1863

He made clear threats to the lesser states not to support Austria's plan, saying that if Prussia lost the vote Prussia would declare herself no longer bound by the Confederation constitution.

Lincoln issued the Emancipation Declaration. Made it easier for Palmerston to shift to support for the North.

Buchanan-Russell, re what Bismarck had said in discussion about war with Austria: 'at all events Prussia will not provoke war but it was impossible that Austria and Prussia could long remain at peace when their conflicting interests could no longer be treated judicially in the Diet and that war within a year or two might be considered certain.' Russell wanted Austria to make concessions to Prussia and develop a compromise for Bund reform.

In a conversation with Count Thun who he had known since Frankfurt and was now Austrian ambassador in Russia (passing through Berlin, called for a chat). He said, 'I am impervious to this kind of sentimental policy-making, I have no feeling for German nationality, for me a war against the king of Bavaria ... is exactly the same as a war against France... Austria and Prussia are states which are too great to be bound by the text of a treaty. They can be guided only by their interests and their convenience. If any treaty should be in the way of these interests and convenience that treaty must be broken.' Rechberg made two big exclamation marks in the margin of Thun's report 'but that was all he did' (Eyck, p66). EF: 'The last thing Austria could do' was surrender its position in Germany regardless of compensation in Italy or the Balkans. Bismarck 'cannot really have thought a division of Germany between Austria and Prussia roughly along the River Main was likely... No one could expect the Austrians to retreat from Germany without a fight.' (I disagree. If Austria had accurately assessed her own strength and internal discussion had been forced to focus on choosing priorities, this could have happened. But FJ remained determined to avoid choosing until too late. Stranger things have happened, one never knows when ministers will be changed, people will die etc. I think Bismarck was suggesting something he thought a rational Vienna could accept, even if he thought it unlikely to happen.)

Joanna wrote to Keudell that Bismarck hardly spoke to the family over breakfast while reading papers, worked all day, had working dinners, finished at around 1am, slept badly, day after day: 'we never see him at all'.

Russell-Bloomfield: Austria should let Prussia have a higher position in the Bund and abandon her recent scheme. Russell tried to encourage Berlin and Vienna to compromise.

Bleichröder to Rothschild: many rumours about the end of Bismarck and Wilhelm withdrawing from affairs of state. His letters from this period show how well-connected contemporaries could not see how Bismarck or anybody could break out of the impasse.

(OP): A revolt breaks out in Poland. (Memoirs — 1/1.) Prussian Poland was not affected but Berlin rushed troops to the area and proclaimed the equivalent of martial law. Alvensleben was sent to St P. Bismarck feared an independent Poland would strive for the frontiers of 1772 including Posen and West Prussia. It would be a natural ally of France. He was worried that the reform party led by Gorchakov might withdraw troops and dominoes might fall. As OP says, his brutal comments about the Poles were unmatched by comments about any other racial group, though his views were political rather than racial/cultural. (Although he never pursued anything like a policy of extermination, and we must beware looking at such comments in the light of Nazi history, he did write things like: 'Strike the Poles in such a way that they will despair of their lives. I have every sympathy for their plight but if we are to exist we can do nothing other than exterminate them. The wolf too is not responsible for being what God has made it but we kill it. nevertheless, if we can' (to sister, 2/1861) and 'we cannot carry on the struggle against this element according to the rules of civil justice, but only according to those of war' (to Bernstorff). In May (Gall) he wrote, 'Restoring the kingdom of Poland in any shape or form is tantamount to creating an ally for any enemy that chooses to attack us.' And cf. unpublished letter 20/4/48)

The Austrian reform plan was defeated in the Bund by 9-7. The Prussian envoy issued a shocking statement to the Bund: 'The German nation can find a competent organ through which to influence the course of common affairs only in a representative body chosen directly by the people of each confederate state according to its population.' He sprang the idea on a startled German public to prevent King Wilhelm from going to a congress of princes called by the Emperor of Austria. (NB. Pflanze says that he only 'hinted' at universal suffrage now and September, but others write he promised it!?) Showalter: his victory over the Austrian plan was 'purchased at the price of most of Prussia's remaining moral influence in Germany'. (Overstated.)

Virchow (a famous surgeon and a liberal antagonist of Bismarck for many years) moved an uncompromising reply to the Address from the throne and declared the government's behaviour unconstitutional. Bismarck's speech in reply went into the details of the constitutional conflict, rejected the liberals' arguments, and provoked the liberals to great anger. (Bits of this speech are often quoted on different days in January.)

'Less than a year ago the assertion that the parliament and the Crown were disputing for control of Prussia was energetically disclaimed, but when you have adopted the Address as it is submitted, you will no longer be able to maintain this disclaimer... If, gentlemen, you had the unilateral right to determine the budget and its items definitively; if you had the right to demand of His Majesty the King the dismissal of those ministers in whom you have no confidence; if you had the right, by means of budgetary resolutions, to determine the size and organisation of the army; if you had the right which, under the constitution you do not have but to which you lay claim in your Address, to exercise ultimate control over the relations between the executive power of the government and its officials - then you would indeed possess full governmental power in this country. Your Address is based on these claims if it has any basis at all. I believe, therefore, that I can describe its practical import very simply: this Address claims to deprive the royal house of Hohenzollern of its constitutional rights and to transfer them to the majority of this House.

'You advance this demand in the form of a declaration that the constitution is violated to the extent that the Crown and the House of Peers do not submit to your will; you level the accusation of violating the constitution at the ministry, and not at the Crown, whose loyalty to the constitution, you do not call into question. I have already rejected this distinction in the sessions of the committee. You know as well as anyone in Prussia that the ministry acts in the name and on the command of His Majesty the King... An English ministry, whatever it may call itself, is a parliamentary one, a ministry of the majority in parliament; but we are ministers of the King...

'You find a violation of the constitution specifically with respect to Article 99... But Article 99 continues: “the latter (i.e. the budget) is determined annually by a law”. Article 62 lays down with incontrovertible clarity how a law comes into being. It says that for the completion of every law, including therefore the budget law, the agreement of the Crown and both chambers is necessary...

'Each of these three concurrent rights is in theory unlimited, one as strong as the other. If agreement among the three forces is not reached, the constitution contains no statement whatever as to which of them must yield...

'If compromise is made impossible because one of the powers involved wishes to enforce its own will with doctrinaire absolutism, then the series of compromises is broken and is replaced by conflicts. Since the life of the state cannot stand still, conflicts become a question of power. Whoever holds the power proceeds according to his will, for the life of the state cannot remain still even for a second... [He recounts how the Crown and ministry had tried to compromise but been rejected.] It is no new discovery that there is a gap in the constitution here... I am content with the necessity of the state's existence and that it cannot pass its time in pessimistic reflections on what would happen if the flow of money dries up. Necessity alone is decisive, we have taken account of this necessity... The rights granted to you by the constitution you shall enjoy in full measure; what you demand beyond this we shall refuse, and we shall untiringly defend the rights of the Crown against your claims...

'The Prussian monarchy has not yet fulfilled its mission, it is not yet ready to form a mere ornamental decoration in your constitutional edifice, or to become a dead cog in the machinery of parliamentary government.'

One of the deputies, a liberal landowner (and former minister), rejected his argument and replied: '“Might before right” ... is not in my view a proposition that is capable of sustaining the dynasty in Prussia in the long run... “Right before might: justitia fundamentum regnorum”. That is the device of the Prussian kings and will ever remain so.'

To Parliament: 'The pathway a Prussian ministry is able to take is never very wide. The man from the far Left, when he becomes a minister, will have to move to his right, and the man from the far Right, when he becomes a minister, will have to move to his left, and there is no room on this narrow trail that the government of any large country is able to tread for the kind of sweeping divagations of doctrine that a man may unfold as an orator or as a member of Parliament.' Gall says in a speech 'at the end of January' (29th?) he again responded to the accusation that he was looking or chances to exploit foreign affairs for domestic purposes: 'the means would be worse than the evil itself, and I have already on previous occasions, when I was likewise accused of pursuing it, described such a policy as frivolous'.

Directive to Alvensleben: 'In our view the position of both courts with regard to the Polish revolution is essentially that of two allies threatened by a common enemy.' On 2 February he wrote a letter to Gorchakov for Alvensleben to take with him: 'We should like, with regard to any Polish insurrection as with regard to any danger from abroad, for that fine remark to be proved true that your Emperor made to Goltz in Moscow, namely that Russia and Prussia act against joint dangers in solidarity as if they were one country.'

To Wilhelm: reiterated that S-H could only be solved by war. (Cf. 22/12/62)

Alvensleben Convention: agreement between Russia and Prussia on dealing with the Polish revolt. Bismarck refused to answer questions about it in the Landtag and the only source of information was the foreign press. Cf. 26/2.

Most historians conclude it was a mistake, including Pflanze ('little doubt that [it] was a bad mistake' p195), Gall, Feuchtwanger and Showalter ('an equally serious miscalculation' to his January alienation of the Bund).

OP: it gave Napoleon a way to attack Prussia, rally support in France. (True but this was short-term. Long-term it worsened French relations with Russia which was more important.)

Gall: it helped forestall France and Russia becoming closer but the price was 'exceptionally high': it alienated liberals in Germany even more, and worsened relations with France, Britain and Austria. (This contradicts Gall's argument (cf. 25/12/62) that domestic pressures drove his foreign policy — in fact, the Convention was evidence that he managed diplomacy in its own terms, not to fit with domestic pressures. And Bismarck was proved right that the immediate rapprochement between France and Britain did not matter and would not last.) Gall: he would not have agreed with Lassalle that the liberals were arguing over abstract principles because they did not have confidence in mass support [BUT that's exactly what he had argued for years before now and subsequently!].

Lerman: his diplomacy was 'clumsy' and his moves were widely seen as a mistake at the time, including by the Tsar, but this may have conned his competitors into underestimating him.

GC is one of the few who does not treat it as an error (p168).

Eyck: it was not a 'master-stroke', his claims for it were false, it even caused problems with Gorchakov — but Eyck nevertheless writes that 'it is true that the Polish insurrection caused a regrouping of the European powers which facilitated Bismarck's task considerably.'

EF: it was a mistake and his position was 'never weaker' than in the weeks and months after it. He always rejected criticisms of this move and defended it in his Memoirs. His relations with Russia strengthened, relations between France and Russia weakened because Napoleon supported the Poles, and Austro-Russian relations weakened. Also Anglo-French relations worsened because of diplomatic wrangling over the incident.

Mosse: Gorchakov opposed it as unnecessary and undignified but the Tsar overruled him. Gorchakov tried to stop it coming into force. Bismarck to Buchanan on 14/3: Gorchakov 'endeavoured to render it unpopular and succeeded in rendering it inoperative so far as the principle of the frontier being crossed by the troops of either Government was in question.' Although the details were unknown, the fact of some sort of deal was soon known. Within a fortnight Cowley was reporting from Paris that feeling for Poland was running very high. Memoirs — his attitude on taking over was that... A powerful force in Russia wanted liberalisation and this group also wanted concessions in Poland while conservatives opposed both. He had seen these debates when in St P. If Russia had been pro-Polish, it could have revived Russo-French sympathies which was bad. 'It was our interest to oppose the party in the Russian cabinet which had Polish proclivities'. Alexander II did not have confidence in Russian administration of Poland. Austria and Russia were hostile. France would probably not be friendly in the long run but Napoleon's 'transitory and miscalculated support' might be exploited.

'With Russia we stood on the same footing as with England insofar as with neither had we diverging interests of capital importance, and with both were united by an ancient amity. From England we might expect platonic goodwill, with letters and newspaper articles full of good advice, but hardly more. The support of the Tsar, on the other hand, meant in certain circumstances more than mere benevolent neutrality.'

