1864

In the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (a Prussian newspaper that was often the place for official stories or semi-official leaks) appeared a story that Britain had protested the Austro- Prussian proposal to the Diet for the occupation of Schleswig, and had told the German governments that 'in case German troops crossed the Eider, England would give Denmark the aid desired'. The story was picked up by other papers including in Copenhagen. On 4 January Bernstorff posted it out to Bismarck and said he was surprised if it were true as Russell had not given any indication of it. Bismarck replied that such a declaration had not actually been made but some information offered some justification for the statements published(!). He did not tell Bernstorff that he had himself urged Britain to toughen its notes to German states (cf. 26/12). Steefel speculates that this was a subtle move by Bismarck to encourage foolish hopes and further resistance in Copenhagen. This seems to me likely, cf. the comments to Beust in August 1865.

Church: Meetings of the Crown Council at which Bismarck got Wilhelm to agree — no agreement with Austria for a permanent commitment to Denmark's integrity. Cf. 10 January.

Carr: British Cabinet decided to help Denmark if Augustenburg was established in S-H but without support from France and Russia it would not be military support.

Mosse: British Cabinet despatched a note to Malet in Frankfurt: HMG would regard giving Augustenburg possession of both duchies 'as equivalent to an attack upon Denmark with a view to its dismemberment, and they would feel bound, in that case, to afford assistance to Denmark in opposing so evident an act of aggression.' Britain asked for a delay to allow consideration by the signatories to 1852. This should be communicated to the Diet after a similar note had been agreed by Russia, France and Sweden. Cf 8/1.

Cowley-Russell: Drouyn says that French sympathies are with Denmark but 1852 provided no guarantee of action and France only had 'so to say, but a sixth of the responsibility' for the Treaty; France won't fight for Denmark alone and doesn't see much prospect of allies and 'the question of Poland had shown that Great Britain could not be relied upon when war was in the distance'. (JS dates this comment to 'late 1863'. He cites Pflanze for this but Pflanze does not give a date and implies p.248 it was January, which it was.)

Cowley thought this 'lamentable' conduct was caused by: 1) The 'rankling disappointment at the failure of the projected Congress and a desire to justify the project in the eyes of the world by the spectacle of a conflict which might have been avoided'; 2) Anger to HMG re 'their imputed abandonment of France in the Polish question'; 3) 'The possibility that out of the complications something may turn up advantageous to France'.

Mosse: This marked 'an epoch in the history of the nineteenth-century', the age of Palmerston was ending and that of Bismarck began, it 'paved the way for the German advance across the Eider', it 'marked the end of the Palmerstonian age in British foreign policy and the beginning of British isolation'. Napoleon was angry with Britain over Poland, angry with Britain over the Congress (especially the insulting nature of the briefing), and hopeful that in the chaos of Bismarck pushing for changes something would turn up for France, with little risk.

Napier-Russell: 'The leading aims of Prince Gorchakov are to combat the notions of democracy and nationality and to control France'.

Granville, who led the pacific majority in Cabinet, told Palmerston he opposed 'plunging this country into a war for the maintenance of the Treaty of 1852'. Palmerston replied that 'there was no question whatever of England going to war'. Palmerston was hoping to get French support to settle the issue without fighting. Steefel: in December (undated) Palmerston had written to Russel to the effect — Holstein is part of the Bund and if Germany grabs Holstein 'we should content ourself with a strong and indignant protest' but 'Schleswig is no part of Germany, and its invasion by German troops would be an act of war against Denmark, which would in my clear opinion entitle Denmark to our active military and naval support. But you and I could not announce such a determination without the concurrence of the Cabinet and the agreement of the Queen.'

Buchanan-Russell: 'I am convinced that [Bismarck] intends to conquer Schleswig for Germany.' Mosse: This prompted Russell to warn Bernstorff that Britain would not allow Denmark 'to perish without aiding her in her defence'. Various reported to London around then that the German states, large and small, did not believe Britain would act, so Buchanan, Bloomfield and Napier all suggested tougher language from London.

Drouyn reminded Goltz of their November discussions including the possible annexation of the duchies. Goltz got the impression in January that Drouyn assumed a general war was coming.

Buchanan-Russell: Bismarck isn't pushing for a division of Schleswig which would 'cause a useless difficulty, if the integrity of the Danish Monarchy is to be maintained', his main condition is 'the complete security of the German population against Danish rule', and he is 'still disposed to prevent invasion of Schleswig, if the new Constitution is abrogated'.

Russell showed the Queen draft telegrams in line with the Cabinet of 2nd. She severely criticised the tone. Russell sent her notes from Buchanan and Bloomfield suggesting stronger language in Berlin and Vienna would help peace. On 12th, after days of wrangling, the Cabinet insisted on no reference to what might happen if Schleswig were invaded and softer language — a 'defeat' (Mosse) for Palmerston and Russell.

Church: After the failure of the August 1863 German plan, Rechberg wanted to get closer to Prussia. Russia was even more hostile after Austria's behaviour during the Polish affair. Italy was waiting to pounce on Venetia. Napoleon was more hostile than at any time since 1859. Britain was not hostile but a) thought Vienna should cede Venetia and b) couldn't be relied on to provide much material support. Rechberg was shocked at the rapid growth of the pro-Augustenburg, pro-nationalist movement in Germany in late 1863 and how even the monarchies in the small German states were pulled towards denouncing the 1852 treaty — while Austria depended more than any Power on upholding 1815 and opposing nationalist movements trying to overthrow 'international law'. He had tried to persuade Denmark to delay and moderate. He even favoured France calling for a conference. In January he wanted to bind Prussia to Austria, partly in case Bismarck were replaced by a ministry favourable to Augustenburg, so favoured a written deal. He knew Wilhelm was pro-Augustenburg. With Biegeleben he drafted a deal. Rechberg's own goal was amalgamation of S-H and a 'personal union' of the new state with Denmark under the guarantee of the Powers, with 1852 and international law seen as having been buttressed.

, Rechberg and Biegeleben submitted their draft agreement with Prussia to the cabinet and FJ. Their draft Article 5 stipulated: Austria and Prussia would in no circumstances give up the integrity of Denmark nor the recognition of Christian. Rechberg stressed that he wanted to avoid a European war and this deal would bind Prussia including in the event of Bismarck being replaced by a liberal. If the Bund tried to occupy Schleswig and set up Augustenburg, then dominoes would tumble: foreign powers would intervene, France would use the chance to attack in both Germany and Italy. FJ stressed that the key was swift action to occupy Schleswig without the smaller states. They agreed they would publish the agreement once it was concluded but when article 5 was amended this idea was dropped. One minister, Lasser (able but apparently corrupt), predicted that as the conflict unfolded the principle of Denmark's integrity might be abandoned, in which case what was Austria's real objective? Rechberg impatiently replied that they couldn't take account of all possibilities without delaying an agreement. Schmerling supported the plan. Essentially Vienna wanted to checkmate the Bund and nip Prussian scheming in the bud.

Karolyi presented Rechberg's draft to Bismarck. He stressed the importance of Article 5. Bismarck was very friendly — 'You are preaching to a convert', he said, but the King is very hostile to this, it will be hard to get his agreement(!). Karolyi stressed that Vienna put great weight on A5 and suggested that without it everything might collapse.

Lassalle wrote asking for a meeting to discuss 'election techniques'. He wrote further over the next few days stressing the urgent need for a meeting and claiming he had a 'magic recipe with most comprehensive effects'. As the S-H conflict grew he also argued publicly against fighting for Augustenburg.

Bund rejected Austria-Prussia proposal to invade Schleswig by 11-5. Prussia and Austria: we'll act alone.

Bismarck meets Karolyi again: as I feared the King won't accept A5, we need a less restrictive drafting 'to help the King over the mountain'. The two hashed out drafts of an alternative and Karolyi sent an agreed one back to Vienna — the two Powers would promise to settle the future status by mutual agreement. (Cf. Church p60-3) Bismarck also mentioned that annexation was being discussed but he had 'firmly' rejected it!

Russell-Queen: Napoleon seems to be 'encouraging Denmark and Germany by turns to bring on a war by which France may profit'.

To Landtag: he wanted to use legally appropriated funds for the Danish war but if not forthcoming he would take them 'wherever he could find them'.

Told Oubril that Prussia and Austria would occupy Schleswig as a pledge for the withdrawal of the Danish constitution.

Bismarck and Karolyi/Rechberg had been negotiating over previous weeks. Now, under time pressure, FJ and Rechberg accepted Bismarck's demand for a change to Article 5. On 16th the deal was agreed though it was not signed until shortly after noon on 17th in Berlin because Bismarck demanded an important tweak. Rechberg agreed the document would be dated 16th so (Church) that it would coincide with the ultimatum (below). This nuance explains why so many books give different dates for the treaty and some wrongly say it was signed in Vienna.

They agreed that in the event of hostilities with Denmark, the future relations of the duchies and the issue of succession would be agreed only by mutual agreement. Austria wanted the issue of denouncing 1852 to be included in this 'mutual consent' clause — Bismarck refused, as so often claiming he couldn't get Wilhelm to agree. Wilhelm's desire to ditch 1852 was useful in that Bismarck could portray himself to Rechberg as struggling to bring the king around to a conservative alliance with Vienna. (Steefel, p102-3)

Prussia and Austria jointly sent a note (agreed by Bismarck and Karolyi in Berlin) to the Danes saying that their moves had broken the 1852 Treaty and they had 48 hours to withdraw the November Constitution or the two Powers would act to restore the status quo; they were free to act without agreement of the Bund. They also agreed that if war breaks out over Schleswig and existing treaty relations become invalid, then 'Prussia and Austria reserve the right to determine the future circumstances of the duchies purely by joint consent'. Danes refused. Prussia and Austria troops moved in to Holstein, ignoring the Federal force, and moved up to the Schleswig frontier by 31 January. Bismarck ordered various units to mobilise to spook different German states — there were concerns, for example, Hanover might try to block Prussian troops and Moltke took steps to plan an attack on them.

Austria wanted an agreement that Christian's succession would never be questioned. Bismarck objected that Wilhelm wouldn't allow a reference to the hated treaty of 1852. For week after week he had told Karolyi and Rechberg about his struggles with the pro-Augustenburg faction such that Karolyi believed him. He said the most he could get out of Wilhelm was an agreement that in the event of war with the Danes and the 1852 Treaty collapsing they would proceed 'through mutual agreement'. This was the technical cause of war in 1866 when Austria asked the Diet to decide the fate of the Duchies and therefore broke the agreement. It was a standard Bismarck tactic to blame the King for things so he could seem more reasonable and confuse enemy diplomats. Years later Rechberg discussed whether he had made a fatal error over this and whether he could/should have tried to get agreement on the future disposition of the duchies. In 1890 he said: 'It is true that before the campaign we did not agree with Prussia with sufficient certainty what would happen to the Duchy after the conquest. That was because things were developing faster than I wished.' Clark thinks it 'possible' that Austria could have successfully insisted on something like a clause to the effect that neither power could take any territory for itself alone. Rechberg explained years later that his decision had been influenced by Bismarck's threat to free the duchies alone. But 'Rechberg's memory deceived him' (Clark) as these threats were made later and in January Bismarck was stressing to Karolyi how Wilhelm was devoted to an Austrian alliance. On 14th he told Karolyi that 'a turnaround' in which the king renounces the London treaty to make common cause with the German-national movement, perhaps with France, 'is now and never to be feared'. Clark: FJ and Rechberg were too 'paralysed with fear of a French intervention to perceive that Bismarck needed them at this time more than they needed him, and that they might have stolen the King away from [Bismarck's] policy'. Despite the enthusiasm in November-December, opinion in Vienna moved against Rechberg's policy — people preferred cooperation with the Bund to alliance with reactionary Bismarck.

(I think it's clear objectively Vienna could have played this better but it's hard to imagine Bismarck letting himself be boxed in on this in January given his whole conduct. If Rechberg had played hardball, surely Bismarck would have done what he often did — reverse ferreted, threatened Vienna with unilateral action etc. Of course, it's possible Wilhelm could have overruled him in this parallel universe. But overall it's hard to think that if Vienna had avoided one error in January then the future would have been substantially different. I think Bismarck would probably have forced that parallel world back to something like what we observe. The only way for this to be significantly different is if Vienna had made a number of significantly different decisions.)

OP: In London Palmerston and Russell were very unhappy about Bismarck's approach but neither the Queen nor Cabinet wanted war, plus war required an ally and they didn't have one.

(evening) Against Bismarck's opposition, Wilhelm went to the Crown Prince's palace to receive a letter from Prince Frederick and talked to Samwer, who had brought it, 'in a tone quite different from the formal and cold reply drafted by Bismarck and actually sent to Kiel' (Steefel, p160). This was the sort of thing that drove him to distraction.

Roon to Perthes: 'The first shot from a cannon tears up all treaties without our having to break them explicitly.'

Russell asked all signatories of 1852 to 'concert and cooperate' with England to maintain the Treaty and uphold the integrity of the Danish monarchy.

Gorchakov-Oubril: Britain won't accept the idea of advising Denmark to accept the occupation of Schleswig in return for rejecting Augustenburg in Holstein, because London does not trust German motives. Berlin and Vienna should therefore publicly clarify their commitment to 1852. This message crossed with one from Oubril (20th) saying Bismarck was worried that if he did not stay friendly with Napoleon the latter was looking for trouble and would swiftly turn against Prussia.

The Danish ambassador in London listened to Russell read a letter from Palmerston saying Denmark 'mustn't imagine that for its sake England will wage war with all of Germany'. This happened while in London newspapers close to Palmerston (such as the Morning Post) thundered threats.

Steinberg: Field Marshall Wrangel entered Holstein. Steefel: Wrangel took command of all federal forces on 20th, on 21st their forces entered Holstein.

(Barry, p89) Meeting called by Wilhelm: 'an immediate and violent dispute between Bismarck and the generals'. Bismarck objected to the plan to occupy all Jutland which he thought would frighten the Austrians into dropping the adventure. Roon and Wilhelm supported Moltke's plan and Roon was happy to pressure the Austrians. Bismarck threatened to resign, Roon looked for a compromise. (This meeting seems to be nowhere in OP, Gall, JS, Wawro. GC discuses p183: Roon disagreed with Bismarck but when he realised the latter would resign he urgently sought and found a compromise with instructions on Jutland removed from orders to Wrangel.)

to Roon: 'I have the premonition that the cause of the Crown against the revolution is lost, for the heart of the king is in the other camp and his confidence rests more with his opponents than with his servants... I have not slept a wink this night and feel miserable, and don't really know what to tell these people, who will for sure refuse to vote credits, when it as good as clear that HM, in spite of the danger of breaking with Europe and to suffer a worse Olmütz, will give way to democracy and the Wurzburger [the medium states] in order to establish Augustenburg and create a new medium state.' (He could see the right path but also how easy for it go wrong. He also had to worry about the generals who he could not control.)

Parliament rejected a bill authorising money for Prussia's action supporting the confederate execution against Denmark 275-51. Many had mocked Bismarck during the debates in January saying he did not understand what he was doing and was doomed. 'Politics is not an exact science... I really believe, gentlemen, that without exaggeration I understand these matters better', he said: we will get the money somehow and 'I believe you too are no longer stranger to the feeling that it will turn out this way.' The deputies laughed. He attacked them for never supporting Prussian nationalism: 'An open profession of the Prussian interest, of Prussian nationalism is not to be found on your side... You reject the glorious traditions of our past for you disavow the ... Great Power position of Prussia acquired through heavy sacrifice in the people's blood and property.' He lectured them on international relations. When one criticised him for giving precedence to the 'European' over the 'German' aspect of the problem, he replied, 'As long as we live in Europe we must place ourselves on the European standpoint.' The deputies' real goal was Parliamentary government: you are trying 'to establish the dictatorship of this House ... This is a battle for the control of Prussia between the [monarchy] and the Landtag.' If the government were to go along with your wishes then 'We should be your ministers — and that is something I hope to God we never come to!'

OP (p269) is confusing, suggesting some of this happened in December, and that there was another vote before 22/1. Cf. 9/12.

Oubril-Gorchakov: Bismarck says we have been very quiet, unappreciative of his support for 1852, Russia should be clearer in support and should support us against France if necessary. When Oubril said that Russia was internally focused and could not provide material aid, Bismarck replied that this was Wilhelm's view — that Russia was not a strong ally — but he had always sought to counter this claim. In a further conversation on 23rd, Oubril told Bismarck that Russia wanted to help him; Gorchakov favoured the peaceful occupation of Schleswig to force Denmark to concede and a conference held.

Napier-Russell: Russian envoys in Vienna and Berlin will join Britain in advising a six week postponement of all action.

Around 23-5 January (it's impossible for me to get this straight from the books), there was a sort-of coordinated push by Britain-Russia-France in Berlin and Vienna. Russell urged Austria and Prussia to give Denmark 6 weeks from 1 February to withdraw the constitution. There were other similar diplomatic initiatives but none of them gained traction.

