1860

Davis (p146): it was a climbdown from blind faith in free trade theory. When the Corn Laws had been abolished Cobden had told voters that 'there will not be a tariff in Europe that will not be changed in less than five years to follow your example'. This isn't what happened. But it wasn't a total break. In England it was seen as a continuation of universalism. Concessions to France were intended to be extended to all countries. Gladstone said that 'our treaty with France was, in fact, a treaty with the world'. It was primarily driven by a desire to avoid war with France and the treaty rested more on the pacifism of Cobden and Gladstone than a revival of reciprocalism. Napoleon, the main mover, saw it as a way to pacify Britain over Italy. It was followed by a treaty with Belgium then an approach to Prussia. Britain found itself having to follow France, mopping up benefits as it could be getting MFN agreements. London found itself facing declining exports to America and a rapidly changing European scene. It also did not have the information-gathering institutions it needed to grasp what was happening in Europe. From February 1861 to March 1862, London tried to get simultaneous negotiations with France and Prussia but failed. The negotiations stayed top secret much to London's frustration.

Minister of Commerce von der Heydt announced to the cheering members of the lower house the introduction of a Bill abrogating the usury laws. 'The well-intentioned objective of the law, insofar as it wanted to provide protection against an excessive interest charge, has not been attained, as experience teaches us, and on the other hand the price of money cannot be regulated by legal stipulations.' Lower House passed 201-105, upper house rejected it 93-8. Cabinet dropped it. Liberals and business pressure groups complained.

British Cabinet discussed Italy. Palmerston: we should support Italy against Austria and therefore get closer to France; Britain cannot stand aside, he argued; if we do a deal with France, it will make war less likely. Russell supported but others in Cabinet were not keen. Palmerston effectively told Cabinet the government would fall if it didn't support him and Russell. They resisted. The two backed down. Palmerston continued to see Austria's role in Italy as a 'malignant fiend'.

Metternich told the French government that Vienna considered France had broken the deal made after the 1859 war. Clark: FJ felt he'd been duped by Napoleon. In 1860 Palmerston let Vienna know about Napoleon's secret help for Cavour talking to Hungarian revolutionaries, which went down very badly in Vienna.

Napoleon replaced Count Walewski (conservative and Russophile) with Thouvenel, a radical Russophobe and friend of Italy, as foreign minister. There were soon reports of plans to seize Nice and Savoy. OP: Russia was 'shocked' by the consequences of her gamble in 1859 with France. Nationalism was advancing in Hungary, Rumania and Poland. In May, Garibaldi landed in Sicily and the Neapolitan kingdom collapsed.

Barry: it was striking that Moltke and the General Staff were not involved in these plans or even formally consulted about them.

GC: in the context of the economic recession of 1857, many deputies, not just liberals, were worried about the cost. The deputies sent it to committee on 15/2. Initially they were looking for a compromise that would strengthen the army without undermining the Landwehr. It was soon clear that a compromise was very unlikely.

Gall: objectively it could have been negotiated in a reasonable way but Wilhelm decided from the start that his rights were under threat and acted defensively and this became a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Showalter: the reforms would require a ~25% annual budget increase, ~9.5 million thaler.

(Friedjung p33) Moltke wrote a note on possible war with Austria: if it happens 'the struggle will produce a strong empire under Habsburg or Hohenzollern but Germany will have to pay for her unification with the loss of provinces in the east and the west.'

1860 he is well enough to travel to Berlin where he stayed until May.

Russell presented the new Reform Bill to Parliament. It was not a success and after months of wrangling and division it was withdrawn on 11 June.

(Brown) Napoleon made clear he would claim Nice and Savoy for France, then grabbed them. Across Europe politicians feared his next move, perhaps on the Rhine. In March Napoleon chastised Cowley, British Ambassador, and said 'it was impossible to maintain friendly relations with England'. Hawkins: France officially announced the grab on 13/3 and embodied it in treaty with Piedmont-Sardinia on 24/3. Derby rallied Conservatives to oppose the commercial treaty and attack the government for letting France expand.

Under pressure FJ had dismissed Bach, the minister for internal affairs, and promised changes to legislation and administration. On 5/3 he announced a 'assembly of notables'. This was seen as a disappointment. The leader of the Hungarian liberals, Deak, denounced the plans and demanded autonomy. This row festered through the summer.

(JS) Manteuffel to Roon: 'the unconditional maintenance of the Military Cabinet, particularly at the present moment, is a necessity'. Cf. January 1861.