He was therefore determined to foster every sympathy. The Convention's significance was 'diplomatic rather than military'. It signalled 'victory in the Russian cabinet of Prussian over Polish policy' and a defeat for Gorchakov. It was decided by the Tsar against his ministers. It therefore 'amply accomplished its purpose' and 'said “checkmate” in the game which anti-Polish monarchism was then playing against philo-Polish Panslavism within the Russian cabinet... It was assumed that liberal concessions, if granted to the Poles, could not be withheld from the Russians. Russian constitutionalists were therefore philo-Polish.' (Memoirs p345ff)

Bismarck told the British Ambassador that if Russia folded, he would occupy Poland himself.

Buchanan: 'Europe will never stand for this.'

Bismarck: 'Who is Europe?'

Buchanan: 'Several great nations.'

Bismarck asked 'whether those nations were at one amongst themselves in this respect'. (The Spectator denounced Bismarck as Lord Tyrconnel, a henchman of James II.) Russell had encouraged the Poles and spoke publicly with moral indignation but could do nothing. Derby and Disraeli were scathing. Disraeli: 'the Polish question is a diplomatic Frankenstein created out of cadaverous elements by the mystic blundering of Lord Russell.'

House of Deputies declared that ministers were responsible with their persons and fortunes for unconstitutional expenditure. Bismarck (Memoirs): I was advised to make over my estate to my brother but declined.

To Wilhelm: 'Seeing how matters seem to be shaping themselves in Poland we shall hardly be called upon for active cooperation there and the convention thus gives us the advantage of having secured cheaply for the future the gratitude of the Tsar Alexander and the Russian sympathy.'

Napoleon proposed identical notes from Paris, London and Vienna censuring Prussian intervention in Poland. British Cabinet met: Russell supported 'a policy of intervention in conjunction with France' but Palmerston was more cautious and warned of 'ulterior plans of aggrandizement'. Victoria was alarmed at some of Russell's ideas which she thought might get Britain into a war with Germany and she wanted milder language used in any admonition of Prussia. Over the next few weeks there were all sorts of discussions in London but essentially the fears of France starting a war dominated thinking and acted to limit Anglo-French cooperation, despite great sympathy for the Poles. Grey warned the Queen (24th) that joining with France diplomatically could increase the chances of a war which would be embarrassing — France would claim it was to support the freedom of nations, like with Italy. The Queen pushed Granville (President of the Council) to restrain Palmerston (cf. Mosse p110ff).

Bleichröder thought the crisis over Alvensleben would lead to the fall of the government within days and set out a code to inform Rothschild of Bismarck's successor. If Bismarck went, the markets would rise, predicted Bleichröder.

Tsar wrote on a report from Berlin 'our dear Bismarck is a terrible blunderer'. Gorchakov referred (28th) to his 'despair over the humiliation of our friend Bismarck' and his correspondence around this time with the Russian ambassador at Berlin was full of sarcasm and criticism of Bismarck's rashness, mendacity, indiscretions etc (Lord, p42).

Rumours in Berlin that Bismarck had offered resignation or shortly would. Cowley reported that Goltz was nervous about joint Anglo-French action.

British Cabinet met, agreed not to act aggressively with France. On 26th Austria declined Napoleon's invitation.

He accused deputies of siding with the Poles. Attacked Unruh. When he was called to order by the speaker, he contemptuously denied ministers were subject to his discipline.

Palmerston to Russell: We should focus on Russia 'the real culprit, rather than to Prussia, an incidental accomplice... public opinion in this country as well as France is getting strong upon this subject, and we shall not stand well if we do not do something.'

Bismarck claimed to Buchanan that the military cabinet had arranged the Alvensleben convention without his knowledge and it was unlikely to come into force.

Commons debate — Commons was 'unanimously Polish' (Palmerston-Russell). Russell therefore worked on a despatch to Russia.

Russell confirmed to Paris that Britain would not join a remonstrance in Berlin.

Cowley: Napoleon and ministers are 'bitterly disappointed at your declining the combined note'.

At the end of February Bismarck tried to prorogue the Landtag again but only Roon supported him in Cabinet and Wilhelm would not do it.

Napoleon offered Austria an alliance based on a major (fantastical!) shuffling of territories (described by Empress Eugénie to Metternich): Austria to surrender Galicia to an independent Poland and Venetia to Italy but be compensated in Germany and Balkans, France to get the Rhine, Prussia to get Saxony, Hanover and other territory in the north, Russia to get Asiatic Turkey, with dispossessed princes being sent to 'civilise and monarchise' the Americas on the Mexican model! Austria declined.

Clark: Metternich wanted to do it but Vienna thought a French alliance was only a last resort to forestall a Franco-Prussian alliance, very unlikely in the immediate future given the Polish affair. Cf. 23/3. (Rechberg wrote to Drouyn on 11 March.) OP: Metternich thought Napoleon shared the 'phantasmagoria' of his wife, 'his language recalls the great epochs of his reign' preceding the Crimean and Italian wars.

Bismarck talked down the Convention in London and Vienna. To Russia and Austria he talked the language of the Holy Alliance. Pressure on Bismarck declined. Napoleon ran out of steam and Russia was increasingly pro-Prussian. Original issue fizzled out quite quickly. (Pflanze describes the effects of the row over the Alvensleben Convention as basically a win for Bismarck but he still concludes it was 'a bad mistake'.)

Bismarck asked Eulenburg to look into the possibility of state supervised pension funds. Nothing came back.

During March there was toing and froing between London-Paris-Vienna about ideas for joint notes. Austria was not opposed but finding languages that all could agree and which actually pressured Russia was impossible. Cf. Palmerston 7/4.

Spring According to Bismarck, in 1881 after Wilhelm recounted to him a dream he'd had, Bismarck told him: 'Your Majesty's story encourages me to describe a dream which I had in the spring of 1863 when there seemed no way out of our difficulties. I dreamt I was riding along a narrow mountain path with a precipice on my right and on the left sheer rock. Gradually the path narrowed until my horse refused to go on and there was no room to turn round or dismount. Then I struck the rocks with my whip and called on God. The rock-face fell like a piece of stage property and revealed a broad road leading down to the Bohemian plain, and everywhere there were Prussian troops and colours. I awoke strengthened and joyful.' (!)

(Pflanze) Lassalle issued the manifesto that led to the German Workers Association (founded 23 May). Demanded universal, direct and equal suffrage.

A despatch from Russell to Napier called on Russia to have 'an immediate and unconditional amnesty to his revolted Polish subjects'.

Gorchakov told Napier, British Ambassador at St Petersburg, that the Convention had never been ratified and could be considered 'a dead letter'. 4/3 Bismarck told Buchanan that no practical effect had been given to it.

(Lerman) To Gerlach: Officials are resisting his opposition to promotion by seniority, desire to open up civil service to talent etc, and Eulenburg, though better than Lippe (minister of justice), is not much use. (In 1865 Lippe threatened resignation, other ministers complained to the King over civil service reform to Bismarck's disgust.) To Gerlach (19/3): he wanted to go on a hunt where all the game were Oberpräsidenten (over-presidents) and Geheimräte (privy counsellors). Cf. Pflanze 207-8.

At Windsor Castle the Prince of Wales married Princess Alexandra of Denmark.

Bismarck told Britain that he could not support measures tending to support Polish independence, that would help France and weaken Prussia.

(OP) Bismarck tried to organise a demonstration of public support for the army and king, on an anniversary, but fell flat. A small crowd cheered the CP but let the King pass in silence.

Rechberg drafted a memo to guide Metternich (cf. above). An alliance with France is not impossible but is 'very remote from practical politics'. To cede Venetia, we'd have to get compensation in Germany and the Balkans 'by launching into an adventurous policy contrary to Austria's traditions' — it would mean 'the annihilation of Prussia' and Austria having to defend German nationality and territory. Ceding Galicia would also require compensation from France. Rechberg wasn't totally ruling out ceding Venetia but was making clear how complex and unlikely a deal seemed.

Carr: 'Strictly speaking the March patent was an attempt to buy off Holstein, not to annex Schleswig ... but contemporaries could hardly be blamed for assuming that annexation was the government's objective after the huge popular gathering in Copenhagen's Casino theatre on 28 March had rejected all but dynastic links with German Holstein.' (Cf. Carr for a summary of the centuries of history of the S-H conflict.)

Steefel (p55): it was an attempt to deal with the constant interference of the Bund in Danish affairs and the impossibility of reaching agreement with the Holstein Estates. The Patent established a constitution for the affairs of Holstein that meant while no law went into force in Holstein without agreement of its Estates, their opposition could not stop the law going into effect in Denmark and Schleswig. Even the British agreed it contravened Denmark's agreement with Austria and Prussia in 1851-2.

After weeks of tension many thought Napoleon might start a war. Metternich said there was 'no other issue to the Polish question than war' (31/3 Cowley-Russell).

When deputies shouted that parliament would not support the government in a war with Denmark over S-H, he replied, 'I can assure you and I can assure the world that if we find it necessary to carry on a war, we shall do so with or without your consent.' As the deputies seethed, he wrote a letter to his old friend Motley: 'Looked at individually these people [parliamentary representatives] are in part very shrewd, mostly educated, regular German university culture ... as soon as they assemble in corpore, they are dumb in the mass, though individually intelligent... I hate politics... The babblers cannot rule Prussia... They have too little wit and too much complacency, dumm und dreist [stupid and brazen].'

In April, the cabinet ordered provincial governors to report on political conduct and sympathies of their officials as a first step to disciplinary action. In 1862 142/325 deputies (40%) were officials on active service. Landowners were 24%. In general, Bismarck tried to persecute officials as hard as he could, but was held back by other ministers. Pflanze estimates that 20 deputies including 9 judges suffered reprisals for political opinions.

The military committee of the Chamber of Deputies recommended limitation of the jurisdiction of military courts, liquidation of cadet schools, selection and promotion on merit etc.

Baron Budberg (Russian ambassador in Paris) sent alarming reports of likely war - Napoleon very hard line, demanding independence of Poland.

Russian army put on war-footing — reserves called up, officers' leave cancelled, forts at Kronstadt were put on alert.

Palmerston to Russell: '... Antwerp is as much in his [Napoleon's] Thoughts as Brussels and his real Object and that which lies at the Bottom of his Heart, as well as that of Every Frenchman, is the humbling of England, the Traditional Rival of France, and the main obstacle to French superiority in Europe and all over the world. The Emperor would wish to bring us upon our Marrow bones in the most friendly manner if we would let him do so and it is our Business by making ourselves strong, to render it hopeless for him to attempt doing so in any other way.'

Also on 7/4 between the same two: 'The French hint threats which we are not prepared to make and we appeal to the Treaty of Vienna which the French would wish to tear to Tatters.' (On 8/2/61 Palmerston had written to Russell: 'The real Truth of the Relations of England to France is that the whole Drift of our Policy is to prevent France from realizing her vast schemes of Extension and aggression in a great Number of Questions, and of Course our Success in doing so must necessarily be the Cause of perpetual displeasure to her Government and People.' We should avoid 'open Collision' and instead restrain 'by the Shackles of Diplomatic Trammels.'

On 21/1/61 Palmerston-Russell: 'It may be doubtful whether Prussia is not falling into a Trap about her Quarrel with Denmark and whether France may not be lying in wait for a Rupture between those Parties to side with Denmark and threaten Rhenish Prussia.' In 1859 he had written to Cowley, 'If [Austria] were dismembered, France and Russia would shake hands across Germany and the independence of Europe would be gone.')

Three different notes circulated to St Petersburg — different language, they couldn't agree on a common goal. Gorchakov thought war was probably coming. Metternich around now also thought war very likely.

Cowley-Russell: Napoleon says he hasn't slept for four nights because of 'the wrongs of Poland'. Rumors of Napoleonic schemes for Poland swept Paris.

