1862

A secret Austrian envoy toured German capitals proposing a new plan. Von Schmerling (interior minister) and von Biegeleben (official) pressured Rechberg towards confederate reform on the basis of splitting the non-German part of Austria away for some purposes (Czechs and Magyars) and consolidating the confederation on a Great-German basis. Their plan was based on Beust's. Add a chamber of delegates drawn from parliaments of member states, an executive committee representing their governments, and a high court to interpret confederate law. OP: with some reservations the middle states agreed to help the Austrian plan and even agreed to form a new organisation if the Bund fell apart in struggle. But they dragged their feet on action, did not meet until July to draft details, as usual reluctant to destroy relations with Berlin by taking the first step. See July and August. (Pflanze, p157)

Bismarck to Bernstorff: 'France and Austria are, each in their own way, destined as a rule to be opponents of Prussia, not through the arbitrary will of their momentary rulers but by the weight of enduring historical circumstances.'

To sister Malwine: 'Since my illness I have become mentally so tired that I have not the energy for troubled conditions. [Gall: My mind has become so dull since my illness that I have lost all my resilience in hectic situations.] Three years ago I would still have made a useful minister but now, when I think about it, I feel like a sick trick rider asked to perform his leaps.'

Loftus was ordered to get at least an agreement to a MFN clause with Britain. Prussia dodged by saying it only had a mandate to negotiate with France. After the Franco-Prussian deal, the Board of Trade started explicitly accepting the drawbacks of non-reciprocal deals. By now the BoT, chambers of commerce, and commercial classes a) were much more aware of the importance of the Zollverein, b) were shifting on unilateralism/reciprocalism.

This was overwhelmingly supported by Parliament in March (264-12, Lerman). Gave Austria a big problem. Since the 1853 renewal of the Zollverein for 12 years, she had been planning a big push. Vienna had hoped in 1853 that the gap with Prussia would narrow and by 1860 Austrian businesses would be able to cope with low tariffs. But economic developments in the 1850s made things harder. The boom of mid-1850s and depression 1857-60 widened gap between Austria/German economies. Prussian commercial interests wanted lower tariffs. Austrian coal, iron and textile producers wanted higher tariffs. Crimea and Italian wars pushed Habsburg finances into a bad state and discouraged lower tariffs that might lower revenues.

The Franco-Prussian deal, giving France MFN status, gave Austria a big problem: copying Prussia and lowering tariffs would mean tougher foreign competition, so Prussia's move made it harder to contemplate trying to join the Zollverein.

Zollverein rules were that Prussia had to get unanimous agreement to change its tariffs. Most of the Zollverein states were 'incensed' (OP) at the Franco-Prussian agreement and its political implications. Southern landowners and textile manufacturers were pro-Austrian. But the Zollverein had become increasingly important and had increased economic interdependence, driven further by railways, industrialisation and the flow of goods and capital in the 1850s. Laissez-faire was the dominant idea. Austrian industrialists realised that the Empire needed to change path and they supported Rechberg in reviving the old Bruck plan in July. In his Memoirs, Delbruck wrote that, 'We knew very well that a treaty with France would ... create insurmountable obstacles to the [equalisation] of the tariff schedules... we wanted no German-Austrian customs union; ... we wanted ... only a limited development of the February treaty' [i.e 1853]... The more the political significance of the question [free trade] emerged, the more it led supporters of the small German policy toward us, even from the protectionist camp.'. See July... (OP p156ff) (Cf. Hamerow, vol 2, CH 3 for details.)

(OP but others say MAY) Bismarck summoned to Berlin. OP: minister without portfolio discussed, Roon was urging Wilhelm but King couldn't face making him minister yet.

Parliament passed a Bill requiring the itemisation of the military budget for 1862, which would have made it impossible for the government to shift funds to purposes not authorised by Parliament.

To sister Malwine, re rumours of him being appointed Foreign Minister: 'I do not believe it is true but would turn it down if it were. All political differences aside, I don't feel well enough for so much excitement in vexation.

, ordered fresh elections, and replaced remaining liberal ministers with conservatives. (Pflanze p173) GC: Manteuffel's advice was behind the dissolution and sackings.

'Physically, however, and perhaps also intellectually he was not equal to the post and when I saw him in May 1862 he tried purposely to strengthen this impression of mine by conjuring me to deliver him from his martyrdom by immediately taking over the post which was breaking him down' (Memoirs). Twesten welcomed the change: 'I think it's a good sign in fact. They want a ministry to slap the country and parliament in the face... Next time they'll have to choose an NCO and a police sergeant.'

Grand Duke of Baden, King's son-in-law, urged him against a coup and to accept that a Parliament was a necessary and legitimate institution. Queen to King: 'But for God's sake not Bismarck for minister. It is a complete miscalculation to believe that a man like this can serve our country, he will certainly stop at nothing and is the terror of everyone because he has no principles.'

Patow (finance minister) and other liberals resigned. Von der Heydt took over as finance minister.

Roon and Bernhardi spoke: Roon said he was 'determined' on a coup by June if the next elections were bad. GC: if a small riot had broken out in the spring, then Manteuffel might have had a chance to launch his coup and lead the new government. He had detailed plans for conquering Berlin street by street. In reactionary circles around the Gerlachs and Kleist-Retzow there was talk of making him Minister-President. But over these crucial weeks both Wilhelm and Roon started to doubt Manteuffel's advice. And (OP) not even the democratic liberals had any serious thoughts about revolution.

1862 A board of fifteen generals (including Moltke) appointed by Wilhelm to study the problem concluded that two-and-a half years would be fine and even two years in some circumstances.

'Easter' (OP) Nationalverein agreed to promote periodic meetings of nationalist deputies from diets and parliaments.

EM to Roon (who was starting to think about compromise, GC): 'How can the three-year service be given up during his reign without bringing shame to the personal position of the All-Highest?... The Army will not understand it, its confidence in the King will be shaken... [If the elections are not favourable to the royal cause then] we shall see bloody heads and then good election results will come.' In early April, Wilhelm suggested that he was confronted with a choice between concessions and abdication. EM was horrified and pleaded that he must stand firm: as he put it later, 'the question was whether he would act like Charles I and Louis XVI and allow power to be wrested from his hands before it came to an open fight' and if he gave way at the expense of the army it would 'only shake the army's confidence in his firmness' and still fail to appease his enemies. Wrangel told Wilhelm 'that abdication would be desertion in the face of the enemy and threatened him with the mutiny of the whole army' (GC, unmentioned elsewhere?).

Bismarck reported that he thought Russia would not oppose an eventual partition of Schleswig along an ethnographic boundary, that Russia would be less rigid than 1848-51, and that Alexander II would try to avoid a conflict with Prussia.

1862 A ship had been secretly built for the Confederacy in Liverpool. In May it was launched then headed off. It was named the Alabama. The North claimed it was a breach of British neutrality. The affair rumbled on for years. Even at the end of 1862 Palmerston thought the South would separate but he also feared the North would look for compensation possibly by annexing part of Canada, possibly by helping Irish nationalists.

elections: conservatives reduced to 10, Progressives up to 135, 'opposition' 223, despite 'severe bureaucratic pressure on the voters' (Pflanze). (Given others, seems 10 is a misprint for 11.)

Gall: 11 Cons; old liberals dropped 'from some 90 seats to around 50', and this bloc then split into pro/anti compromise blocs; PP up 29 to 135; overall opposition now ~250. In 8/10 provinces not a single conservative elected.

Steinberg: PP up 29 to 133 and 'left liberals now controlled 65% of the seats'. Turnout for class III voters was 'always low, usually well under 20 percent' and the hotly contested elections of the conflict period 'attracted only the voters in Classes I and II'. The PP represented the bourgeoisie not the masses. This was not the moment when history 'could have turned'.

Lerman: Cons 11.

EF: PP 133, Cons 11, parties opposed to the government on army reform had 'about 230 out of 352 seats'.

Hamerow: this was the high water mark for liberals with 285 vs 11 conservatives. In this parliament only 42/285 were noble (relative to 75% in 1854); largest occupational category was the civil service. After 1871 too 'the great majority of liberal politicians belonged by descent as well as occupation to the middle class.' Hamerow (p375) stresses that the fluctuation of results through the 1850s and up to 1866 was based on the swing of 'a few hundred thousand voters out of more than three million eligibles'. Only 1863 has detailed records analysing party preferences.