(JS) Manteuffel to Roon: 'When a question of principle arises, everyone advises concession and compromise and advises against bringing matters to a head; and when this or that minister has acted upon those rules of prudence and the momentary mood has passed, then everyone says: "How could he have given in like that?"' Wilhelm and Roon went along with him until mid-1862 (GC, p151).

Russell denounced French conduct in the Commons. The Volunteer Movement was further energised. In June the Queen reviewed 20,000 volunteers in Hyde Park. Palmerston reinforced Derby's support for the Volunteer Movement and more naval spending, against Gladstone who opposed defence spending.

Crown Council. Wilhelm listened to discussion and after wrote to Schleinitz directing closeness to Austria but not alliance. France is our main danger. We must beware 'the sad possibility' that south Germany will seek a separate deal with France. We must come to some sort of understanding with Austria. Schleinitz wants to give up opposition to Austria in the Bund and make an explicit alliance. Others oppose this. 'I will never play a part in Germany such as that played by Victor Emmanuel in Italy.' We must try to pull the Bund back to its 'legal limits' but not seek 'a special alliance with Austria for German purposes'. If Austria wants an alliance for non-Germany purposes 'it should not be discussed until she actually faces an enemy that she is unable to withstand alone'.

Palmerston had tough words with the French Ambassador, suggesting French conduct might lead to war. Brown (p445): at some point in 1860, the French Ambassador told Palmerston that if Britain did not support France over unification of Danubian principalities then British dockyards would be destroyed. France had been strengthening Cherbourg which had been noted in London. Palmerston used growing fears of France to justify higher defence spending.

(OP p141) Wilhelm summoned Bismarck and Schleinitz to present their opposing views. Bismarck argued for alliance with Russia, drastic action of the Bund and a German parliament. Schleinitz: France is the main enemy and we should stick with conservative Austria. Wilhelm immediately agreed with Schleinitz but refused Bismarck permission to return to St P until June.

Schleinitz: we must maintain relations with Austria, France is the biggest danger, alliance with Russia is condemned by public opinion. William sided clearly against Bismarck. Bismarck thought this was partly a move by Augusta who disliked Russia, Napoleon, and Bismarck. Schleinitz was 'a courtier without any political opinion of his own.' Hohenzollern, 'convinced that the Princess and Schleinitz were stronger than he, soon withdrew from all active participation in affairs although he bore the name of Minister-President until 1862.' (p261ff)

OP (p150): In 1860 when there was a dispute over Hesse-Kassel again, Bismarck advised Schleinitz to subvert the Bund, condemn condemnation in internal affairs, attack the Bund for failure to realise national aspirations and call for 'a representative assembly in the confederation'. It was 'the most radical statement yet to come' from Bismarck (OP who doesn't give a date in 1860).

Queen Victoria re France: 'Really it is too bad! No country, no human being would ever dream of disturbing or attacking France; everyone would be glad to see her prosperous; but she must needs disturb every quarter of the Globe and try to make mischief and set everyone by the ears; and, of course, it will end some day in a regular crusade against the universal disturber of the world! It is really monstrous!'

Garibaldi landed in Sicily, the Neapolitan kingdom collapsed. Garibaldi had returned from adventures in Britain, South America, and China settling quietly on the island of Caprera in 1854. He had learned guerrilla warfare in South America. He quickly beat the royal army. Then crossed to Naples where he beat the army in September. Britain got panicky, Russia was nervy re revolution and nationalism spreading.

In his last letter to Leopold Gerlach (died January 1861), Bismarck wrote: 'Fundamentally you want nothing to do with Bonaparte and Cavour. I do not want to go with France and Sardinia — not because I hold it to be morally wrong but because I consider it harmful to the interest of our security. Who rules in France or Sardinia, once the Powers have been recognised, is a matter of complete indifference to me, a matter of fact not right or wrong... I am a child of different times than yours but just as true to mine as you to yours... To me France would be the most dubious of all possible allies, although I must keep open the possibility, because one cannot play chess if 16 of the 64 squares are forbidden from the beginning... I should overestimate the value of this life strangely if I did not constantly bear in mind that after thirty years, and possibly from a great deal earlier, it will be irrelevant to me what political successes I or my country have achieved in Europe. I can even think out the idea that some day “unbelieving Jesuits” will rule together with a Bonapartist absolutism... From my twenty-third to my thirty-second year I lived in the country and I shall never get the longing to return there out of my veins. I am in politics only half-heartedly.'