Gorchakov having received the notes from the three Powers thought war likely: France is 'determined on war unless she is prevented by England, and we do not feel confident England will do so' he said, (Napier-Russell — Mosse says 'Buchanan' but is it a misprint?). Napier: Russian government and public are 'of one heart' and won't be pushed into further concessions.

Buchanan asked Bismarck what he would do if Russia asked for military assistance. He said it would depend on circumstances but suggested he would support Russia.

Palmerston-Buchanan: A French attack on the Baltic coast is practicable and given British sympathy for Poland he would not be able to oppose it.

Secret talks with Lassalle, extending over next 10 months. According to Gall, there is no record of those talks, though there are fragments in letters here and there. Bismarck said to Keudell that Lassalle was 'a visionary... He is the best speaker who has ever been heard... His opposition to the Progressive Party would be politically welcome. We can therefore let his agitation continue for a while, with the proviso that at the right moment we will intervene.' In summer 1878 during the row over the anti-Socialist Law, Bismarck was challenged about these talks by Bebel. Bismarck admitted to having met him 'three or four times'. 'There was never the possibility of our talks taking the form of political negotiations. What could Lassalle have offered me? The poor devil had nothing behind him... He attracted me as an individual. He was one of the most clever and attractive men with whom I have ever talked... He was ambitious, on a large scale, and there is perhaps room for doubt as to whether, in his eyes, the German Empire ultimately entailed the Hohenzollern or the Lassalle dynasty... Our conversations went on for hours and I was always sorry when they ended... [I would have been] happy to have a man of his gifts and intellectual sophistication as a neighbour on the next estate'. (A good example of Bismarck's character, he could see the strengths even of those he totally disagreed with.)

Lassalle made clear he was happy to help Bismarck alter the franchise and argued that the masses would support the monarchy if it abandoned the liberal middle classes for the proletariat. 'The working class is instinctively inclined towards dictatorship' but must be convinced 'power will be exercised in its own interest'. The proletariat would accept a 'social dictatorship' by the Crown if the Crown would 'strike out in a truly revolutionary and national direction and transform itself from a monarchy of the privileged classes into a social and revolutionary people's monarchy'. He even explained to Bismarck a legal dodge whereby the king's scruples about his oath could be overcome (the 3-class system had been introduced by decree and could be removed the same way, which would automatically reboot the system to the 1848 law — universal and equal suffrage, OP p232). They did not settle on a definite agreement. Lassalle got into problems with the police. He appealed to Bismarck for help but didn't get it. He was killed in a duel in August 1864.

Bismarck approached the issue of universal suffrage cynically, with ideas such as introducing a provision providing for abstentions to be automatically counted for the government. Lassalle's colleague, Bucher, converted to the Bismarck cause in 1864 and was used by Bismarck as a spin doctor for the nationalist cause and as a personal envoy, much to the amazement of conservative friends. Cf. Wagener and Napoleon below.

In March Lassalle said, 'An association such as I have described ... including 1 million workers in Germany with 150,000 talers annually for purposes of agitation and led with energy, that would be a power!' In May he promised, 'Give me 500,000 German workers entering my association and our reaction will be no more!' In a letter to William Rüstow, he said, 'I only want a minority, that is natural. Everything that has happened in the world has been done with minorities. But it must be a respectable minority. I cannot create a political party ... with a hundred workers. A sect for a later age could be founded with that number, not a party. In that case I was wrong, in that case I came too soon. If my labour association does not have 10,000 workers within the space of a year, then of course I will consider whether I should not give up politics altogether, since all sacrifice would then be useless.'

By late summer, he wrote to a deputy, 'So there are about 1,000 members in our entire association! Those are for the present the fruits of our labour! Those are the successes I have won by writing my fingers off and talking my lungs out! Don't you agree, this apathy of the masses could drive a man to despair! Such apathy toward a movement which exists only for them, only in their interest; such apathy despite the intellectually enormous means of agitation which have already been employed and which would already have produced tremendous results among people like the French! When will this unfeeling people finally shake off its lethargy!' When he died the next year membership stood at 4,600; it then fell, 2,500 May 1867 and remained 'a sect for a later age'; grew to 12,000 by March 1869; fell again, 8-9,000 January 1870.

Britain invited Austria and France to join her in inviting Russia to suspend hostilities for a year.

He told Oubril (Russian Ambassador in Berlin): 'Our hesitation could only come from Austria if it took a hostile attitude towards us and of such a nature as to paralyse us. But my opinion is that it could not do it and that the interests of Germany, as well as the present state of Galicia and of Poland, would prevent our abstention. Force of circumstances would oblige us to take part in such a fight... Anyway, for my part I will advise the King to march, because we could not tolerate on our borders the establishment of an independent state which would tend to make for us an impossible situation.' Mosse says he'd made clear 'he was unwilling to commit himself in advance', had 'learnt the lesson of the Alvenseben Convention' and was pursuing a policy 'similar to that which Prussia had adopted with success in the Crimean War.' (This seems wrong: a) he was making pretty clear he was on Russia's side and only a hostile Austria could create hesitations; b) the policy in the Crimean War had been hesitant, confused and noncommittal — here Bismarck was clearly determined to secure Russian friendship, oppose Polish independence and fight if France started a war.)

Debate in House of Lords on Denmark, Derby criticised Russell's blunders (cf. 24/9/62) and said Britain must support Denmark.

Bleichröder: business is suffering 'terribly' by the impasse. 24 May — most are hostile to the government but 'a great many prudent people think the Diet is going too far'.

Oubril-Gorchakov: Bismarck thinks war may be coming.

Council of Ministers in Vienna. Rechberg: our internal problems demand peace, we should not make demands of Russia that might be refused and give France an excuse to attack. FJ: we should stay neutral but try to get closer to Prussia. Vienna rejected British pressure to support an armistice.

Parliament passed (239-61) a resolution: '... between the Crown's advisers and the country there exists a gulf that cannot otherwise be filled than by a change of personnel and further more a change in the system.' Gall: Wilhelm refused to accept the deputation handing him the message. He supported Bismarck, who had wanted to prorogue Parliament again in February. The King's reply (4 days later, Gall) accused them of seeking 'an unconstitutional dictatorship of the Landtag... I repudiate this demand. My ministers enjoy my confidence, their official acts are performed with my approval and I am grateful to them for making it their business to oppose the unconstitutional aspirations of the Landtag for an extension of its power.' Parliament was prorogued [not dissolved] on 26 May [Gall & Stern 27th]. No action had been taken on the military or budget bills.Years later, Bismarck said: 'In the palace the king heard from every side insinuations to the effect that I was a democrat in disguise. I could gain his complete trust only by showing him that I was not afraid of the chamber.'

Summer 63 Growing feelings that a coup might be imminent/desirable. Bismarck talked of a coup (including with Lassalle) as did Wilhelm, but Bismarck did not want pure absolutism and reliance on just the army. His attitude was: try other things first, keep that as a last resort. He was interested in ideas to change the electoral law and the voting system. It was universal but very unequal suffrage. There were 3 voting classes: Class 1 contained the top ~5 per cent of taxpayers, Class II the next ~15 percent, and Class III the remaining ~80 percent. Class I and II paid two-thirds of taxes and chose two-thirds of electors after 1849 but it shifted in the 1850s as industrialisation shifted wealth. By 1861 class I contained 159,000, class II 454,000 and class III 2,750,000 voters. 65% of those eligible to vote in 1862 and 70% in 1863 did not vote: i.e turnout just 30-35%. In 1863, 43% of I, 56% of II and 73% of Class 3 did not vote and in some cities the rate was 90%. They knew their vote was worth ~1/17 of a wealthy vote. Voting was indirect and by voice not ballot, so risky for poor people dependent financially on richer and more powerful people. (OP p224ff)

Back in Frankfurt, Bismarck had observed the old guilds were inefficient and factories would dominate the future and this got him thinking about how to use the political desires of this new working class against the liberals. (In Frankfurt he'd written to Wagener about the guilds, handicraftsmen, factories: the guild system here means 'exorbitant cost, indifference toward customers and therefore careless work, long waiting for delivery, starting late, stopping early, long lunch hours ..., lack of choice..., backwardness in technical training'. And the handicraftsmen are not proving so loyal — 'they read to their journeymen the writings of red democracy' driven by 'the envious feeling of equality which drives the well-to-do handicraftsmen to compete with the men of education...' He wasn't sure what to conclude but 'I cannot deny that these manifestations have disconcerted me'; Hamerow,Vol 2, p201.)

The liberals opposed an equal franchise. Even Waldeck, leader of the extreme democratic faction, thought the time had not come for equal suffrage. Liberals were repelled by the recent lesson of Napoleon exploiting equal suffrage. The Nationalverein would not lower dues to allow proletarian membership. Most liberals told themselves that interference in labour markets was bad for everybody, justifying a lack of support for workers, and confined themselves to supporting education and the argument that only after education had spread could the proletariat be considered for voting. Conservatives also largely ignored the new working class. The Lutheran Church focused on the spread of faith, not social welfare, and Christian morality was seen as a matter of inner piety, not social service. Wagener advised Bismarck on communication and political strategy. Wagener thought that divine right and aristocratic support were no longer sufficient foundations for the monarchy. The monarchy must establish itself as the protector of the masses and promote 'the moral and material interests of the masses... This is the secret of the popularity of Bonapartism.' He thought conservatives should defend the masses against finance capital: 'what threatens the monarchical principle is not the broad mass of the population, which is always monarchical out of need and instinct, but the oligarchs of moneyed capital as well as the 'Catalinarian creatures' [i.e like Cataline] whom they have on their leash, namely, men of letters and enlightened notables of bureaucratism favourable to change.'

Bismarck was also thinking about Napoleon's combination of nationalism, democracy and state socialism which provided food for thought over ideas such as public works, health insurance, selling bonds to the poor, public housing. Bismarck asked Itzenplitz to consider private old-age pension funds in March 1863. In May 1863 he asked him to consider drafting legislation on legalising trade unions but nothing much happened. Cf. 12/64 and talks with Lassalle in May.

Hamerow: After Itzenplitz replaced Heydt (9/62) policy shifted in a more free trade direction. He was less keen on financing railways. In the 1860s the mileage of private railways in Prussia increased twice as much as state-owned lines. A lot of these companies then collapsed in the 1870s depression. Total value of Zollverein imports and exports doubled 1850 to 1860 and more than doubled again by 1870. Even on a per capita basis trade more than tripled.

Lerman: emphasis on weakness of liberals is 'misleading', there is 'no question' Bismarck saw an alliance with the liberals as more important than alliance with the lower classes, theories that Bismarck tried to play middle and lower classes against each other 'overestimate the importance of the working class' in the 1860s and 1870s (p88) (Cf. OP p227ff) (Lerman is overstating — Bismarck brought in universal direct suffrage in the new New North German Confederation unambiguously to pressure the liberals from below and provide new reinforcements for the Crown/aristocracy.)

Moltke working on operations against Denmark, discussions with Roon.

that allowed publications to be banned after two warnings for a 'general attitude' considered 'dangerous to the public welfare', with appeals to the cabinet, not to a judicial body. It was introduced under A63 of the constitution allowing the king to issue decrees when a) the Landtag was not in session and b) conditions were 'urgent' for 'the preservation of public safety or the settlement of an unusual emergency'. Many lawyers condemned it as unconstitutional (Bismarck had assured William that it was constitutional). Bismarck used the new law vigorously. Despite outrage, to avoid suppression and financial loss most publishers and journalists did not fight and 'bowed to the inevitable' (OP).

the Berlin city government sent a delegation to the king protesting arbitrary acts by government, Eulenburg issued an order forbidding such activity and threatened mayors and municipal officials if they disobeyed.