(April, Steinberg, EF; March OP!?) Bismarck recalled to Berlin, arrived from St P on 10th (Gall).

EF: he arrived in Berlin 'a week after these elections', he'd been recalled 'a few weeks' earlier. (Grumpy about the sudden move: having to sell his Russian possessions 'at short notice quite unnecessarily, a certain way to lose a great deal of money'.) Discussions with Roon and Wilhelm but Wilhelm still not ready to take the plunge and many opposed including his wife. Bismarck felt depressed on his return: he did not have confidence that Wilhelm would fight, he worried about all the influences on the King and the intrigues, he disliked 'lying at anchor in a Berlin hotel' amid frenetic discussions and he 'begged Count Bernstorff to procure me either an office or my dismissal' and he got agreement on his appointment to Paris. JS: Roon's notes show Bismarck had multiple long conversations with Wilhelm and other ministers and 'the initiated believed that his appointment to the Ministry must be expected directly.' (I'm not aware of a detailed account of the ins and outs of these intrigues in 1862, what diaries still exist etc.)

KL: In 1862 from St P, Johanna wrote to a friend: 'I become more and more an old woman, grey-haired, wrinkled, crooked and barren — and live with my interests only in the family and in the friendships of past times.'

Roon: 'We lack a mere trifle at this stage and that is the brains of the ministry.'

Bismarck asked for 'an office or my dismissal' — Bernstorff suggested Paris to the King who agreed, but King made clear to Bismarck this could be temporary (Gall).

Roon's friend Perthes wrote of Bismarck: '[He] has great moral courage. A decisive spirit expresses itself in the energetic tone of his voice in all his speeches. He can sweep people along with him. He has no previous political training and lacks a thorough political education... He has a series of contradictions in his character... [He] inclines to a determined Lutheranism too but is irresponsible. There is an absent-mindedness in him and he can easily be stirred by sympathies and antipathies... He is thoroughly honest and straight but his politics can be immoral. By nature he has an unforgiving, vengeful tendency, which his religious sensibility and nobility of character keep under control.

OP: Wilhelm told him in their last audience to remain au qui vive (alert) and he may soon be needed back in Berlin.

He describes the move to his wife as 'more an escape attempt than a new residence I am taking up.'

He arrived in Paris (Steinberg).

In the spring, Disraeli had attacked the government for spending too much on defence. This roused internal disagreements among Tory MPs and Derby disagreed with him. Over the previous winter there had been rumours that Palmerston was finally about to run out of health but by now he had bounced back. Disraeli retreated from the Commons for two years. Derby's health collapsed again in September, so the Tories had an ill leader and a semi-withdrawn Commons leader. Derby also organised charity for the relief of workers impoverished by the Cotton Famine (caused by the Civil War) and contributed unprecedented cash himself.

To his wife: 'In eight to ten days I shall probably receive a telegram summoning me to Berlin and then the whole song and dance will be over. If my enemies only knew what a relief their victory would be for me and how sincerely I wish them it!... You cannot dislike the Willhelmstr[asse] more than I do and if I am not convinced it has to be, I won't go. I consider it cowardice and disloyalty to leave the King in the lurch on the pretext of health reasons.' Gall — this was 'immediately after' his first meeting with Napoleon.

Bismarck writes to Roon that he has arrived and 'living here like a rat in an empty barn'.

Roon writes that the King has 'the old inclination towards you along with the old indecision'.

(OP) Bismarck dined with Napoleon in Tuileries Palace, 'three weeks later' (OP) they met again at Fontainebleau.

EF: He met Napoleon on 6th and 27th.

(Gall) He wrote to the Foreign Minister that Napoleon was 'an enthusiastic supporter of German unification plans, that to say Lesser German ones, certainly not including Austria'. 'The next day' (Gall), Bismarck and Napoleon met again at Fontainebleau at which they had the alliance discussion described in Memoirs below. (I.e Gall says there were two meetings on 26th and 27th.) In his Memoirs, he records his meeting on 26 June, a long walk with Napoleon at Fontainebleau. Napoleon asked if Wilhelm was interested in alliance. Bismarck — the King is very friendly but with what object? Napoleon — no particular object but to develop an 'intimate and durable entente'. Then he said that Austria has been making great overtures and Metternich has been given unprecedented powers to negotiate: 'You could never imagine what overtures were made to me by Austria a few days ago.' Bismarck's view reported to Wilhelm — we could not count on Austria to stick with the Confederation nor hope for Austria's free consent to the improvement of Prussia's position in Germany. OP: in his report he stressed Austrian perfidy, and was careful to stress that he did not advise a treaty with France. Wilhelm nevertheless told Bernstorff, 'Tell him that I shall never consent to an alliance with France.' (p162).

Gall (p179): Bismarck commented on the discussion that while Napoleon may be exaggerating regarding Metternich, it 'cannot be a complete fabrication... Vienna will sacrifice Venetia and the left bank of the Rhine if they gain in exchange, on the right bank, a federal constitution with Austrian supremacy assured. Sentimental Germanity [Deutschtum] has never in centuries been the guiding principle of Vienna's Hofburg, and talk of Germany is only tolerated there as long as it serves as a leading-rein for ourselves and the Würzburgers.' A Franco-Austrian alliance has not happened since 1852, not because of Austrian reluctance, but because of Napoleon's 'lack of confidence in the future of Austria, which is not in a position to sail with the currently powerful wind of its [subject] nationalities'. This does not mean we should pursue a French alliance but 'we must pursue no policy that would involve our depending upon the loyal federal partnership of Austria against France and we must not let ourselves be guided by the hopes that Austria will ever voluntarily agree to an improvement of our position in Germany.'

'Even in Frankfurt I became convinced that Austria's policy under certain circumstances would shrink from no combination and would sacrifice Venetia or the left bank of the Rhine if by these means they could purchase a Confederacy on the right bank securing the preponderance of Austria over Prussia'. If there was no Franco-Austrian alliance now it was not because of affection from Napoleon for Prussia but because of 'his doubts whether Austria would be in a position to sail with the nationality breeze then blowing strong'. (Memoirs, p284)

, met Palmerston, Russell. He reported that Palmerston thought it 'an unavoidable necessity that Your Majesty should choose a ministry from among the oppositional majority... He did not know the Prussian constitution in detail but derived the necessity for always choosing the Crown's advisors from the Parliamentary majority from the nature of representative constitutions in general... [Palmerston] and, to an only slightly lesser degree, Lord Russell too were in a state of complete ignorance about the direction pursued in the field of foreign policy by the Party in Prussia from which, in the opinion of British ministers, a new Prussian Cabinet ought to be formed.' Palmerston wanted peace between Prussia and Austria and did not realise that the group he wanted to form the next cabinet would soon be in conflict with Austria if they had their way. When Bismarck pointed out to Palmerston (8 July) that the King's domestic problems would disappear if he used the army for the purposes of the Nationalverein, Palmerston 'considered it a falsification of the fact, which, in his opinion, I had permitted myself in the interests of my reactionary party views'. He wrote to his wife (5 July) that 'the British Ministers know less about Prussia than about Japan and Mongolia' (Gall).

In London, Bismarck met with Disraeli, the Russian Ambassador (Brunnow), and the Austrian Ambassador (Vitzthum) and Disraeli later recounted the famous scene in which Bismarck told him: 'I shall soon be compelled to undertake the conduct of the Prussian government. My first care will be to reorganize the army, with or without the help of the Landtag... As soon as the army shall have been brought into such a condition as to inspire respect, I shall seize the first best pretext to declare war against Austria, dissolve the German Diet, subdue the minor states and give national unity to Germany under Prussian leadership. I have come here to say this to the Queen's ministers' (Monypenny & Buckle, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli (6 vols, 1910-20), iv, p339). Disraeli apparently said to Count Vitzthum on the way home afterwards, “Take care of that man, he means what he says."

AJPT suggests this story was 'manufactured later' by Disraeli. Gall says that a version of this appears in a note by the Saxon envoy, Count Vitzthum and Pflanze and Steinberg assume it is roughly right but embellished. Gall: Bismarck left Britain sure that Britain would stay out of continental conflicts unless forced, reluctantly, to join from fear for the balance of power; she was concerned with domestic and imperial problems far from the calculations of central Europe. Napoleon is supposed to have said of reports from London, 'Ce n'est pas un homme serieux'.

