1861

FW died (two strokes in 1859 had left him incontinent in a wheelchair), Wilhelm became king. Leopold von Gerlach noted in his diary 2/1 that Wilhelm would be dominated by Augusta 'which is extremely dangerous in view of her strange, agitated, passionate, and insincere character'. Leopold stood guard by the coffin for hours wearing a heavy helmet which injured him. He was advised not to attend the funeral. He went, walking behind the coffin bareheaded in extreme cold and wind. He died on 10 January. Bismarck: 'His end reminded one of the way in which the followers of the old Germanic princes chose to die with them.'

Holstein arrived at the Russian Embassy and first met Bismarck and later (in his Memoirs, after switching from admirer to embittered enemy) recalled his impression: 'Tall, erect, unsmiling... A man who allows no one to know him intimately... Never gay even when telling amusing anecdotes... Total impression one of a dissatisfied man, partly a hypochondriac... His every utterance revealed that for him action and existence were one and the same thing... Bismarck's whole person was calculated to impress and he knew it... Bismarck's attitude to the diplomatic corps was one of indifference... When he was at the height of his intellectual powers one received the impression that he was always striving towards some goal and putting behind him all past achievements... I was amazed at the amount Bismarck could eat and still more at what he could drink... Bismarck possessed a prodigious memory... Bismarck displayed considerable nobility of character in the way he bore his wife's inept behaviour, which was at times appalling. He never winced at it but would on occasions gently admonish her. Even though he did not move much in society it seems hardly credible that he can have failed to notice his wife's blunders. It was most probably the conviction that he could never bring his wife to mend her ways, coupled with his disdain for mankind, which determined him to let well alone. And it was part of Bismarck's strength of character to remain true to that decision... She was entirely devoid of feminine charm, attached no importance to dress, and only lived for her family. She exercised her quite considerable musical talent merely for her own enjoyment, though Bismarck liked to listen when she played classical music such as Beethoven. In society her speech and behaviour were not always appropriate but she moved with a calm assurance, which prevented her from ever appearing ill at ease or unsure of herself. Her husband let her go her own way. I never once saw him take her to task.'

The finance minister von Patow had given verbal assurances (May 1860) that those parts of the general plan re military reform to which Parliament objected would not be put into effect. Manteuffel did not feel bound by Patow's assurances to Parliament and urged Wilhelm to ignore this promise and form new regiments regardless of their legality (cf. 29/5/60). Wilhelm did not think he had authorised Patow's promise and agreed. On 18th regiments of the militia were separated from the army and replaced by new regular regiments whose standards were dedicated over the tomb of Frederick the Great.. GC: it was a royal fait accompli that was a decisive moment in the conflict. Liberals were outraged but held back from all out conflict. (GC, p152)

Steinberg writes that on 18 January 1861 Wilhelm:

• Transferred the Section for Personnel Affairs under Edwin von Manteuffel from the control of the Ministry of War to the personal headquarters of the king
• Issued a cabinet order to the effect that army orders concerning personnel, service details or matters of command would not require ministerial countersignature, and the Chief of the Military Cabinet 'became solely responsible to the King for making suggestions for the assignment of officers of all ranks to their posts'
• 'The Militärkabinet grew steadily in power and authority until finally on 8 March 1883 the Emperor removed the institution from the rank list of the Ministry' (JS)
• According to Steinberg, 'the efficiency that Moltke achieved in 1866 and 1870 never occurred again and that was Manteuffel's legacy'
• JS's account does not make sense. The great 'efficiency' of 1866 and 1870 supposedly developed AFTER this supposed change in 1861 which he blames for undermining the 'efficiency'. JS has confused the change of January 1861 and the change of 1883.

Pflanze describes it differently. The chief of the military cabinet was already (pre-1848) a post that reported directly to the King and had a right of immediate access (which the Chief of the General Staff then did not, but did later). The personnel division of the War Ministry worked for the chief and the King. In 1848 there was an attempt to abolish the position of chief of the military cabinet.