In 1862 'the conservative press was hopelessly outclassed': of 300,000 papers sold in Prussia daily, 5/6 backed the opposition. One of his first acts had been to end government support for a newspaper. He 'secretly bought the services' (OP) of Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, a leftwing paper edited by a revolutionary of 1848 (!) — Liebknecht resigned when he learned of it — and often wrote pieces in it himself anonymously (it had originally been a mouthpiece for Austrian interests but under Bismarck it became a mouthpiece for the government via the Literary Bureau of the Ministry of the Interior). Taxpayers' money was used to influence other papers and to set up a new government information system, with all official information channelled into the official Staatsanzeiger from November 1862. Legations in Paris and Frankfurt were used to pay journalists in France and south Germany. From September 1862, Bismarck used the 1851 press law to clamp down on opposition papers. However, the results disappointed him. He considered a 'corrections' system in which papers would have been forced to correct inaccuracies but didn't do it. Gall: The press law was 'almost universally regarded as the prelude to a dictatorship by decree'. Pflanze: city councils started to protest, on 6 June Eulenburg told them to keep out of national politics or suffer disciplinary action. Pressure on civil service to support the King, Bismarck used all sorts of tactics to weed out hostile officials (he also opposed promotion by seniority).

Alexander II wrote to Wilhelm: War is likely in August, hostilities may start in the Baltic on the Vistula and spread to Rhine. In what circumstances can Russia count on Prussia? 'I know I can count on you — but in what eventualities and to what extent will your interests make you active? It is not a diplomatic opening that I am addressing to you, it is an appeal that I am making to your loyal friendship.'

Clarendon (London) to Cowley (Paris): Apponyi thinks Palmerston's diplomatic campaign was a prelude to war. Rechberg feared the same.

Crown Prince wrote to Wilhelm complaining about the press law.

Crown Prince publicly disowned the press law at a dinner in Danzig — 'I have had no part in the deliberations'. (Crown Prince wrote in diary that he spoke out to make himself 'publicly known as an opponent of Bismarck and his evil theories'.) Wilhelm was furious and talked of arresting him.

Crown Prince rebuked by Wilhelm. He replied offering apology and resignation from all offices. (Steinberg: if he had fought he may have won and Wilhelm abdicated. Really?! Sounds delusional.)

Bismarck and Wilhelm discussed it (in French so the carriage servants couldn't understand) and Bismarck claimed (Memoirs) that he advised reconciliation and makeup so there would be unity against parliament, do not make Crown Prince a martyr in your wrath etc. (Crown Prince suspected some generals were conspiring to replace him as heir with his reactionary uncle, Prince Friedrich Karl. Pflanze, p.175. Letters show Bismarck was right to claim that the Crown Prince's wife was writing to Victoria providing information about family rows over the press law.) Pflanze (p218): it was a big sensation in European papers but no Prussian paper dared cover it and those who knew heard from leaflets and rumours. 'Outside Prussia leaders of the Nationalverein were highly disturbed by the feeble reaction to the edict', including among the Progressive Party, and 'at no time during the constitutional conflict did the liberals question that the army ... would stand behind the crown'. (In February, General Wrangel had increased the number of battalions in Berlin from 50 to 80). They also did not think they had support for a taxpayers' strike which would have been unconstitutional. So the money kept coming in and was spent by the Government as it wanted. Liberals also rejected Lassalle's idea of a parliamentary strike: under modern conditions no monarchy could rule indefinitely without a parliament, he argued — 'A government that has its hands continually in everyone's pocket must assume at least the appearance of having everyone's consent.' (Liberals attacked him, the one deputy who supported it suffered such a backlash he resigned.)They were neither prepared to take responsibility for governing themselves nor did they dare make alliance with the working classes. They suffered 'crippling uncertainty of popular support' (OP p221ff).

Steefel: Napoleon 'seems to have been ready to restore confidential relations with Prussia' as early as 8 June. Cf. Prince Henry VII of Reuss's notes of his conversation with Napoleon at Fontainebleau on 8 June.

Bismarck opposed other ministers in a Crown Council who wanted to dissolve the Landtag and have another election. He thought this an admission of weakness that the government felt it needed a parliamentary majority. The King was not obliged to call parliament until January 1864. He wanted to rule without Parliament sitting. Others objected Parliament needed to pass a budget. (Some time in 1863 he complained to the Crown Prince that Wilhelm took his oath to uphold the constitution too seriously. Cf. August.)

Wilhelm replied ???: He warned that he had to be careful about Bund legalities, he would try to keep Austria neutral until he could persuade the other German states 'of my own conviction'.

Drouyn again suggested a joint demonstration to Britain and Austria.

Cowley-Russell: Napoleon means to drag us into war. Further discussions in mid-June about joint demands to Russia but the three still couldn't agree. Russell made clear to Paris that Britain would not join a war against Russia. (At the end of June the Cabinet was 'dispersed on holiday' (Mosse), the timetable was different to now.)

Palmerston note: 'Bismarck might be privately told that if the King's Life is in Danger, Bismarck and the unwise and unconstitutional system he is persuading the King to adopt were the true Causes of that Danger.' Palmerston to Russell: 'This is highly probable and indeed more than probable and the gentlemen in Frankfurt and the crazy minister at Berlin should have this impressed upon them. Any aggressive Measure of Germany [against] Denmark would most likely lead to an aggressive move by France [against] Germany, and especially [against] Prussia, the main instigator of that aggression. The Prussian Provinces would at once be occupied by France and in the present state of the Prussian army, its system of drill Formation and movements, the first Serious Encounter between it and the French would be little less disastrous to Prussia than the Battle of Jena [Napoleon's famous victory].' On 26 December Palmerston repeated to Russell his view that 'the French would walk over' the Prussian army. (Good example of how hard it is to judge the dynamics of state power — scarcely would Palmerston have believed that a mere seven years later the Prussian army would have crushed Austria and France.)

Crown Prince wrote to Bismarck attacking his whole policy and saying he did not want to take part in any further discussions with this ministry. There had been a leak from the Crown Prince's circle about the correspondence with the King. Bismarck wrote in his Memoirs that the incident was part of the general problem of Crown Prince's wife and the quarter century of mistaken discussion in Prussia about adopting the British constitution: 'What wonder then that the Crown Princess and her mother overlooked that peculiar character of the Prussian state which renders its administration by means of shifting parliamentary groups a sheer impossibility? What wonder then that this error bred the further mistake of anticipating for the Prussia of the 19th century a repetition of the civil broils and catastrophes of the England of the 17th-century unless the system by which they were terminated were introduce among us?' The progressives anticipated victory and were using the media to, among other things, try to influence 'female minds'. In August at Gastein, 'less under the sway of English influences', the Crown Prince asked Bismarck for forgiveness. (Memoirs, p352ff)

Battle of Gettysburg.

Cowley made clear to Drouyn that regardless of pro-Polish sympathies Britain would not go to war with Russia over it. London was still worried re the chance of a French strike. Drouyn made clear that he did not think France could go to war with Russia without Austrian support. The diplomatic wrangling sparked by the February action over Poland petered out at the end of June/July. NB. France still diverted by Mexico, Britain by the US Civil War. Both Britain and Russia feared Napoleon more than Germany and feared that a weaker Germany threatened their interests — the Low Countries (Britain) and Poland (Russia).

The Confederation decided to summon the Danish King to revoke within six weeks the March Patent and preparations were made to occupy Holstein, a federal execution.

Palmerston speech to Commons: 'I am satisfied with all reasonable men in Europe, including those in France and Russia, in desiring that the independence, the integrity and the rights of Denmark may be maintained. We are convinced — I am convinced at least — that if any violent attempt were made to overthrow those rights and interfere with that independence, those who made the attempt, would find in the result, that it would not be Denmark alone with which they would have to contend.' This strengthened feeling in Denmark that they could play hardball. Russell, however, did not conceal in diplomatic circles he disapproved of Palmerston's words. Steefel: the threat got little attention in England or Germany but did in Scandinavia. Hall took comfort from the words and did not bring forward conciliatory proposals. Palmerston also told the Commons that 'what is at the bottom of the German design, and the desire of connecting Schleswig with Holstein, is the dream of a German fleet, and the wish to get Kiel as a German seaport. That may be a good reason why they should wish it; but it is no reason why they should violate the rights and independence of Denmark for an object which, even if accomplished, would not realise the expectation of those who aim at it.'

2 days later Palmerston wrote a memo: 'war begun about a petty quarrel concerning the institutions of Holstein would in all probability not end where it began, but might draw after it consequences which all the parties who began it would have been exceedingly sorry to have caused.

(JS) Bismarck arrived at Bad Gastein.

Russell warns Vienna that an invasion of Schleswig might provoke war not just with Denmark but with Sweden and France, and provoke a general European intervention.

FJ arrived at Bad Gastein. Bismarck was sitting under the fir trees in the Schwarzenberg gardens by the gorge of the Ache.

Memoirs: 'Above me was a nest of titmice and watch in hand I counted the number of times in the minute the bird brought her nestlings a caterpillar or other insect. While I was observing the useful activity of these little creatures, I saw King William sitting alone on a bench on the Schillerplatz on the opposite side of the gorge. When the hour drew near to dress for dinner with the King, I went to my lodgings and there found a note from his Majesty informing me that he would await me on the Schillerplatz in order to speak to me about the meeting with the Emperor. I made all possible haste, but before I reached the King's apartments an interview had taken place between the two sovereigns. If I had spent less time over my observations of nature, and had seen the King sooner, the first impression made on him by the Emperor's communications might have been other than it was. He did not instantly feel the slight implied by this sudden attack, by this invitation... He probably favoured the Austrian proposal because it contained an element of royal solidarity in the struggle against parliamentary liberalism.' (p375) (EF implies this happened on or after 3rd.)

Eyck: after this first discussion, FJ telegraphed to Vienna: 'King not yet decided but seems favourable. I think he will come to Frankfurt.'

OP (p214): At Gastein Wilhelm said to the Crown Prince (their first meeting since the Danzig episode) that he foresaw a series of dissolutions and elections. 'Above all obedience must be reestablished in the country.' Bismarck said a 'constitutional regime' was 'untenable' and under parliamentary government the monarchy would fall apart. The Crown Prince replied that this was 'peculiar talk' for a Minister President, if that was his attitude why did he govern under the constitution at all? Bismarck replied that he would observe existing laws as long as he could, but the time would come when it would be 'otherwise'. Cf. 2/9.

It included: a new 5-man executive including the Austrian Emperor and the King of Prussia, a new assembly of delegates appointed by the national parliaments, a federal court etc. It did not mention the Zollverein but was clearly intended to disrupt Prussian plans for it.

Mosse: the Austrian plan was Schmerling's (and it resembled Schwarzenberg's before Olmütz), who thought Prussian internal problems provided an opportunity. Rechberg opposed it and unsuccessfully offered his resignation. Clark: Schmerling and Biegeleben had worked on it behind the back of Rechberg and got FJ to agree. The goal was Schwarzenberg's before Olmütz: maintain Austrian dominance in the Bund and bring all her possessions within mutual defence of German states.