The Prussian Parliament passed a resolution condemning the expenditure of funds as illegal and it refused to authorise a loan for the war. Virchow attacked Bismarck for no longer attempting 'an energetic foreign policy' and for having given himself to evil. Bismarck replied that: 'I have acted on the principle: Flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronta movebo. I did incidentally when I came here cherish the hope that I should find in others besides myself a willingness, should the need arise, to sacrifice the standpoint of party to the overall interest of the country. I shall not, lest I offend anyone, go any further into how far and in whom I have been disappointed but disappointed I have been and of course this affects my political position and relations.' The same day Parliament was prorogued.

OP (p270): Berlin was 'awash with rumours' of a cabinet crisis, Wilhelm and Bismarck disagreeing over Augustenburg etc. Twesten bombarded Wilhelm with promises the Landtag would support any other minister as liberals tried to drive Bismarck out. BUT the liberals were not confident in public support in Prussia, bemoaned the lack of public interest in Augustenburg, didn't dare try a tax strike, and they rightly feared that a Prussian victory would move opinion behind the government. On 29 January Mommsen wrote to Freytag: 'I have completely given up the idea that the nation will interfere with real energy.'

Oubril-Gorchakov: Talleyrand says that Bismarck told him that if pressed too hard he would denounce 1852 and side with the Bund.

Buchanan-Russell: Bismarck says that although he understands normal diplomatic discussions among the Powers, he hopes Britain will not try to form an alliance with France to pressure him — 'not give a signal for the commencement of a steeple-chase to Paris'. He implied that he had hitherto refused advances from Paris but might not continue to do so 'if the past self-denial of the government is not fairly appreciated'.

Cabinet meeting where Russell failed to get agreement for armed assistance for Denmark in the event of German attack.

Rumours had reached Paris of Bismarck's discussions with Vienna about possible alliances, including Prussian support in Italy. Drouyn asked Goltz formally if it was true. Bismarck denied it on 27th (lying — he had dangled such possibilities many times in Vienna).

Oubril-Gorchakov: Bismarck's response to the joint suggestion of a 6 week delay — Oubril didn't expect further developments for a week or so, the King was resisting any declaration, Bismarck's position was dicey and he may be replaced by a liberal government that would seek alliance with France; he wanted to occupy Schleswig 'on conservative principles' and maintain 1852.

(Friedjung) Debate in the Austrian Parliament on the war against Denmark — fierce attacks on Rechberg's policy. Schindler said, 'Prussia has scarcely digested Silesia and now she is getting her claws into the Duchies, while we are leading her into them with drum and trumpet. But what music will get her out again?' Schmerling spoke out in defence of Rechberg's approach even though he opposed it.

Oubril read to Bismarck a despatch from Gorchakov sent on 28th (cf. Mosse p169ff): Britain won't let the Danish monarchy be destroyed, we should look for a solution that she and Germany can agree, don't drive London towards Napoleon, London is hinting at intervention, you should provide a clear and unambiguous commitment to 1852 on condition Denmark meets its obligations, perhaps consider occupying only part of Schleswig. (It's unclear how much Gorchakov believed the possibility of British intervention. Brunnow had written (undated, around then) that he did not believe it — Palmerston won't give France the excuse to cross the Rhine. On 13th Brunnow had reported the Cabinet discussion and concluded: Russell and Cabinet don't want other Powers to act 'to justify their inaction'. Bismarck prevaricated, blamed the King and avoided commitments.

In the last week of January, lots of diplomatic exchanges between the powers. Russell pushed for the 1852 signatories to sign a further protocol by which the Danish government agreed to repeal the constitution while Prussia and Austria postponed action in Schleswig. At some point in last week of January Wilhelm rejected it. Bismarck prevaricated and fobbed everyone off, often using Wilhelm as an excuse. To Russia he stressed the conservatism of his policy and the danger of his replacement, to London he stressed his support for 1852.

British Chambers of Commerce protested to Palmerston about the failures of the FO and Board of Trade to advance British commercial interests and 'the division of authority' between the two they blamed for lack of action. Palmerston replied: there are three modes of influence open — persuasion, equivalence, and compulsion. The first is always tried, 'as to the second, we have none to offer, and the last was of course out of the question'. The pressure building led to the instigation of the Select Committee on Trade with Foreign Nations in mid-1864. Ward, Britain's greatest expert on the Zollverein, came over to give evidence. Ward spent time discussing matters with British businessmen and concluded that they did not appreciate the politics of the Zollverein and the obstacles to Prussian liberalisation.

Palmerston had been accused of being caught in an adulterous affair. The case collapsed 2/64. Gladstone worried about the effects on the Liberals' reputation, Disraeli suspected it had been a deliberate scheme to enhance Palmerston's popularity(!).

Prussian forces move across the Eider into Schleswig, Danish forces soon retreated from fortifications, and by the end of February Danes pushed out of Schleswig. (Barry: orders to move into Schleswig issued on 3 February, but seems contradicted in his own story.)

The invasion of Schleswig prompted questions:

1. Would the 1852 Treaty survive?
2. Would the Danish monarchy survive?
3. Would Napoleon or England intervene?
4. What did Austria and Prussia truly intend?

Redern (Prussian ambassador)-Bismarck: Gorchakov said — 'So this is the general war you want... Russia will never do anything against Prussia but you will have the other three on your hands and you will have brought back the agreement between France and England.' While they were talking the first reports arrived of clashes between Danish and German forces. Gorchakov was 'tief erschüttert' (deeply shaken), wrote Redern, and repeatedly warned 'c'est la guerre générale'. But this was a misreading — the British Cabinet opposed intervention and would only have countenanced it in conjunction with at least France, which she did not trust and which she had fallen out with in 1863, while France was enjoying the embarrassment of London and hoping to profit from the action.

OP: When the army marched against Denmark, another 'of nearly equal size' (35,000) remained in the neighbourhood of Berlin as part of the plan to maintain the monarchy in the event of any revolutionary activity. 'At no time during the constitutional conflict did the liberals question that the army, both officers and men, would stand behind the crown'.

Showalter: Moltke wanted to send a single corps under Frederick Charles (on the grounds of having units and officers who knew each other) but was successfully opposed by others including Manteuffel who argued it was too dangerous to strip a province of all its active force. The Austrian army, rejigged after 1859, relied on long-service conscripts and quick victory based on shock. The Prussian approach, of short-service conscripts with breech-loading rifles and cast-steel cannon, supported by intense preparation, was seen in Europe as an experiment. Prussia's rail deployment was effective (thanks to Wartensleben).

(Steefel) Goltz-Wilhelm: Drouyn at dinner '... in a half-joking manner ... said to me that we should annex Schleswig-Holstein, and some of the other lands nearby. France would gladly be of help to us and would be content with compensation which would amount more to an outward satisfaction for the French nation than a real equivalent to such an increase in the power of Prussia.' (Reported to Berlin on 9/2)

Crown Council, Bismarck pushed annexation, Wilhelm resisted. (See above for problems dating this meeting, cf. Pflanze p251, Steefel p.108-9, Gall p244.) Bismarck made clear a) he wanted to annex the duchies, b) they could not say so now, c) they must oppose the Augustenburg option, which would close down annexation and just cause them trouble, d) they should go along with Austria for the moment and bide their time. Wilhelm argued but accepted the proposed note with Austria, and wrote on the margin of the note of the meeting that annexation was not the only aim but merely one of the possibilities. (Steefel, p108) OP: Wilhelm 'added to the protocol that recorded the discussion' that annexation was not the goal but a possible outcome. 'I reminded the King that each of his immediate forebears, except his brother, had won for the state an increase in territory and encouraged him to do the same.' Gall says he felt 'the moment had come' to reveal his support for annexation.

Over the next few months Bismarck encouraged allies to push for annexation in public.

Metternich reported that Napoleon wants 'England to intervene in it [the war] and above all that she remain impotent'.

British Parliament reassembled, Queen's Speech. The Queen said of Denmark only that the government would 'continue Her efforts in the interests of peace'. (Palmerston had tried to insert a tougher passage but it was vetoed by the Queen, Steefel p172.) Palmerston and Russell tried to defend their policy in Commons and Lords. Palmerston claimed that 'within the last very few hours' he had received an Austro-Prussian assurance that they would declare they would abide by 1852 and maintain integrity of the Danish monarchy, and they would leave Schleswig 'whenever the conditions which they attach to the entrance shall have been complied with'. Steefel: it was clear that the PM's claims were 'hollow'.

Palmerston made clear to Greville at dinner on 6th that he thought 'the fighting was over', and was 'sanguine' that Austria and Prussia would keep their word and restore the dominions to the Danes after the King renounced the Constitution. Disraeli and Derby attacked the policy of 'meddle and muddle', criticised a lack of help for Denmark, but also made clear they wanted peace. 'The hesitant policy of a divided Cabinet was shown to represent fully and faithfully the conflicting emotions of Parliament' (Mosse, p175).

Derby in Parliament attacked Russell and Palmerston for their ineffective interference everywhere — 'meddle and muddle': 'Now, my Lords, as to non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, when I look around me I fail to see what country there is in the internal affairs of which the noble Earl [Russell] and Her Majesty's government have not interfered. Nihil intactum reliquit, nihil tetigit quod [He left nothing untouched, nothing he touched that] — I cannot say non ornavit [he did not decorate], but non conturbavit [he did not disturb]. [So: He left nothing untouched, nothing he touched that he did not disturb.] Or the foreign policy of the noble Earl, as far as the principle of non-intervention is concerned, may be summed up in two short homely but expressive words — 'meddle and muddle'. During the whole course of the noble Earl's diplomatic correspondence, wherever he has interfered — and he has interfered everywhere — he has been lecturing, scolding, blustering, and retreating.' Palmerston had gone to the Lords to listen and watched the Lords strongly support Derby's attack. But the Queen asked Derby not to push attacks too far and force a dissolution and Derby also thought trying to push Palmerston out a mistake.

Buchanan warned that as long as Berlin thinks our non-intervention is a 'certainty', 'no one is to be trusted' and this 'illusion' should be corrected. Napier echoed this. Cowley: France will continue to stand aloof and wait to profit.

News of the Danish evacuation of fortifications reached Paris in the evening (Steefel). The next morning (7th) Goltz called on Drouyn at home to find him decorating his house for a fancy dress ball — 'You find me surrounded by flowers and you are covered with laurels.' Drouyn again hinted at Prussia annexing the duchies and France altering her 1815 borders and some other alterations. Goltz pushed back against such ideas, probably unaware (Steefel) that Bismarck was secretly encouraging just such ideas in Paris via other routes.

Bismarck and Talleyrand spoke (before reports of Goltz's recent chats had arrived in Berlin) — Talleyrand then called in to see Buchanan who sent a report to Russell on 8th, Talleyrand reported it to Paris on 9th.

Talleyrand's report: Bismarck says that the King and Crown Prince support Augustenburg but 'As for me, my ideas on the Danish question have not changed. Of all the policies we could follow, the most inept would be for Prussia to cooperate to establish a new German Grand Duchy, to create a Prince who, in time of peace will vote against us at Frankfurt and in time of war will compromise us if he does not betray us. Believe me, it is not for a nobody like the Prince of Augustenburg that Prussia is spending the blood of its soldiers and the money of its treasury.' But he suggested that annexation wasn't practical and therefore he supported 'reconciliation with Denmark' and he still adhered 'to the principle of the integrity of the Danish Monarchy.'

Buchanan's report: Bismarck told Talleyrand that there were three courses he could follow: support Augustenburg, annexation, or maintain the integrity of the Danish monarchy. The first would be against Prussian interests [for the reasons he repeated many times]. The second would be impossible for even if there were no other objections to it France would want some equivalent gain. The third option was therefore his preferred policy.

British Cabinet supported the proposal for an armistice following total evacuation of Schleswig by Danes but this was rejected by Vienna and Berlin on 11th.

Palmerston spoke to Klindworth, 'the famous secret agent' (Steefel), who reported the chat to Apponyi who informed Rechberg on 10th. Palmerston was angry and threatening re Austria, and complained about the Queen who was following 'a policy of her own in espousing the cause of Prussia' and in influencing party leaders in Parliament. He regrets the fallout with Napoleon and intends a rapprochement including the offer of carte blanche in Italy in return for help on Denmark.

The alliance with Prussia will end in disaster — you will lose Venetia and Galicia, 'so much the better', and Hungary, 'so much the worse'. Gorchakov is supporting Prussia and wants an alliance with Napoleon. (Palmertson knew Klindworth was an Austrian agent and referred to it being 'very useful to remind the Austrians privately of the danger they were running' to Russell a few days later, so it's very likely this was a deliberate back-channel message from Palmerston to Vienna.) Apponyi agreed that Palmerston was cross because he was isolated — he had no ally, his Cabinet was divided and the Queen disagreed with him. (Otto Manteuffel also hired Klindworth around 1853, Barclay p263).

The Danes formally asked London for support. This was probably the reason for Palmerston and Russell giving orders that Sir Alfred Horsfold 'prepare the scheme for an English army to be landed on the shore of Denmark'. By 11 February The Danish army had retreated from fortifications, riots in Copenhagen, but Wrangel had blundered. Moltke was sent on 11/2 to inspect situation but had no direct command and was not always even informed of developments. GC: At the start of the Danish war Moltke's influence was 'almost negligible'. If it had not been for his private correspondence with Colonel von Blumenthal, serving as Frederick Charles' chef, 'he would have been completely in the dark concerning events in Schleswig' (GC).

Oubril again stresses — accept Britain's suggestion of armistice and conference. Bismarck replies: We support the integrity of Danish monarchy per the terms of 1852 (i.e conditionally), we are released from obligations to Denmark, a conference is OK provided no preconditions, and if a change is needed I prefer Oldenburg to Augustenburg. On 13th Tsar wrote that 'material intervention ... is not to be thought of'.

Palmerston-Russell: 'The conduct of Austria and Prussia is incredibly bad, and one or both of them will suffer for it before these matters are settled.' France will 'probably decline' to act with us 'unless tempted' by the prospect of an army on the Rhine. Sending a fleet would take 'many weeks' and wouldn't have 'much effect upon the Germans unless it were understood to be a first step towards something more; and I doubt whether the Cabinet or the country are as yet prepared for active interference.' Fighting Austria and Prussia is a 'huge undertaking' — we have 20,000 men, they have '200,000 or 300,000' and would have German allies. Also, we face a problem in raising for Prussia the spectre of France attacking as 'it might not be advisable nor for our own interest to suggest to France an attack' on the Rhine. 'It would serve Prussia right if such an attack were made; and if Prussia remains in the wrong we could not take part with her against France. But the conquest [of Rhenish provinces] by France would be an evil for us and would seriously affect the position of Holland and Belgium.' I.e Palmerston's view was that traditional British interests were at bottom the Low Countries and containing France and they should not act to contain Germany, in defence of secondary interests, in such a way as to jeopardise these primary interests.

British Cabinet meetings on 13 and 17 February confirmed that Cabinet was determined to avoid threatening unilateral intervention. Granville reported to the Queen: Russell clear there is 'no question of our going to war single handed' and Palmerston seems even less keen, but it would 'weaken' our leverage if the Cabinet's position were known. The Queen complained (13th) re suggestions of threatening Germany with intervention and of Napier's 'wild and violent advice'. On 17th Russell retreated from intervention further.

Wrangel: unless explicit orders to contrary, I'll invade Jutland on 17th. GC: by now reports had come from Vienna and from Austria's Ambassador in Berlin that FJ opposed a move to Jutland and Wilhelm realised Bismarck had been right on 21 January (or 20th?). With Wilhelm's agreement, Wrangel was telegraphed explicit orders not to invade Jutland until further orders. Wilhelm decided to send Manteuffel to Vienna to push for a commitment to a joint occupation of Jutland (some accounts including Showalter's suggest this was Bismarck's idea).

Showalter has a totally different account — he writes (p.124) that Moltke was never told about the importance of not moving into Jutland and it was he who pushed Wrangel into the operation, only for them both to be pulled back by Berlin.

'Mid-February' To Gerlach: 'I am a Prussian, not a German.'

GC: It was unclear in Berlin whether Wrangel was deliberately disobeying or just neglecting to inform officers — a unit advanced into Jutland (a place called Kolding). (Mosse: probably unauthorised.) Bound to cause trouble with Austrians but they could not be ordered back without signalling disagreement between the allies so Bismarck had to try to persuade Vienna that invading Jutland was necessary — in the meantime, he sent a new order on 19th forbidding any further advance. Wrangel provoked serious worries in HQ including with Crown Prince who complained of his 'stubbornness and vanity'. He was extremely rude, drove his staff mad, made the diplomats attached to HQ miserable (he tried to send Holstein on a tour to a place the Danes could have shot him!) and made clear he detested Bismarck. (JS writes p217 that Bismarck 'hoped to use the incursion to raise the military stakes in the war' — but this implies he was happy with it but he was not.)

Mosse (p.179): the news of forces moving into Jutland 'created a profound sensation in London and Paris' and together with rumours of Austrian naval forces moving was 'the first great crisis' of the SH affair.