The military cabinet was reintegrated into the Ministry of War but an informal camarilla of military advisers continued, under Leopold Gerlach. Manteuffel — chief of the military cabinet and head of the personnel division of the War Ministry — was determined to rebuild the military cabinet at the expense of the Ministry of War to undermine the constitution. This ultimately brought him into conflict with Roon, who became War Minister (1859), but the two agreed on a lot including keeping the army out of the grip of the constitution. In January 1861, Manteuffel got Wilhelm's approval of a cabinet order that removed from the signature of the war minister all military orders except those dealing with purely administrative matters and those requiring legislation or dealing with the budget. NB. If one accepts Craig and Pflanze, then Steinberg has confused changes made in 1883 with the change in 1861. Further, Steinberg's narrative is confused because he describes (wrongly) changes made in January 1861 as influential on Manteuffel intensifying the constitutional conflict by doing things Steinberg describes as happening in 1860, i.e before 18/1/61. Cf. JS, p.162-4. And see 1883 for the changes made then.

Austria got its first Parliament. Some trappings of constitutional government but Crown, Army and bureaucracy kept real power. On 28th (Clark) at a council of ministers, FJ told them that he would make no further concessions and he asked them to sign a document to the effect that they would support him in going no further. They all signed. (This episode remained secret.) Deak remained intransigent, no Hungarians took their seats. Schmerling: 'Wir können warten' (We can wait). Von Plener undertook financial reform hampered by the twin pressures: 1) FJ didn't want army cuts, b) the aristocracy didn't want tax rises. By 1864 the 94 million florin deficit was down to 45m.

Stahl gave a lecture on FW4 praising him for fighting the spirit of the age — 'revolution, technical civilisation, rationalism, liberalism, or the ideas of 1789'. Barclay: Wilhelm II was taught in the late 1870s that FW4 had been a failure. (Check p284-5)

: A new constitutional monarchy of Italy proclaimed: 17/3 Parliament proclaimed Victor Emmanuel King of Italy, 27/3 Rome was declared Capital. Piedmontese institutions extended to the rest of Italy.

Tsar and Prussian aristocracy outraged by developments in Italy. Bismarck's attitude was, 'We would have had to invent the Kingdom of Italy had it not come into existence on its own.' From Prussia's perspective, it could be a useful ally against France and Austria. As long as Austria had Venice, the new state was bound to be an enemy of Austria. In this Bismarck was out of line with fellow conservatives who admired Francis II of Sicily for trying to resist the tide. Wilhelm would continue see Victor Emmanuel as a usurper and tried to avoid a personal relationship. Francis wrote letters from besieged Gaeta to conservatives across Europe portraying his resistance as a defence of European monarchy. Sixty years later in November 1918, his widow heard shooting in the streets of Munich and bullets hit her house: 'That reminds me of Gaeta', she said as monarchies tumbled (Hamerow, p188).

NB. Gladstone and Russell favoured the South. Palmerston's instinct was similar because his distaste for democracy outweighed his distaste for slavery and he initially thought, like many, the South would win. 20/10/61: 'It is in the highest degree likely that the North will not be able to subdue the South and it is no doubt certain that if the Southern Union is established as an independent state it would afford a valuable and extensive market for British manufactures but the operations of the war have as yet been too indecisive to warrant an acknowledgement of the Southern Union.' Hostility peaked early 1862 (Brown p451-2). Disraeli also wanted and expected the South to win but thought it unwise to take sides publicly.

In a pamphlet Twesten (a judge) attacked Edwin Manteuffel personally and the institution of the military cabinet and asked what crisis could 'remove this unwholesome man from an unwholesome institution'. In May, EM challenged Twesten to a duel (27th). Twesten missed, EM offered to withdraw the challenge if Twesten would retract, Twesten refused, EM shot him in the arm, when he offered to shake hands Twesten apologised for offering his left arm. EM was briefly imprisoned. Wilhelm wrote that being without EM was 'a triumph for the democracy which managed to chase him out of my presence; the excitement that the affair must cause in my immediate family circle, these are things that look set to rob me of my sanity.

Craig: Manteuffel believed and persuaded Wilhelm that Twesten was the leader of a secret revolutionary party plotting to overthrow the state. Wilhelm believed this — far from being outraged he 'wrung his hands in despair at the thought that he might be expected to punish Manteuffel for his courage' (GC).