Friedjung (p36): the idea of FJ inviting the German princes came from Julius Fröbel, a democrat who had been condemned to death for his part in the revolution in Vienna in 1848 but was pardoned, emigrated to America, returned to try to influence the German question. He wrote a memo proposing that FJ invite the German princes to a meeting in Frankfurt to reform the Bund and the memo found its way to FJ (outside normal channels). Friedjung says that FJ worked out the plan with Biegeleben and left Rechberg out, and Schmerling found out what was going on from Fröbel(!). Friedjung: 'The origin of the plan was thus almost more remarkable than the plan itself' and Biegeleben was hoping to use the coup to grab control of German policy. FJ brought the ministers in when the moment seemed right: Schmerling was pro, Rechberg strongly anti. Rechberg argued that changes to the Bund required unanimity, trying to force such changes through would lead to war. He offered his resignation, rejected. Rechberg insisted that he, not Schmerling, attended Frankfurt with FJ. FJ agreed. Rechberg acted at Frankfurt 'without energy or enthusiasm' (Friedjung). Schmerling complained to FJ about being left behind and claimed to Fröbel that FJ had replied, 'If I take you, what room will there be for me!' Fröbel wrote later that Schmerling complained to him, 'Where are we to find the strength and goodwill to carry through any big measure? In Austria everyone works against everyone else.' (These details seem to be absent all later books I've read. NB. Friedjung interviewed many of the participants himself including Bismarck.)

It was a huge threat to Bismarck's plans: it potentially would consolidate Austria's position in Germany and channel national energy into new institutions. Bismarck called it in his Memoirs 'Schwarzenberg policy in the posthumous form of the Congress of Princes'. Austria put great pressure on Wilhelm. On the drive from Wildbad to Baden, talking in French so the servants could not understand, Bismarck sought to persuade him not to go to Frankfurt and thought he had succeeded. (Eyck: Bismarck rightly followed him to Baden knowing he should not leave him alone and further pressure would come.)

In Baden a dramatic, crucial scene played out. The King of Saxony, acting for Austria and on the half of all the princes, renewed the invitation to Frankfurt (19th, Memoirs). 'My master did not find it easy to resist that move. He reflected over and over again: “Thirty reigning princes and a king to take their messages!” Not until midnight did I succeed in obtaining the King's signature to a refusal to the King of Saxony. When I left my master, both he and I were ill and exhausted by the nervous tension of the situation and my subsequent verbal communication with the Saxon minister, von Beust, bore the stamp of this agitation. But the crisis was overcome and the King of Saxony departed without, as I had feared, visiting my master again.' (As he left the King's room, he smashed up the washbasin in the antechamber in rage.)

In Busch's book (Vol 1, p131/175 depending on edition), he told Busch in 1870: after the King of Saxony had visited, 'his Majesty lay on the sofa and had an attack of hysterical weeping; and when at last I had succeeded in wringing from him the letter of refusal, I was myself so weak and exhausted that I could hardly stand. Indeed, I actually reeled as I left the room and was so nervous and unhinged that in closing the outer door I tore off the handle... I told Beust that I would have the regiment stationed at Rastatt brought over to guard the house and to prevent anybody else having access to the King in order to put fresh pressure on him.' (Showalter's description of this as demonstrating a relationship between the two aristocrats akin to that in The Odd Couple seems completely anachronistic and false.)

JS: winning the battle with Wilhelm not to go to Frankfurt was 'the most important achievement of his entire career', if he had failed then as he said to the Dowager Queen Elizabeth he could not have remained as minister, and this was an example of 'Germany's fate' decided by Bismarck and if he had failed then 'the history of Germany and the world would have run a different course'.

(*While 'most important achievement of his entire career' is an exaggeration, it's fair to argue that this event could have propelled the world down a very different track. If he had lost this argument and resigned, Bismarck would now be dismissed as an out-of-his-depth loser in history's footnotes and Prussia/Germany would undoubtedly have evolved very differently. Even if some sort of expanded Prussia had happened (who knows) it would not have had the distinctive constitution that he crafted. If he had resigned perhaps Wilhelm would have ended up abdicating after all and Frederick would have ruled for 20 years before dying of cancer in the 1880s. Given how hard it was for Bismarck to push Wilhelm to challenge Austria it must be doubted whether anyone else could have done so.)

Gall (p232): the princes were only told the detailed proposals, such as the five-man committee, on the 16th the day before the opening of the Council of Princes in Frankfurt on 17th.

Friedjung: FJ arrived in Frankfurt on 16th.

It was crucial that the princes at Frankfurt would not accept Austria's proposals to push on without Prussia but stated that there should be fresh negotiations with Prussia. Bismarck delayed responses for weeks and played for time, replying formally on 22 (OP) September (15th, JS) demanding: a veto over declaration of war, parity in control of the Bund, and 'a true national assembly which emerges from the direct participation of the entire nation'. The congress was the last attempt at something like the Schwarzenberg policy — a union of all German powers on the basis of a dual government but with Austria top dog and Prussia 'reduced to the rank of a middle state'.

The entente between France and Britain encouraged FJ to make the push against Prussia at the Congress of Princes — he didn't realise NIII was 'weary of the Polish affair and anxious to find a decent pretext for retreat' (Memoirs, p344). Gall: it was proposed to be on 16th but opened on 17th, Prussia was invited again, the King of Saxony was deployed to deliver the request in person at Baden-Baden.

While at Gastein, the Tsar informed William of his intention to fight over Poland and wanted a Prussian alliance. In Memoirs (2,p70ff) he describes this episode again. Tsar sent a long handwritten letter to William: he wanted to break out of the manoeuvres of Austria and the western powers and wanted Prussia's help in war. Bismarck wrote a long memo about the idea: a war with Russia against Austria and German states would harm our position in Germany, which required independence from Russia; that Russia would suffer less than Prussia which would have to fight hard against France; that even if victorious Russia would end up dictating peace. In his Memoirs he added that a soft peace with Austria would also have been very hard to pull off, as it was in 1866. Eyck gives a completely different account (p.71-2), says that Bismarck's account in his Memoirs is lies, and the Tsar was actually asking for an alliance against Napoleon. (I can't tell what is true about all this.)

Letter Wilhelm-Alexander: There is still a chance for Prussia and Russia to work together to avert war and restore the Austrian alliance. However, Austria's initiative with the German princes was very threatening.

Clarendon had been sent by Russell to observe events at Frankfurt, reported back: in Frankfurt they have 'harnessed together a team of 30 horses — two great dray horses ... who are always kicking and biting at each other — then a lot of half-bred shambling vicious beasts of different sizes, and a dozen Shetland ponies of the smallest dimensions — and how such a team is to be made to look well, or draw evenly, and to have its due share of work assigned to each, with a lumbering coach in a heavy road — is likely to puzzle the raw German Coachmen and Helpers who have undertaken the job.'

To Joanna: complained that he would love someone else to take over so he could 'turn my back on this uninterrupted stream of ink and withdraw to the quiet of the country. This restless life is unbearable. For ten weeks I have been doing nothing but secretarial service in a coaching inn.'

Mosse: Wilhelm and Bismarck made a brief visit to see Queen Victoria at Coburg. Victoria promised to urge on FJ 'complete parity' for Prussia in German affairs. Wilhelm stressed their interests as 'the two great Protestant powers'. Bismarck stressed to Granville the probability of war as a result of Austria's actions. According to Granville, he spoke of honour, pride and the German proverb 'better an end to terror than terror without end' (Granville memo, 31/8). 3 days later Victoria met FJ who rejected the idea of sharing the Presidency with Prussia and abandoning a hereditary prerogative.

Goltz-Bismarck: Napoleon is friendly.

Parliament dissolved again.

Crown Prince recounted in his diary a conversation with his father.

CP: I didn't want to express my doubts yesterday in front of the ministers. But what about the future?

W: Repeated dissolutions, one after the other.

CP: But to what end shall these measures finally lead?

W: Obedience in the country, scaffold, possibly a rupture of the constitution by barricades in the streets and then naturally suspension of the same.

CP: In Gastein Bismarck spoke of the untenability of the constitution and of the coming necessity of its abandonment.

W: The Kaiser of Austria and I are both convinced that in twenty years there will be no more constitutions.

CP: What then?

W: I don't know. I won't be alive then. But this abominable constitutional system can't continue, it will only bring about the destruction of royal authority and the introduction of a republic with a president as in England [sic]. Scoundrels of the opposition ... have to be shown who is king of Prussia.

Pflanze: This exchange sparked another crisis in relations. Encouraged by wife and mother, FW refused to attend further sessions of the cabinet but did attend Crown Councils. Wilhelm feared he intended to break publicly with the regime but it didn't happen. The Crown Prince wrote to Bismarck that he had told the king of his opposition and 'I am the determined foe of the Ministry.'

OP: smashing the constitution was only one possibility for Bismarck and he had not decided on this then. In October Wilhelm wrote to FW: 'You always come back to Minister von Bismarck's utterance that we could reach the point of dispensing with the constitution. In his conversation with you at Gastein he presented this as one possibility, while you make it out to be the goal of his efforts.'

. He used all the weapons he could lay hands on to smash the liberals right down to prosecuting pubs that hosted opposition meetings. Whole apparatus of the Prussian state moved against liberal candidates across the country. Soldiers were forbidden to vote. Officials told it was unpatriotic and against their oath to the king to support liberal parties. Cf. 22-24/9.

Bismarck absent from Berlin after death of his mother-in-law. At some point around then Wilhelm asked Bismarck to tell the Crown Prince that he could NOT absent himself from government meetings. There was a meeting in which the Crown Prince told Bismarck not to expect to continue under him. 'The refusal [to cooperate] was accompanied by a hostile expression of Olympian disdain which after all these years I have not forgotten... I suppressed my own rising choler, thought of Carlos and Alva (Act 2, sc.5), and answered that my words had been prompted ... in the hope of restoring him to closer relations with his father, in the interest alike of the country and the dynasty...; because ... I wish to preserve harmony within the royal family. I said that I was a loyal servant of his father and desired that on his accession to the throne he might find, to supply my place, servants as loyal to him as I had been to his father. I hoped he would dismiss the idea that I aimed at someday becoming his minister; that I would never be.' FW kept pushing to be allowed not to attend meetings but William insisted. The row ended with a brutal rebuttal from Bismarck to Crown Prince on 7 November. (Memoirs p357)

Palmerston-Russell: 'Perhaps all things considered dualism is the only arrangement possible in Germany. Austria & Prussia are like Caesar and Pompey. Prussia like Caesar will not brook a superior, and Austria like Pompey will not endure an equal. Each might be a centre around which the smaller states might range themselves ... and there would be two strong bodies who would unite against a foreign foe.'

Oubril-Gorchakov: '“Tell the Prince [Gorchakov]”, he told me, among other things the day before yesterday, “that you found me cold and calm. Indeed, I rage calmly”. His indignation against Austria knows no bounds.' He said that Prussia was determined to avoid another Olmütz and would fight Austria to stop it, even if he had to 'ally with the Devil' ('... dûssions nous nous allier au Diable') which Oubril interpreted as Napoleon. I am the champion of a Russian alliance but 'I would be the first to give way to a liberal ministry, even in advance, if we were to have the sad experience of being deceived about you' — neutrality isn't possible and it would be a disaster for Russia if Prussia disappears from the map. When Oubril said Russia's German policy was based on fear of French intervention, Bismarck said this didn't worry him as France could be compensated — the line of the Weser was more important than the Rhine ('la ligne du Weser est plus important pour nous que celle du Rhin'). 'Besides, a war [with Austria] could only facilitate the internal situation for us. So I would accept it without hesitation and without fear.' Prussia would be united but Russia should pressure Austrian borders to paralyse the government. 'You are accustomed to a Prussia that lives quietly between Berlin and Sans Souci [the summer palace at Potsdam built by Frederick the Great — sans souci means 'carefree'] and goes, if necessary, to Olmütz. The time for that is absolutely past.' (He had talked to Oubril on 3/9 of acting 'like Frederick the Great in 1756' and striking a sudden blow before they realised the danger.) Oubril thought Bismarck was dangerous but also a true ally of Russia and if he were replaced Russia would struggle to find allies in Prussia over Poland. The Tsar's view was Russia should not get embroiled in the details of the German rows — 'the German dispute only interests us if it resulted in a general conflagration'. But Bismarck's violent language and Oubril's reflections influenced the Tsar and Gorchakov to shift away from neutrality to a more pro-Prussian stance (Mosse, p136).

