him, he wailed 'The public regard me as the one who sacrificed my beloved Hinckeldey to myself, as though I were a Moloch!!!' He then complained Hinckeldey had been 'too plebeian for me' and hoped his successor would be 'a more refined character'. (This incident in particular makes me think of Bismarck's comment about FW being 'a handful of slime'.)

The Treaty of Paris ending the Crimea War. The waters of the Black Sea were 'formally and in perpetuity interdicted' to ships of war. The war weakened Russia. Russia-Austria and Russia-Britain relations were bad for years. Napoleon could exploit the block on Russia- Austria and Russia-Britain alliances. Russia was determined to separate Austria and France, which helped Bismarck. After this, Napoleon's position was seen as much stronger, politicians across Europe looked to Paris, and France's intellectual and artistic influence also strengthened. The British Cabinet were satisfied with the eventual deal. Many in London were worried about their ability to continue the war if a deal was not done. When the terms were debated in parliament in May, there was little dispute and general acceptance.

(Total British war expenditure came to £69.3m, and the net creation of national debt during the war years was £39.7m. The army's dismal performance led to many reform proposals.)

Alexander II replaced Nesselrode as foreign Minister with Gorchakov who strongly believed in a French alliance.

Bismarck's 'Prachtbericht' memo (sometimes referred to as 'the splendid report' or 'the showpiece report'). France holds the central position: 'Meanwhile all [cabinets] great and small, in expectation of the way things may turn out, are seeking to obtain or to retain the friendship of France, and Emperor Napoleon, however new and apparently flimsy the foundations of his dynasty even in France itself, can take his pick from among the alliances currently available.' We should expect an alliance between France and Russia: 'Of all the Great Powers it is these two that because of their geographical situation and their political objectives contain within them the fewest elements of antagonism, having virtually no interests that necessarily clash.' The Holy Alliance and Nicholas I's personal views hitherto prevented this — now with 'Emperor Nicholas dead and the Holy Alliance smashed by Austria', there is nothing 'to inhibit the two countries natural attraction for each other'.

Schwarzenberg had seen this possibility and calculated that Austria could join it and therefore continue to dominate central Europe. But the bottom has been knocked out of this. 'Given the Russians' present antipathy towards Austria and given France's increased pretensions to influence in Italy, it cannot be assumed that Austria will automatically be called to be the third member of the alliance, although it will surely not be lacking in the necessary goodwill.'

Could Austria form a counter-coalition with Britain and Prussia? Who would want to bear the burden of possible two-front war? The other states of the Bund have shown recently 'that they regard it as their honourable duty to abandon the Confederation should the interests, not to mention the security, of their own prince or country be jeopardised by clinging to the Confederation'. Why should they oppose a new Rhenish Confederation under French patronage, given the experience of the past? After all, he wrote sarcastically, in 1813-14 German rulers were spared 'at least the inconvenience of a constitution, particularly tiresome for a prince' — and servitude to France at least 'had its rateable fleshpots and was not so arduous for the princes that in order to escape from it they would have needed to risk country and people and like that emperor in Bürger's poem go “through heat and cold, through the tents of war, eating black bread and sausage, suffering hunger and thirst” for the sake of their own and Germany's freedom'. The successors of the Rhenish Confederation princes think similarly. The 'inner rottenness of the Confederation ... [had] become visible and obvious both abroad and at home'. (Cf. letter to sister, 22/12/53: 'That well-known song of Heine's, “oh Bund, du Hund, du bist nicht gesund”[oh Bund, you dog, you are not healthy], will soon be adopted by unanimous resolution as the national anthem of the German people.') ['Particularly arduous for a prince ... fleshpots...' — absolutely characteristic sarcastic cynicism about royalty which often popped up despite his monarchist beliefs. Cf. also for example his comment in 1857: **'We cannot make an alliance with France without a certain degree of meanness, but in the Middle Ages very admirable people - even German princes - used a drain to make their escape, rather than be beaten and strangled.']** The essence of his argument: An Austro-Prussia-Britain bloc could not work partly because the Bund is too flaky under French pressure and a 'Third Germany' is a fiction.

He was also sceptical of Austria's fundamental soundness, asking whether 'with the enemy's first successful thrust into the interior the whole artificial edifice of its centralised regiment of scribes would not collapse like a house of cards... The Viennese policy being what it is, Germany is clearly too small for the two of us. So long as an honourable agreement over the influence of each in Germany is not reached and executed, we shall both plough the same disputed acre [narrow furrow?] and Austria will remain the only state to whom we can permanently lose or from whom we can permanently gain... We have ... a great many conflicting interests, which neither of us can give up, without renouncing the mission in which each believes for itself; they are, therefore, conflicts which cannot be peacefully unravelled by diplomatic correspondence. Even the most serious pressure from abroad, the most urgent danger to the existence of us both, could not in 1813 nor in 1849 forge this iron. For a thousand years the German dualism has every so often — since Charles V regularly every century — regulated its mutual relations by means of a thorough-going internal war. In this century also no other means than this can set the clock of historical development at the right hour.