The Government, knowing it would lose the vote on army reform, withdrew the Bill and asked for a grant of 9 million thaler as a provisional grant without prejudice to later decisions over the issues under discussion, the money would only be used to strengthen existing units. The liberals did not dig deeply and accepted Patow's assurances (that the government would not put into effect the parts of the plan objected to by Parliament) at face value in a vote on 15 May. This turned out to be 'a tactical mistake of the highest order' (GC, p148). Cf. January 1861.

To Joanna: 'I sit here and the wheel of time has forgotten me... I finally ran into Schleinitz by chance at dinner... I explained rather drily that I would rather resign than continue this life of hanging about and worrying in suspended anxiety. He urged me to be calm “for a few more days” and made unclear references to undefined alterations.'

To brother: 'I am doing my level best to get back to St Petersburg unmolested and resignedly watch developments from there. If, however, the ministerial horse is nevertheless paraded in front of me, I shall get on whatever my concerns about the state of its legs... If we go on driving before the wind like this it will be a miracle and a great mercy if we do not run so firmly aground that such questions as the Jews and the land tax soon seem very unimportant.'

(JS) Manteuffel-Roon: 'I consider the state of the army morale and its inner energy imperilled and the position of the Prince Regent compromised if these regiments are not established definitively at once.'

(OP p144) Bismarck told to return to St P for another winter. Over the next few months he was attacked in the nationalist press for supposedly being happy to have an alliance with Napoleon and cede German territory and was not defended by his conservative friends. To his wife: 'One ought not to rely upon people. I am thankful for every impulse that draws me within myself.' By now the Nationalverein had shifted and given up on the idea of cooperating with the Prussian government. He had alienated some of his conservative friends but not gained other support. He asked Gorchakov to make an official denial that he had proposed an alliance against Austria and the cession of German land. Gorchakov refused. He wrote to Auerswald 3/8 stressing that he opposed such an alliance: '... if I considered the promotion of a Franco-Russian alliance and our adherence to it an advantage I would say so. The Regent knows me and believes that I would honestly obey while I remained in his service, if I could do so no longer, I would leave.' He was stretching the truth.

Wilhelm met Napoleon at Baden.

(OP) Alexander expressed to Bismarck a desire for an alliance with France and Prussia so the two could keep Napoleon in check. After annexation of Nice and Savoy the Tsar became more worried about Napoleon. Bismarck watched Gorchakoff carefully and concluded that Russia was basically focused on internal problems and Gorchakoff's diplomatic intrigues were mostly empty and designed to give an appearance of activity, 'basically just a sham fight having neither aim nor. result, a gymnastic performance executed with elegance and distinction by this brilliantly capable artist and then repeated'. Pflanze reports a letter to Schleinitz around this time (1860/1) in which he wrote that 'Napoleon's great talent is to conceal himself in a cloud of vapour in such a way that no-one knows where or whether he will emerge. Perhaps he will remain within and steam leisurely away ad infinitum.'

(EF) Wilhelm and FJ met at Teplitz. Clark: their personal friendship was restored. FJ was pleased to hear of Wilhelm's distaste for Napoleon but would not agree on alternating presidency of the Bund. FJ hinted re Prussia commanding federal troops in the next war. No clear deal and no written support from Wilhelm re support if AH attacked. FJ was encouraged by Biegeleben — a conservative Catholic — who opposed concessions to Prussia. Rechberg was more open to a deal. Biegeleben was more interested in trying to use public opinion. Both appreciated the dangers latent in Prussia's small-Germany ambitions, and thought war inevitable, possibly when Prussia tried to exploit a Venetia crisis. Both thought Vienna had to sort out Hungary in order to be able to function in Europe. Biegeleben, like Schwarzenberg, favoured a hard line — enforce the Bund constitution, don't concede to Prussia. Rechberg, like Metternich, preferred a softer line that blurred Austria's formal dominance. Interestingly Biegeleben proposed Rechberg for the job because of the latter's success as envoy in Frankfurt. They maintained friendly personal relations despite disagreements. Biegeleben's 'manner and style were more incisive and convincing than Rechberg's' (Clark). Biegeleben was generally supported by von Schmerling from December 1860.

Handicraftsmen started organising to represent handicraft guilds across Germany to counter liberal pressure for the establishment of industrial freedom. (See 9/2/49, 12/59, Bismarck discussions with Lassalle 1863 etc.) They were cheered by the conservative Neue Preussische Zeitung. 'We rejoice that we can march on the same road... There was a time when the urban guilds often fought the landed aristocracy, not with the weapons of competition and capital, but with sword and mace. That is over now and the handicrafts are fighting another sort of aristocracy, if it is permissible to apply this noble word to the men of capital.' They managed to get an organisation going — 'anti-capitalistic, anti-liberal, anti-intellectual, and anti-Semitic' (Hamerow) — that met in 1862, 1863 and 1864 but by then it was disintegrating. Cf. 12/64.