He wrote to Catherine Orlov: 'I console myself by opening my cigar case, where I always find by one of your big hairpins a small yellow flower plucked at Superbagnères, moss from Port de Venasque and a twig of olive tree from the terraces of Avignon. German sentimentality you will say. No matter. One day I will have the satisfaction of showing you these souvenirs of happy times to which I think back as [in English] a paradise lost.'

(JS and Gall date this to 15/9). There were disagreements between Bismarck and king about the nature of the franchise but these remained private (OP says the original draft had a phrase about a 'popular assembly' but this was left out). Outwardly it 'looked like an offer of universal and equal suffrage'. This was a nightmare for Austria because of the potential split of her German and non-German population. Gall (p233): It was 'an extraordinary turn of events' for Bismarck to support the idea that the Kings could not solve the German question without the people and without a directly elected parliament. This aligned the Prussian government with the liberal position and 'opened up entirely new and far-reaching perspectives for everyone concerned' but 'the overwhelming majority of liberal contemporaries saw it as a purely tactical move'.

OP: most liberals tried to ignore the move and focus on domestic issues but they were greatly hampered by Bismarck's press law and other repression. On 22/9 officials serving as deputies were assessed the cost of substitutes appointed by the government and a directive on 24/9 from Eulenburg informed them that if elected they were bound by oath to follow the 'constitutional way' as determined by the crown. Wilhelm told the country that 'an inimical attitude toward my government is incompatible with loyalty to my person' thereby branding liberals as unpatriotic and even treasonable. Teachers, professors, mayors were warned to support the government, pastors preached voting with the king. Renters of public property were told to support the king or suffer. Bismarck had suspended a group of railway workers who failed to prevent a hostile demonstration against himself at a Pomeranian station.

Alexander-Wilhelm: He sympathised with Prussia over Austria's recent action and would nudge Austria accordingly, but there was no promise of support in a war. Alexander's view was that a Prussian-Austrian war then would be a disaster — Russia needed peace to sort out Poland and internal problems. He stressed similar thoughts to Prussia's military attaché. The letter produced on Bismarck 'the depressing effect to be expected' (Oubril-Gorchakov 23/9).

To Wilhelm: expects to be back in Berlin in a week then proceed to Baden. He suggests that the king should pardon a locally-influential peasant under attack from local liberal/legal forces who are trying to persuade the peasants that they have more power than the king over local issues — a pardon would make the point forcefully that the king could influence local battles. (Interesting example of the sort of small battle, which doesn't make it into history books (it's recounted in a letter), that someone like Bismarck is constantly engaged with.)

He complained that the Foreign Ministry was in 'a deplorable state of decay'. One of his officials wrote that he was 'not completely of sound mind' and from time to time demanded completely impracticable things'. Blanckenburg wrote to Gerlach on 3/10 that Bismarck is 'writing everything on his own, no one can do it right for him, ... he is losing contact, speaks to few people'. Gerlach advised him to bring in outsiders to help. He complained to Keudell that he had aged 15 years in a year and 'the people are much stupider than I thought'.

(Clark) There was a conference of German state foreign ministers at Nuremberg. Rechberg tried to get them to agree on the August plan without Prussia. The other states did not want to alienate Prussia. Rechberg said to the Saxon minister, 'Very well, if you wish it that way we too can make friends with Prussia.' When he returned to Vienna, he decided that, although Bismarck wanted to push Austria out of Germany, in the short-term he should look for a deal to buy time while Austria recovered from recent disasters. Bismarck would also help against the democratic tide while the minor German sovereigns were bending like reeds in a storm. FJ was disheartened by the failure of the Schmerling/Biegeleben plan and was willing to listen — although he preferred Schwarenberg's approach to Metternich's, his disposition was to temporise and swerve around. Influential people around FJ disliked Bismarck's style and aggression but they also feared that if he fell he would be replaced by a liberal and this limited action against him in 1862-4.

(Gall) The Bund approved a 'federal execution' order against Holstein and charged Prussia and Austria with Saxony and Hanover to enforce it. Bleichröder: the market is depressed with fears of conflict (Stern).

Bismarck spoke to Buchanan: suggested he was happy at the idea of a conference but he urged Britain not to act until after the Execution. He repeatedly portrayed himself to Buchanan as softening demands from Austria and other German states.

(Clark) Metternich wrote to Rechberg re latest French ideas for an alliance — this time Venetia was unmentioned, Austria would not have to cede Galicia (only Russia and Prussia would lose in Poland) and Napoleon renounced the Rhineland. Rechberg remained opposed and it went nowhere.

To Bernstorff: 'It is not the German governments but the German people that overwhelmingly shares the same interests as ourselves. Prussia needs a counterweight to the dynastic policy of the governments and will be able to find it only in a national representative body.'

Buchanan-Russell: Bismarck says that he prefers the Danish king in the Duchies to a new Duke.

1863 elections (Pflanze refers to September elections p208 but 20/10 p216): conservatives recovered a bit from 10 [wrong, 11] to 36, liberals had 258/350. Steinberg: PP 135>>141; other liberals 96>>106; conservatives 11>>35; 'Constitutionals' disappeared completely. EF: cons 11>35, PP 133>140 (historian Mommsen elected), liberals ~70%, turnout down from 34% to 31%. Wilhelm was so worried by the October 1863 election results that he apparently said, looking out of a window onto Palace Square, 'Down there is where they will put up a guillotine for me' (Clark). Deputies soon rejected the three-year military reform again and cut the budget accordingly. OP: the results were roughly as Bismarck expected, the only good news was some better conservatives elected, such as Wagener and Blanckenburg. Hamerow: the liberals got 536k votes (49%) and 258 (down from 285) seats (same seats as OP) vs conservatives 336k votes (31%) and 36 seats (same seats as OP). PP up from 141 to 143. They had roughly the same advantage in each of the three classes. Turnout down from 34% to 31%. (Only 1863 has detailed electoral records.) Seems 258-36 is the right result.

Bismarck wrote to Gerlach complaining that Crown Prince was an 'impudent nonentity' and 'cretin'.

Bismarck to Schleinitz: 'The Prussian monarchy and our present constitution are irreconcilable.' The chief obstacle in the way of the 'complete and unconditional' elimination of the constitution was the king. (In autumn (Hamerow) Roon wrote from Pomerania (autumn): 'I live here in the midst of so-called Junkerdom, but my hopes for the future are not thereby strengthened. Supineness, laziness, pusillanimity, these are the chief characteristics of the so-called conservative monarchist majority of the people, which endures everything but also expects everything from the government. Only the rule of the sabre can save us!

Russell-Queen: 'Prussia is becoming more friendly to England than she has been for many years.'

Disraeli-Earle: 'Prussia, without nationality, the principle of the day, is clearly the subject for partition.'

Bismarck creates more conservative peers for the House of Lords, which had an important veto.

Austrian Council of Ministers met — what to do if France continued to push on Poland? Mosse: Rechberg feared Napoleon and wanted closer relations with Prussia.

Napoleon declares that the 1815 treaties had 'ceased to exist' and demands a European Congress. (Mosse — invitation to Congress on 4th, denounced 1815 on 5th.) Cowley reported to London that in Paris the message of Napoleon's speech was seen as 'A Congress or war'.

Bismarck replied in a friendly tone without commitment, assuming Britain would veto. Austria and Russia didn't want it but wanted Britain to torpedo. Russell's first reaction was not hostile but he thought it required serious thought, not immediate response. Rechberg expressed the fear it would lead to a general war (Bloomfield, 8/11). Gorchakov wanted to weaken further the Britain-France relationship.

His friend Hans von Kleist wrote to him quoting Revelations 2.27 (... And he that overcometh and keepeth my works unto the end, to him will I give power over the nations and he shall rule them with a rod of iron...), Bismarck scribbled 'O Hans, always wrathful with God's thunderbolt'.

Karolyi-Rechberg: Bismarck isn't being friendly towards the idea of closer relations, claims Austria threatening him with a French alliance. Over the next fortnight Bismarck and Karolyi talked more. Karolyi reported that closer relations with Prussia required clearly abandoning the Schmerling plans for Bund reform.

Bismarck-Redern re Napoleon's invitation: 'Bernstorff telegraphs, “I learn from a certain and very confidential source that the Queen finds the approach very impertinent.' Werther telegraphs: “Rechberg fears the Congress, of which he disapproves in principle, hoping that the project will fail from a refusal of England.'

Goltz-Bismarck: Drouyn says the Congress could 'facilitate your escape from the difficulties against which you are struggling in the interior and in Germany... You will recall that several times I have expressed the desire of doing something with you: perhaps the moment has arrived'. Bismarck immediately replied in friendly spirit.

Wilhelm opened new session with 'intransigent' speech from the throne (JS). JS writes, oddly, that the government lifted the June press edict but at the same time insisted it was 'urgently necessary and absolutely constitutional'. OP writes more convincingly that the liberals voted down the press edict 'which thereby became inoperative (p.222).

British Cabinet decided to inquire in Paris about the agenda and powers of a congress.

Wilhelm received Napoleon's invitation to the Congress from the Ambassador. Reply was presented by Goltz on 22nd.

Denmark adopted a new constitution. It put into effect the concept from the March Patent. The Danish Council President, Hall, went to get it signed by the King but found him ill. Two days later on 15 November the Danish king died, he had no direct heir. He was succeeded by Prince Christian of Schleswig-Holstein-Sönderburg-Glücksbrg as King Christian IX (proclaimed 18th). The new King signed the new constitution (20th) under great pressure from politicians and even the police (who said they could not guarantee law and order unless he signed). (Gorchakov tried to stop Christian signing the new constitution.) This kicked off the Schleswig-Holstein affair. Schleswig and Holstein were possessions of the Danish crown. Holstein was part of the German Confederation but Schleswig was not. Denmark had promised not to incorporate either duchy in 1852.

Steefel: the new constitution did not incorporate Schleswig but it was reasonable to argue that it was a step toward its incorporation, and Denmark had expressly promised not to do this. It is generally now agreed that Denmark was violating its promises of 1851-2.

(19th JS) Duke Christian Augustenburg had accepted 1852 but not given up his rights forever in favor of his son. Frederik proclaimed himself 'Friedrik VIII, Duke of Schleswig-Holstein' and soon his sovereignty was recognized by most lesser German states and his case was taken up by liberal Germany. There was 'almost unanimous support of the German public' (Gall) for him. His wife was a niece of Queen Victoria which added to Bismarck's problems.

Bismarck was intimately familiar with the details of the famously complex SH question. He had been involved in 1851 in Frankfurt talks and over the years advised the government on how to handle it. He always looked at it from the perspective of how it could help the Prussian monarchy, as he defined its interests. He had consistently told diplomats that he preferred to see the Duchies under the Danish King than a new Grand Duke who would oppose Prussia in the Bund. Openly he agreed with Rechberg in August and September that the Danish policy was unsatisfactory and the legal procedure should run its course but secretly October/November he was working with Britain to try to avert the Execution by securing concessions from Denmark. He presented himself to London as a moderating influence on Austria and the south German states. He also secretly encouraged Denmark into a more aggressive posture that he would later use to justify his action against her. NB. He was explicit 22 December 1862 (to Count von Fleming): 'I am certain that the whole Danish business can be settled in a way desirable for us only by war. The occasion for such a war can be found at any moment that we find favorable for waging it.' He was determined to undermine the Bund and happy to do so by using the supposed sanctity of international treaties he thought were untenable and undesirable — everything in good time.