'I do not intend by this reasoning to reach the conclusion that we should immediately direct our policy to bringing about the decision between Austria and ourselves in as favourable circumstances as possible. I only wish to express my conviction that we shall be obliged, sooner or later, to fight for our very existence against Austria and that it is not within our power to avoid this, since the course of events in Germany offers no alternative. If this is correct, which of course remains more a question of faith than knowledge, then it is not possible for Prussia to take self-denial to the point where she puts her own existence at stake in order to protect the integrity of Austria — in what is in my opinion a hopeless struggle... [He refers to the post-Crimea position of Austria facing pressure in Balkans and Italy.]' Should Prussia fight France and Russia to maintain Austria's position and the Bund? 'We cannot possibly exert our last ounce of strength for it.'

Austria would probably use an alliance with Prussia purely 'to procure at our expense better terms for an understanding with France and if possible with Russia... It will play Don Juan to every Cabinet when it can produce so stout a Leporello as Prussia, and true to that role it will always be ready to extricate itself from a tight corner at our expense while leaving us in it.' (Cf. similar reference to Don Juan/Leporello in 5/54.) If a Franco-Russian alliance does come for the purposes of war then 'we cannot, I am convinced, be among the opponents of the same, because we should probably be defeated and possibly, pour les beaux yeux de l'Autriche et de la Diète [for the fair eyes of Austria and the Diet], bleed to death even in victory'.

'In 1851, particularly in the early part of that year, the dangers of a revolutionary overspill from France and Italy were more obvious and there was a feeling of solidarity between the monarchies against that danger...; a similar situation would recur only if the French Empire were to be overthrown. As long as it [i.e the French Empire] stands it is not a question of holding off the democrats but of Cabinet politics, in which the interests of Austria do not in fact coincide with our own.' I.e the Holy Alliance revival may occur if Napoleon falls, but if Napoleon stands then our policy is not determined by fighting democracy. This was a fundamental difference from the Gerlach perspective (is there a record of how they saw this document?).

(Gall stresses the importance of this passage. For Gall, the story that Bismarck preserved the old ship of Prussia — the old social and political order — from going under and made it seaworthy again — this story is false. No country (other than possibly Japan) changed more swiftly 1840-90. Though he was trying to persuade the Gerlachs that he was being consistent, he was not — and 'from now on his own power interests drove him farther and farther away from the ideas and interests not only of those who had been his political friends hitherto but subsequently also of the social group to which he belonged'. He'd started as a spokesman for the Junkers. His 'secret ambition had been ... a career as the leader of a major conservative aristocratic party in a monarchal state that had been forced back into the traditional corporative mould.' This now had 'little basis in reality.' Instead he was on the edge of an arch-conservative Camarilla surrounding a chronically indecisive monarch with mental illness. Conservatives in the Landtag had no sense of purpose or strategy and were pushed around by the bureaucracy. The Wochenblatt network had the probable successor to FW on side. In time his power would come to depend on 'a precarious equilibrium' between the old order and revolutionary forces. In time he would create counter-forces to both Crown and revolutionary forces.)

He wanted the Gerlach network to understand: 1) regardless of romantic talk of conservative solidarity, Austria always put her own interests first, 2) Prussia should do the same and 3) therefore be ready to attack Austria, possibly in alliance with France, when she got into difficulty. It was not put here as starkly as later but the message was clear.

Gall: two days later he wrote to Leopold Gerlach that conflict with Austria was only 'a question of time and opportunity... when it chooses to make the decisive attempt to hamstring us; that it intends to do so is politically speaking an absolute necessity.' Even if Prussia tries to 'piteously avoid' war, 'Austria will wage it at the first favourable opportunity'.

Memoirs: the liberal faction (the 'Wochenblatt' group) — Pourtales, Bethmann Hollweg (grandfather of the later chancellor), Goltz, 'sometimes Usedom' et al — had ideas about an alliance with Britain against Russia and creating a liberal Germany. (EF: Hollweg and his supporters had their base among the aristocracy and upper bourgeoisie of the western provinces and Silesia.) He described this as 'childish utopias'. (Goltz and others created fabricated Russian documents they leaked to the press to try to bolster support.) How would they cope with Russia as a permanent enemy ready to attack Prussia in any war with France? Wilhelm was also won over to an anti-Russian position, mainly because of his wife's intrigues. Bismarck stressed to him that 'we had absolutely no real cause for a war with Russia, and no interest in the Eastern question that could possibly justify a war with Russia, or even the sacrifice of our prolonged good relations with Russia.' Getting involved in such a war would put Prussia in a position like 'an Indian vassal-prince who has to conduct English wars under English patronage' (1p125). (He mentions that Manteuffel recruited an agent who was a great burglar to steal documents from the King, Gerlach, and Niebuhr but because the agent was 'paid with Prussian frugality' he 'sought a wider market' including with the French ambassador. 1p125. Bismarck also thought Manteuffel used intelligence to profit on foreign stock markets (Busch, II, 484). See above, 30/1/56.)