Wrangel telegram to Wilhelm, enraged and insulting Bismarck: 'The diplomats may counsel [retreat] but they may be sure that their name will be affixed to the gallows.' He awaited an order to advance, it did not come. In Berlin they focused on Manteuffel's negotiations in Vienna. GC: Manteuffel had his own idea — he thought Vienna would give Prussia a free hand in the duchies after the fighting if Prussia promised to help Vienna recover Lombardy in the next war. 'The great majority' of Prussian officers (GC) thought France was the real enemy and an alliance with Vienna would be needed. Bismarck did not want such a promise made and restricted EM's instructions to the Danish issue. EM accepted this, perhaps surprisingly, and deployed 'a diplomatic skill and personal charm which won the complete admiration of his hosts' (GC, p187). By the first week of March he had persuaded Vienna to drop its objections to operations in Jutland, a deal was signed on 6 March (?one account says 29/2 — was it a leap year?!). Gall: 'the crucial change of policy' came with this repudiation and carrying the war beyond Schleswig into Jutland. This cut off Austria's line of retreat and she really became tied to Bismarck's policy.

Augustenburg and his advisers knew Wilhelm was much more friendly to them than Bismarck. Some advisers urged the Duke to offer a deal to Wilhelm to undercut Bismarck's schemes. On 19th he wrote to his friend the Crown Prince suggesting the terms of a deal but asking him to propose the plan as his own idea and to keep it secret from Bismarck. The Crown Prince did as he was asked but Wilhelm did not bite.

With news not just of Jutland but also rumours of an Austrian fleet on the way through the Channel, Palmerston wrote to the Duke of Somerset, First Lord of the Admiralty, urging the despatch of a squadron to Copenhagen 'as soon as the season will permit ... to prevent any invasion or attack'. Prussia and Austria 'contemplate the occupation of Copenhagen ... and mean to dictate at the Danish capital their own terms of peace. We should be laughed at if we stood by and allowed this to be done.'

News from Cowley after discussion with Drouyn that Napoleon, who just the previous day was against action with Britain and unperturbed at the likely future of the duchies, was reconsidering in alarm at the news from Jutland. Bismarck is making arrangements with only 'Russian and Prussian' interests in mind, and was plotting to install 'some member of the House of Oldenburg' which would be tantamount to annexation for Prussia.

Evening of 20th: Russell telegraphed to Vienna asking about the rumours of an Austrian fleet to go through the Channel, and to Berlin saying the invasion of Jutland was 'a very serious affair'.

News filtered out 20-22 February from London to Paris, Vienna, Berlin and St Petersburg that Britain was considering sending a squadron to Copenhagen and Cowley and Napier were asked to invite France and Russia to join the demonstration. (On 20th the head of the House of Rothschild in Paris told Goltz that news from London was of spreading war, England offering the left bank of the Rhine to France in return for support in Denmark.)

Wilhelm wrote to FJ urging him to stick with Prussia. By now he agreed with Moltke re the military approach but was concerned to keep Austria captive to his policy. The alternative to invading Jutland was a frontal assault on Düppel and neither Bismarck nor Moltke wanted to do this if they could get it a different way (Barry).

afternoon (Steefel, p189ff) Goltz told Drouyn that the move into Jutland had not been ordered by the government but was a local military decision taken because of Danish action. After much toing and froing about the last 2 months, including probing about whether the real purpose was annexation (denied again by Goltz), the conversation ended amicably.

Cabinet agreed to order the Channel Squadron home, and the Queen was informed (but she was not informed on 21st about the idea of a squadron to Copenhagen or telegrams to Paris and Petersburg). Russell informed Paris of the plan to send the squadron to Copenhagen (via telegram to Cowley and discussion with La Tour (French Ambassador in London) reported to Drouyn at 6pm) but after his discussion with La Tour, he had an explanation of the Jutland/Kolding news from the Prussian Ambassador and a denial by Austria of the news about an Austrian fleet (Rechberg told Bloomfield (Bloomfield-Russell 21/2) the story was 'absurd'). Russell therefore told La Tour before midnight about these updates and La Tour sent another telegram to Paris (23:54) explaining these developments and saying they were 'de nature ... à suspendre les résolutions' to send a squadron.

Around 22nd it seems Napoleon changed his mind again and backtracked from joint action possibly because of Russell's change of tune. The details and reasons are murky, cf. Mosse p181ff and p186, Steefel p186ff. Mosse thinks that the only serious attempt to organise armed intervention failed because of 'Russell's change of language during the course of the critical Sunday [21st]'. This added to the pressure from various — including Eugénie, Metternich (who suggested, according to Cowley, that joint action with England would push Austria closer to Prussia, when she was looking for a way to detach) and others — to influence Napoleon against joint action and his reversal on 22nd put paid to 'all serious prospect of mediation even before the Queen and the majority of British Ministers finally killed the proposal'.

(I'm unconvinced that the change of language from Russell on 21st made any significant difference to the overall question of whether there would be Anglo-French military intervention. The idea only arose because of a sudden panic about Prussia seizing Copenhagen and Austria sending ships. Once this panic subsided, Palmerston and others hastily dropped the idea. The basic dynamics make it hard to see a counterfactual in which we assume Russell a) did not send the near-midnight telegram pulling back and instead b) over the next few days pushed hard for joint intervention and c) this succeeded. Given the view of the Cabinet, Palmerston, Queen and the overall European situation — Russia's determination to stay out, the distrust between Palmerston and Napoleon etc — I think that in this counterfactual (no second Russell telegram etc), something else would have prevented serious Anglo-French cooperation to thwart Bismarck: e.g Russell would simply have been overruled by the Queen, Cabinet and Palmerston 22-23rd. Even if Napoleon had come back on 22nd (in this counterfactual world) and said 'great let's go', I think this would have prompted discussions that quickly led to the abandonment of the plan.)

Steefel thought now lost-to-the-record suggestions from Bismarck were probably the reason for Napoleon's latest switch (cf. lost telegram 23/1 below); Mosse thought him wrong (p182, footnote).

Palmerston-Queen: France is watching for opportunities on the Rhine, Bavaria, Italy — all over. Sending 20,000 troops ('more could not be got together') to fight with the Danes and Swedes is rightly a cause for hesitation. BUT it briefly seemed Austria might send a fleet through the Channel and attack Copenhagen, it would be 'a national disgrace' for Britain to allow such an act and 'makes one's blood boil to think of it' and Britain must stop such action with or without allies. It now seems there is no actual danger of this.

But also on 22nd Russell was discussing with Ambassadors in London and sending telegrams re a joint naval demonstration and told the Queen that 'in the opinion of the Cabinet the Channel fleet ought to be sent to Copenhagen' and instructions will be submitted to her. His telegrams of 22nd did not have the sanction of Queen or Cabinet. She opposed and asked him to tell Napier not to act until further orders, which Russell did but by the time the new message arrived Napier had already spoken to Gorchakov. On 23rd Russell learned Napoleon was backtracking again.

(Clark) Bismarck telegraphed to Manteuffel: we need a deal with Austria, 'the chances of separate action by Prussia are not very favourable'. This was apparently not intercepted and decoded in Vienna.

Talleyrand-Drouyn: Bismarck says the move into Jutland is a response to Danish naval operations, but everybody is cross — Austria is not consenting to the entry of allied troops to Jutland, Russia is pushing for a conference and armistice, 'England threatens us' and if France opposes us too now we will have 'to call a halt' as we can't 'alienate the four Great Powers at once'. But Talleyrand also sent a separate note about Bismarck to Drouyn that day which has not survived — Drouyn replied 'Let Bismarck take the initiative but try to get him to make his overtures more definite. Don't lay too much stress on the evacuation of Kolding [the Jutland town that the Prussian army had taken]'.

Napier spoke to Gorchakov: Maybe we could join a naval demonstration but decisions can't be rushed, we've got to impress on Denmark the need for concessions as they are now too aggressive.

British Cabinet met. It was agreed that given the news of an Austrian fleet was false, 'there is no question of sending the Channel Fleet to the Baltic at present, but in case of a danger to Copenhagen the reason would revive' (Russell-Queen). (Steefel: only Palmerston and the Lord Chancellor supported Russell's communication, the others insisted that no measure be taken without consultation.) Cowley and Napier were informed.

Bismarck and Talleyrand talked, reported on 26th. The discussion took on 'an intimate and confidential character'. Bismarck read parts of a telegram from Goltz to Wilhelm (see above, referring to changing French opinion about the war given the news from Jutland etc) and said that while Goltz was easily influenced, still it was hard for him to ally with France when policy 'is based upon prevailing sentiment'. 'Based, no, but certainly influenced.' Talleyrand stressed that he was being encouraged to continue confidential discussions. Bismarck criticised Goltz for being deceived by 'empty rumours or false appearances' and he incurs 'heavy responsibility in echoing them'. Whilst he had told Wilhelm that relations with France were good, he now wasn't so sure. '"For", he added with a smile, "from the moment that you show us faccia feroce it is necessary for us to put ourselves on good terms with Austria".' (Steefel, p195ff)

Napier told Gorchakov that London had decided not to send a squadron, Gorchakov was pleased. Napier was not. (Gorchakov wrote to Brunnow that he thought Napier felt humiliated by the government's inaction and preferred a war to inaction.)

Bernstorff notified Russell that Prussia accepted a Conference (Mosse).

Karolyi to Rechberg: Manteuffel told the Austrians, on behalf of Bismarck, 'Give us a free hand in Schleswig-Holstein and we will help you reconquer Lombardy in the next war.' But see Gordon Craig above (19/2) — so GC is wrong that Manteuffel obeyed orders, or wrong that Bismarck opposed suggesting such a deal?

(Clark) Austrian ministers met to discuss the deal negotiated with Manteuffel. Austria agreed to push the war into Denmark. Prussia agreed to argue for Personal Union at the conference. Clark — Bismarck got the substance, Rechberg the shadow. It was another missed chance for Vienna, like the deal in mid-January.

Deal signed in Vienna. Agreed that as hostilities had broken out they could no longer negotiate on the basis of 1852 but would propose at the prospective conference the personal union of the duchies with the Danish monarchy.

(Showalter) Prussia and Austria announced publicly their acceptance of the invitation to the London conference.

Prussia and Austria push into Denmark. There was a rush to score a victory before the conference opened in London on 20 April.

GC: Bismarck wanted an assault on Düppel, Prince Frederick Charles, in charge, didn't want to do it but Wilhelm did and Manteuffel sided with Bismarck and tried to persuade Frederick Charles to push on. On 10 March he wrote to Frederick Charles that it was not primarily a military question but about 'the position of the king in the councils of Europe' and this prize 'is worth streams of blood ... from the highest officer down to the drummer boy'. Roon also agreed with Bismarck and Manteuffel about the importance of Düppel.

Early March Prussia did a secret deal with a bank and a former Rothschilds employee, Erlanger, for a loan. Rothschild was furious with Bleichröder who denied knowledge of it and claimed Bismarck also had not known about it and was 'highly annoyed' with Bodelschwingh. It's impossible to know what Bismarck was up to: perhaps he was playing the bankers as he played the diplomats, egging them on in competition with each other knowing the Rothschilds' hatred for Erlanger. Historians have underestimated the importance of financial worries to Bismarck during the war in 1864. (Stern, p42)

'The Crown Prince very much wishes ... that the conference negotiations are dragged on for 14 days or 3 weeks in order to take Düppel beforehand' (where have I got this quote from?). Bismarck was stringing out the start with the same idea in mind.

Lassalle predicted in court (which was trying him for subversion): 'The greatest games, gentlemen, can be played with the cards on the table! Great diplomacy does not need to conceal its intentions because they rest on iron necessity. And therefore I announce to you that, perhaps before the year is out, Herr von Bismarck will have played the role of Robert Peel and introduced direct and universal suffrage'.

France proposed to Britain that they jointly recommend the division of Schleswig according to nationalities. After consideration London rejected this plan as impractical. They thought that although it could be the solution, they should not propose it before the conference. Further, the idea is 'stimulating revolutionary passions all over Germany' and fair elections would be impossible without 'the influence of terror' (Russell 9/4). The plan was communicated to the Danes (27/3) and the other Powers and main German states (29/3). After rejecting it they sent Clarendon, their 'ablest negotiator' (Mosse) to Paris (April).

Sir Robert Morier to Lady Salisbury: 'I think the first fact to be realised is that England stands outside the circle of organic changes now going on in Europe.' The organic changes going on 'are very real changes', the 'attacking and defending forces' are 'very much in earnest' and 'it is childish to throw mere words at them and entreat them in God's name to be quiet.' We should side neither with Napoleon nor with a staunch defence of 1815, we should keep out of the struggles. To do anything serious would require backing either the Holy Alliance or Napoleon — and it would be a 'total impossibility' to get British taxpayers to support either course. So 'non-intervention is the true policy of England', 'systematic non-intervention based on a definite principle', 'dignified, intelligent non-intervention versus undignified, unintelligent non-intervention'. Cf. Disraeli, 4 July.

Roon to Wilhelm: 'Your Majesty must win some sort of substantial success in order not only not to lose the respect gained abroad and at home but also raise it to such an extent that we shall be lifted above many difficulties... In the present state of the war there is no more important objective than the glory of the Prussian army.'

Karolyi-Rechberg: Bismarck thinks that we should propose personal union with the Danish King and a European guarantee against the recurrence of Danish oppression, including the inclusion of Schleswig in the Bund. There was a question re the Danish north to negotiate over. He also wants some other things including an indemnity and he's got great plans for a canal. If personal union is impossible then separation of the duchies under the Duke of Oldenburg is much to be preferred than Augustenburg.

Goltz was instructed to try to interest France in the project of a Baltic-North Sea canal.

Robert Cecil (later Lord Salisbury): '[Britain's] pledges and her threats are gone with last year's snow, and she is content to watch with cynical philosophy the destruction of those who trusted to the one, and the triumph of those who were wise enough to spurn the other.'

'In April' (Pflanze) Bismarck remarked to Keudell that it was 'incomprehensible' why Austria had followed Prussia into SH. Eyck: speeches in the Austrian parliament showed that some could see that Rechberg's policy was dangerous and hard to justify.

Around this time but unclear exactly when, there were signs that Napoleon might switch and support Britain. Bismarck warned Talleyrand that hostility would force him to be more pro-Austrian: 'From the moment that you show us faccia feroce, we must put ourselves on good terms with Austria'. (OP, p249 — see above, this remark was 25/2).

Napier: Gorchakov opposes the French plan and the idea of consulting the people. Austria also flatly rejected the idea while Bismarck, as usual, was more flexible/opaque and suggested he was prepared to discuss it.

Gorchakov-Brunnow made clear that he could not agree with Napoleon's plan for a plebiscite for all sorts of principles and practical reasons.

Drouyn met Goltz. A better solution would be the separation of Holstein and southern Schleswig from the Danish monarchy. There could be a vote for either a) union with Prussia or b) an independent state under Augustenburg (France would prefer the Prussian option). In return France wanted no territory but the compensation of a frank and firm entente. Goltz telegraphed to Berlin that a letter was on its way with 'a very important offer from France'. It did not arrive at Bismarck's office until after noon on 12/4. If he rejected it, Napoleon might do a deal with Britain. If he accepted it, it would break his agreement with Austria to sort out the duchies with her. On 13th, Talleyrand-Drouyn: Bismarck is favourable towards your plan and will discuss it with the King tomorrow. Wilhelm disliked the French offer. He did not understand what France wanted and feared that he would alienate the other Powers and be left with the 'arch enemy and her enigmatic ruler' (Wilhelm-Bismarck, 16/4).

Bismarck worked away on Wilhelm 14-16th. On 17th he telegraphed Goltz that Wilhelm agreed in principle to the French proposal but quibbled over details. He sent to Goltz a detailed reply: the agreed plan with Austria for personal union of the duchies would be proposed to the conference but 'has no prospect of success'. What will emerge is the idea of the cession of Holstein and part of Schleswig, which even Denmark will prefer, 'especially after we have agreed with Austria to demand in addition to the personal union the entry of Schleswig into the Confederation, ... the canal, and the repayment of the cost of the war. If this falls through at the conference, it offers, in the first place, proof that even in this form the integrity of Schleswig cannot be maintained; in the second place, we gain time during the negotiations to exert influence on the sentiments of the population; in the third place, we have already gone too far in our negotiations with Austria decently to free ourselves from the proposal for the personal union in any other way than through its rejection by the conference. The latter will be the more easy if, to the opposition of Denmark and her associates, is added that of France. Then it will be necessary to negotiate for new combinations... It will then be inevitable that dynastic separation be discussed, and we will then, quite apart from the question of the dynasty have to try to secure the most favourable possible boundary for Germany... From the political point of view, the Augustenburg possibility is not in opposition to our interests [not what he truly thought]' but is not worth a European war. 'Nevertheless, it is still only natural for the Prussian government to give its preference to the direct acquisition of the duchies by Prussia if an acceptable prospect is offered. I believe that it may be possible to win the vote of the population for this if we gain time, but in my opinion it will be probable only if first the programs of personal union and Augustenburg candidacy fail... We have no illusions that we can realise any part of this program without the sincere and complete cooperation of France... Especially in accordance with the King's wish [annexation] is never to be brought forward through our own initiative but we must wait for its suggestion from the duchies or from France... I regard a postponement of the definitive solution while we remain in military occupation of the Duchies and of Jutland, as in conformity with our interests.' I.e he planned to use the conference to ditch his deal with Austria and move on to new ground and once he'd scuppered personal union and Augustenburg he hoped to grab the duchies for Prussia.