OP: Almost every force in Europe was opposed to Prussian annexation: the Great Powers, his own King and his family, his own Parliament, the German lesser states, many of his own officials in the Foreign Office, the media. As Pflanze writes, his achievement over SH was 'one of the amazing feats in the history of politics'. He did it by constantly diverting the pressure from different forces against each other, keeping them all divided, expanding his own possibilities.

He later told Bucher: 'The Schleswig-Holstein question was a nut on which we might well have broken our teeth. Denmark didn't worry me. I counted on her making blunders and it was only a question of creating a favorable situation. Austria had to be brought to see that she would dissipate all sympathy in Germany if she didn't go with us. Russia had to be reminded of the services we rendered when Austria wanted to mobilize Germany against her. England had to be isolated so that she would confine herself to threats, as she always does when no-one will pull her chestnuts out of the fire for her. The individual actions were trifles in themselves; to see that they connected was the difficulty.'

Russell asked Prussia and Austria to delay the Execution to give the new king time to consider the situation. Two days later he offered British mediation on the duchies. After the news of Augustenburg's proclamation he switched tactics and pushed for a rapid Execution as it would imply recognition by the Diet of Christian as Duke of Holstein (Bernstorff-Bismarck, 22/11). Then he reversed again and told Prussia and Austria that Britain expected Christian's right of accession to all territories to be acknowledged and warned against the use of Execution to enforce international obligations.

The Nationalverein issued an inflammatory appeal calling for Germany to reclaim the two duchies and supporting Augustenburg, with much talk of 'common fatherland' and warnings against 'betrayal to foreigners'. The Reformverein joined them. Both summoned the deputies of all German parliaments to Frankfurt on 21 December. Wilhelm and the Crown Prince supported Augustenburg.

OP (p268): 'Moderate' liberals such as Virchow feared that Bismarck would take up Augustenburg's cause and put them on the defensive. They urged Wilhelm to support Augustenburg. Waldeck and his democratic faction of 35 opposed them. Waldeck actually supported Prussian annexation and the development of German naval power but did not want Parliament to support the Crown and Bismarck, thus dissipating energy from the constitutional conflict. Some prioritised freedom at home, others prioritised progress on unification. Waldeck feared war would strengthen Bismarck, others confidently predicted the government could not survive such a crisis. When debate ended, the resolution urging support for Augustenburg passed with a large majority. Cf. 9/12. (Blackburn: Pflanze underestimated the importance of the Nationalverein in general, referred to a 'few thousand' members but it had 25,000. True?)

Frederick left Gotha for Berlin to seek Prussian support.

Bismarck to Talleyrand: 'For Prussia I prefer the King of Denmark in Kiel and Altona to a Duke of Holstein who out of fear will feel obliged, like so many other Princes, to oppose us at Frankfurt.'

Lincoln's Gettysburg address.

British Cabinet discussed Napoleon's offer and agreed to decline. Palmerston wanted to stay friendly with France to contain Russia in the East but did not want a Congress that he thought would exacerbate disagreements. Russell's despatch declining the Congress was sent on evening of 25/11, reached Paris on 26th, but not presented to Drouyn until 28th, meanwhile the full text had appeared in the London Gazette on 27th. Napoleon was furious about it and made clear the Anglo-French alliance was over and he would be looking for new combinations. Cowley reported he'd never seen Napoleon so angry. It seems the Cabinet did not appreciate the way in which they turned this down would have the effects it did.

Mosse (p141-2) describes this event as 'a landmark in the history of European diplomacy'. Arguably this is an overstatement but a) the tale does not appear in the standard Bismarck books and b) it really does seem important. The implication is it was briefed deliberately to the Gazette, but the details aren't clear — perhaps lost to history like many a media briefing?! Interestingly Clarendon wrote to Cowley (14/12) of this incident saying that 'Palmerston's pen is always dipped in gall and the Earl's vision is always obscured by the blue books [a reference to the Colonial Office's Blue Books?] that stand before him, while the others [in Cabinet] are indifferent because they are not personally responsible.'

OP: In 1848, the Frankfurt Parliament had asked Prussia to intervene on behalf of the Germans in SH, Prussia had been forced to back down — the failure had 'presaged the failure of the German revolution'. From November, Napoleon encouraged Bismarck to push for annexation of SH and the 'crowd of small states' hemming Prussia in (p. 244). 'If you now have something to whisper into our ears we shall listen attentively' (Drouyn to Goltz). OP: by encouraging Prussia to destroy the Bund, Napoleon hoped to kill the 1815 settlement. Bismarck told Goltz that the 'favourable disposition' of Napoleon was a good 'means of pressure on England' hence repeated dangling of possibilities for Napoleon on the Rhineland, without ever making specific commitments.

Bleichröder: stock market 'swept by a great panic concerning the Schleswig-Holstein affair' and stocks lost 3.5%. Over winter, Bleichröder said little to Rothschild about Bismarck's policy viz S-H perhaps because he did not know what it was amid the extreme complexity and different rumours. By 1864 according to Keudell, Bleichröder, 'a man of unusual abilities', was one of Bismarck's closer confidantes and had told Keudell to keep Bleichröder briefed on non-secret matters. This was partly in the knowledge that information would flow to Rothschild and thereby to Napoleon. In November 1863 Bleichröder first suggested to Bismarck that Prussia could sell its rich coal mines in the Saar. Businessmen wanted them privatised. Bismarck knew Napoleon coveted them and had raised them in their October 1862 meeting. Wilhelm hated rumours in the press that he might sell them to Napoleon. The story returned in 1866. (Stern, p37)

Buchanan-Russell: Bismarck said that Wilhelm is disposed to favour Augustenburg and it was 'only after a very animated discussion which lasted two hours and a half, and during which he threatened his own resignation that he succeeded in convincing His majesty that he must abide for the present by the provision of the Treaty of 1852.' The Queen and the Duke of Saxe Coburg were working with Schleinitz to push Wilhelm to support Augustenburg. Bismarck had angrily confronted Schleinitz about his interference. He now stood 'almost alone'. (Buchanan wisely had some doubts about the veracity of all his claims.)

Napier-Russell: Gorchakov keeps stressing how he wants the other four Powers to work together against Napoleon.

First meeting of Bund since Danish King died. Austria and Prussia had the accession question referred to the Committee for Holstein and Lauenburg (agreed by Bismarck and Karolyi the night before, Steefel, p99).

Goltz-Drouyn: France has the least interest in maintaining 1852, she has a chance to show her support for the national issue, and the plan for a Scandinavian union required first the separation of the duchies from Denmark. Drouyn didn't bite but stressed how France would be helpful at the Congress. Later that day, at Compiègne, Goltz presented Wilhelm's reply. Napoleon said to Goltz that he wished an entente: 'Prussia is surrounded by a crowd of small states which hamper its action without adding to its strength. I had hoped that the meeting of the Sovereigns would give the opportunity of establishing an understanding between us on this as well as on the other great questions.' (Steffel: Sybel and others wrongly place this discussion on 23rd, p117.)

Goltz and Drouyn spoke again about the division of the duchies. Drouyn floated the possibility of Prussia annexing territory.

After dinner Goltz had another chat with Napoleon who said that while his sympathies were on the side of nationalities he would remain neutral, but the conflict showed the need for a Congress. He was grateful for Wilhelm's reply but thought the other Powers' attitude meant there was little hope of important results. He was pondering new alliances and wished one with Prussia. He also agreed with Goltz that a) France could not ally with Austria and b) Austria's existence being based on treaties meant she could not tolerate a policy based on the principle of nationality. Wilhelm scribbled on Goltz's despatch: 'What does it mean — that Goltz always speaks of a possible Franco-Prussian alliance? He has never been authorised by me to do this!' [... nie autorisirt worden!]

Around 24-5, Gorchakov proposed to London,Vienna and Berlin (and slightly later Paris) the idea of a London conference on SH. He wanted the Danes to ditch the new constitution and provide a way out for Germany without a crisis and Prussia renouncing 1852 etc. The Cabinet agreed the plan, the Queen was delighted. Over the next few weeks there was tension between Palmerston and the Queen about the balance of pressure to be applied in Copenhagen and Berlin/ Vienna.

Britain's refusal published in the London Gazette on 27th, presented formally on 28th (see above 19th).

The majority of the Bund Committee: the vote of Holstein-Lauenburg should be suspended pending settlement of the succession question. The minority, Prussia and Austria, read a declaration that they saw themselves bound by the 1852 Treaty— i.e they did not support Augustenburg. Bismarck and Karolyi/Rechberg had agreed on this approach. The details are more complex than related in almost any of the books except Steefel — Austria had wanted just to refer to the 1852 treaty but Bismarck insisted that Denmark also had obligations from 1851-2 connected to the Treaty — 'No fulfilment of the Danish obligations of 1851-2, no Treaty of London' he said (Karolyi-Rechberg, 23/11). This distinction provided him with future wriggle room. On 28th they also made clear that the Execution should proceed swiftly on the basis already agreed — it should not change, as some states wanted (because the original was a tacit recognition of Christian as Duke of Holstein). The issue was referred to the Committee. Prussia and Austria told the Bund states that if they tried to change the Execution they would forestall the Bund by occupying Holstein themselves. The lesser states were enraged but enough buckled to allow the vote to pass by one vote on 7 December. (Cf. Steefel p. 99ff.)

When Austria, which had for years led an anti-Prussian majority, suddenly adopted the Prussian line that the Diet could not outvote the Great Powers there was an outcry. This was disastrous for Austria's reputation with the Confederation. Her envoy in Frankfurt reported it had been catastrophic for Austria's prestige: 'So they put a knife to our throats' shouted the Bavarian minister president. Austria feared she could not support Augustenburg and a national movement without causing itself internal problems. Clark: Rechberg said around then, 'Never could Austria be expected to submit to a pack of little states.' He wrote to Prince Alexander of Hesse: ' The demand for the conquest of Schleswig for Germany, which is now so prevalent that it seems even to be catching hold of governments otherwise prudent, differs in no way from the striving of the French people for the Rhine frontier.'

Goltz-Bismarck: Drouyn keen on alliance, said 'If you have something to whisper in our ears, we shall listen to you attentively.'

Budberg presented the Russian reply to Napoleon, who spoke of new alliances and possibilities with Prussia and Russia. Budburg left the meeting convinced Napoleon would launch a war in the spring probably against Austria. (Steefl, p119)

Moltke in Frankfurt talking to Austrians and others about military plans and reporting back. He thinks possible to get Austrian agreement on a Prussian commander.

Crown Council — DATE?? JS says 'early December'.

Napoleon-Nigra: 'We will bring it to pass that Prussia and Austria turn their cannon on each other.'

(Pflanze) Prussia, supported on this by Landtag, told the lesser states that unless they accepted the French free trade deal the Zollverein would expire in 1865. They buckled.

Wilhelm asked Bismarck not to tell people that 'an independent Holstein does not commend itself to you, as this is not my opinion.' Bismarck replied the same day threatening to resign. (This isn't mentioned in any of the books I've read except Gall but is in the correspondence (#52, 1/12/63). Any reply from Wilhelm is not included.) On 3rd, Wilhelm wrote to Bismarck re police reports about subversives and asked whether they ought to increase defensive measures (also not mentioned in the books but an interesting reminder that the king was genuinely worried about revolutionary violence at this time).

Goltz wrote to Bismarck outlining his own policy — Prussia should align with German nationalism against Austria and lead 'the moderate elements in its own land in a sounder direction'. Bismarck completely disagreed, cf. 20 December.

Buchanan-Russell: Bismarck is keen that Britain counteracts 'the daily influences' on Wilhelm by insisting on Prussia observing 1852.

Buchanan-Russell: Bismarck says that while he and Austria are counteracting the smaller states 'acting under the influence of Democratic Societies', 'the Danish government should emancipate itself from the control of the mob at Copenhagen'. (Bismarck's conduct of diplomacy is evidence regarding the proposition that 'democracies are more inclined to peace': a subtext of much discussion was that democratic influences made policy more emotional and inclined to risk war, with governments wanting to retain power inclined to let themselves be influenced by the forces around them.)