Augusta wrote a note: 'As the envoy [in Frankfurt] Herr v. B always filled those governments friendly to Prussia with mistrust and affected those houses hostile to Prussia with political views which did not correspond to the position of Prussia in Germany but to its status as a threatening great power.' (Emphasis in original)

and proposed that the Zollverein and Habsburg Empire unite in a common market in 1865, with equalisation of tariffs by 1877; and a new representative body for the Confederation made up of delegates from the parliaments of member states. Austria was ready to make 'sacrifices' to stop a 'wall' being built between itself and Germany, he said. Prussia rejected the offer, on 21 July recognised Italy, and pushed for ratification of the French deal with the Zollverein 2/8. Cf. 21/7.

The 'most dramatic occurrence of the year' in Frankfurt (Pflanze): a gigantic hunting festival in which 10,000 men armed with hunting rifles paraded before the confederate diet. Small-German sentiment dominated such events but Great-Germanists kept pushing too, encouraged by Vienna's apparent shifts towards constitutional government as Prussia sank into reaction. Gall: majority opinion outside Prussia wanted a solution involving Austria.

Left London, 5 July back in Paris (Steinberg).

Bismarck wrote to Roon that Bernstorff has written that the King has not decided what to do with him, whether to appoint him to government or not. Bismarck therefore requested leave so he could recover his health away from 'this confounded lounging bachelor's life' in Paris as 'a political dilettante'. He wrote that the Government should draw out the argument over the budget as the public gets more bored and tempt the opposition into fighting over trifles — when they are tiring and losing confidence, then is the time to appoint Bismarck along with 'a good deal of clatter about granting charters and coups d'etat, my old reputation for light-hearted violence will come in useful and they will think “Now for it!” Then all the Centre and the “halfs” will be ready for negotiation.' But maybe the King won't appoint me if he hasn't already. 'How have we Germans come by our reputation for retiring modesty? There is not one of us who does not think that he knows better about everything, from managing a war to picking fleas from a dog, than all the learned specialists; while in other countries there are many people who admit they know less about some things than other people, and are therefore ready to give in and keep silence.' In July, Roon was studying the history of Charles and Strafford.

Bismarck writes to Bernstorff. 'The longer Parliament sits and talks the better things stand for the Crown in the eyes of public opinion... Patient and persistent attempts to reach agreement simply lead us into the passage between the Scylla of conditions at home resembling those in the Electorate of Hesse and the Charybdis of Parliamentary rule.'

Leave granted. He headed for south of France, via Bordeaux to Biarritz by 4th (Steinberg).

Catherine Orlov (a very grand Princess Trubetskoy, married to Russia's ambassador to Brussels), aged 22, beautiful, arrived in Biarritz 8 August. As tension mounted in Berlin, they wandered in the Pyrenees from 1/9 (gall) where they stayed a night in a shepherd's hut on a mountain to see the dawn, climbed the Col de Venasque and gazed on Spain. Here he enjoyed what he later referred to in English as 'a Paradise Lost' with the princess. He carried an onyx medallion that she gave him on his watch-chain for the rest of his life. While he travelled with her, his mail was forwarded to him according to a pre-planned system. 20/8 He wrote to his sister: 'I live with them [Orlovs] as if we were alone in the country and I have somewhat fallen in love with the dear little princess.You know how that occasionally happens to me without doing any damage to Joanna.'

(In September 1863, he wrote to her, 'I console myself by opening my cigar case, where I always find by one of your big hairpins a small yellow flower plucked at Superbagnères, moss from Port de Venasque and a twig of olive tree from the terraces of Avignon. German sentimentality you will say. No matter. One day I will have the satisfaction of showing you these souvenirs of happy times to which I think back as [in English] a paradise lost.' October 1864, using a meeting with Napoleon as an excuse, he met with Cathy again. June 1871 he wrote to her reminding her of this trip. After her premature death in 1875 he wrote to her husband, 'The memory of that time, when I discovered this magic, has accompanied me through the political storms and tribulations like the last reflection of a beautiful day that is no more.' Their correspondence was edited by her grandson and is partly lost.)

(EF/OP) Prussian government recognised the new Italian kingdom (against Wilhelm's wishes) as part of counter-offensive against Austria. This was a mix of 'glove in the face and knee in the groin' (Showalter).

(Showalter confused: critical point in row over Zollverein seems to have happened in December 1863, see below??) Karolyi told Bernstorff that Austria's existence was at stake, 'Likewise for Prussia' was Bernstorff's reply and if Austria persisted the result would be a 'struggle of life and death' (OP implies (p160) this was soon after 2/8 but possibly around 14th).

Austria, Bavaria, Wurttemberg and others proposed the Austrian plan (touted since January, see above) including a representative body made up of delegates from parliaments of the states. On 14th, the Frankfurt Diet discussed a motion to refer the Austrian proposal to committee. Usedom, Prussia's delegate, denounced it vehemently, attacked the idea of confederate reform by majority vote, and challenged the delegates to support Prussia in creating instead a strong executive and a national parliament. Austria won the argument for committee discussion by a big majority.

The Government let it be known in the press that it regarded the constitution as having a gap: it did not say what to do in such a crisis over the budget so the government could govern as it saw fit. This provoked a serious backlash ('a storm of protest' Gall).

In London Palmerston was under growing pressure to recognise the South. Some liberals were campaigning for it. The South had won victories in the summer, Washington was vulnerable to occupation. There were discussions between London and Paris of a diplomatic intervention for mediation. Russell was pushing. But in September the North's success in the battle of Antietam (still the bloodiest day in American history) gave Lincoln space and days later he published his Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, coming into force on 1 January 1863. Palmerston pulled the Cabinet back to neutrality.

Wilhelm told Roon Bismarck was impossible because of his views on a French alliance. ('He thought me more fanatical than I was.' Memoirs.)

In August 1862 while he was with Kathy Orlov the government had spun the 'gap theory' to the press, infuriating the liberals. On 9/9 the Cabinet agreed unanimously that if the budget were rejected then 'the constitutional foundation of the administration [was] removed', and the government could not allow this to continue 'without wholly abandoning the constitution'. Gall: the Cabinet 'explicitly repudiated' the gap theory and this was in effect a suggestion to Wilhelm to compromise, given the hopelessness of more elections. Wilhelm refused to accept the need for compromise. Cf. 17/9.

(Gall, EF) He arrived in Toulouse in the evening. Received Roon's letter from 31 Aug... Roon:You will have to take over as minister president but without portfolio. 'There must and will be fighting. Concessions and compromises are not to be thought of; least of all is the king disposed towards them. We may therefore look with certainty to dangerous catastrophes quite independently of the complications of our foreign policy which already exhibits some very interesting entanglements. I can imagine that you, my old friend, are greatly disgusted... You must have certainty and I will do my part to procure you this certainty before long... I am therefore pretending that I have your consent in advising your appointment, for the present, to the presidency without portfolio, which I have hitherto avoided doing; it cannot be managed in any other way!.. The internal catastrophe in my opinion will not take place now, but early in the spring, and then you must necessarily be present.'

(OP) Wilhelm dismissed the idea of Bismarck in the Cabinet, 'Bismarck is pressing for an alliance with France, which I will never accept.'

Bismarck to Roon from Toulouse: complained that he's been on holiday but still no decision. 'My belongings are still at St Petersburg and will be snowed up there. My carriages are at Stettin, my horses in the country near Berlin, my family in Pomerania, and I myself on high road.' (Hasn't seen family since 8 May.) He will write to Bernstorff looking for clarity: he would be happy to stay in Paris but it must be a permanent post, no more back and forth, and would be happy to become Minister President without portfolio if commanded, though he thinks it an error. His trip has improved his health to its best state for a decade. Procure any certainty for me 'and I will paint angels' wings on your photograph'. EF: He told Bernstorff he wanted to speak to the King but did not mention this in his Memoirs or later tales of his appointment.

Wilhelm allowed Bernstorff to summon Bismarck to Berlin (Pflanze). Gall: Bernstorff telegraphed: 'The King consents to your coming here now. And I advise you to come immediately since His Majesty will soon be leaving again.' Gall: Bismarck had made plans months earlier to come to Berlin in September, his account in his Memoirs is false. Roon had suggested compromise which was not Bismarck's view, and a compromise would have meant no opportunity for takeover by Bismarck.