In his Memoirs: 'Before 1866 we could only claim the title of a Great Power cum grano salis [with a grain of salt], and after the Crimea war we considered it necessary to sue for an outward recognition of this position by dancing attendance at the Congress of Paris. We confessed that we required the testimony of other Powers in order to look upon ourselves as a Great Power... Her belated admittance could not obscure the fact that a Great Power requires for its recognition above all else the conviction and the courage to be one. I regarded it as a deplorable lack of self-knowledge that, after all the slights that had been put upon us by Austria and all the western powers in general, we still felt the necessity of gaining admittance to the Congress and adding our signatures to its conclusions... How dignified and independent would have been our position if we had not forced our way in a humiliating fashion into the Paris Congress, but had rather declined participation, when our invitation did not arrive at the proper time. Had we shown a suitable reserve we should have been courted when the new grouping took place, and even outwardly our position would have been more dignified if we had not made our inclusion among the great European Powers dependent upon our diplomatic opponents, but had based it simply upon our own self-knowledge, refraining from any claim to participate in European negotiations, which were of no interest for Prussia, instead of seeking ... after the vanity of prestige and the discussion of things which did not concern us.'

The King kept offering Bismarck Manteuffel's job but he could not 'shake the impression' that this was just to push Manteuffel into doing what the King wanted.

Summer (JS) Bismarck visited Paris. He wrote to Leopold Gerlach: 'You scold me that I have been to Babylon but you can hardly expect from a diplomat eager to learn the rules this sort of political chastity... I have to get to know the elements in which I have to move from my own direct observation when the opportunity arises. You need not fear for my political health. I have a nature like a duck and water runs off my feathers and there is a long way between my skin and my heart.' (JS dates this to 1856 and 1857, p130.)

In their correspondence somewhere, perhaps in 1857, Gerlach wrote: 'The kings of the earth perceived the nearness of the Lord; they realised the old system of politics no longer sufficed; they concluded the Holy Alliance... The princes declare that they derive their power from God, and that they want to rule in accordance with God's commandments. It was precisely this, however, which the revolutionaries did not like. There should no longer be any authority instituted by God. Men wanted to establish it by themselves, to control it by themselves, and so forth. The subjects wanted to be rulers and the rulers should become subjects... You cannot and must not disavow the principles of the Holy Alliance. They are nothing other than that authority comes from God, and that the princes must accordingly govern as agents commissioned by God.'

Leopold Gerlach to Edwin von Manteuffel: Re Hinckeldey's police reports to FW, they are 'mostly quite unimportant. They contain a lot of absurd, contradictory stuff. But the King likes them, because he believes that they give him a chance to hear a point of view different from that of his entourage.'

The Neuchâtel Affair. Neuchâtel had seen a republican insurrection in 1848. FW had never reconciled himself to it and badgered other Powers to no avail. In September a small group of royalists staged a coup and were arrested. FW tried to support them. Manteuffel and others did not want a diplomatic row over one of the King's foolish spasms. In autumn 1856 Leopold Gerlach was at his estates dealing with family illness. Cf. January 1857.

The Arrow, a ship, arrived at Canton harbour. It was Chinese owned and crewed, with an Irish captain, registered in Hong Kong therefore entitled to British protection (though it turned out to have not been renewed and therefore lapsed in September). One of the crew was accused of being a pirate. Crew were arrested. The captain went to the local British consul, Parkes, and alleged an insult to the British flag (doubtful whether this happened). Parkes was unreliable, sent on dubious reports, and escalated the situation then involved the governor of Hong Kong who, by the end of October, had ordered British ships to shell Canton. The affair rumbled into 1857.

End of 1856 Disraeli visited Napoleon in Paris to try to detach him from Palmerston who he wanted to overthrow. Napoleon was firmly with Palmerston and thought of the Tories as his 'hereditary enemies'. An attaché at the British Embassy, Ralph Earle, supplied Disraeli with documents concerning a secret treaty agreed in December 1854. Britain and France had been trying to bring Austria into the war and secretly agreed to promise her that they would make no trouble for her over Italy. In 1857 Disraeli tried to ambush Palmerston over it in Parliament. Palmerston had to admit he'd misled the House in denying it had been signed and handled the situation poorly but survived. (Blake sees Disraeli's use of Earle and Earle's behaviour, which continued for years and included trying to tempt Napoleon into action that would cause chaos with Palmerston, as disgraceful and from his account it's hard to disagree.)