An agent for Augustenburg gave Wilhelm a suggestion on how they could do a deal, similar to the attempt on 19/2 (above). On 16th Wilhelm wrote to the Crown Prince that he was prepared to listen to formal proposals and Augustenburg sent a detailed statement of obligations he would accept including: a naval station for the Prussian fleet, a federal fortress, a military treaty, accession to the Zollverein, a canal.

Gorchakov sent a tetchy despatch to Oubril about the 'unsteady' Prussian policy warning Prussia to be careful or she could find Russia 'no longer at her side'.

The Austrian plenipotentiary to the Conference, Biegeleben, arrived in Berlin and talked to Bismarck at length, once with Karolyi present. There seemed to be agreement, reported Biegeleben to Rechberg, though Bismarck does not seem too bothered about threats to legitimate governments. He portrays the rapprochement with Napoleon as a flirtation to help attain the best deal possible. He seems to think that England should be 'kept in good humour by Austria and France by Prussia, which I ventured to declare to be a somewhat doubtful game.' Bismarck would not accept a referendum. For Bismarck's view of the agreed negotiating terms for the conference see Steefel p 220-1. Steefel also says (p233) that Biegeleben 'left him with the impression' that Austria was more likely to accept annexation than Augustenburg (see below 23/5).

Clarendon in Paris, sent by Palmerston and Russell as he had a closer relationship with Napoleon than any British minister (he had been the chief plenipotentiary at the Congress of Paris). He spoke to Napoleon on 14 and 15 April. Napoleon, Clarendon reported, believed he had received a 'gross souflet with respect to Poland from Russia' and he couldn't afford another from Germany 'as he would have fallen into contempt. He could not therefore join us in strong language to the German Powers, not being prepared to go to war with them [stress in original]. The question did not touch the dignity or the interests of France, and caused no excitement here.' Given his support for 'the policy of nationalities', he could not support putting the Holstein population under the Danish king 'which they detested; and, as his great desire was to see Venetia wrested from Austria and restored to Italy, he could not lay himself open to the charge of pursuing one policy on the Eider and a totally different one on the Po.' (This report seems underrated by the later books as an accurate description of Napoleon's position at the time.)

Mosse (p188) — Clarendon's mission was doomed as different goals were desired by the Queen (no deal with France), PM (Anglo-French agreement to defend 1852), and Foreign Secretary (a modified version of Napoleon's proposal redividing Schleswig).

Victory at Düppel. Berlin was illuminated and streets decorated. This victory undermined the liberals' support for Augustenburg. Important figures like Treitschke changed their position. (Treitschke's father, an old legitimist, grumbled, 'Heinrich has become a Jesuit. For him the end, which in my opinion is most reprehensible and pernicious, justifies the means.') Mommsen was pro-annexation. It also made it much harder for the liberals to oppose Wilhelm's military reforms. The liberals sensed the national mood changing. E.g Droysen, a leading liberal deputy, in 1863 found Bismarck and his tactics 'revolting'; after Düppel he wrote 'thank God at last a Hercules has arrived to clean out the Augean stables'! Cf. Von Sybel's reply 19/6/64 to such sentiments to see how torn liberals now were between the exhilaration of victory and progress towards national unity versus their committed battle lines in the constitutional conflict.

Barry: in the days after, Moltke, though happy with the win, was excluded from discussions, fearful of Wrangel's next moves and worrying about newspaper reports of uncertain insight. Manteuffel worried about the disorganisation of HQ, persuaded the King to make Moltke chief of staff of the Allied forces in Schleswig and Jutland and he arrived at the front on 2 May.

(18 April Palmerston suggested to Russell: if France and Russia agree, we could tell Austria that unless they and Prussia agree an immediate armistice this week, we will send the Fleet to the Baltic to protect the Danes' retreat; opinion will be 'shocked' if we let the Danish Army be captured. WHERE HAVE I GOT THIS FROM IS CLEARLY WRONG; does it belong earlier?)

Conference in London. (24th, JS; 25th Gall and GC; Mosse & Steefel — the conference formally opened on 20th, was adjourned because the Diet's representative hadn't arrived, the first full meeting was on 25th. Barry: originally planned to start on 12th, Bismarck delayed it to give the soldiers more time at Düppel.)

Prussia, France, Austria (Apponyi) and Russia (Brunnow) were represented by their Ambassadors. Bernstorff was hostile to Denmark and sympathetic to Augustenburg so Bismarck did not give him his full confidence (Steefel p226).

Mosse: Divisions between Queen, PM and Foreign Secretary meant British policy for the conference 'hardly deserves the name'. Palmerston and Russell agreed to recommend that they push for an armistice — if Denmark refused she should be left to her fate; if the Germans refused, then they could try to get Russia and France to agree a joint naval demonstration in the Baltic. The Queen attacked the idea and Clarendon said he would not participate in the conference unless threats to Germany were dropped. Palmerston and Russell dropped the idea (19th) and 'the British representatives entered the discussions without any plan whatsoever... The British government, rent by internal divisions and enfeebled by the absence of any firm control, hesitated between the conflicting principles of nationality and treaty rights' (Mosse).

Attempts to get agreement between Britain-France, Britain-Russia and France-Russia beforehand all had failed.

Prussia no longer recognised the integrity of the Danish monarchy and demanded separation for the duchies. The Danes would not compromise. (EF: this was the only international conference at which the Bund ever had its own representative, Beust.)

Brunnow's instructions from Gorchakov were: seek armistice, use 1852 as starting point and keep it as intact as possible, if 1852 were abrogated then Russian rights must be asserted, seek concessions from Denmark, any settlement accepted by both sides which also preserved the balance of power would be OK for Russia, a plebiscite should be opposed if proposed.

Bismarck and Oubril discussed the situation. Oubril told him of Russia's objections to a referendum. Bismarck said — why are you even thinking of Schleswig returning to the Danes, we've occupied it, we are not bound to 1852 any more than we wish to be. Oubril: you've said repeatedly you'd respect 1852. Bismarck: true but the situation has changed, the King and country must be satisfied.

Goltz spoke to Napoleon who was favourable towards Bismarck's ideas in the note of 17th. Bismarck was happy to spin out such discussions and keep Napoleon hopeful and out of Britain's clutches.

Buchanan to Russell (after a discussion with his Berlin doctor!): Perhaps Bismarck is aiming at a union of the duchies with Prussia.

Oubril-Gorchakov: Bismarck says he must get a good solution or he'll have to resign and the King might abdicate. He says he hasn't decided between Augustenburg, Oldenburg and annexation. He was only going along with the idea of a plebiscite because of British pressure, so he didn't want to alienate Paris. His language convinced Oubril that he was aiming for annexation, which he had kept hidden. In the margins of the report the Tsar scribbled, 'I find Bismarck's language very disquieting' (many such notes were scribbled over the years). Gorchakov replied urging moderation and stressing his desire not to see further escalation at a European level or division among conservative powers.

After the first full day of the conference (25th) Clarendon wrote to the Queen that rupture was more likely than settlement.

The Arnim-Boitzenburg petition for annexation. Within weeks it had 70,000 signatures.

Rechberg-FJ: Our current proposals on tariffs appear to those states friendly towards us still insufficient in lowering tariffs. If we don't shift on tariff policy, Prussia's long-term approach with the Zollverein will work and we will be excluded.

Bismarck persuades Wilhelm to change judges' pay and reward them for political loyalty. When the Minister of Justice objected, Bismarck replied, 'The government must reward its friends and punish its enemies.' (The supreme court had a reactionary majority that repeatedly overruled liberal judgements by lower courts.)

(Clark) Russell told Pasolini: 'If you do choose to make war for Venetia, we shall not oppose you.'

Conference reconvened (2nd meeting). Prussia and Austria put forward a proposal for an armistice based on the removal of the blockade in exchange for the withdrawal of their previous demand for money from the Jutland population, plus the restoration of Danish civil power there. Danes: for blockade to be lifted, Allies must leave Jutland. Bernstorff: withdrawal only on basis of complete evacuation of Schleswig islands and return of captured shipping. Danes refused. Russell, irritated, adjourned again until 9 May for consideration of neutral powers offer: armistice on basis of the blockade lifted and Jutland and Schleswig islands evacuated by both sides. Clarendon-Queen (4/5): 'neither Party was more disposed to yield than two parallel lines are to meet'.

A 'unique' battle in naval history between Austrian and Danish fleets — 'the only fleet action between wooden ships under steam and armed with heavy shell guns'. Not much happened, a tactical victory for Denmark but their blockade was raised and Danish navy didn't play a further role so 'a moral victory' for Austria (Barry).

Denmark agrees armistice for 1 month only from 12 May and refused to extend it. Barry: Bismarck was much happier with the terms than Moltke and Roon. (Cf. Barry p125ff for details.)

(Pflanze, p.249, Mosse p194) [Steinberg p.217 says 11 March but then contradicts himself on the next page.] In London, Prussia and Austria informed the conference that they no longer considered themselves bound by the 1852 Treaty, but left open the possibility of 'personal union' between the Duchies and Denmark under King Christian. Denmark rejected the idea of 'personal union', 'to the great distress of the Austrians' (OP). (Danish intransigence again helped him. If the Danes had accepted, Bismarck would have insisted on conditions to try to break the deal.)

Clark: Bismarck had told Bernstorff secretly to sabotage the personal union plan without getting the blame — handle it such that 'it will not be accepted but also will not seem to miscarry through our opposition'. He had been dangling ideas of a deal with Rechberg — Austria approves Prussian annexation in return for compensation — but latter had not committed. Bismarck had kept secret from Vienna the discussions with Augustenburg and more radical ideas like a referendum.

British Cabinet met. On 14th Russell told Brunnow of a new policy: nobody is prepared to fight to restore the status quo ante, we must consider separating Holstein and the German parts of Schleswig from Denmark. Brunnow said he would have to consult with Gorchakov. Gorchakov shifted: as Napier said, Russia supported Denmark but her predominant goal was to maintain relations with Austria and Prussia.

Chotek-Rechberg: Bismarck says of the petition for annexation circulating in Prussia that if he were to publicly object to it, it would only encourage more Danish intransigence(!). He is fishing around for a deal to grab the duchies and give us something, he even said 'We would even give you a guarantee of the entire Austrian territory.' Clark: Bismarck needed Austrian support to continue the war and was throwing out inducements to keep Austria on board, but see later in August the situation was different. In Vienna opinion was strongly against the Prussian alliance and in favour of Augustenburg. Schmerling used this to improve his standing with FJ viz Rechberg.

Palmerston: Gladstone says any sane man has a moral right to vote — this goes straight to universal suffrage. 'Moreover if every sane man has that right [to vote] why does it not also belong to every sane woman who is equally affected by legislation & taxation. The fact is that a vote is not a right but a trust. All the nation cannot by possibility be brought together to vote and therefore a selected few are appointed by law to perform this function for the rest and the publicity attached to the performance of this trust is a security that it will be responsibly performed.

To Arnim: '... it seems to suit our purpose at the conference to let loose against the Danes all the dogs that want to howl..., the whole howling pack together has the effect of making it impossible for the foreigners to place the duchies again under Denmark... [F]or me annexation by Prussia is not the highest and most necessary aim but it would be the most agreeable result.' (Some time around then he also wrote to Zedlitz, 'We must let the whole pack howl.')

Clark says 17th was the day that personal union failed at the Conference.

Wrangel replaced by Frederick Charles as Commander-in-chief. (Years later Bismarck said: 'Old Wrangel is a most cultured and intelligent man with a great fund of learning. Yet he acts like a clown and is taken for one. In contrast, Stolberg, who is not very intelligent and is a complete ignoramus, does know how to handle people and has in consequence been able to achieve a good position wherever he went.' A good description of how much of the world works.)

Bismarck told a confidant of the Crown Prince, Max Duncker (a publisher), that he thought Austria was more likely to support annexation and a deal than Augustenburg. Duncker reported him as saying: 'I have succeeded in what seemed to most people impossible, in bringing Austria to declare itself no longer bound by the Treaty of London. The independence of the duchies with the material guarantees which we demanded for them has been rejected in the conference by the Danes. The dynastic question thus comes into the foreground. I have nothing against the Augustenburger. It is of no decisive importance to Prussia to possess 200 to 300 square miles more territory with half a million subjects if the advantages which dominion over this territory offers can be won for Prussia in other ways.' He mentioned e.g the navy, the canal, a military treaty etc mentioned to various people in the preceding months. He said that a crucial issue was 'guarantees of a conservative system of government', Austria would never recognise the Duke without them, and the Duke has proclaimed the 1848 Constitution. 'It is contrary to the honour of the Prussian government to take Schleswig-Holstein away from Denmark only to give the government of the duchies into the hands of men who have incited and encouraged the opposition in Prussia against the government... Speaking frankly we could carry out the annexation if we wanted it. Austria would rather see the duchies in our hands than in those of Duke Frederick. [Bavaria and Württemberg will go along.] France admits the annexation in the hope of embroiling us with England and Austria. [England will probably 'yield to the fait accompli'.) I do not act in the Danish question without the agreement of Austria; on that rests our security against France. Russia ... will not act against us... We can annex. We will not provided that the Duke gives us guarantees for a conservative regime.' (Steefel).

(Clark) Rechberg to Gramont (Ambassador in Vienna): I'm still hoping that Danish integrity can be saved but am thinking about the possibility of Oldenburg.

Apponyi-Rechberg (but Clark says the report was almost certainly written by Biegeleben as almost all from the London conference were; it reached Rechberg's desk on the morning of 22nd): Clarendon blames Austria for the crisis, says we should have either sided with Denmark or German national opinion. Biegeleben said Austria had to resist nationalism and uphold monarchical principles. (An interesting example: London is telling Austria to ditch what Austria regarded as fundamental interests and also ditch 'international law', which Britain repeatedly said it wanted upheld. Seems somewhat hypocritical!) Clarendon then attacked Prussia: 'All England would rather see the left bank of the Rhine, except for Belgium, fall into Napoleon's hands, than Schleswig-Holstein into Prussia's.' (This was not Palmerston's view.) He said they would have to create a new state out of Holstein and part of Schleswig. Biegeleben: we need a new path and the only solution that might preserve peace, since it would have the support of neutrals, is to divide Schleswig and create a new state. It is full of dangers for the future but is probably the best we can do.

Bismarck sent two memos to Vienna: now that personal union has been rejected, they must insist on total separation from Denmark. There were three possible rulers: Augustenburg, Oldenburg, and Prussian annexation which is growing in popularity in Prussia and the duchies. While he would not reject annexation if it were to emerge from the course of events(!), 'The King would never strive for the realisation of such an idea which has recently been brought to his attention, though without our initiative[!], by addresses from many of his subjects, except in complete agreement with his imperial ally.' Clark: Bismarck said that Augustenburg would be easiest to achieve. (These telegrams are unmentioned by almost everybody, EF mistakenly refers to just one message, cf. Steefel p230-1.)

(Clark) The news of the collapse of the personal union project in London (17th) and Biegeleben's report of 19th landed on Rechberg's desk in the morning. At noon he conferred with Schmerling then advisers and other ministers 'and presumably' FJ (Clark). Rechberg and others switched to support Augustenburg. It had obvious advantages: a chance to regain support in Germany, nip Bismarck's emerging plan for annexation in the bud, avoid a referendum etc.

In Vienna, the collapse of the personal union project was bad news — it was their preferred option as it closed the whole mess down with the minimum trouble. Augustenburg was a victory for German nationalism and annexation a victory for Prussia. They were alarmed at the growth of support for annexation since 18 April. Rechberg believed that he and Bismarck were on the same side in pressuring Wilhelm against the idea of annexation: 'the King had been taken with the idea, but M. de Bismarck had valiantly opposed this particular project, and he hoped with a good prospect of success' (Bloomfield-Russell, 12/5). Of course, the truth was the opposite: Bismarck was organising a campaign for annexation and pushing a reluctant King towards it. On 15th, Chotek (where was he working then?) reported to Rechberg that Bismarck had suggested Prussia gaining territory and 'a policy of mutual compensation'.

Rechberg told Werther that he agreed with Bismarck's notes of 21st re the conditions for the separation of the duchies but wished to take up the dynastic question in London and said that Augustenburg was now his favoured candidate. (Clark: Around now Rechberg also communicated to Augustenburg who had been pessimistic and resigned to annexation and encouraged him to be tougher in discussions with Bismarck.)

Pflanze thinks Bismarck was 'probably caught by surprise'; Steefel 'he seems not to have expected such a complete change in the Austrian attitude'. Clark: 'the Austrian reply came as an unpleasant surprise... He had misjudged the situation believing Austria's dislike for Augustenburg to be stronger than her dislike for Prussian annexation... He seems to have laid entirely too much weight on certain alleged words of Biegeleben's, while the latter was in Berlin a month before, to the effect that Austria would sooner recognise the claim of a Prussian prince ... than that of Augustenburg.'