Roon suggested in Parliament he was willing to concede a two-year service in return for funds necessary for military reforms — 'an almost total victory for the government' (Gall). But Crown Council on 17th: Wilhelm says NO compromise, tells ministers he will abdicate if unsupported and is summoning the Crown Prince (which conservatives dreaded). Gall: Wilhelm drafted a deed of abdication that evening. GC: there were two meetings between Wilhelm and advisers on 17th at which he rejected compromise and said if he could not rule in accordance with his conscience he would abdicate. Roon was horrified and abandoned his attempt at compromise which infuriated Heydt and others. Showalter: Roon did not consult Wilhelm before his words in Parliament. As soon as Wilhelm mentioned abdication, Roon abandoned the compromise. Fischer: Roon was actually playing a subtle game with complex 'concessions' that amounted to a win — but Wilhelm didn't want such schemes so Roon dropped them.

'. The code had been agreed in advance. Early morning of 19 September (OP) Bismarck boarded the train to Berlin. 19 September Heydt, Bernstorff and Holzbrinck resigned. OP: this left Wilhelm with 'no other choice' than Bismarck but he still hesitated. (Lerman says the Landtag rejected the budget for army reorganisation on 19th but nobody else says this, cf. below 23/9.) 19-20 Discussions between Wilhelm and the Crown Prince re abdication at Babelsberg (near Potsdam). CP urged his father not to abdicate — he would then be seriously hampered in his own exercise of royal authority. Gall: Unclear what Wilhelm and his son said to each other about Bismarck 19-20 and whether Wilhelm repeated that he would not appoint him.

in the morning. Gall: he spoke to Roon briefly. EF: he arrived in Berlin in the evening and was 'immediately' called to see the CP. OP: The Crown Prince left Berlin on 20th to rejoin family in Thuringia believing Bismarck's appointment was NOT imminent and was shocked to discover on 23 September that he had been misled — but Pflanze also says that Bismarck spoke to Crown Prince 'immediately on arriving from Paris' which was 20th (OP p175) and others also say they met on 20th including in Memoirs. Logical implication of Pflanze: they met but somehow the CP did not connect the dots and realise Bismarck might be in play as PM.

Gall (p193): The CP sent for Bismarck on the evening of the 20th. Bismarck tried to keep their discussion brief and formal to avoid compromising himself with Wilhelm. EF has a similar take. (So Pflanze says the CP/Bismarck spoke earlier on 20th then the CP left Berlin, Gall says they spoke in the evening of 20th.)

Bismarck said in his Memoirs (p.294ff) that he had not said much to CP as he had not seen the German papers and did not want to give his views before seeing the King. Wilhelm heard that Bismarck had already seen his son and told Roon on Sunday 21st, when they discussed a meeting with Bismarck the next day: 'He's no good either, he has already been to see my son.' Roon told Bismarck this.

EF: After church at Potsdam, Roon persuaded Wilhelm to see Bismarck. There seem to be almost no accounts of this meeting, and most don't mention it, with all the historic drama being the next day. (Is EF confused?)

' (OP). EF: The only account we have is Bismarck's. Wilhelm pointed to the draft of his abdication and explained the situation. He told Bismarck that he could no longer reign unless he could find ministers who would 'conduct my government without subjecting me to the will of the parliamentary majority'.

Bismarck wrote in Memoirs that the King had an abdication document on his table. Bismarck offered to serve and said that Roon and others would too. Wilhelm asked if he would push through army reform against Parliament. Bismarck: Yes. Wilhelm: Then it is my duty, with your help, to try to continue the battle, and I shall not abdicate.

Memoirs: 'I do not know whether he destroyed the document, which was lying on the table, or whether he preserved it in rei memoriam.' (Did it survive?) They walked in the garden. The King gave him an 8 page document to read. Bismarck: it isn't a question of liberal or conservative government, it's a question of parliamentary or monarchical rule — and it must be the latter even if it means 'a period of dictatorship... In this situation I shall be quite open in giving you my opinion, if your Majesty should request of me things that I do not consider right, but if you insist on your own judgement I would rather perish with the King than desert your Majesty in the contest against parliamentary government.' Wilhelm tore up the document and made to throw it in a ditch but Bismarck told him it may fall into the wrong hands. His appointment as 'minister and interim chairman of the ministry' was made public the next day, nomination as President was kept in reserve until he'd corresponded with Prince von Hohenzollern who still occupied the post constitutionally (?? p. 297). (All books report appointment as President on 23rd.) Delay in appointing him foreign minister until 8/10. The Crown Prince wrote in his diary: 'People will immediately smell reaction, mistrust is bound to arise on all sides, and poor papa will cause myself many a difficult hour through this false character!... The party of the Kreuzzeitung will not cease and desist from its hypocritical web of intrigue to regain all the influence it lost until now! Did it have to come to that, after the regency was established in November 1858 with such brilliant prospects? Poor mama, how bitterly she will feel this appointment of her mortal enemy!'

The landscape Bismarck faced...

'[T]he designation of Bismarck was received by the bourgeois with resounding laughter. The fellows were in general extraordinarily confident and to some extent rash.' Engels-Marx, after a trip to Germany.

'[T]he Bismarck ministry, moreover, is absolutely nothing but the realised pious wish of the Small German members of the Progressive Party. They were enthusiastic about the 'man of progress' Louis Bonaparte. Now they see what a 'Bonapartist' ministry in Prussia means. Bismarck has indeed been appointed by Bonaparte (and Russia), as it were.' Marx.

Bismarck moved into the Foreign Ministry at Wilhelmstrasse 76, 'the least pretentious building' on the street (Pflanze). (Gall: he took over 74 and 76, the Presidential Chancellery and the Foreign Ministry.) His offices and living quarters were on the second floor. From then until he left office in 1890, he maintained no fancy porters, no flunkies. Everything was so simple and modest that visitors would comment on it. His office was plain, not grand, and Pflanze writes that 'no provincial prefect in France' would have been content with it. Grand aristocrats would often be astonished at the state of Bismarck's office and his estates that he bought later — he put his cash into buying land and forests, which he loved, not houses and art. He soon ordered that papers be written in German, not French.

Prussia's position by 1862 was 'exceedingly advantageous' and Austria was 'a paralytic if not a corpse, had not a friend in Europe' (Mosse). This seems true to us because we can see how Bismarck took advantage of the dynamics. It was not so obvious to contemporaries.

Lerman judges that 'there was a fundamental continuity' in policy before and after Bismarck, such as Bernstorff's pushing for a small German policy in December 1861 and Prussian officials constantly excluding Austria from the Zollverein, and 'the direction those [Prussian] interests dictated in Germany was clear' (p44). I think this is ahistorical and wrong. Of course Bismarck did not represent an entirely clean break and there were policies he continued, notably the exclusion of Austria from the Zollverein. But in no sense was the direction in which Prussian interests directed 'clear'. It was extremely murky to contemporaries and Bismarck's path was strongly opposed by both the majority of liberals, who thought Prussia must liberalise in order to lead in Germany, and the Prussian aristocracy, who thought that Prussia's default should be alliance with Austria against Napoleon and liberalism. Wilhelm and other conventional conservatives wanted nothing to do with a policy of exploiting possibilities with Napoleon in order to pressure Austria.

Pflanze writes (p164) that the outlines of his plan to exploit German nationalism had been conceived 1858-9 when Wilhelm wanted to reconcile the Crown with its subjects, politically conscious Germans were enthusiastic about the 'New Era' cabinet, and the Nationalverein seemed supportive. These conditions had passed by October, when the Nationalverein called for the constitution of 1849.

Bismarck did not have the support of a single part of Parliament, not even the conservative ultras. He did not have control of the ministers. All ministers were appointed by the king. The King could summon meetings with anybody, Bismarck could not exclude rivals like Goltz. In Memoirs he writes that the very difficult European situation was made worse by 'dynastic sentimentality and courtier-like Byzantinism', personified by the Queen, Schleinitz, princely influences, family correspondence, hostile elements at court, Jesuit organs, 'intriguers and capable rivals, such as Goltz and Harry Arnim, or incapable ones', such as former ministers and parliamentarians.