Grey had two meetings with Wodehouse, stressing the importance of pressuring Denmark. Grey thought Wodehouse was influenced by the strong pro-Danish public opinion which 'exists in utter ignorance of the merits of the question' (Grey-Queen). The Queen tried to push Russell to push Wodehouse in a tougher direction viz Denmark. 3-5/12 Palmerston and Victoria had exchanged letters with Victoria stressing Denmark's obligations of 1851-2.

Bund vote (see above).

Drouyn proposed a Paris Congress without Britain. Bismarck again was friendly, even though he didn't want it, to pull Napoleon towards him (cheaply) and pressure others.

Government asked Landtag for a loan of 12m thaler for military expenses against Denmark. They didn't need it but Bismarck brought it to a vote to cause trouble. Waldeck opposed. Leading nationalists argued for acceptance. Liberals argued for days and brought a motion stating the readiness of Parliament to support the government if it adopted a 'national policy'. (OP, p269). Bleichröder thought it would be turned down. Cf. 22/1/64.

Tsar made clear to the Danes that he would not fight to defend her nor to defend 1852. He also politely pointed out the Danes were being overly aggressive towards Germany — 'you have been drawing the cord too tight... If unhappily war should break out between you and Germany I cannot take part in it; you know our situation, you ought to understand... I don't want to say anything painful to you, we are merely consistent; we have often warned you...'

Talleyrand-Drouyn: Bismarck says he said to Wilhelm: 'I do not wish to throw down the gauntlet into darkness and without knowing who will pick it up. I cannot expose myself at one blow to the polite observations of France, to the violent recriminations of England, to the paternal admonitions of Russia, and, finally, to be coolly abandoned by Austria, who may well be tempted to show herself moderate at our expense. I shall not, then, take a step without her and without her sharing our risks and perils.'

Buchanan-Russell. At the end of a long note (cf. Steefel p288) Buchanan observed: various things may flow from the Execution and 'I shall be surprised if M. de Bismarck does not endeavour to obtain more solid advantages for Prussia in return for the losses and sacrifices which the country will have to suffer in the event of war, than the honour of having placed a Prince of Augustenburg upon the Ducal throne of a Sleswig-Holstein state.'

(Amid all the lies and trickery, one of the things Bismarck was honest about to Buchanan (and others) was his opposition from the start to Augustenburg. Should London have wised up earlier to the question: given there's so much evidence Bismarck opposes Augustenburg, and given his character, what if his real goal here is a war to detach the duchies, using 1852 as a pretext, in order to then grab them for Prussia later, and if so shouldn't we pressure the Danes into rapid concessions to forestall this possibility? Of course, such a policy would have been strongly attacked by Disraeli and the Tories. Even if this had happened Bismarck would have continued to look for chances to push Austria out of north Germany — his long-term true goal. The deeper problem viz British policy is: given the greater fear was Napoleon, not a united north Germany, Britain was never going to fight to block Bismarck provided he pursued his goals in such a way as to keep Austria-France-Russia unable to unite against him.)

Bismarck made clear to Wodehouse (envoy sent by Russell to Denmark via Berlin — NB. interesting that Palmerston, Russell and the Queen all had wanted another candidate but were overruled by the Cabinet, something inconceivable in the past 20 years at least, Mosse p156) that unless the new Danish constitution was declared inapplicable to Schleswig before 1 January, the German powers would see themselves as released from 1852. Wodehouse spoke to Wilhelm and Karolyi in Berlin too but got the same answer. Bismarck would not explore quite what it was Prussia would accept as a solution. He told the French Ambassador he'd told Wodehouse, 'You are too distinguished a man of affairs to expect an answer from me. If I had to sell you a two hundred louis horse, I would not tell you that I would end up giving it to you for a hundred because you would only offer me eighty.' (cf. Wodehouse-Russell, 13/12). Wodehouse spoke to the Russian envoy to Copenhagen (Ewers) in Berlin and reported to Russell (13th) he thought Russia would 'go very far on the German side'.

Buchanan telegrammed Russell discussing the possibility of Bismarck's fall. The Queen inquired about contingency plans.

Wodehouse told Hall that Britain hoped for a conciliatory attitude.

Hall (day after first talk with Wodehouse) advised the King that a peaceful solution was unlikely. Anglo-French relations made mediation hard and German feeling was pushing Austria and Prussia. Denmark could not yield to the demand to suspend/amend the new Constitution — it would not appease Germany and it would cause terrible internal problems. If they did as demanded what security did they have the Powers would then guarantee their security? (When a report of this argument from Hall came to Bismarck on 31/12, he scribbled on the margin 'None'.) Steefel, p.147ff: It seems that the Danish ministers were also misled (wanted to be misled) about the chances of support by a) promises from Sweden, b) bad intelligence that France would fight for her against Germany in the spring, c) hopes that the British government would be pushed by opinion and the Tories to step forward and defend her. After their discussions on 20th Wodehouse telegrammed Russell: 'I cannot help suspecting that the Danes still count upon support from France in the spring.' It also seems that although the English were clear that Fleury was telling them that France would not fight for Denmark, members of the Danish government and the Swedish representative (Count Hamilton) got conflicting impressions.

Mosse: Denmark decided to withdraw all forces from Holstein.

Bismarck to Goltz (see below).

Wodehouse and Ewers met Hall. Wodehouse took the lead: the Constitution violated 1852 and Denmark's promise not to incorporate Schleswig and should be modified. Fleury separately met Hall who took a similar line and proposed a conference. Hall rejected the advice as he was under huge domestic pressure not to renounce the constitution. The King was much more cautious but the ministers would not yield. On 21st Danish ministers 'burned the bridges behind them' by dissolving the Danish parliament. On 23rd the King said he wanted parliament recalled to discuss the issue. Complex negotiations between King and political leaders — King fed up with Hall. On 28th he accepted resignation of Hall government and 31st appointed Bishop Monrad as President of the Council and Finance Minister.

The deputies summoned to Frankfurt created a committee and voted to promote Augustenburg. Prussia and Austria declared this new committee 'revolutionary' and called upon states of the Bund to suppress it.

Buchanan-Russell: 'He [Bismarck] would not be surprised if Austria and Prussia were called upon ere long to contend with a new Confederation of the Rhine established under the protection of the Emperor of the French, and he asked what support Austria and Prussia might expect from England in such an eventuality, adding that it might be necessary soon that they should know upon what assistance they could calculate, for if Prussia did not see her way clearly in her resistance to the democratic influences which were now driving the country towards war with Denmark, she might be carried away by the stream and the King might yield to the entreaties of those who wish him to place himself at the head of the popular movement of the day.' A few days earlier he had telegrammed to his Ambassador in London: 'Reports from Paris give rise to the fear that with the complete failure of the congress idea, Napoleon is preparing a revolutionary war for next spring, to begin by a rising in Galicia.' He suggested that a conference in Paris on the Danish issue only and without England is 'little adapted to assure peace and is contrary to our [good] relations with England'. I.e he'd supported the idea to Napoleon and was undermining it in London.

Talleyrand-Drouyn: Bismarck criticised Goltz to me — 'He [Goltz] gets heated' and 'I was obliged to write him a special letter, where I gave him to understand that it would be impossible for the Minister of Foreign Affairs to keep in Paris an ambassador who does not identify with his foreign policy.'

Carr: Bismarck told the British Ambassador that 'a few cannon shots would settle the affair'. (Meaning what exactly?)

Napier-Russell: 'It is thought here of the highest importance to support Bismarck in every way. He is considered the only bulwark against war with Denmark and revolutionary agitation.'

(Pflanze) Napoleon sent General Fleury on a mission in December — ostensibly to congratulate King Christian on his accession, but in reality secretly to discuss alliance options with Prussia and Russia. Bismarck told him on 24th that a Congress should be limited to the duchies, he would not discuss Poland — 'Rather die than permit discussion of our possessions in Poland. I would rather cede our Rhenish provinces.' He was also more open to him about the possibilities of an alliance than he was via Goltz (cf. 22/12).

Letter from Bismarck to Goltz, see below.

Saxon and Hanoverian troops entered Holstein and Lauenburg. Danish troops withdrew on advice from Britain and Russia. (EF says this was 23rd.)

Russell-Buchanan: ask Bismarck on what basis the Diet has the right to decide the Duke of Holstein?

British ambassador at Frankfurt warned that England, France, Russia and Sweden had recognised Christian IX as king of all the components of the Danish monarchy and warned of 'serious complications' if the Diet were to breach the Treaty, but there should be a conference in London and the Diet should be represented.

Buchanan-Russell: Bismarck suggests that in Germany people think Britain won't intervene, therefore Britain 'should use the strongest language compatible with diplomatic forms, to convince [the German people] and more particularly the people of the Northern Sea-board that they are following a course which may expose their coasts to a blockade by a British Fleet... [Britain] should let the people of Germany know the risk they are incurring'. NB. Bismarck also pointed out to Buchanan that Britain should not let it be known that he, Bismarck, was urging such action or else he would have to act publicly in such a way to contradict any British leaks. (This is a nice example of the deep, subtle, and dishonest moves he made. He was 1) trying indirectly to get the Danes to resist, by using British threats to mislead them as to their true situation, 2) while fooling London about his true goals (pretending he just wanted the issue to go away and was respecting international law) and 3) using aggressive British language to manipulate both his own King and the other Powers. NB. the leak to the press of 1 January 1864 (a week later) and his comments to Beust in August 1865 about his indirect manipulation of Denmark.)

The Austrian and Prussian envoys proposed to the Bund that Schleswig also be temporarily occupied as a guarantee of the Danes fulfilling legal obligations but soon clear would not get a majority. Voted down on 14 January.

Napier-Russell: Gorchakov says 'France allied with the revolutionary forces in Europe is a constant source of anxiety and disturbance'; monarchies 'may at any moment be laid in ruins'; England and Russia should support Austria and Prussia 'to resist the elements of internal dissolution and the menace of foreign aggression'; he proposes the four Powers 'avow to each other the formation of a sort of moral coalition against revolutionary conspiracy, Ultra-Democracy, exaggerated nationalism and Military Bonapartist France.' (But Britain wanted the liberal forces to win in Prussia and for Austria to move out of Italy. This sort of appeal to a conservative 'moral coalition' could hardly work with a liberal British government (or even a Conservative one?).)

Friedrich arrived in Kiel and set up his court, which was illegal. Wilhelm had asked him not to but he feared seeming feeble so risked offence.

Among his family Bismarck said: 'The “old inseparables” [i.e the duchies] must some day be Prussian. That is the goal toward which I am steering; whether I reach it rests in God's hands. But I could not take the responsibility for letting Prussian blood be shed just to create a new 'middle state' which would always vote with the others against us in the Diet' (von Keudell, old family friend and secretary, p140). It's surprising how little historians refer to this given debate about when he was pursuing annexation. EF mentions it and EF quotes another line: 'How long it will later hang together I don't know but the beginning is good and the obstinacy of the Danes will probably give us what we need, a reason for war.' But EF wrongly dates it to a year later, New Year's Eve 1864 (so does Carr, p87)! EF also says that a month earlier Keudell had angered Bismarck by suggesting that he put himself at the head of national feeling, an interesting sign that Bismarck's inner circle also did not necessarily appreciate at the start how he would approach the crisis.

After a lot of discussion since 5/11, Russell told Napier to give Gorchakov an assurance of British goodwill in the event of 'hazards to which the peace of Europe and the Balance of Power may be exposed'. It was not a specific promise of action, but was still 'a significant change in the direction of British policy' (Mosse).

Britain formally proposed a conference.