He decided to go along with Austria for the moment to keep Austria tied to him, knowing Wilhelm supported Augustenburg, and prepared to scupper it by imposing unacceptable demands. He tried to get Austria to support merely demanding separation of the duchies from Denmark and to leave the dynastic issue for later but he failed. While he had to go along with Austria for the moment, he made clear to Paris quietly that he still agreed with Napoleon re the division of the duchies on the basis of nationality. Clark: He also told Bernstorff to drop Augustenburg if the candidacy met with more opposition than the plan to divide Schleswig. He also pushed Oldenburg harder with Russia.

He wrote to his cousin asking him for his help with buying a property for General Wrangel at a decent price, a job thrown at him by the King (Steinberg p.219; JS right to remind readers that amid the 'great events' people like Bismarck are having to deal with endless small tasks forgotten in the history books, many of which can explode into big problems if not handled right).

Napier-Russell re recent chat with Gorchakov. When the subject of threatening Germany with armed intervention arose, Gorchakov said he 'did not take even into contemplation the contingency of armed intervention from any quarter whatever ... [the possibility was] so improbable and remote, that he did not allow [it] to affect his resolutions.' He doesn't believe Britain will fight in any circumstances and the Germans think the same. The military frontier would be abandoned as 1852 had been. Gorchakov would not take any risks with Prussia and Austria for Denmark.

Crown Prince to Augustenburg: 'Bismarck himself said to me yesterday that now England and Austria are for you (France has been inclined that way for some time) and that therefore the moment has come to negotiate with you directly. It is a question, first of all (i.e. for Bismarck) to know whether you would place yourself on the 'conservative basis' and would be disposed to give such assurances or guarantees. This last point refers especially to the constitution of 1848... I tell you this in the greatest haste ... because Bismarck added that it would be desirable that you either come here to Berlin or that you meet me somewhere else to reach an agreement on this point.'

Apponyi, in the name of Prussia and Austria, told the London Conference: since Denmark rejected our previous proposal, we now support 'the complete separation of Schleswig and Holstein from Denmark and their union as a single state under [Augustenburg]'. (The document was drafted by Bernstorff.)

Clark: There was a planned compromise offer involving Lauenburg but before Bernstorff could read this out, Brunnow spoke out objecting to Augustenburg and putting forward Oldenburg. The Danes said the new proposal was worse than Personal Union. Contrary to the Austrians' optimism, the Augustenburg plan stalled. The Danes held out — divided in the government, incompetent in London, and foolishly still hopeful of British help. It was a very uncomfortable month for Austria with discussions dominated by nationality.

Pflanze: Europe was 'astonished' by this move.

GC: In response to a recent comment from Bismarck, in response to complaints from the military about concessions in London, that the army should keep quiet about political questions, Roon wrote to Bismarck that the army could not be seen as 'purely a political instrument' and has a right to have its opinions considered. Given the government depends on the army 'the army's view on what the government does and does not do is surely not a matter of indifference'. Roon thought by now that they must annex at least one of the duchies or else the army would feel the government had failed them and 'it will be an inglorious end of the present government'.

Roon to a friend: I fear Bismarck has given away too much in London. GC: The military complaints were overcome and Bismarck's view, that the concessions were not important because the conference would fail in the end, was vindicated and the battle was rejoined.

Napier: Russia has formally abandoned 1852 and the tsar has ceded his rights to Oldenburg — announced 2/6.

Augustenburg arrives in Berlin and met Wilhelm and Crown Prince. Wilhelm was pleased with the turn of events and had told the Duke's mother the day before that he was now sure to obtain the duchies and he wished to be the first to bring her the good news (Karolyi-Rechberg, 1 June). From 9pm to midnight Bismarck met Augustenburg. Bismarck imposed such severe conditions on him — such as Kiel being a Prussian naval station, a conservative constitution, territorial compensation for Prussia and so on — that he rejected the offer, then Bismarck blamed him for being unreasonable to Wilhelm. To Beust (autumn 1865, Eyck): 'I hitched the duke of Augustenburg as an ox before the plough. As soon as the plough was in motion, I unhitched the ox.' (Beust scribbled: verba ipsissima ('the very words used').) Bismarck gave Wilhelm a doubtless exaggerated account of the discussions, portraying Augustenburg in a bad light. Augustenburg's account is of course different but he also said that he regarded the consent of the Estates as necessary to an agreement with Prussia and was unwilling to agree any written statement for the time being (Steefel, p239ff).

Bismarck never saw him again until the day after Sedan, when he was wearing the uniform of a Bavarian general, Memoirs 2p32. A few days later in August 1870 as they followed the army, he told Busch the story of this 1864 night. In his billiard room, Bismarck called him 'Highness' for the first time; after disagreeing over Kiel he called him 'Prince'; 'Finally, I told him in Low German that we could wring the necks of the chickens we had hatched.' He concluded to Busch: 'He's an idiot. He might have secured much better terms. At first I did not want from him more than the smaller Princes were obliged to concede in 1866. Thanks, however, to Divine Providence and the pettifogging wisdom of Samwer, he would agree to nothing.' He then leaked an account of the meeting to the media which led to many liberals deserting Augustenburg. All in all, this episode is a great illustration of Bismarck's skill and how hard he was to beat — the ability to adapt and continually overcome apparent obstacles.

Bismarck-Bernstorff: 'After a thorough discussion with Augustenburg, it seems to me required in special Prussian interests to further his candidacy no more that has already been done, and as soon as objections to it are expressed, to declare that the dynastic part of our proposal is not the first consideration.'

Drouyn again said to Goltz that he 'would much rather see' [the duchies] in the hands of Prussia ... than in the hands of a petty duke' — the Emperor agrees with me but this view is very unpopular in Paris. Around this time there were also some discussions between Cowley/Russell and Drouyn re possible joint initiatives but the record seems clear that Napoleon 1) never seriously considered doing anything that might lead him into a major war with Germany over the duchies, 2) he most wanted to see England intervening then failing, and 3) persisted in thinking that Prussia's disruption would provide him some opportunity (cf. Steefel p247-9, Mosse p196-7). (Interesting that Cowley was writing to Clarendon about the 'hatred' of Napoleon and Drouyn for Russell [his boss]: 'His appointment to the F.O was certainly most unfortunate — it is his unpopularity which is killing the government. I hear this on all sides.') Rumours of discussions between London and Paris alarmed Russia.

(EF, unmentioned by most) Tsar and Gorchakov arrived in Berlin. Bismarck stressed conservative solidarity. Mosse: Tsar was at Potsdam en route to the spa at Kissingen. On 10th the Tsar urged Bismarck to be conciliatory, if an armistice could not be renewed he should not push further and possibly provoke British and French intervention. Bismarck said a bad deal was worse than war and he would not concede to spare British embarrassments. He successfully waved the Oldenburg possibility at the Tsar, who liked it but warned against annexation. Bismarck said he would not see a European war over the duchies but could not refuse them if offered. Tsar: who would offer them? Gorchakov also warned re French intervention on the Rhine which Britain would support [false — Palmerston was much more worried re French gains on the Rhine than anything in Denmark]. He conjured other possibilities of Anglo-French action and said that although a Prussia-Russia war was impossible, if a British squadron arrived in the Baltic then Russia might have to participate. Wilhelm: 'At least you will not fire on us.' Gorchakov: 'No, your Majesty, but the mere presence of our flag amongst your enemies would be a regrettable proof that from the political point of view, we cannot support the cause you uphold. It would be utterly inconsistent if we acted otherwise.' Gorchakov also warned that the democratic forces looking to smash Denmark and grab the duchies would be supported by Britain and France. Is it worth risking disaster for a few more square miles of land? Wilhelm promised to 'weigh carefully' Gorchakov's words. Bismarck hid behind the King — he and his entourage have certain views, my own position is very tenuous, and there could easily be a liberal takeover, a war with Britain wasn't the worst outcome. Bismarck was confident that Britain would not start a war alone and that France would not intervene imminently over the duchies, cf. 14/6. (Mosse p198-200) Gorchakov also tried to push Vienna similarly over the next few days — watch out for a revival of an Anglo-French alliance, be moderate etc — but failed there too.

There was a long discussion in British Cabinet. Granville-Queen: Cabinet 'not as compact as it was, on the question of what part England should take in the case of the conference being broken up and the war renewed'. There was also a strong move to the view — if the Danes accept arbitration but Prussia refuses, Britain should give Denmark 'material aid'. The Queen was very unhappy with this and asked that Cabinet reconsider (to Russell, 12th). There were disputes re what Cabinet had actually agreed. Granville told the Queen (13th) that Russell had misrepresented Cabinet.

Russell-Cowley: It would be 'a step back in civilisation to lay down as a principle that a Sovereign could not rule with justice and fairness subjects of a different race and language' — such a principle 'would not suit' any of the Powers.

Armistice renewed for a fortnight. Crown Council. Bodelschwingh, finance minister, said that they needed to raise more money. Bismarck and Roon: let's raise loans without asking for Parliament's permission. Bodelschwingh and others objected it would be unconstitutional. No decision taken. (Steinberg)

Stern's account is different. He says there was a ministerial council on 12th and a Crown Council on 13th that continued the discussion in which Bismarck and Roon 'violently opposed' Bodelschwingh's proposal to ask Parliament for authorisation for a loan. Bismarck argued: if war comes 'the article of the Constitution could not mean that the king in such an eventuality would be compelled either to submit to the conditions of the Diet or to give up the country to the enemy.' Bodelschwingh argued the Constitution was clear that they could not accept a state loan without authorisation. Stern — the majority 'seems to have supported Bodelschwingh against Bismarck' and 'no decision was reached'. (Cf. 24 March 1865 — how to reconcile? In 1865 the finances were in good shape and Prussia didn't need a loan. Perhaps the situation looked shakier in 1864 and they thought the war with Denmark might be longer, more expensive etc than it turned out.)

In a highly confidential note to Werther in Vienna Bismarck wrote that Britain may be forced to act by public opinion but he thought it likely that a firm stand from Prussia and Austria would see Britain back down. Anti-war opinion was strong and England needed France as an ally. Even if she did act, Prussia should fear this less than a yielding attitude: 'We must not jeopardise the great conservative interests which we are defending for the sake of an immediate good relationship with England.' Together we should not fear her navy and her interference would unite Germany and rob German liberals of many illusions. Napoleon knows that intervening would provoke a powerful German alliance that Russia would sympathize with and he will not start a war.

Bismarck called in the Austrian chargé d’affaires Count Chotek and span him a tale of how Prussia was rolling in money, he opposed asking Parliament for a loan, many bankers were offering cash and so on. ‘Ah, if one could only get rid of this whole dirty business known as parliamentary constitutionalism.’ If we need to change the constitution to raise money, we will do so.

British Cabinet met again (cf. 11/6). No clear decision.

A letter from Napoleon arrived at the British Embassy in Paris suggesting Britain intervene, but Cowley told Russell he did not think this meant there would soon be assistance from Napoleon.

Bismarck told Buchanan that if he believed the reports of the media from London he would consider war between the two as inevitable (reported to Russell on 18th). Bernstorff-Wilhelm (17th): Clarendon told me that 'as surely as we are at this moment here in Buckingham Palace — England will take part in the war if it begins again.' On 18th Bismarck told Buchanan that he didn't care whether Britain joined the war or not. Steefel (p253): it wasn't until the Congress of Berlin that 'the words of a British statesman again had weight in the councils of Europe'.

Bernstorff proposed the population of Schleswig be consulted, Denmark objected. Brunnow opposed the Prussian proposal on principle. After arguments meeting postponed to 22nd for envoys to discuss with their bosses.

Russell-Queen: Bismarck seems to court rather than avoid war with us.

JS: Bismarck at Carlsbad with Wilhelm, met Rechberg and FJ. (Clark: FJ was there 22-24 and conferred on Bismarck the Grand Cross of St Stephen.) Austria had financial problems as well as diplomatic ones and was looking to pull the plug on military action. Bismarck pushed them to keep going for a little longer. (Stern — while this was going on there was another cabinet meeting without Bismarck to discuss finances, but Stern dates this to 6 July. Stern seems confused — refers to this Carlsbad meeting happening in 1864 and 65!?)

(Clark) Augustenburg wrote a conciliatory letter to Wilhelm on 20 June and gave a speech on 22nd in which he expressed his desire to make far-reaching concessions to Prussia. Clark thinks this had some effect in countering, in the mind of Wilhelm, the effects of Bismarck's manipulation of the 1/6 interview.

Drouyn and Cowley discussed the situation. Drouyn said that an alliance would allow them both to 'govern the world' but that separately France was suffering viz Italy and Britain was suffering viz Denmark: 'Why can't we come to an understanding?' Cowley thought Napoleon wanted to use the situation to push Austria out of Italy and 'get a bit of the Rhine'. To Clarendon, Cowley wrote that 'It is clear, I think, that the French alliance is to be bought, but the price will be perhaps more than it is worth. The [illegible] destruction of Austria is a high price to pay. As to the Rhine, as I do not think Belgium to be asked for, I confess I should not care.' On 21st Cowley and Drouyn had another chat about the possibility of Britain and France uniting to tell Germany and Denmark — here is a fair division, both sides must accept it. (Napoleon is 'getting so sick of the question and so disgusted with the proceedings of the Germans' said Drouyn.)

The Queen spoke to Palmerston who thought the situation extremely dangerous, but was less concerned about Germany united against us than France. 'The greatest danger he saw from France joining us was dragging us into a war, in which she would claim the Rhine, and possibly the whole of Italy. He also entirely agreed ... that it was very doubtful whether we could do anything, for nothing but naval assistance could be given and that only for three months.'

Clarendon told the Queen he feared the war continuing, Denmark's integrity threatened, and the government — or a new government — being forced by 'exasperated public opinion' and 'irresistible public indignation' to throw itself into a war. He therefore thought that 'it would be dangerous to do more than this [sending the fleet for the protection of Copenhagen] but not safe to do less.' Cowley told Russell his hopes of cooperation with Napoleon were strengthened and a decision was needed. (Another example of how ideas about 'public opinion' were much more influential in elite discussions even in this period, pre-universal suffrage, than often assumed.)

Prussia and Austria accepted mediation of a neutral power, Denmark rejected it. Steefel: 'the Danes had done Bismarck's work for him' — they had already accepted the division of Schleswig in principle and could have got all the Danish-speaking populations. The Danes remained over-optimistic about the military situation and the prospect of British help. (Carr, p83; Mosse p202.)

(Many books place this on 25th for some reason) British Cabinet discussion. Palmerston in favour of sending a naval force but Cabinet divided and he accepts he cannot act. There was discussion over whether to send the fleet. Mosse says Cabinet was 'very evenly divided'. Gladstone, Granville and Wood were strongly for peace. The Queen sent Grey to lobby for peace the next day but the decision was already clear. There was discussion over whether they would reconsider the decision if Copenhagen was threatened and they agreed 8-7. No proposal to send the fleet was made. Clarendon thought public opinion was for peace, Russell told the Queen (26 he thought the Commons and country wanted peace, and that it is better to avoid a war in alliance with Napoleon — he wants a war for Venetia which 'will probably occur before long. But it is not for us to stir the coals.' France was told that after all the discussions that an alliance to retake Schleswig for Denmark was not desired.

Conference ended, armistice expired 26th. Some time this summer Clarendon said: 'Je ne veux plus jamais rien avoir a faire avec cet homme sans foi ni loi qui s'appelle M. de Bismarck, ni celui qui est son nègre M. de Rechberg' (I never want to have anything to do with this man without faith or law who is called Mr. de Bismarck, nor the one who is his negro [contemporary slang for 'slave'?] M. de Rechberg). This insult spread to the Vienna press (Clark).

Clark (p79): Austria failed to push for Personal Union with Britain and Russia then do a deal with Denmark behind Prussia's back. While Bismarck was lying and cheating and double-dealing behind Vienna's back, FJ told Biegeleben to stick with Prussia. This passed up a chance that was there. Rechberg didn't realise what he was dealing with. (When Prussia was suddenly warm to a referendum in June, Rechberg expressed his 'astonishment' that a monarchy could adopt 'even temporarily ... so disastrous a modern principle' — how would she feel about a referendum in Poland?) Biegeleben admitted to a friend (12 July): 'A diplomat doesn't willingly admit that he has failed all along the line ... but ... I'm privately admitting the complete collapse of all my ideas.'

Palmerston (Commons) and Russell (Lords) presented their case to Parliament. Bombast from Palmerston — 'if the existence of Denmark as an independent kingdom or the safety of Copenhagen was threatened, a new decision would have to be made.' But also he admitted: 'We had also to consider what really was the matter in dispute for which hostilities were to be begun, and it did not appear to us to be one of very great importance.' Russell: 'we should remain neutral in this war'. Debate in Parliament over four days. French Foreign Minister Drouyn: 'the British do nothing by halves, they are now retreating vigorously'.

Bismarck writes to his sister that 'politically things are going so well that it makes me nervous'.

On night of 28/29 Prussian forces crossed the narrow channel from the mainland to the island of Alsen, this victory 'shattered Danish confidence' (Pflanze); public in Copenhagen 'utterly dismayed' as the stubborn diplomatic resistance in London had been based on belief in the efficacy of Danish naval superiority. GC: The success of the Alsen operation was attributed widely inside the army to Moltke and this 'enormously strengthened' his position with army and king.