Goltz was 'a man of unusual competence and energy ... ambitious and capable... he had less vanity and more patriotism and character [than Arnim but also] more bitterness and temper in his disposition'. Although he promoted Arnim and Goltz, 'I experienced at the hands of these what Yglano experiences from Anselmo in Chamisso's poem.' 1p101. He would sometimes tell a story about Goltz coming to visit him in his Frankfurt days. Goltz was so unpleasant about everyone that, when he left and was barked at by Bismarck's dog, Bismarck called out to him from the window, 'Goltz, don't bite my dog.'

He wrote of officials: 'The majority of these highly expert officials were at heart with the opposition against the [government], which they regarded as a brief episode in the progressive liberalisation of the bureaucratic machine, and though the most able of them were too conscientious to hamper the action of the government, yet when their official sense of duty permitted, they offered a passive resistance which was considerable. This state of things produced a strange situation: von Bodelschwingh, who in respect of his personal convictions constituted the extreme Right of the Ministry commonly gave his vote on the extreme Left.' In general he regarded his fellow ministers as mostly unfit with only Roon, his boyhood friend, a staunch ally. Only with Roon did he discuss his plans and 'he was unequalled in the loyalty, staunchness, and resourcefulness with which he helped to surmount the crisis'.

Gall (p199): When he took power 'his appraisal of the circumstances was well wide of reality', he 'completely and utterly misjudged the situation' and his initial reactions to the situation were 'in every respect inappropriate ... from the standpoint of a man thinking purely in terms of success'. He thought he would be able to pressure the middle classes by mobilising the lower classes. But the boom and rapid industrialisation of the 1850s strengthened the middle classes politically as well as economically. Antagonisms between the propertied middle class and the petty bourgeois strata of the craft trades and small-scale commerce were greatly diminished compared to 1848-50. His success came not from playing off the middle-classes and lower classes against each other, but instead from the insight 'painfully acquired after a whole series of setbacks' that he must ally with at least some sections of the middle-classes and share power with them.

Outside the Kreuzzeitung network, his appointment was universally greeted with disapproval. Many thought it was the prelude to a military coup against the constitution and possibly war. It was seen as a desperate last throw of the reactionaries' dice and most assumed he would not last long. Rumours started immediately of his imminent dismissal.

Gall argues that Bismarck was pushed towards a 'white' revolutionary foreign policy by the internal struggle. But his views on Austria and foreign policy predated the constitutional conflict and he would have 'sneered' at the idea he was forced into his foreign policy by the liberals (Pflanze — surely right). I think Gall is wrong to think of foreign policy as produced by domestic struggle — there is vast evidence suggesting the opposite, that Bismarck had clear views on the right foreign path that he stuck to despite massive pressure. An example is the way he stood alone from November 1863 in rejecting the alliance with Augustenburg. If Gall were right, then he would have done as almost everyone urged and sided with Augustenburg and with the nationalist liberals.

Lerman: He 'inherited' his foreign policy. No. Before him, Wilhelm had stopped ministers making friendly overtures towards France. Wilhelm had no desire for a high stakes attempt to force Austria out of influence in north Germany.

His liberal opponents thought:

1. Stand firm on army funding and Bismarck will fall, the king will concede.
2. Only a liberal Prussia can unite Germany.
3. The monarchy cannot tap vital economic, intellectual, popular forces.

His goals in winter 1862

A. Protect the independence of the Prussian monarchy and the army against the growing liberal forces and civil service sympathies for the liberals. B. Expand Prussian power in North Germany, undermine the Bund's constraints, push Austria out of North Germany. If possible do this without war, increase pressure and use circumstances as they arise to do so, if necessary war but only in the right circumstances when Austria is isolated. E.g to Karolyi, 4/12/62: 'Our relations must become either better or worse than they now are... If Austria persists in her present direction and restricts our action and the air we breathe, then you will conjure up catastrophes which in the last analysis must end in a fight.' C. Expand his own freedom of manoeuvre, evade all constraints from all parties, break alliances between enemies. He did not control his Cabinet or King. He was surrounded by people who despised him and wanted to replace him.

Some aspects of his approach:

• He looked for ways to a) compromise with the liberals, b) to divide them, while also c) hinting about a black reactionary alternative he could explore. He was held back by Wilhelm's intransigence (encouraged by Manteuffel).
• He looked for ways to expand Prussian power by mobilising the desire of Prussia's liberal/commercial classes for economic liberalism and German nationalism.
• He looked for ways to use the negotiations over the renewal of the Zollverein in 1865 and combine with ideas about a Zollverein parliament to: a) divide liberals and b) divide Austria from German states. E.g 7/61 and Christmas Day 1862 to Wilhelm: The Zollverein is 'the most effectual basis for the common handling of the economic and eventually of the political interests of the German states.' January 1863 to Diet: 'The German nation can find a competent organ through which to influence the course of common affairs only in a representative body chosen directly by the people of each confederate state according to its population.'
• Threaten all Powers with the possibility of alliance with their main opponents to nudge them into closer relations with Prussia and disconnect them from other alliances. Only Russia was pretty secure in 1862 and caused few problems 1862-6 but this was partly because of the Alvensleben Convention in early 1863, his first test (and which most thought he was wrong about).
• With Austria, he said repeatedly: either a) a deal (Austria lets Prussia dominate north Germany, Prussia supporting her against France and Italy) or b) conflict (diplomatic and ultimately if necessary military). Use Zollverein and nationalism against Austria. Scuppered Austria's Bund reform plans in 1863.
• Disconnect liberals from popular support. Most liberals regarded it as axiomatic that German unification would have to be based on liberal principles and required the liberalisation of Prussia. Bismarck thought they had little popular support, did not understand the realities of power politics, and Prussia could expand without move toward the British system with government responsible to parliament.
• Grip the civil service and stop officials attacking the government.
• Use the media and campaign groups.

The Landtag passed the 1862 budget but struck out all funds for military reorganisation by 308-11 and rejected by 273-68 the army reform. (Some confusion over numbers in different accounts is because of conflation of two different votes.) Wilhelm used this fact in a letter (evening of 23rd) to his wife to justify his appointment of Bismarck. 'Faced with such conduct I could not hesitate nor would my conscience and my sense of duty any longer allow me to hesitate to set against this unflinching resolve one equally unflinching.' Parliament's decision would 'decree the ruin of the army and the country'.

OP: It was now expected that the government would have to either accept 2 years or restore the army to its status of 1859. Now the conflict changed from 'the army question' to 'constitutional conflict'.

Steinberg writes (p178) that this vote was on 22nd (Sunday), Wilhelm asked what he should do, and Roon said 'Your Majesty, summon Bismarck.' This cannot be right.

(Gall) The official press announced his appointment in the evening.

(EF) He wrote to Joanna: 'It's not a cheerful prospect and I feel frightened every morning when I wake up. But it must be... Accept what God has sent us, it is not an easy matter for me.'

Bleichröder to James Rothschild (Paris): we'll get an 'entirely reactionary ministry', the market for Prussian bonds is down. At this time, Bleichröder did not see Bismarck much but this changed over the next 3 months and by Christmas his letters to Paris were better informed. (Stern, p28)

Russell overthrew British policy by advising Denmark to cede Holstein to the German Confederation. Derby: 'What on earth does [Russell] mean by turning round on Denmark, and taking up all at once the Prussian view about the Duchies? And how can Palmerston stand it, the original author of the Protocol which was the basis of the treaty of 1852?' Derby and Malmesbury were furious. On 30/11 under pressure from Palmerston, Russell recanted his Danish despatch.

(29th, Gall & EF) He withdrew the 1863 budget Bill and promised to reintroduce it along with a new Bill on military organisation in the next session.

Meeting of the budget committee where he gave his first speech as Minister President and probably his most famous, for the memorable line about 'iron and blood' (often written 'blood and iron' in English books). There are no minutes and reports vary on details. No English book I've seen simply prints the whole speech or the different versions for it. [A useful exercise: collect all contemporary records of the speech that secondary sources refer to, publish originals and translations. I'll pay someone £500 to do this!]