The first convention of the German Commercial Association, University of Heidelberg with a black, red, gold flag. Hamerow (p352): Its resolutions showed the inevitable connections between economic and political reform, with calls for uniform weights and measures, coinage reform, a commercial code. Its executive committee repeatedly conferred with Bismarck.

(Gall) Wilhelm closed the session of the Diet remarking that he would 'overlook' the provisional nature of the army funding 'which does not affect the central principle of this major measure'. This was 'the last straw' (Gall) for many liberals, prompting the split the next day.

Cavour died aged 51.

It was liberal and national. Its creation was sparked by disappointment with and mistrust of the 'New Era' cabinet (OP). Its founding program stated: 'the existence and the greatness of Prussia depend on a firm unification of Germany, which cannot be conceived without a strong central authority in the hands of Prussia and without a common German popular representation.' It wanted: judicial independence, ministerial responsibility, local self-government, religious equality, popular education, civil marriage, freer markets, reform of the upper house.

The democrats wanted to represent artisans, shopkeepers and others of modest means in the lower Mittelstand. Their emphasis was equality. The moderate liberals wanted to represent the merchants, industrialists and educated of the upper Mittelstand. Their emphasis was national unity and laissez-faire. They were divided over suffrage with the democrats wanting universal male suffrage and the liberals wanting a wealth-based suffrage. The founding program dodged the issue to preserve unity. (OP p165)

Hamerow (p311): the PP changed party politics including in its appeals to the lower classes, which liberals had avoided in the 1850s. The conservatives felt the need to respond. Characters like Wagener tried to organise in response.

OP (p288): Statute completed transition from government direction to inspection over the mining industry, abolished all local regulatory agencies and limited provincial agencies mainly to safety. In 1865 a statute established a mining code that incorporated all remaining regulation. Wages, hours, conditions were now contractual. The code 'marked the final triumph of the free enterprise system in the mining industry and was also a milestone in the development of class consciousness among Ruhr miners' (OP p289).

(28th Steinberg) Roon wrote to Bismarck re the 'homage' question and the crisis. It was a question of whether one saw 'the traditional hereditary homage as an assault on the constitution', as the liberal ministers did, or whether such a view was 'a piece of doctrinaire humbug, a product of political commitment and party-political posturing'. 'The King cannot give away without ruining the crown forever' nor could the ministers. 'They would be slitting open their immoral stomachs, destroying themselves politically.' They had to 'convince the King that without proclaiming a change of system he can find the kind of ministry he needs'. If he gives in now, as his closest relatives (including wife and son) are advising, 'we should be heading under full sail into the mire of parliamentary government'. He urged Bismarck to 'start your planned holiday without delay... Periculum in mora [see Roon's famous repeat of this phrase 9/62]'. Roon and Manteuffel were trying to use the crisis to drive liberals out of the cabinet. By the time Bismarck arrived in Berlin the King had given in (Pflanze p152). JS: when he arrived in Berlin Schleinitz sent him to Baden and he missed Roon.

(3rd Steinberg) Bismarck to Roon, disagreeing on the homage issue: 'As to the homage question, I scarcely understand how it can have become so important for both sides... If anyone denies my sovereign a right which he is willing and able to exercise, I feel myself bound to assert it, even though I am not convinced of the practical importance of this exercise... My impression is that the chief fault of our policy hitherto has been this: it has been liberal in Prussia and conservative in foreign parts; we have esteemed the rights of our king too cheaply and those of foreign princess too highly... Only through a change in our “external” attitude can the position of the Crown at home be relieved of the pressure that otherwise it will not in fact withstand in the long run... Political unripeness has a good deal to do with this stumbling over threads. During the last fourteen years we have been teaching the nation a taste for politics without satisfying its appetite, and it has to seek its nourishment in the sewers [gutters?]. We are almost as vain as the French; if we can talk ourselves into the belief that we are respected outside our country we are ready to put up with a good deal at home... [Similar line re vanity in his 1857 Gerlach correspondence.] My loyalty to my sovereign is of Vendean completeness but as regards all others [royal houses], not in one drop of my blood do I feel a trace of an obligation to lift a finger on their behalf. I fear that this attitude of mine is so far removed from that of our most gracious master that he will scarcely consider me a suitable advisor to the crown. Therefore if he employs me at all he will prefer to use me in internal affairs. But according to my view that makes no difference, for I do not believe that the collective government will produce any satisfactory results unless our attitude in foreign affairs becomes stronger and less dependent on dynastic sympathies. Our want of self-confidence causes us to seek in them a support which they cannot give us and which we do not require. It is a pity on account of the elections that the split has taken just this form: the loyal and monarchical mass of electors will not understand a quarrel about homage and the democrats will distort it. It would have been better to hold out firmly on the military question, to break with the chamber, dissolve it, and thus show the nation what is the King's position towards the people.'