Hesse-Kassel folded on the Zollverein renewal issue rumbling since Christmas. It had an important role between the Prussian frontiers and between Hanover and the south. Bismarck had been pushing the states to accept Prussian terms, including the French free trade treaty, since he took office. Cf. October 1864.

Rechberg agreed to exclude the Diet from the peace negotiations and to provide in the treaty for the cession of sovereignty over the duchies to the dual powers alone. Prussian forces expelled Hanoverian troops from the fortress of Rendsburg.

Cowley-Clarendon: 'The disappointment at our pacific resolution is very great here, and proves how glad they would have been, had they been able to involve us in difficulties.'

An operation around Lundby showed the effectiveness of the needle gun when deployed properly: ~200 Danes charged 124 Prussians, the Prussians fired in volleys — after 20 minutes the charge collapsed, 88 Danes were dead or wounded, 3 Prussians suffered light wounds.

Disraeli moved a vote of censure in the Commons: 'The position of England in the councils of Europe is essentially that of a moderating and mediatorial power. Her interest and her policy are, when changes are inevitable and necessary, to assist so that these changes, if possible, may be accomplished without war; or, if war occurs, that its duration and its asperity may be lessened... Within twelve months we have been repulsed at Saint Petersburg. Twice have we supplicated in vain at Paris. We have menaced Austria and Austria has allowed our menaces to pass her like idle wind. We have threatened Prussia, and Prussia has defied us. Our objurgations have rattled over the head of the German Diet, and the German Diet has treated them with contempt... Sir, it is not for any man in this House, on whatever side he sits, to indicate the policy of this country in our foreign relations — it is the duty of no one but the responsible Ministers of the Crown. The most we can do is to tell the noble Lord what is not our policy. We will not threaten and then refuse to act. We will not lure on our allies with expectations we do not fulfil. And, Sir, if it ever be the lot of myself or any public men with whom I have the honour to act to carry on important negotiations on behalf of this country, as the noble Lord and his Colleagues have done, I trust that we at least shall not carry them on in such a manner that it will be our duty to come to Parliament to announce to the country that we have no allies, and then declare that England can never act alone. Sir, those are words which ought never to have escaped the lips of a British Minister. They are sentiments which ought never to have occurred even to his heart. I repudiate — I reject them. I remember there was a time when England with not a tithe of her present resources, inspired by a patriotic cause, triumphantly encountered a world in arms. And, Sir, I believe now, if the occasion were fitting, if her independence or her honour were assailed, or her Empire endangered, I believe that England would rise in the magnificence of her might and struggle triumphantly for those objects for which Men live and nations flourish. But I, for one, will never consent to go to war to extricate Ministers from the consequences of their own mistakes. It is in this spirit that I have drawn up this Address to the Crown. I have drawn it up in the spirit in which the Royal Speech was delivered at the commencement of the Session. I am ready to vindicate the honour of the country whenever it is necessary, but I have drawn up this Address in the interest of Peace. Sir, I beg leave to move the Resolution of which I have given notice.'

Robert Cecil attacked the 'oscillating, vague and fluctuating' policy — 'If we did not intend to carry out by arms our threats and measures, we must abstain from the luxury of indulging in them. That is the only policy for the future which I believe is involved in the censure of the government for the past.' Cecil observed that foreign policy would have been better had Cobden been Foreign Secretary.

Cobden: '... why do we trouble ourselves with these continental politics? We have no territorial interests on the continent. We gain nothing there by our diplomatic meddling.'

Stanley: 'I believe that a policy of neutrality and non-intervention may be not only a safe but a respectable and an honourable position.'

Palmerston got 'a surprise majority of eighteen' in the Commons but lost in the Lords. The government could continue but it was clearly 'a turning point in British diplomacy' (Mosse). Cecil (then Lord Cranborne) wrote 4 July 1866 to the Danish Ambassador: 'The policy that was pursued in 1864 has undoubtedly had the effect of severing [England] in a great measure from the course of continental politics: & the declared principles of non-intervention, which it was the effect of the policy of that year to establish have necessarily diminished her influence in the decision of Continental questions. The general feeling in this country is in favour of abandoning the position which England held for so many years in the councils of Europe.'

AJPT: This decision 'has usually been regarded as a catastrophic blow to British prestige. But quite apart from the obstinacy of the Danes, which put them technically in the wrong ..., it is difficult to see what other course British policy could have taken. Russian backing could have been bought, if at all, only by giving up the Black Sea clauses in the treaty of 1856... Cooperation with France, even if possible, was too dangerous... Nothing that the British did in 1864 could have checked the industrial expansion of Germany in the last third of the 19th century or their own relative decline; if mistakes were made it was rather in the 20th century than in the last days of Palmerston' (AJPT, Struggle for Mastery in Europe, p.154).

(I disagree with AJPT. An alternative approach was 1) realism about priorities: was stopping Prussia making gains in S-H worth a general war? Was the priority avoiding France making gains (if so then an alliance to fight Prussia was illogical). 2) If avoiding war was the priority then we should not have encouraged Danish intransigence — we should have said from the start 'do not count on us, cut a deal'. 3) Not crude bluffing. We again tried to make gains 'on the cheap' by bluffing, but this was doomed and counterproductive against Bismarck who was adept at calling players' bluffs. Apart from Bismarck, the only player who had roughly a clear view of their priority and stuck to it was Russia. They were clear from the start that their focus was domestic problems, they would not fight and unlike Britain and France could not be accused of giving Denmark false hope. They stuck to 1852 until all the others abandoned it.)

The cabinet in Denmark gave up and a new one formed, on 12th asked for armistice which started on 20th.

Bismarck to Rechberg re the peace terms to be sought: King Christian must renounce all his rights and assent to whatever disposition we and you decide on for 'the three duchies, and the territory belonging to Jutland, lying inside Schleswig', plus reparations.

Bismarck to his Vienna envoy: 'We regard the Danish conflict as being in essence an episode in the struggle of the monarchical principle against European revolution, and we allow our handling of the duchies question to be guided by our views concerning its repercussions on that greater question of our time.' We should not jeopardise 'the great conservative interests that we are defending' even for the sake of temporary good relations with Britain. In a further directive drafted the same day he wrote that if Paris wanted to start an unprovoked war they could prevent it by means of 'harmonious collaboration' between the 'three continental great powers together with the rest of Germany', and it would be easy to arrange such collaboration given that in this context 'France's victory would be the victory of revolution'. This seems clearly to have been part of his attempt to keep Austria thinking about the advantages of further cooperation.

Landtag prorogued again (Steinberg).

To his wife, from Carlsbad where he was with the King who had thanked him '... much moved and giving me all the credit for what God's help has done for Prussia. May it please God to continue to lead us in mercy and not leave us to our own blindness. It is a lesson one learns well in this business, that one can be as wise as the wise ones of this world and yet at any point find oneself next moment walking like a child into the darkness' (Gall). 'Don't let's invoke Him gratuitously and let us hope that He will continue his grace and not leave us to our blindness. This trade teaches that one can be as shrewd as the shrewdest in this world and still at any moment go like a child into the dark' (Pflanze). (The Carslbad visit dates seem confused across the books.)

Just before he left Carlsbad for Vienna, the 'Rendsburg incident': street brawls between Prussian/Hanoverian troops. Bismarck ordered the occupation of Rendsburg, sent 6,000 troops, and hyped up the media. The Bund commander withdrew. This caused an outcry in the Bund.

Clark: Leaving Wilhelm to go to a cure at Gastein, Bismarck went to Vienna on 22 July for 9 days to discuss peace terms with Rechberg and the Danes. (While there he wrote that he was stared at like 'a new hippopotamus in the zoo' which 'is very unpleasant when all one wants is to be allowed to drink one's beer in peace'.) He tempted Rechberg with a deal whereby each of them would nibble some land from the duchies, with some islands going to Austria, but Rechberg declined the bait. FJ and Rechberg brought up the Rendsburg incident (and a row between Bismarck and Hanover over control of the telegraph system) but got nowhere. Bismarck left 'more doubts in the minds of Austrian statesmen than he had allayed' (Clark). They had hammered out an approach to the peace deal but clearly aiming in different directions over Germany. Rechberg was still infuriated with the smaller states but had to try to get closer to them. He made a play to involve the Bund more in the administration of the duchies. Cf. 6/8.

(JS, April) Perthes, a conservative friend who was Professor of Law at Bonn, had written to Roon complaining about Bismarck's contempt for morality, revolutionary agenda, and 'has no scruples about methods': 'It seems to me that [Bismarck] has acted like Esau of old and has sold the great position which fell to him for a mess of pottage. It was to be expected of the government which put an end to the new era that it would bow down before the divine and human order which is given and established... But the diplomatic struggle over both of the questions which preoccupied and preoccupy everyone the most, the struggle over the position of Prussia in Germany and over the position of Prussia toward the duchies, ... does not have conservative feeling and will as its basis, so the word “revolutionary” comes to mind almost involuntarily.'

Roon to Perthes: 'B. is an extraordinary man whom I can certainty help, whom I can support and here and there correct, but never replace. Yes, he would not be in the place he has now without me, that is an historical fact, but even with all that he is himself... To construct the parallelogram of forces correctly and from the diagonal ... then assess the nature and weight of the effective forces, which one cannot know precisely, that is the work of the historic genius who confirms that by combining it all.'

JS implies he arrived in Vienna in the last week of July for the peace discussions and some time in this week also dined with his old friend Motley and family.

Lothar Bucher started working for Bismarck. Many conservatives scandalised when they realised. Keudell recorded that Bismarck wasn't worried about his revolutionary past and told Keudell to see if he would switch sides: 'We all cook with water and most of what happens or will happen gets into the press. Take the case that he comes to us as a fanatical democrat, like a worm to bore its way into the state structure and to blow it up, he would soon see that he alone would be destroyed in the attempt. Let that possibility be. Such perfidy I cannot believe of him. Talk to him without asking for his confession of faith. What interests me is whether he will come or not.' Bismarck apparently said to him, 'I know your national standpoint only too well but I need it for the conclusion of my policy and I will only give you work to carry out which moves in the spirit of your national efforts.' (Holstein later wrote how Bucher combined an 'abnormally ugly face' and 'a strong interest in the opposite sex' — during the war with France he observed in Bismarck's office Bucher and Wagener sitting next to each other, the revolutionary of 1848 and the founder of the Kreuzzeitung, talking in monosyllables. Wagener had in 1848 issued an order for Bucher's arrest which failed because the telegraph broke. Generally we have far too little information on Bismarck's handling of the media and the one book I can identify, A Study Of The Press And Bismarck In Imperial Germany, I can't find a copy of.)

Preliminary peace signed with Denmark (made permanent on 30 October): King Christian ceded forever rights in the duchies to Austria and Prussia. Bismarck had succeeded in detaching the duchies from Denmark and Austria was now stuck with troops miles away occupying territory of no value to her.

Steefel: Denmark's two big errors were 1) not compromising on the constitution in December, thus giving Bismarck the pretext for the war; 2) not accepting mediation in June, which allowed him to grab all Schleswig. Napoleon's error was not in a failure to launch a war against Germany in 1864 but his failure to act after Königgrätz.

Mosse's book is good but his judgement (p212) that 'The Schleswig-Holstein dispute exercised little influence on the evolution of the German question or the Austro-Prussian struggle' is weird.

Keudell reported that in Vienna, Rechberg is attacked on all sides, Austria is depicted as Prussia's vassal, 'Bismarck is envied and praised'.

Clark: Schmerling thought it the right time for a counter-attack, the time would soon come for a revival of his schemes for a Greater Germany and for Vienna to support the Bund. He sent out agents to the south German states to test the water (Beust was doing similar). He mobilised the press. He started to undermine Rechberg at court. And Biegeleben returned from holiday determined on revenge against Prussia. Cunningly, Schmerling did not attack directly on the Prussian alliance — this being FJ's policy too — but he demanded that Rechberg obtain the renewal of Austria's option to join the Zollverein. Cf. October.

Rechberg note to Bismarck re the role of Bund in duchies and pressing his case on the Zollverein.

Disraeli walked in the park with Russian Ambassador Baron Brunnow: 'Bismarck has made a good book but, what is most strange, he backed the worst horse of the lot. For Prussia is a country without any bottom and in my opinion could not maintain a real war for six months.' (Steinberg — 'at the same time' as this discussion, Bismarck was in Vienna. Wrong, he went on 20/8.)

Note from Bismarck (part drafted by Abeken?, Clark) to Rechberg pushing back against involvement of Bund in duchies, and strongly urging conservative solidarity for joint action in the spirit of fighting 1848. An alliance between Prussia and Austria is the only path to a 'true German and Conservative policy'. 'If Prussia and Austria are not united, politically Germany does not exist.' We can't be knocked off course by small states with their parliaments and newspapers.

The note was the start of a series of complaints about Austria, in an injured tone that continued to summer 1866 (gap in 9/65). He knew, says Clark, from his recent trip to Vienna that most of the court and military still wanted to stay close to Prussia, on simple conservative grounds. He also got Manteuffel, popular in Vienna, to write in similar vein. Over coming days he pushed back against the Bund but looked for ways to be conciliatory about the Zollverein.

14 Aug Rechberg/Biegeleben replied to Bismarck: they stressed that the idea of Bund involvement had been his idea and it must happen, unless the Bund agrees some other arrangement based on both Powers promising they 'intend no acquisitions' and await the Bund's decision 'on the sovereignty question, before giving up the Duchies to their future lord'; no more 'Rendsburg tactics'. Clark (p101): This was an attempt to fix the basic Austrian error since January. Rechberg was not playing a straight bat but Bismarck's had been much more crooked: he'd secretly worked with France to undermine Personal Union; worked to scupper Augustenburg in London; he'd suggested annexation to Napoleon and Alexander; he'd secretly had Wilhelm talking to Augustenburg to extort Prussian control; negotiations with Oldenburg; recent resumption of commercial discussions with Italy (which he thought Rechberg strongly opposed) etc.

Wilhelm wrote to Moltke praising and decorating him for his role.

17 Aug Bismarck left Gastein.

Bismarck went with Wilhelm to Vienna. He wrote to his wife that day to remind her of a previous visit they made to the Schönbrunn palace on their honeymoon: 'It is too strange that I should be living in the rooms on the ground floor, abutting on the private reserved garden where, very nearly seventeen years ago, we intruded in the moonlight. I see through a glass door the dark beech hedge along which we walked, secretly enjoying forbidden fruit looking through the windows, behind which I am now living.' On 17th he said he left Gastein and slept at Radstedt; on 18th on to Aussee, and after a trip across a beautiful lake on to Hallstadt; on 19th they reached the King at Ischl and they all spent the night of 19th at Gmunden. 'Today, by steamer, hither, arriving about six.'

Clark: Biegeleben wanted to scupper annexation by counter-demanding Prussian territory such as land in Silesia and Schmerling agreed with him (but took the month off on holiday and wasn't there). Rechberg focused on trying to get a Prussian guarantee of help if Austria were attacked (which was also close to FJ's heart) and knew he'd have to pay a price for 16 January deal. At the first formal meeting in Vienna, FJ wore the uniform of a Prussian colonel, Wilhelm the uniform of an Austrian colonel. They stayed in FJ's 'favourite suburban palace of Maria Theresa' (Clark) where they enjoyed more privacy and were more insulated from Viennese ill-feeling. There were banquets, operas, troop reviews and two hunts — at which Bismarck strengthened his reputation as a great shot by shooting the largest stag, reported the local press. The history of these days is vague — none of the key participants wrote an account at the time that has survived, Bismarck made many dishonest claims about it later. His account of the discussion à quatre is false. Bismarck and Rechberg wanted to stress in later years their desire for good relations — Bismarck because of his Triple Alliance policy, Rechberg to defend himself from blame for the 1866 war. Some Rechberg letters were published in 1927 that helps piece together events. (Friedjung interviewed Bismarck and Rechberg in 1889-90.)

Bismarck and Rechberg discussed at Schönbrunn various schemes for Prussia taking duchies and Austria getting compensation in Italy; discussions about an alliance, Bismarck dangling carrots as usual but nothing settled. (He had been dangling such ideas since start of year, see 28/2.)

On 22nd at Schönbrunn, there was a meeting of FJ, Wilhelm, Bismarck and Rechberg. (NB. There was more than one discussion but we can't disentangle them all now given the sources.) In his Memoirs, Bismarck claimed he said to FJ and Rechberg: 'Destined by our history for one political community, we should both do better business if we held together and accepted the leadership of Germany, which we shall not lose, when once we are united.' Bismarck urged Rechberg — 'it would be useful for Austria to act generously and obligingly towards Prussia now' and to consider possible gains from further cooperation. Clark: Bismarck said, 'Our alliance ... is like a hunting party in which each takes home his own share of the spoils. If, later on, we should make war together against France and Italy, and with Prussia's aid Milan should fall again into Austrian hands, Prussia would not ask for a land-equivalent, but would accept a money immunity for war efforts' — the implication was obvious, Prussia will buy the duchies. FJ replied, fencing, suggested a possible trade of land (Duchies/Silesia, per Biegeleben) and asked Wilhelm outright whether he wished to annex. William replied 'with some hesitation and embarrassment' that he had no right to the duchies and could make no claim to them. In this answer Bismarck 'perceived the influence of the King's relatives and of the Court liberal party' (Memoirs).