This is my attempt at reconstruction:

'It is not to Prussia's liberalism that Germany looks but to its power. Bavaria, Wurttemberg and Baden may indulge in liberalism, no one will expect them to take Prussia's role. Prussia must gather and keep its strength for the right moment, which has been missed several times already. Prussia's frontiers as laid down by the Vienna treaties are not favourable for the healthy existence of the state. The great questions of the day will not be settled by speeches and majority decisions - that was the great mistake of 1848 and 1849 - but by iron and blood. The previous year's allocation [of military funds] was agreed, for what reasons does not matter... If no budget can be agreed, then it is tabula rasa; there is no way out under the constitution, it would be one interpretation against another...' EF writes that one account paraphrases him'... he was sincerely seeking the path of accommodation.'

At one point he waved the olive twig he kept in his cigar case (from his trip with Cathy Orlov) as a gesture of his willingness to compromise, for the sake of unity against foreigners.

OP (p202): He argued that under the constitution, the King, Chamber of Deputies and House of Lords have equal voices in the passage of legislation but all rights not reserved in the constitution were reserved to the Crown. If the three entities cannot agree a budget, then the Crown must follow 'the law of necessity' and allocate expenditures as it sees fit. 'The question of law easily becomes a question of power.' This was the infamous Lucketheorie (the 'gap theory') whereby the ambiguity or silence of the constitution was deemed to allow the king's government to proceed with government as it wished, 'since the life of the nation cannot stand still even for a second' (Bismarck). It was a 'crude attempt' (Pflanze) to dangle the promise of foreign success before Parliament to pull apart the opposition. OP: the 'gap'/loophole had been intended by the constitution's authors. (Oddly Pflanze does not quote these words in his account of this speech but only out of context a few pages later. Cf. p.180-1 and 202) NB. He had referred to this gap in a speech on 24 February 1851.

Gall (p204): He was 'clearly at pains, not least through the relaxed and courteous manner in which he spoke, to defuse the tension, to play down the antagonisms'. He clearly wanted to diffuse tension and focus attention on the aim of army reform — strengthening Prussia as a prerequisite to progress on the German question. He stressed that antagonisms had been dramatised out of proportion by an irresponsible media and by 'a host of Catalinish characters who have a major interest in upheavals'. Gall: 'He even hinted that he was open to suggestions on the question of the two-year period of service.' He was looking for the liberals to give way on the budget issue in return for genuine cooperation with the government on the German issue including appointments to the Cabinet. When he was attacked by Virchow (eminent pathologist) for pursuing war to solve domestic problems, he replied: 'To seek conflicts abroad in order to get over difficulties at home, there he must protest; that would be frivolous; he was not looking for deals; he was talking about conflicts that we would not be able to avoid, without our having sought them' (Berliner Allgemeine Zeitung).

Gall:Virchow's argument had 'more than the whiff of hypocrisy' given the Progressive Party's official policy was to support war if needed for progress towards a Lesser Germany (!) but the argument was nevertheless effective with liberal opinion and all those who saw Bismarck as a dangerous pirate.

This speech caused him serious problems. The historian Treitschke: 'When I hear so shallow a country squire as this Bismarck bragging about the “iron and blood” with which he intends to subdue Germany, the meanness of it seems to me to be exceeded only by the absurdity.' Even Roon (who walked home with him after the meeting) was irritated by his 'witty sallies'.

He was looking for ways to split the liberal opposition. He argued to liberals that a compromise was needed and the conflict was undermining foreign policy: according to GC, he said at the time (to whom?) that the continuation of the conflict was 'an essential and grave obstacle' to successful action abroad. He suggested Wilhelm could be brought round to 2 years but it would need time. Seems Wilhelm did not hear about some of his risky discussions around this time.

At this time most liberals regarded it as 'axiomatic' (OP) that German unification would have to be based on liberal principles and required the liberalisation of Prussia, hence they thought Bismarck's Napoleonic tendencies were doomed. It's unclear how many at this time really wanted a shift to the British system of proper parliamentary government. When Bismarck accused them of seeking this, many shouted their denials. In 1862, they were mostly fighting to stop the reactionaries upsetting the constitution. They wanted to force the resignation of Bismarck and see the monarchy back down but not a big change and they opposed a democratic franchise. Further, its leaders never had confidence that the public really supported them. (Hoverbeck said astutely a bit later, 'I am very much afraid that this entire notion about our moral success is only an illusion. All our deliberations have no influence on the great bulk of the population, on the third and partly the second class of voters... A general suffrage would possibly bring us naked absolutism once again. We who work for the freedom of the people do not therefore stand on a solid foundation and we cannot therefore count on sweeping successes.') Nor was the conflict about economics. The Government and liberal opposition continued to cooperate on many economic issues. Many of the liberal deputies were aristocratic landowners who were supporting what they saw as political modernisation, the Rechtsstaat, the constitution.

Lerman: in his first months, Bismarck had to deal with all sorts of craziness including rumours that Wilhelm had multiple mistresses. Bismarck tried to make himself indispensable in matters large and small. In January 1864 he was getting half a dozen letters a day from Wilhelm which he replied to in his own hand.

At Coburg the Nationalverein demanded the Frankfurt constitution of 1849.

(EF) Deutscher Handelstag, an organisation of chambers of commerce, voted in favour of the Franco-Prussian trade deal, a blow to Austria.

Moritz von Blanckenburg set up Die Patriotische Vereinigung.

Meeting of the German Commercial Association in Munich. Hamerow: since the summer Vienna had been urging the Austrian chambers of commerce to send delegates to defend their interests. The effort had been hindered by the refusal of many non-German businessmen in the Empire to participate. Berlin had encouraged the Prussian chambers of commerce to attend. The meeting resolved 102-93 that 'the prompt execution of the commercial treaty should not be called in question'. Even 8/33 Bavarian votes supported the trade agreement. 95-51 of the Zollverein delegates supported it. The business/commercial classes across Germany were moving behind the Prussian policy and supporting the Zollverein despite Austria's counter-offensive.

He met Twesten. At first he argued that the Crown and Upper Chamber could reject the amendments made to the budget in the lower chamber, and the expenditure not agreed by the elected deputies could then still be spent — the business of the state could not stand still. When Twesten argued he said he did not want to make a stand on this principle. Re the army reforms, he was prepared to concede on two years but Wilhelm 'was like a horse shying from a new object, that would get even more recalcitrant if force was used, but might gradually get accustomed. For the moment it was impossible ... but by the winter he hoped to change the king's mind, by persuasion, and through the influence of people in whom he trusted, also through the advice given by generals and conferences with them'. A few days later he told Unruh that he had wanted a compromise but been disappointed (EF, p85). OP: Twesten and Unruh wanted compromise and dreaded the prospect of fruitless conflict with extremes on each side empowered. Waldeck, a judge on the democratic left, had the support of ~40.

But Hamerow (Vol 2, p167): Twesten supported force. 'The revolution is in my eyes now only a question of expediency. As soon as it has prospect of success, it must be dared. I want no end of the crisis without a humiliating, disgraceful abdication. Kingship by the grace of God needs a salutary and terribly severe chastisement.' On the other side, Sybel said that 'You would find no man in all of Prussia who would not consider a step involving open violence a folly and a crime, since it would be sure to encounter immediate suppression.'

Hamerow quotes in this context a speech by Twesten (but books give dates in 1861 and 1862 for this and it looks from google as though it was probably given before Bismarck took over): 'I believe that many people perceive therein [Cavour/Italy] a model for that which we desire for our own fatherland... If some day a Prussian minister would step forward in the same way and say . . . “I have moved boundary markers, violated international law, and torn up treaties, as Count Cavour has done”, gentlemen, I believe that we will then not condemn him. And if an inexorable fate should carry him off in the midst of his brilliant career, as happened to the former, before he achieved his high goal to its full extent, then we will erect a monument to him, as the history of Italy will erect one to Count Cavour, and I believe that even a soaring ambition will be content with such a monument.'

Bismarck, worried about Wilhelm's reaction to his 'iron and blood' speech, wrote a long letter blaming false reporting of his speech for the tumult. The King was in Baden for his wife's birthday, therefore amid many enemies of Bismarck.