The 'Macdonald Incident' — a 'somewhat arrogant British traveller'(Mosse) found himself in a dispute with a zealous railway official in Bonn, was arrested and apparently mistreated.

Piedmont troops marched into the Papal territories under the pretext of restoring order.

FJ's latest constitutional offer was rejected by Hungarian liberals and 'bitterly disappointed' Austrian liberals and the bureaucracy (Clark). Hungary wanted the 1848 constitution.

To sister: 'Daily life controls my every movement from the breakfast cup to about four with every manner of duty, in paper or person, and then I ride until six. After dinner I approach the inkwell on doctor's orders only with great care and in the most extreme emergency. Instead I read documents and newspapers that have arrived and about midnight I go to bed amused and thoughtful about all the strange demands that the Prussian in Russia makes of his ambassador. Before dropping off to sleep I think then of the best of all sisters but to write to that angel becomes possible only when the Tsar orders me to appear for an audience at 1 and I have to take the 10 a.m. train. So I have two hours during which the apartment of the most beautiful of all grandmothers, Princess Wjäsemski, is placed at my disposal, where I write you... I look out over the desk and through the window down the hill over birch and maples in whose leaves red and yellow dominate the green, behind them the grass green roofs of the village, to the left of which a church with five onion-shaped domes stands out and that all framed against an endless horizon of bush, meadow and woodland. Behind their brown, grey tints somewhere, visible with a spy-glass could be seen St Isaac's in Petersburg ... After the long wanderings since the beginning of 1859 the feeling of actually living with my family somewhere is so soothing that I tear myself from the home and hearth very unwillingly.'

Wilhelm, FJ and Alexander meet in Warsaw. Bismarck attended. Austria won't cede dual command of Confederation; Russia, though nervy of spreading revolution, won't drop France; Wilhelm won't either join Russia against Austria or ally with Austria. The Holy Alliance can't be put back together despite fears in London. (The three didn't meet again until 1873.)

EF: Shortly after this meeting Prussian first secretary Schlözer: 'My Pasha is in a dreadful state of excitement ... he thinks his moment has really come. There will be a heated session of the chamber, Schleinitz will leave in high dudgeon — and Pasha hopes to move in ... nothing reaches him from the Wilhelmstrasse. They don't like him there... He makes his own policy... he does not entertain here, complains it is too expensive, does not get up til eleven or half past in the morning, spends the day in his green dressing gown, takes no exercise, drinks a lot — and curses Austria.'

Garibaldi greeted Victor Emmanuel: 'Hail to the King of Italy.'

Palmerston speech: '[I]n a country like this, where the whole nation participates in the function of government, public opinion is as powerful as the edict of the Premier's authority, time and delay are often necessary for the accomplishment of good and useful legislation.'

To Auerswald: 'In the long run we have actually but one reliable support, the national strength of the German people (if we do not intentionally reject it). This will be true as long as they see the Prussian army as their defender and their hope for the future and do not see us conducting wars for the benefit of other dynasties than the Hohenzollern.' OP (p145ff): His views had changed a lot since 1857. (But cf. similar idea in his 'Booklet'.) He had not become a convert to German nationalism but appreciated its potential value for expanding Prussian power. He now stopped discussing his idea of 1856 of jumping in 'with both feet' into a Russia-France alliance. But he still thought Prussia should dangle the possibility of a French alliance in front of Austria and the other German states. His reports to Berlin were angled to improve relations with Russia. He did not think a Russia-Britain alliance was at all likely — as he wrote to Auerswald, these two Powers had been hostile for decades and their interests diverged from Balkans to India. After the Warsaw meeting in October, fear of revolution receded and Austro-Russian rivalry in Balkans increased. By 1861 he had little to report other than domestic affairs.

Palmerston-Lewis: 'Now I beg to submit that the prevention of evil is the proper function of statesmen and diplomatists, and that the correction of evil calls for the action of generals and admirals; evils are prevented by the pen, but are corrected by the sword; they are prevented by ink shed but can be corrected only by blood shed; the first is an operation of peace, the second an action of war.'

von Schmerling became Austrian Interior Minister. He was seen as a moderate liberal and supporter of constitutional government.