Clark: FJ turned the conversation to other topics and let Bismarck and Rechberg explore details. Clark thinks Venetia was probably not discussed between the two kings, contra Sybel, and notes that if Bismarck personally told Sybel that it was then it should be remembered that he also told Friedjung that it was not! Bismarck had connected the Duchies/Venetia, e.g with Karolyi on 14/1 and Chotek on 14/5, but he did not intend a real guarantee — e.g he told Manteuffel 21/2 to offer verbal assurances but no guarantee. Now Wilhelm was still not prepared to buy the duchies.

Bismarck to Rechberg (Clark p113): 'A treaty with Austria would be either eventual or definitive; if only eventual, Austria would not gain very much, for it would always depend on Prussia to decide whether the casus foederis had arisen or not; on the other hand, if it were a definitive treaty, all the disadvantages would be on Prussia's side, for Austria would only need to cause the questions to arise which the treaty foresaw, in order to bring on the war.' Why not therefore continue double ownership until a new constellation allows an alliance more popular than it is today and provides another way to solve the issue?

Clark: as Biegeleben expressed it, Bismarck was trying to persuade Austria 'with her own hand to undermine her position in Germany merely in order not to lose the uncertain prospect of Prussia's alliance in a future war'. But Rechberg had Biegeleben in FJ's ear and had to try to get something out of the situation. On the last evening there was an attempt to write some sort of understanding. Bismarck and Rechberg haggled while Wilhelm waited upstairs nervously until after midnight. Rechberg urged not an all-inclusive alliance but a limited defensive alliance against France: Napoleon will need a war, together 'we can strike France down'. For Bismarck, such a deal would make an enemy of Napoleon and tie him to Austria — not his style! There then emerged a new idea — whether from Rechberg 'or from Bismarck's more inventive mind may never be known' (Clark): Prussia gets Schleswig, outside the pale of the Bund, Austria gets Holstein and Lauenburg, Prussia makes a partial guarantee of Venetia against France. Austria would have burned bridges with the Bund, Bismarck with Napoleon. There seems to have been a written document that Rechberg referred to in later years but it has not been found. (Clark: Rechberg always gave the impression this plan was his but never explicitly stated so. It was 'probably' Bismarck's idea, it was a step from the July suggestion re the islands and Bismarck was far more resourceful than Rechberg, p115.)

Rechberg summoned Biegeleben late at night to help the drafting but Biegeleben refused and Rechberg said, 'Then I'll draft it myself.' A version was drafted and shown to Wilhelm who refused to sign. FJ similarly did not agree, influenced by Biegeleben (during the night or early next morning of 25th). Bismarck and Rechberg therefore drafted a short and vague statement, the Kings signed, Wilhelm left and Bismarck stayed to tidy up business and attend a formal dinner that night. After this dinner in the villa of Kettenhof, Bismarck had a long discussion with Gramont. No final settlement had been reached and for the time being 'oceans of ink would flow' but no blood: 'The one who can give the Rhine provinces to France is the one who possesses them... We can march with France better than anybody else, for as a start we can give her what other Powers can only promise. We do not desire a European conflagration. But if it comes we shall not be among the losers. This perspective does not frighten us' (Gramont-Drouyn, 28/8). (As Eyck says this is similar to his comment years earlier: 'Great crises are the very weather which stimulates Prussia's growth, if we turn them to our account fearlessly and, maybe, very recklessly.') Later that evening, at a safe distance from his hosts, Bismarck joked about Austria's position and said she should not 'chase the phantom of supremacy in Germany'. Just before he left the next day, Rechberg spoke to him and stressed the importance to his personal position of keeping open the Zollverein option.

Pflanze (p254): It would have been 'most unlike him' to make an offer of - alliance against France and Italy for the defence of Venetia and recovery of Lombardy, in return for Prussia annexing the duchies and solidarity against the middle states. He wanted Austria to agree that Prussia get the duchies in return for a vague verbal promise of help in Italy that he could wriggle out of. Rechberg presented on 24th a draft agreement — Prussia gets the duchies if Lombardy is reconquered. Bismarck got rid of it in typical fashion, letting Wilhelm knock it back. When Wilhelm was asked by FJ whether he wanted the duchies, Wilhelm groped for a reply, Bismarck said that he too wanted to hear what the King wanted. Wilhelm said he had no right to the duchies. Bismarck pretended in his Memoirs this was tricky for him but it actually scuppered Rechberg's plan. (Bismarck knew Wilhelm well enough that if this conversation happened, Bismarck surely prompted Wilhelm knowing how he would answer.) Isn't Pflanze confusing Bismarck's account of the meeting on 22nd with the proposal on 24th?

JS does not go into the details of these meetings and leaves unexplained what was actually agreed. Of all the books I've read, Clark (p103-120) has by far the most details and footnotes on original sources re this Vienna interlude.

Gall (p257): it's 'certain' that 'the substance of and basis for a Prusso-Austrian partnership at this time was so feeble from the very beginning that such a partnership could not possibly have lasted.' It ran 'counter to the spirit of the age', liberal and national, and was incompatible with 'concrete interests'. (Overstated. It implies that there was never a possibility for FJ to have chosen a different path but this is un-historical. If you are asking about counterfactuals you have to be open to such possibilities. Perhaps Napoleon would have become more aggressive over Italy again, perhaps to shore up his domestic position. In such a situation one can easily imagine a desperate Vienna deciding to do a deal on the duchies in return for Prussian support. And so on...)

Friedjung (p58): on 13 June 1890 Bismarck told me the following about the Schönbrunn meeting. 'Rechberg declared that the Duchies could be handed over to Prussia only if Austria received the county of Glatz in order to preserve the balance of power in Germany. This the King would not agree to: the inhabitants had no desire to be transferred to Austria; indeed, petitions and addresses were being sent begging the King not to separate them from Prussia. I put it to the Emperor that it would be in accordance with the spirit of our alliance if Prussia received the Duchies without giving any compensation; our alliance was not a trading company, dividing its profits in a fixed percentage, but rather a hunt, in which each party took its own spoils home. If, in continuance of our alliance, we waged war against France and Italy and recovered Milan, Prussia would not demand territorial compensation, but would be content with a contribution towards the cost of the war. This argument had an effect on the Emperor, as was shown by his asking if Prussia then regarded annexation as the most desirable solution of the question of the Duchies. I was very pleased to have the question so directly put in the presence of the King, for I had never been able to get a definite answer from him. I therefore turned to him and said I was not empowered to answer this question. But the King hesitated and replied that he was not exactly thinking of the absorption of Schleswig-Holstein. I therefore had to drop the subject.' This is close to the account in his Memoirs, though Wilhelm's answer is recorded there slightly differently.

(Clark) Russell-Apponyi: 'I regret to see the secondary states lose confidence in Austria little by little. My wish would be to see you at the head of Germany.'

Lassalle shot in a duel over a woman, died on 31st.

Tsar to the new Austrian Ambassador in St P, Revertera: Bismarck has been too aggressive and alienated England, hopefully Oldenburg's claims will be accepted, I have no ambitions in the east and want to preserve the Ottoman empire which is 'a sad necessity' (un triste nécessité), I'm opposed to Panslavism. A few weeks later Gorchakov assured Revertera that past grudges were banished and the three conservative Powers should cooperate.

Bleichröder to Rothschild: '... the great intimacy with Austria has reached its term and a chill will follow', Bismarck wants 'an understanding with France', S-H for Prussia, thinks England and Austria will 'remain silent, however unhappy they may be' but 'for time being this ideal is frustrated by [Wilhelm] who, because of the crown princess, is inclined toward the duke of Augustenburg.'

To Rechberg: 'You will recognise with me the difficulty of the task we have set ourselves, to relegate years of differences and conflicts to the past. We will only succeed if we maintain for our alliance the fresh life of an active common policy ... which would without doubt bring us to our desired goal, to the unity of Germany against internal and external enemies, to the restoration of the basis for a monarchical regime, to the emasculation of revolution.' Around then he was also floating all sorts of ideas about cooperation on customs etc as part of the tortuous negotiations over the Zollverein.

Buchanan left Berlin and became Ambassador in St P, Napier took over. (Davis: Napier was appointed in November.) Negotiations over winter between London and Berlin over an Anglo-Prussian trade deal.

Napoleon signed deal with Italy agreeing to withdraw his troops from Rome within 2 years in return for Victor Emanuel's promise not to attack the papal city and a secret pledge to move his capital to Florence. News filtered out over coming days. Rechberg, very worried about possible secret elements to the deal, insisted in Paris that the Pope must approve the deal but he did not seek to escalate into a crisis — instead he was conciliatory. The outcome was improved relations.

'Late September' (Clark): Clarendon travelled through Vienna en route for Italy. He spoke to Rechberg. Along with Austrian recognition of King George of Greece and the opening of commercial negotiations for an Anglo-Austrian deal 'revived the latent friendship' of UK/Austria in autumn 1864.

Clark: Bismarck was absent from Berlin at this time because his wife was ill. Rechberg had asked for a delay to the ultimatum to Bavaria and Württemberg regarding the French treaty. In Bismarck's absence Delbruck declined. This increased Rechberg's problems.

Rechberg wrote to Bismarck insisting that Article 25 (giving Austria a future right to negotiate entry to the Zollverein) be left open. (Clark: this latter arrived as Bismarck was leaving Berlin to meet Wilhelm at Baden-Baden. Did he see it before he wrote the below about 'fogs'?) Bismarck to Rechberg: The tariff issue is less important than the political alliance between us: 'I believe ... we should be surer of the progress of our common course if we were both to take our stand on the practical ground of Cabinet politics without allowing the situation to be obscured by the fogs that emanate from the doctrines of German political sentimentalists.' (Clark: '... without befogging the situation...')

Rechberg exploded with frustration over how to deal with Bismarck in a note to FJ (3/10 Clark): 'It increases to a more than ordinary degree the difficulties of conducting business when one is dealing with a man who so openly professes political cynicism as to reply to the passage in my letter, where I say that we must make the maintenance of the Confederation and of the legitimately acquired rights of the German princes the foundation of our policy, ... with the outrageous piece of claptrap that we both take our stand on the practical ground of Cabinet politics without allowing the situation to be obscured for us by fog emanating from the doctrines of German political sentimentalism. This is language worthy of a Cavour. Holding fast to what is lawful is foggy sentimentalism! ... To hold fast to the treaty-basis is a nebulous and sentimental policy!... The task of keeping this gentleman in check and talking him out of his megalomanic utilitarian politics ... is one that exceeds human powers.' FJ (away hunting in the mountains for a fortnight with his cousin Prince Albert of Saxony) scribbled in the margin: 'Very true, alas, except that the alliance with Prussia is still the only right one in the circumstances, and we must therefore continue our thankless efforts to keep Prussia on the right lines and within the fold of the law.'

Bismarck went to Baden, from thence to Biarritz on 5th for a holiday with the Orlovs. On 9th he wrote to his wife overlooking the bathers playing on the beach at Biarritz: 'I cannot help saying that southern nations possess a peculiar grace of God in their climate... If we were free, I should propose to you to come with child and baggage to this place, and remain here the whole winter as many of the English do'. On 12th he wrote to his sister: '[T]he evil habit of work has rooted itself so deeply in my nature that I feel some disquiet of conscience at my laziness — almost long for the Wilhelmstrasse, at least if my dear ones were there...'

Napoleon appointed Benedetti to be Ambassador in Berlin. He had been a senior official at the Quai d'Orsay and the first envoy to Italy. He was pro-Italian and in the group around Thouvenel (former foreign minister), instinctively hostile to Drouyn. He couldn't speak German well. He had much less access to Wilhelm than Goltz enjoyed with Napoleon, so was more dependant on discussion with Bismarck. On 7/10 the French legation in Berlin was upgraded to embassy status. He arrived 22/11.

(Clark) A Council in Vienna. Sharp opposition to Rechberg. Biegeleben argued for a sort of ultimatum to Berlin re Article 25 and if this failed then urgent negotiations with France for a commercial treaty. Rechberg argued the timing of an ultimatum was terrible, with Bismarck travelling, and the talks could still yield something. Clark: papers close to Schmerling carried hostile briefings against Rechberg and his policy. Some advocated a rapprochement with France and England. FJ still sided with Rechberg who pressed on trying to negotiate with Prussia. He told Werther in Vienna and Chotek in Berlin — we need an answer on Article 25. To Werther he said he'd have to resign (reported by Werther to Abeken on 8th) and he repeated it 2 days later. From Biarritz, Bismarck, fearing Rechberg's replacement by someone cleverer, sent multiple messages to Wilhelm urging the folly of letting Schmerling get the upper hand when an empty phrase would keep Rechberg in place. Thile, acting for Bismarck, tried to muster reinforcements to speak to Wilhelm who was taking his cure in Baden. Wilhelm did not think it urgent. Delbruck and others in Berlin objected to leaving Austria wriggle room with A25.

(Gall) Bismarck wrote to Wilhelm (from Biarritz): 'Should the Schmerling policy gain the upper hand in Vienna we must be prepared not only for a striving for the support of the western powers but also the establishment of close relations between Austria and the medium-sized states. Presumably Austria would then immediately take steps over the Holstein question by bringing motions before the Confederation in the interests of the medium-sized states.'

(EF): He wrote to Roon warning that Delbruck was making trouble and the government should do as he had said re the Zollverein and not make it look to Rechberg and FJ that 'the break is only a question of time.' EF: Delbruck threatened resignation and this may have influenced Wilhelm. Friedjung quotes a letter of 16/10, presumably the one to Roon, complaining about Delbruck and Bodelschwingh: 'If they succeed it will be obvious in Vienna that we attach no value to their alliance, they will act accordingly, and first of all in the Danish question, in which, led by Schmerling, they will go over to Beust and Pfordten. But a breach with Austria would be ill-timed from every point of view and I disclaim all responsibility for the effects of such a mistake on our foreign policy.'

Hamerow: around this time Bismarck wrote about keeping alive the possibility of the Zollverein for Austria (also the letter to Roon?): 'They would consider it a slap in the face if this prospect should be immediately and categorically cut off... The more certain we are that the force of actual material conditions will not let it be realised, the less we need to object to making it a subject of negotiation also in the future. It is important for us that [the project] miscarry not because of our ill-will but precisely because of these actual conditions.' (This is a good example of his fingertip feel for politics — there is a policy objective, X, but X can be sought in different ways, and one way arouses less unnecessary opposition by letting circumstances dictate the outcome rather than being overtly antagonistic and provoking counter-measures. But a less subtle and cleaner alternative seems preferable to tidy bureaucratic minds. Even brilliant officials like Delbruck who agree X couldn't see the point of the subtlety.)

(Clark) Rechberg offered his resignation to FJ. He knew Biegeleben, Schmerling et al were pushing for him to go. Bismarck had not come through with Article 25. He was tired and fed up. FJ felt he could not lose Schmerling. He accepted the resignation and asked that he stay until the peace deal was finalised. (In a 1892 discussion, Rechberg said that Bismarck had been very lucky.)

Biegeleben's memo savagely attacked Rechberg's policy. Argued 1) Prussia is a more dangerous enemy than France, and we can't be real friends without giving up our place in Germany which is unthinkable, 2) a reliable entente with Napoleon is possible, and Bismarck will also seek it so we must move first. Rechberg thought both false. Biegeleben did not have a convincing answer to how the issue of Venetia could be solved other than fudging it and hoping. Clark thinks he had schemes such as: rally the middle states, beat Prussia, retake Silesia then trade away Venetia. Clark discusses the theoretical options open to Austria p150-6.

Chotek told Rechberg that Wilhelm said nothing could be done until Bismarck returned end of October.

Bismarck left Biarritz, was in Paris on 25th, 'plenty of politics, audience at St Cloud, a dinner at Drouyn de Lhuys's'.

The peace deal was formally signed and Mensdorff formally replaced Rechberg. (OP says Rechberg resigned on 27th but it seems from Clark that he resigned on 18th but was replaced on 27th.) Ironically given Bismarck's desire to save Rechberg, Mensdorff was arguably much worse than Rechberg so Bismarck caught a break. He was a general with no diplomatic experience — 'a mediocrity of noble birth and ample means' (Eyck) — and was more dependent on the official Biegeleben who gained in influence.

Clark: he didn't have the skills needed but he was part of the old nobility, he was not a political fanatic, FJ liked and trusted him, and other candidates presented problems. FJ had asked Rechberg whether he could recommend Esterhazy, Rechberg said no and recommended Mensdorff. Clark: Rechberg's fall was a victory for Schmerling and Biegeleben but Mensdorff was a defeat (p145). Mensdorff disliked Schmerling's pseudo-liberal government and Schmerling apparently did not realise it when he was appointed. Contemporaries thought that Esterhazy was the most important influence on FJ 1864-6, they probably over-estimated a bit, it's hard to tell given much of his papers/letters were destroyed, but he was definitely very influential (p147). He was a minister without portfolio, he lacked definitive duties. He was conservative and wished to bring Austria and Hungary together. He was 'tinged with insanity' and craved the shadows away from the media (Clark). He had a plan for Hungary and Rechberg opposed it so he helped push Rechberg out in October. He thought he could work with Mensdorff to remove Schmerling, shift policy in a more conservative direction and implement his Hungary plan. FJ-Wilhelm: 'The very name of my new minister, Lieutenant Field Marshal Count Mensdorff, will convince you that I am fully determined to make no change in the direction of my policy.'