Evening (OP): He had dinner with Schlözer who recorded: 'We drank a lot of champagne which loosened even more his naturally loose tongue. He exulted about pulling the wool over everyone's eyes. Partly by himself and partly through others he is seeking to get the king to concede the two-year service period. In the House of Lords he paints the reaction he plans in colours so black that ... the lords are becoming anxious... [In the Landtag] he appears at one moment very unbending but in the next hints at his desire to mediate. Finally, he intends to make the German cabinets believe that the king is hard put to restrain the Cavourism of his new prime minister.' (Steinberg says this was 'two days later' after his meeting with the King, but a) OP says 3rd and OP is much more reliable, b) the date JS gives in a footnote is not 'two days' after the 4th but the 3rd. JS adds: Schlözer made one indiscreet comment too many in Berlin about his chats with Bismarck and found himself transferred to Rome, on which he commented: 'Tannhauser, end of Act II. Otto sings, “To Rome, thou sinner.”)

The station (Jüterbog) was being built and he sat on an upturned wheelbarrow left by the workers waiting for the train to arrive. He found the King travelling alone in a carriage, depressed. A famous scene...

'[I] waited for him in the still unfinished railway station filled with third-class travellers, seated in the dark on an overturned wheelbarrow... My object in going to meet him was to counteract the probable effect press criticisms... The after-effects of his discussions with his wife was an obvious depression, and when I begged permission to narrate the events which had occurred during his absence, he interrupted me with the words: “I can perfectly well see where all this will end. Over there in front of the Opera house under my window, they will cut off your head, and mine a little while afterwards.”

'I guessed, and it was afterwards confirmed by witnesses, that during his week's stay at Baden his mind had been worked upon with variations on the theme of Polignac, Strafford, and Louis XVI. When he was silent I answered with the short remark, “Et après, sire.” “Après indeed: we shall all be dead,” answered the king. “Yes, then we shall be dead, but we must all die sooner or later, and can we perish more honourably? I fighting for my King's cause, and your Majesty sealing with your own blood your rights as King by the grace of God... Your Majesty is bound to fight, you cannot capitulate, you must, even at the risk of bodily danger, go forth to meet any attempt at coercion.”

'As I continued to speak in this sense, the King grew more and more animated and began to assume the part of the the officer fighting for kingdom and fatherland. In presence of external and personal danger he possessed a rare and absolutely natural fearlessness, whether on the field of battle or in the face of attempts on his life his attitude in any external danger was elevating and inspiring... He felt as though he had been touched in his military honour and was in the position of an officer who has orders to hold a certain position to the death no matter whether he perishes in the task or not. This set him on a course of thought which was quite familiar to him and in a few minutes he was restored to the confidence which he had lost at Baden and even recovered his cheerfulness. To give up his life for King and fatherland was the duty of an officer, still more that of the King... As soon as he regarded his position from the point of view of military honour, it had no more terror for him than the command to defend what might prove a desperate position would have for any ordinary Prussian officer. This raised him above the anxiety about the criticism which public opinion, history, and his wife might pass on his political tactics.... The King, who I found weary, depressed, and discouraged had, even before we arrived in Berlin, developed a cheerful, I might almost say joyous and combative disposition, which was plainly evident to the ministers and officials who received him on his arrival.' (Memoirs, p314ff).

Steinberg says (p.182) that at Baden Wilhelm agreed to remove Bismarck but Gall says the opposite (p206) — that Wilhelm forbade discussion of the subject with the Grand Duke who wrote grumpy letters about it. Pflanze says (p182) discussions at Baden ignored the Prussia crisis but when the liberals' demand for the 1849 constitution was raised, Wilhelm shouted so loudly at his son-in-law he could be heard in the street. (How good are the sources on this story?!). EF implies it is wrong (p86).

Roon tried to get Wilhelm to agree a compromise: e.g let middle classes buy their children out of the third year, which would also give the government revenue and divide the opposition. Wilhelm rejected, urged by Manteuffel. He scribbled marginalia like 'ruin of the troops... death warrant of army'. Bismarck had stayed on the sidelines but (OP) Roon acted with his approval. He wrote to Bernstorff: 'For the infantry two years, with volunteers, would be satisfactory. But if the King insisted on ten years I would not refuse obedience in such matters. In my opinion there are more important questions than that of purchasing momentary peace with the present parliament by this concession. Peace with such people would not be lasting. As far as I'm concerned, therefore, no surrender.'

He now had to look for other paths. He thought that a combination of renewing the Zollverein in 1865 and some sort of assembly based on it was Prussia's main chance, plus warning Austria to get out of Germany or else.

GC: Bismarck and Roon drafted for submission to Parliament a Bill that would have fixed the army at a percentage of the population and set out a distinction between conscripts who would serve 2 years and long-term volunteers who would serve longer, with a scheme of taxes for their support that seemed to suggest middle classes could buy their sons out of service. It was a clever move: 'it seems likely that if it had not won the opposition it might have split it' (GC) but EM sabotaged it with the King. After this Bismarck stopped pushing for a compromise (p162).

JS: Roon presented a compromise proposal: allow those with means to purchase release from the 3rd year and set army at 1% of population. Wilhelm and Manteuffel opposed. Landtag voted against by 150-17. Bismarck withdrew compromise proposals and shifted attention to the civil service. (His reference to a vote is not in GC or Pflanze??)

After the House of Lords rejected the amended budget bill for 1862 and 'exceeded its authority' (OP) by accepting the original bill proposed by the government, there was uproar over the powers of the Lords. Bismarck walked to the rostrum and prorogued Parliament.

Gall: there was a 'speech from the throne' on the occasion of this adjournment in which Bismarck had the King speak as if he still wanted an agreement. Also span a story to the Norddeutscher Allgemeine Zeitung (controlled by Bismarck's 'Literary Bureau' in the FO) to similar effect. (Norddeutscher Allgemeine Zeitung was a liberal Austro-phile paper which converted to support Bismarck. Still only had circulation of 2,000 in 1863, 4,500 in 1864. Hamerow: overall conservative circulation of ~40,000 versus liberal 250,000. The biggest circulation periodical was Gartenlaube which was quite apolitical.)

Bismarck wrote to Crown Prince about the need for a campaign to intimidate the civil service into obedience.

Napoleon replaced Thouvenel as Foreign Minister, quite friendly to Prussia, with Drouyn de Lhuys, more friendly to Austria: 'the most disastrous step in the history of the Second Empire' (AJPT). Also Clarendon and Cowley thought him a liar which made cooperation with Britain very hard.

Bismarck discussed ideas for a Zollverein parliament with a Hessian liberal, Oetker — cf. note to Wilhelm, Christmas Day 1862.

Bismarck's first discussion with Buchanan on Schleswig-Holstein (Steefel, 1932). He suggested he was happy with the British approach but warned the issue aroused passions in Germany that would have to be managed. (But numerous sources give 28/10 as date Buchanan became ambassador — was this discussion unofficial, was he 'acting'?)

Hamerow: among the 500 participants were conservatives, clericals, liberals, even democrats; the social distinction of the gathering was impressive. Prussian supporters mostly stayed away for fear of losing influence in Berlin. Its goals: reform of the Bund including a vigorous federal executive authority with national representation, inclusion of all Germany, reform by agreement, admission of Austria to Zollverein.

In November, Austria and her allies agreed to press the Diet to accept the new Austrian reform plans and most of the states opposed Prussia's trade deal with France, though businessmen increasingly supported it.

Buchanan became Ambassador in Berlin until 15 September 1864.

Bismarck went to Paris. Napoleon assured him that France would remain neutral in a conflict between Prussia and Austria. In Paris, he told Austria's Ambassador, Prince Metternich, that he intended to make Prussia dominant in north Germany. He preferred to do this 'through understanding and close union with Austria' but if opposed would use 'every means ... without special scruple'.

To Wilhelm: I dined with Napoleon at St. Cloud on 28th, will see him again in a few days. Napoleon said that Drouyn de Lhuys' appointment 'is without any bias for Austria or against Prussia and has significance only for Italian relations. The Emperor's utterances with respect to us are more friendly than ever... Coolness towards England noticeable on the part of the Emperor and of the minister.'

Bismarck threatened violence in Hesse over the constitutional conflict, he forced the Elector to do a deal with his parliament. EF: a deliberate signal to Prussian liberals he was not what they assumed, it's possible he hoped that his deliberately humiliating behaviour would lead to resistance and an excuse to send in troops (plausible!).