(Gall) He arrived in Berlin on 10th, officially en route for summer leave. Wilhelm had already conceded and gone to take the waters at Baden-Baden. There he spoke with Bismarck who advised rejecting the plan for reform of the Bund, as suggested by Roggenbach and the Grand Duke Frederick. Bismarck was asked (by Wilhelm or Schleinitz?) to write a memo. The result was 'the Baden-Baden memo', of which there were two versions, July for the King and September for the conservative leaders. The earlier is 'more radical' (Pflanze). (Gall (p164) the second version, 'the Reinfeld Memorial', was October. KL also says October, p42.)

The confederation could not satisfy Germany unity. Prussia should support a national assembly for the German people with members chosen by state legislatures (guaranteeing a conservative outlook). This is the 'only unifying force that can supply an adequate counterweight to the tendency of the dynasties to adopt separate and divergent policies.' It would probably 'at the same time mean with some certainty that the regrettable tendency of most German Diets to devote themselves primarily to minor tiffs with their own governments was provided with a healthy diversion along broader lines of greater service to the community, and the petty squabbles of the assembly halls of the estates gave way to a more statesmanlike discussion of the interests of Germany as a whole'. It could hardly be expected though that the majority of national governments would accept such a plan, it was a question of mobilising the public. Prussia should therefore also pursue a Zollverein parliament, which could then develop a common military paid for by common taxes and tariffs. In the September version, he rejected the idea of conservative solidarity in foreign affairs. The main task of the monarchy was 'the protection of Prussia' and they should abandon 'the whole unhistorical, godless and lawless sovereignty swindle of the German princes' and use nationalism to overcome liberals. He also planned an upper chamber of state representatives voting in secret to counterbalance centripetal and centrifugal forces.

The 'need to see the developing strength of the German people more tightly and more uniformly integrated [was] emerging with daily increasing decisiveness. The upsurge in national feeling, part of the whole trend of the time, is pushing us, as is the demand for protection against attacks from abroad, towards the objective of closer German unification, at least in the fields of defence and material interests' (July version).

Gall: In 1859 Wilhelm had said to the Duke of Coburg, one of the liberal princes, of Bismarck, 'That's all we need, for a man to take over the ministry who is going to turn everything upside down.' The Baden-Baden memorandum probably did not make him revise that verdict, and Bismarck probably revised his approach to dealing with Wilhelm to avoid discussion of principles (p167).

EF: The Grand Duke of Baden, Wilhelm's son-in-law, had appointed liberals and was making Baden the most liberal state in Germany. He denounced Bismarck as, 'An unprincipled Junker who wants to make a career through political villainy'. (Gall attributes this line to Roggenbach, not the Duke.)

In Baden-Baden an attempted assassination of Wilhelm. A fanatic fired shots at Wilhelm complaining he had not 'done enough for German unity'. Mild injuries. (The assassin fired at his head from behind at a very short range but missed with both shots, with one just grazing the neck.) When a reactionary suggested a clampdown, Wilhelm replied that a wiser path was satisfying the just demands of the German people. Liberals around the court in Baden presented to Wilhelm a plan for a small German federal union with a parliament, with a constitutional guarantee of the entire Habsburg Empire to sweeten the pill for Vienna.