Mosse writes (p215) that Bismarck 'showed his true temper' by refusing Rechberg's 'modest requests' but it seems Mosse is wrong here and the account in Pflanze and Clark is more reliable. Mosse writes that 'real control of foreign policy soon fell into the hands of Maurice Esterhazy an ardent opponent of Prussia who hoped to revive the glories of Schwarzenberg.'

By mid-October (Pflanze) the renewal of the Zollverein, including the new French treaty, had been accomplished (signed following May, Gall), the medium and smaller states had folded under the pressure. There was opposition to Prussia in the south but the key state was Hesse-Kessel, between the Prussian frontiers and between Hanover and south: it folded in June 1864 and resistance crumbled. The French treaty offered the German states great possibilities. Prussia was determined while Austria seemed hesitant (e.g strong commercial interests opposed opening up lagging companies to German competition).

Gall: Bavaria and its foreign minister Pfordten were the biggest obstacle and had longstanding ideas about a 'third Germany', a new centre of power.

Renewal of the Zollverein was an event of 'major importance in German history' (OP). 'The common market, railways, banks, joint-stock companies, and bourse had begun to produce an interlocking, interdependent economic order throughout the small-German region. The Zollverein had become indispensable for the material prosperity of the entire area' (Pflanze). The French free trade deal was supported by crucial interests. Eastern landowners were grain exporters and consumers of manufactured goods and supported free trade as did merchants who wanted low tariffs and many light industrialists who did not fear competition. The main opposition to the 1862 deal had come from the iron and steel industrialists but they were 'not yet weighty enough to dictate tariff policy' (OP).

The new Zollverein agreement based on the French deal was supported by the Landtag without a single dissenting vote! Since 1851 statutes had freed mining companies and given tax advantages culminating in the 1861 statute and the same year also saw the tax on gross income of mining companies fall from 5% to 2%. In 1865 the Landtag approved a statute establishing a mining code that incorporated in a single statute all remaining regulatory acts: wages, hours, conditions previously subject to state control were now left to the market and the code 'marked the final triumph of the free enterprise system in the mining industry and was also a milestone in the development of class consciousness among Ruhr miners' (OP, p288ff).

Traditionally Prussian businessmen were 'pacifist and antimilitary', resented the aristocratic officer corps, preferred a fleet to the army. There were no strong objections from business over the three-year service and Landwehr reform. The 1863 press law radicalised some but no appetite for radical action like a tax strike. 1861-5 was a period of growth and they were in no mood to support radical measures against the Crown. For much of the well-connected finance world the constitutional conflict was 'not a deterrent but an opportunity' to do profitable business with Bismarck. Overall businessmen by 1864-5 'appear to have lost interest in the [constitutional] struggle', they were 'practical men' who 'deplored the tendency' of the lawyers and professors to talk so much about principles, and they increasingly admired Bismarck's successes (OP).

BUT... Prussia's economic advance and victory on the Zollverein did not mean the struggle for hegemony in Germany was over — in fact Prussia's growing economic strength made the other German states more worried about their own political independence. Austria was determined to resist in Germany. 'Without Bismarck's narcissistic determination, his diplomatic skill, and Prussia's military might this resistance could not have been overcome. Here is one of those moments in the processes of history where a single personality, by his capacity to manipulate the forces within his grasp, influenced the course of history and the lives of millions' (OP p258).

JS writes: 'In the summer of 1864 France opened negotiations to create a free trade zone between the Empire and the [Zollverein].' But Prussia and France agreed a free trade deal in March 1862. He then says that the Landtag, bureaucracy and smaller states 'opted for the French treaty which undermined Rechberg's entire policy of cooperation with Prussia.' This seriously confuses the story.

Peace with Denmark, Treaty of Vienna: Denmark renounced rights over the Duchies, joint Prussian and Austrian control of them.

(Clark) Bismarck stopped at the Krupp factory in Essen, on the way from Paris to Berlin, where he remarked: 'When I consider something right, and possible of attainment, I intend to carry it out, though the shrewdest people hold it impossible.'

Roon wrote to Manteuffel that he was thinking of resigning and suggested the latter take over from him but Manteuffel declined: 'Your Excellency entered the boat with His Majesty and must now help to steer it — I shall gladly continue to row.'

FJ set out his own views to his ministers and complained about them briefing the media. We must pursue peace and internal development. We need to stay close to Prussia and improve relations with the smaller German states. Best possible relations with France but no alliance. Better relations with England and Russia but no expectation of material help. No more playing off the German states against Prussia — it has 'proved detrimental by experience and has given them an exaggerated idea of their own importance'. (A blow for Biegeleben.)

Clark: 1) FJ offered no concession to Prussia that might soften its attitude, and 2) he rejected a French alliance. In his hope that a united Germany would thwart France, he ignored the repeated failures of the past few years. This idea needed a) Prussia to return to subservience, b) concessions to Prussia to win her over, or c) imposing Austrian will on Prussia. Bismarck would not allow (a), (b) was not tried. FJ's approach was essentially a passive waiting game based on a miscalculation of the European chessboard, Austria's strength, and the abilities of Bismarck. He was obsessed with law and 'principle' — 'Not all Europe combined will induce me to sacrifice a principle. The Austrian Empire may be sacrificed. I had sooner that than the sacrifice of a principle' he had told Napoleon at Villafranca. His view of 'honour' meant no concessions or allowing France to be a potential piece on the chessboard (as Bismarck had insisted to Wilhelm). Mensdorff's takeover strengthened Biegeleben's influence a lot — henceforth he drafted almost every word that came from Mensdorff, and if the latter wanted something changed he would not draft it himself but would speak to the former who would redraft himself.

(Fundamentally it seems to me that neither FJ nor his ministers could decide their core priority. Was it A) to maintain dominance over Prussia in north Germany (with all that entailed); B) solidify monarchical relations 'against revolution' (therefore be prepared to make concessions to Prussia); C) keep Venetia (with all that entailed); D) overcome the recent past and decisively improve relations with Russia; E) reach out to Napoleon? Bismarck was determined to increase Prussian influence in north Germany and decrease Austria's and the Bund's. He was prepared for a war to achieve this in the right circumstances. He told Austrians repeatedly — reorient yourselves away from north Germany or else. This required an equally clear response or good luck or a superior army - Vienna ended up counting on the last, which was a false hope.

Clark: Esterhazy and Mensdorff were happy to do a deal with Prussia — neither loved Augustenburg or the middle states. Metternich urged FJ — no more half-measures, either do a deal with Prussia or take a stand against Prussia. Biegeleben continued to argue the latter. But FJ could not decide a clearer path and Vienna limped on.) By November, liberals very divided, many now supporting annexation over Augustenburg. 9 November Bennigsen wrote, 'The Bismarck course (that is, the worship of military power and diplomatic success) is growing in a shocking way.' Mommsen and Twesten (both natives of S-H!) had converted to annexation during 1864. Supporting annexation meant: supporting Bismarck and the principle of 'might is right', violating national self-determination (most in the duchies favoured Augustenburg, OP p273). Rejecting it meant: denying Prussia's glory and reward for military success, increasing the number of small anti-Prussian states, undermining Prussian naval power, possibly slowing German nationalism. Mommsen was more liberal than Treitschke but he thought that self-determination must be limited when considering the overall context of progress on unification.

Bismarck spoke to Chotek: I have a scheme to restart commercial discussions, but keep it secret for now while I try to persuade Wilhelm. During November this was achieved and talks restarted in December.

Lincoln re-elected.

(Clark p171-4) Karolyi was given instructions after the discussions in Vienna but they were a tangle: part a rejection of a deal, part an offer of one, part a rejection of cash-for-land, part an admission they might sell something. Bismarck rejected territorial compensations but talked about money, stressing the advantages of Oldenburg over Augustenburg. Mensdorff replied (15th) that Karolyi not negotiate further but 'stand firm' on the basis of previous instructions, 'Prussia now knows exactly what we have to offer' (wrong!) and Karolyi should seek 'rapid decision'.

(Clark) Bismarck demanded that all Bund troops (Hanover's and Saxony's) be withdrawn from the duchies not by a vote of the Bund but by demand of Prussia and Austria. There was back-and-forth over the next fortnight. Beust rallied the King of Saxony to call out his army. To begin with Karolyi thought Bismarck was bluffing. Mensdorff held firm. Bismarck threatened Beust with a 'second Rendsburg' and moved some troops to the Saxon border. OP: He argued that Confederate law did not allow for federal troops to remain after a successful execution, only Prussian and Austrian troops could legally stay. (He was happy to use 'international law' when it suited him.)

Bismarck-Karolyi discussions, Bismarck talked about military and naval interests that must be acquired if annexation is given up. Karolyi reported that ideas of Prussia giving up territory have 'made a very bad impression on Bismarck, and will make the worst possible impression on the King'. Mensdorff got sucked into broadening discussions re naval bases etc.

Revertera-Mensdorff: 'If the accord of the two German powers should come to grief, Russia will range herself on Prussia's side and will lend her moral and material aid according to circumstances.'

Karolyi saw Wilhelm who was very firm in rejecting territorial exchange but was more conciliatory than Bismarck on other things. But Karolyi realised Bismarck was spinning everything out and avoiding a resolution. On 25th he wrote that unless he got what he wanted (which remained opaque) 'Bismarck will make every effort to keep the whole matter open as long as possible... The desire to drag out the whole affair, despite assurances to the contrary, is evident on every side.'

Metternich reported on his discussion with Napoleon at Compiègne: Napoleon wants to be reasonable on Italy, doesn't want her to seize Rome. Reassured,Vienna would cut troops in Venetia.

Benedetti arrived in Berlin and had his first discussion with Bismarck that evening. Re the controversy over Saxony and Hanover refusing to withdraw their troops, he assured Benedetti that he would ensure the withdrawal. Bismarck visited him the next day at the Hotel Royal. On 27th Benedetti had an audience with Wilhelm, spoke to Bismarck after and spoke to him again on 28th. Bismarck made clear he was still looking to cooperate with Austria to the exclusion of the rest of the Bund.

, Vienna dropped its demand that both openly support Augustenburg, Bismarck dropped his demand that both powers ignore the Diet, and both agreed on getting the Diet to vote in favour of withdrawing Bund troops and the official end of the federal execution, which it did (9:6) on 5/12. Bismarck had forced the pace and won the substance. The duchies were now ruled by the two powers with the Bund pushed out. This showed Vienna that his approach to the alliance would continue to be aggressive. Vienna had also lost leverage with the departure of the Bund troops. Vienna worried increasingly about the affair being dragged out with no clear way to escape humiliation or the risk of war.

Clark (p201ff): Bismarck had treated Schleswig as a Prussian province from the start. Zedlitz (his commissioner) seized the mail and telegraph system, filled important offices with Prussian officials, gained control of the police. Bismarck encouraged Prussian officers to move their families to the Duchies. Over the winter Bismarck advanced his propaganda campaign in the duchies. He used Baron Scheel-Plessen, liaising with von Richthofen (his envoy in Hamburg), to organise petitions, publish pamphlets attacking Augustenburg and calling for annexation, brief the newspapers etc. By April 1865 the Austrian envoy reported that 'the entire press in the Duchies' was in the pay of Prussia. Zedlitz distributed Prussian honours, promised prominent citizens favours, spread false news (e.g. that Austria would swing to Oldenburg). Bismarck used reports from Zedlitz to arouse Wilhelm's anger against Augustenburg and Vienna. In late December, 'the too-conciliatory Baron Lederer' was replaced by Baron Halbhuber to push back against Bismarck's campaign.

Napier-Russell recounted how Bismarck had told him: 'We have a very good custom in Germany where we turn the cattle into the fields at the beginning of spring. We let the bulls fight it out without interfering with them. The strongest bull wins and for the rest of the summer there is peace in the herd. That is what I have done. I have fought it out and will have less trouble in future.' Mensdorff pressed for a deal — either a new principality under Augustenburg or Prussian annexation with Austrian compensation. Bismarck prevaricated and used Wilhelm as an excuse. Meanwhile he was orchestrating an annexation campaign, bribing the press etc. The Prussian commissioner ruled Schleswig 'as though it were already a Prussian province' (Pflanze).

Moltke returned to Berlin from Jutland after wrapping up affairs over previous months, had meetings before going to Vienna in January.

A document was submitted to the Bund by the artisan movement, 'the most eloquent expression of the outlook of independent tradesmen threatened by the imminent breakthrough of a new industrial order' which attacked the entire system of liberal economy thought (Hamerow, p128, and cf. 8/60).

Cabinet discussion of social policy. Bismarck had asked Itzenplitz to consider private old-age pension funds in March 1863. In May 1863 he'd asked him to draft legislation on legalising trade unions but nothing much happened. A Bill was presented to Landtag in February 1866 but not passed until 1869. OP (p284): Bismarck's retreat on this was partly because of the failure of his model cooperative in Silesia. Also cf. below, 57 page note post-Gastein in 1865.

(WAF) Bismarck sent two notes to Vienna calling for Austrian support against the anticipated interference of the Bund in the duchies. These were published in Vienna and worsened relations. (Deliberately leaked by who??)

Revertera reported to Vienna: 'An abyss separates us from Russia, however much we try to cover it with flowers.' (Clark dates this 1864 but maybe 1863?)

Freiherr von der Pfordten appointed by King Ludwig Minister President in Bavaria. He was close to Beust who was scheming for an Austro-French alliance to scupper Bismarck. Pfordten was vain, prone to academic theorising and had a weak heart (Clark).

(JS) Victorious Prussian troops marched through Berlin. The liberals were weakening and increasingly feared they did not have public support.

Karolyi-Mensdorff: Bismarck will settle for Augustenburg sooner or later. Clark: this view was shared by many diplomats. WRONG.

Bismarck sent a note to Vienna: annexation would not harm Austria, Prussia will not give up territory, we will formulate conditions for independent duchies, we will not submit to hostile resolutions of the Bund, influenced by democrats and parliaments. On 14th he referred the sovereignty question to Prussian judges, further delaying resolution for months.

Benedetti was trying to figure out whether Prussia would be able to annex, if not then what would she demand, and France was particularly worried re some sort of deal — Prussia gets duchies, agrees to support Austria viz Venetia etc. Before returning to Paris for the Christmas holidays, Benedetti spoke to Bismarck who told him of his next move: that Austria should support Prussia's contention that the Bund had no legal right to dispose of SH. He hinted that he would try to do a deal over annexation but did not expect it to work, at least for a while. When they discussed north Schleswig, Bismarck suggested that he was open to the idea of giving it back but Wilhelm was the block (recent sacrifices, public opinion etc) — a theme that would recur in their discussions. He left for Paris thinking there had not been a deal over the duchies/Venetia. He returned to Berlin in time for the opening of Parliament on Saturday 14 January.

(WAF) Mensdorff replied to Bismarck's suggestion, drafted by Biegeleben: 'If Prussia expands in Germany, the Imperial Monarchy must expand equally', we can't stop the Bund getting involved, opinion is too strong, we will have to give our views even if it upsets Prussia, we oppose creating 'a vassal state in a Diet of independent sovereigns'.

Beust and Pfordten met at Bamberg to plot the development of German states cooperating against Prussia, including an all-German parliament, common military arrangements, and forcing Prussia to bring the duchies to the Diet. Beust and Pfordten rallied some support over the next couple of months but also met some resistance to joining a clearly anti-Prussian coalition. Beust foresaw Bismarck's scheme with a German parliament so wanted to forestall it but Mensdorff was hostile and thought it would be 'disastrous' to push it. However, signals also came to Vienna over coming weeks of Pfordten's contradictory attitude and unreliability — he was reported as saying that Austria would have to accommodate Prussia's expansion in the north, and even that if he were a minister in Berlin he would be acting similarly to Bismarck, and he had his own schemes for things like a separate southern German group with its own parliament. Pfordten would later 'drive the Austrian statesmen almost to distraction' (Clark).

Bismarck talked to Chotek. Clark: Now he was wanting to soothe Vienna somewhat and keep control of the timing. He 'conjured up anew all the glowing visions with which he had tried to enchant the Emperor and Rechberg four months before (p181) — cash, retaking north Italy, partition of the duchies etc. Chotek turned a deaf ear for the moment. Cf. 18/1.

After the Danish War, Austria faced multiple problems:

1. Bismarck wanted the duchies and Prussian dominance in north Germany.
2. Napoleon wanted Venetia.
3. Britain was most worried about a) Napoleon's adventurism and b) Russia in the East and was useless as an ally for war unless there was a major threat to the balance of power or Belgium.
4. Russia was close to Bismarck and still resentful about the Crimean War.
5. If Austria supported Russia with the Oldenburg candidate in the duchies and over the Principalities (Rumania etc), she would offend liberal Germany and Napoleon.
6. Austria could only get support from France and Britain by abandoning Venetia, but any attempt to gain compensation in the Principalities would provoke Russian enmity.

Like many Powers at many times, Austria could not prioritize as Bismarck increased the pressure in 1865-6.