Bismarck spoke to Ludwig Gerlach. Gerlach recorded that Bismarck said, 'One can accomplish a great deal even under a constitution by such ordinary means as fear, enticement, and the like. If nothing avails, one can still resort to a coup d'etat.' On 23/11, he wrote to Prince Henry VII of Reuss that 'we are going to carry out a sharp raid on the civil servants ... [I] am intent on bringing the civil service back into discipline at any price.' (OP: Ritter says that Bismarck had 'nothing in common with the Staatssreich plans of the military cabinet' but this is clearly not the case. His view was that his own conscience and loyalty to the Crown overruled any duties to the constitution.)

Lassalle proposed in his 'What Now?' speech that the deputies go on strike and refuse to meet until Bismarck restored their constitutional powers (Steinberg). OP: this shocked the liberals who totally opposed it (p.222). Lassalle's immediate reaction to Bismarck was: 'He remains a thoroughly reactionary fellow and Junker from whom only reactionary experiments are to be expected. The only thing which distinguishes him from the ordinary party of the Kreuzzeitung is that he does not have its doctrinaire consistency but is baroque! He is a baroque man of the Kreuzzeitung... He will either only begin an obbligato sabre-rattling in order to squeeze out the money for the army by pretending there will be a war, although people are already firmly resolved not to snap at this bait, or he will really try to bring about some sort of “tasteless pastry” of reactionary unity.'

Moltke replied with a first draft 6 December and more detailed work later in December.

Eulenburg replaced Jagow as Interior Minister. Made it easier for Bismarck to attack liberal officials. (Pflanze: 40% of 1862 chamber were political officials.) Eulenburg's first act was to instruct officials their primary duty was to support the King 'unconditionally'.

he said that Austria should cease looking for hegemony in Germany and shift its centre of gravity to Hungary, in return for which Prussia would regard Austria's interests in Italy and the East as vital and would help protect them. The alternative would be war. 'Our relations must become either better or worse than they now are. I am prepared for a joint attempt to improve them. If it fails through your refusal, do not reckon on our allowing ourselves to be bound by the friendly phrases of the Diet. You will have to deal with us as one of the great powers of Europe.' Austria deliberately leaked the exchange to damage Bismarck and many indeed thought he was mad (Gall). To Karolyi: 'If Austria persists in her present direction and restricts our action and the air we breathe, then you will conjure up catastrophes which in the last analysis must end in a fight.'

'If you are willing to take a direction similar to that of Metternich's policy, you will find us ready to conclude a hard and fast alliance with you ... and you won't find any other Prussian statesmen so indifferent to public opinion and so willing to follow a genuine Cabinet policy ... as I.' (Clark) In his Memoirs, Bismarck writes that if Austria had taken seriously what he'd said and 'sought an understanding with Prussia instead of trying to coerce her by means of majorities and other influences, we should probably have seen, or at any rate made trial of, a period of dualistic policy in Germany. It is certainly very doubtful if, without the clearing effect of the experiences of 1866 and 1870, such a system could have developed peacefully in a sense acceptable to German national sentiment, and with permanent avoidance of internal dissensions. The belief in the military superiority of Austria was too strong, both at Vienna and at the courts of the middle states, for a modus vivendi on the footing of equality with Prussia. The proof that this was the case at Vienna lay in the proclamations that were found in the knapsacks of the Austrian soldiers together with the new uniforms ordered for the entry into Berlin. The contents of those documents betrayed the certainty with which the Austrians had counted on the victorious occupation of the Prussian provinces. The refusal to entertain the latest Prussian proposals for peace ... demonstrates the certainty with which a victory in this was reckoned on.' (p373)

Friedjung (p33): while in Paris in the summer he had met some of the Hungarian nationalist exiles such as Count von Seherr-Toss and told them that he wanted to unify Germany under Prussia, this needed Hungarian help: 'If we win, Hungary too will get her freedom.' As soon as he was Minister President he met them again and stayed in touch. (Cf. Seherr-Toss Memoirs, p140)

Manteuffel to Roon — no compromise, 'the game must be played to the end'.

Eulenburg issued orders to the civil service that they must 'support the constitutional rights of the Crown... [T]he distinction which your position lends you is not to be misused to promote political movements which run counter to the views and the will of the government'.

Letter from Bismarck to Prussian envoy in Karlsruhe, Count Fleming (JS says 'unknown correspondent' but Gall names him): 'I am certain that the whole Danish business can be settled in a way desirable for us only by war. The occasion for such a war can be found at any moment that we find favourable for waging it... The disadvantage of having signed the London Protocol we share with Austria and cannot free ourselves from the consequences of that signature without war. It cannot be foreseen what development of the German Federal relations is destined for the future. As long, however, as they remain about the same as in the past, I cannot regard it as in the interest of Prussia to wage a war in order, as the most favourable result, to install in [SH] a new Grand Duke [I.e Augustenburg], who in fear of Prussian lust for annexation, will vote against us in the Diet and whose government, in spite of the gratitude due to Prussia for its installation, will be a ready object of Austrian intrigues.'

Morier had been travelling around Germany gathering intelligence on German views on the Zollverein, Franco-Prussian treaty, Austrian policy. He reported back to London that Rechberg was not able to make progress with an Anglo-Austrian deal. Rechberg stated that the Austrian parliament does not care for a liberal commercial policy for its own sake but only as a means to a closer union with the Zollverein. Austria is opposing the French treaty for political, not commercial reasons.

Christmas Day Bismarck to the King: We must aim for 'liberation from the web of federal treaties'. He suggested the introduction of the majority principle into the Zollverein and a directly elected Zollverein parliament to represent the people of the various states, not the states. The Zollverein is 'the most effectual basis for the common handling of the economic and eventually of the political interests of the German states'. Until the end of 1865 and the expiry of the Zollverein agreements, he counselled caution 'if possible ensuring the realisation of our intentions for the period from 1 January 1866 without allowing ourselves to be distracted by concern for bogus successes in the intervening period. That intervening period will in any case be filled with diplomatic battles over the shape of the future after the year 1865.' He also stressed the advantages of the free trade treaty with France.

Gall (p217): Bismarck saw the future lay with the programme of Lesser German liberalism and 'therefore, power-politician that he was, made it his own, as it were taking the political wind out of his opponents' sails... Ipse faciam [I will do it myself] — that was the watchword and the extent of the secret... His much-invoked juggling encountered precisely defined limits in the realities of the given balance of power and interests.' To this program and these forces he 'surrendered almost without reserve and at the sacrifice of convictions and objectives of his own that ran in a different direction'. No, this is overstated. Yes to a considerable extent he went along with the liberal program regarding the economy, free trade, regulation, banking and so on. But the program of Lesser German liberalism wanted the liberalisation of the Prussian state (not its continued control by the monarchy, Junkers and military), not the triumph of the old Prussian state on the battlefield, not universal suffrage, not alliance with Austria against Augustenburg.Yes he clearly would have preferred it if the liberal opposition had crumbled earlier and part of it had joined him in propagandising in Germany, but he stuck to his guns and in the end the liberals split and quarrelled under the pressure he applied. Lesser German liberalism was united in supporting Augustenburg in the Schleswig-Holstein affair but he opposed this very strong wave in opinion, even though the King himself supported it — he did not 'surrender' to it.

He spoke again to Karolyi (Gall). If Austria persists in seeking hegemony, 'Nous croiserons les bajonettes' [we'll cross bayonets].

France told Bismarck it will not agree his proposal whereby France would not offer free trade deals to other Zollverein states. (OP: He hoped that if France did this, then after the Zollverein expired in 1865 he would be able to push the lesser states to accept majority vote and a parliament, which Prussia would dominate.) This unwelcome development, says Pflanze, meant he now did a characteristic shift. He now drew away from France and made offers to Austria, hoping to spook the French into a rethink. He had to draw closer to Austria and scare Napoleon while also scuppering Austria's reform plan for good. In his talks with Karolyi and Thun in early 1863, he sometimes talked of an 'offensive-defensive alliance', sometimes of Prussian self-sufficiency. He spoke of the dangers of revolution and the potential for exploiting it. He denied wanting to divide Germany into two spheres and discussed plans for doing so. He suggested the two powers 'abstract' the European from the German situation, cooperating in the former while disagreeing on the latter. OP: he deployed 'appeasement, threat, enticement and diversion in rapid succession'. Karolyi found it 'truly astonishing with what rapidity Herr von Bismarck goes from one extreme to another diametrically opposed'.

Bleichröder to Rothschild: Bismarck does not expect the conflict with parliament to be resolved in the next session.