Summer Prussian constitutional conflict deepening. Roon feared government tottering towards collapse, King 'more than ever under the orders of the Queen and her accomplices', and 'I can recognise only one organism with any power of resistance and that is the army. To maintain this untainted is the problem which I regard as still soluble but certainly only for a short time. It too will become plague stricken if it does not get to action'.

Showalter: Manteuffel and similar were planning to end the constitution and put down street protests with artillery and firing squads. By the end of 1861 Wilhelm approved a modified version of the plan. Army exercises in 1861 showed poor performance, noted by French and Austrian observers.

At Ostende Wilhelm and Bernstorff conferred and agreed in general the Baden plan for confederate reform (cf. 14/7).

[We should explain what we want in Germany.] We have the double task to bear witness that the existing constitution of the Bund is not our ideal, but that we are openly striving for the necessary alterations by legal means, and do not want to go beyond the measure requisite for the safety and prosperity of all. We want a closer consolidation of the German force of defence as much as we require our daily bread; we want a new and plastic arrangement in the department of the customs; and a number of institutions in common, to protect our material interests against the drawbacks which arise from the unnatural configuration of the interior boundaries of Germany. That it is our intention straightforwardly and earnestly to demand these things ought to be placed beyond all doubt.

Moreover I cannot comprehend why we coyly shrink from the idea of a popular assembly, whether at the Federal level or in a Zoll Parliament [customs parliament based on the Zollverein]. An institution which operates in every German state and which we conservatives in Prussia cannot do without, can hardly be called a revolutionary innovation. Until now national aspirations would be easily met by very modest concessions, which would still be considered valuable. One could create a very conservative national assembly and still reap the thanks of the liberals.'

Hamerow: few listened to such advice and 'the aristocracy generally proved unable to formulate an economic program beyond a die-hard defence of the status quo.' He also wrote around this time (where?): '[A] political party cannot survive with only a feeble defensive position, much less conquer terrain and followers.'

Wagener launched in Berlin the Prussian Volksverein (Prussian People's Association) to counter the Nationalverein and Progressive Party. At the launch speakers attacked red republicans, moneyed capital and usury. An alliance of landowners and artisans to protect what remained of manorialism and the guild system against liberalism, free market economics and factory system. It got ~26,000 members by end of 1862 and ~50,000 by 1863 (high point) — roughly double the Nationalverein. In Bismarck's first few months in power it showered Berlin in 'loyalty declarations'. Even Marx, usually highly critical of everyone, told Engels that Wagener was a serious force 'among this stable of pygmies' (with Waldeck on the other side). Its program was:

1. Unity of our German fatherland, yet not in the fashion of the “kingdom of Italy” with fire and sword, but through the union of its princes and peoples, and through adherence to authority and justice. No disavowal of our Prussian fatherland and its glorious history; no descent into the filth of a German republic; no spoliation of crowns and swindle about nationalities.

2. No break with the past in the internal affairs of our state; no destruction of the Christian foundation and of the historically proven principles of the constitution; no ... weakening the army; no parliamentary regime and no constitutional responsibility of the ministers; personal kingship by the grace of God and not by the grace of a constitution; church marriage, Christian school, Christian authority; no abetment of the demoralisation which is steadily gaining ground and of the disregard for the divine and the human order.

3. Protection and respect for honest labour, for every form of property, right and class; no favouritism and exclusive rule of moneyed capital; no abandonment of the handicrafts and landed property to the false teachings and usurious tricks of our times... the autonomy and self-government of the corporations and communities...No resort to bureaucratic absolutism...; no resort to an imitation of the political and social practices which led France to Caesarism...

Coronation. He complained to his sister about having to change three times a day in cold draughty castles and explained how he wore a thick wig for a two-hour ceremony. Queen more friendly than for 'many years'. The King avoided talking politics with Bismarck 'probably' to avoid being seen by others 'in a reactionary light', an anxiety that 'prevailed with him as late as May 1862 and even September. He thought me more fanatical than I was.'

Gall: Antagonism between the king and the liberal majority received a further dramatic boost. Wilhelm greeted deputies simply as 'advisers' to the crown, 'evidence of a very curious interpretation of the constitution', and the army delegation to the coronation included the commanding officers of the new regiments that had been created by the government with the aid of funds only provisionally approved.

Schleinitz became minister of the royal household until 1880s, a constant thorn in Bismarck's side. OP: Bernstorff though conservative was acceptable to the remaining New Era ministers and favoured rapprochement with France and a strong initiative in the German question. Cf. 7/9.

OP (p161) In October Wilhelm made a state visit to Compiègne.

Palmerston-Russell: Prussia 'sets public opinion in England against her by her aggressive policy against Denmark, by her anti-English policy all over the world' and by a general rude official attitude. Clarendon wrote around then: 'All my political sympathies are for Prussia, the greatest Protestant Power in Germany.' The experience of the coronation was worrying. Wilhelm 'a man of perfect honour, has no idea of the Duties of a Constitutional Sovereign' and doesn't 'possess a single statesman... All Prussian officials overrate themselves and are self-conceited... I am beginning to think that Constitutional Government in Prussia is impossible.' The King and government have no notion 'of the volcano seething beneath their feet'. Mosse: Clarendon's attitude at this time was 'representative of educated British opinion'.

Returns to St P for another winter.

A Union vessel stopped the British ship, the Trent, and forcibly arrested two Confederate envoys en route to London. Diplomatic incident. In 1/62 Lincoln backed down.

Palmerston-Russell, re America: '... nations and especially republican nations or nations in which the masses influence or direct the destinies of the country are swayed much more by passion than by interest'.

Elections.

OP: Progressives were the biggest party with 109 and 'with other oppositional groups they controlled 161' seats; conservatives and the old liberals 164.

Gall: PP had 106; together with old liberals and left centre they had 260/325 = 80%.

Gall: 'A crucial trial of strength was now virtually inevitable, with both sides arming for a decisive encounter. For the liberal majority this meant the full implementation of parliamentary rights with regard to the budget and on top of that a commitment on the part of the government to respect the will of the Parliamentary majority. For the Conservatives around Roon it meant the rejection of any kind of cooperation and if necessary a military coup to preserve the traditional distribution of power' (Gall, p170). Manteuffel et al increasingly planning a coup.

So Pflanze lumps the 'old liberals' in with the conservatives, Gall lumps them with the Progressives.

Hamerow: liberals 256, conservatives 15.

Steinberg: 104 PP, 48 other liberals, 91 'constitutionals' (moderate liberals supporting the government) — '69 percent ...belonged to the liberal persuasion' and conservatives shrank from 47 to 14. (JS jumps in less than half a page from the October 1861 election to the May 1862 election.)

Lerman: PP 109.

EF: PP got 104, various liberal factions got 'about 250 out of 352' [was it 325 or 352, who has misprinted??]

Showalter: PP had 109, other 'more moderate liberal factions' had 141, 54 Catholics, 14 conservatives.

Overall it seems: PP got 100-110; conservatives got ~15; overall 'liberals' got ~260.

(Pflanze, Gall, Steinberg, Lerman, EF all give different figures for this election. Gall/Pflanze say 325 total, others say 352. I assume someone has made a typo and others have copied?)

GC: The victory for PP caused 'consternation' among Wilhelm's military advisers. Roon's mood had been dark all year and he now started talking of the need to remove Parliament. Over Christmas and January there was talk in military circles of telegrams being laid between the castle and garrisons in Berlin and other preparations for a revolt. Also in January, Wilhelm accepted a contingency plan for a revolt worked out by Manteuffel after discussion at the Military Cabinet. Manteuffel's influence was never greater than the first few months of 1862.

Beust (Saxony) had submitted a plan — a tripartite reorganisation of the Bund under Austria, Prussia and the lesser states. Bernstorff rejected it and proposed a barely disguised version of the Radowitz plan: a small north German federation within the existing great-German confederation. Small-Germans celebrated but there were angry protests from minor states and Austria was 'shocked' (Pflanze) despite the mild language and rallied opposition. Bernstorff didn't have the ability or support to push it through, it soon seemed dead. Friedjung: it was rejected by Austria and others 2/2/62.