1865

Palmerston complained of a document from Bismarck re alliances: 'an impudent vainglorious & boastful pamphlet intended to inlist Prussian sympathies in support of a ministry likely to be defeated in Parliament; to coax France by visions of Prussian assistance to promote the ambitious projects of France; to intimidate Austria by representing her as unable to stand alone, and to keep Russia quiet & friendly, and finally to destroy the influence of England on the continent by representing her as incapable of any exertion. The pamphlet is however ably written for its purpose.' (What was this 'pamphlet'?)

Council of Austrian ministers, Mensdorff complained of the 'miserable inheritance from the Rechberg period'.

Opening of Landtag, speech from the throne expressed an 'urgent wish' to come to an agreement. Stern: 'conciliatory in tone but not in substance.'

(Clark) there appeared in several leading newspapers excerpts from Austrian official documents. Clark thinks they were 'probably' leaked by Schmerling, in alliance with Metternich but without telling Mensdorff, to improve Austria's standing in Germany. It backfired because, says Clark, the news that Prussia wanted to annex the duchies was less surprising than the news that Austria was prepared to discuss it! Pfordten and Beust knew now, if not before, that Vienna would ditch Augustenburg if Prussia offered enough.

(late evening) Bismarck and Chotek talked. Bismarck raised ideas about partition again. He rejected Mensdorff's counter-arguments and stressed his desire to maintain the alliance. Chotek reported this on 20/1. Also in January, some senior soldiers went to Vienna including Moltke. FJ and Mensdorff stressed their desire to resolve the issue. Moltke returned and argued for cession of the Hohenzollern Principalities for Austria's share of the duchies.

Crown Prince hosted a reception for Benedetti.

Chotek-Mensdorff: Bismarck will soon send his conditions, within 7-10 days, and is about to 'climb down' and accept Augustenburg(!). Mensdorff made a 'very rare' marginal note on this telegram (Clark). Karolyi was recalled from his honeymoon to be ready to deal with Bismarck's note. (He had left Berlin in December to get married in Paris.)

Eulenburg speech to Landtag made clear government desire for compromise. Bismarck and Roon wanted to settle the conflict before war with Austria and were still willing to look at compromises on 3-year service. They now had the Cabinet with them. However, Wilhelm was cross about Eulenburg's speech and told the Cabinet he remained opposed to any concessions. He was encouraged by Manteuffel and his circle who were still angling for a coup, an 'inner Düppel' or 'Düppel at home'. Gall: this episode made Bismarck more determined to move Manteuffel out the way.

Pfordten sent a draft of a resolution to Vienna. Discussions over drafts occupied several weeks. Blome wrote on 19/2 of their gentle handling of him, with frequent and 'flattering expressions' and 'theoretical legal deductions. The former show him that he is respected in Vienna, the latter provides endless delight for his professorial nature.'

Bismarck sent a note, rebutted some of Biegeleben's arguments but still did not give his own plan, infuriating Vienna.

Werther-Bismarck: Mensdorff is very upset at the delay and refusal to put forward a specific proposal. He would give up his job if the alliance 'were no longer the cornerstone of Austrian policy'. We must see a specific plan.

Mensdorff sent instructions to Karolyi, drafted by Biegeleben as (almost) always, with menacing hints such as 'a frank declaration in the Diet' and 'publication of our correspondence with Prussia'. Austria cannot 'wait with folded arms' while Prussia waits for 'European complications' and its propaganda campaign in the duchies to bear fruit.

Bonar-Russell: Mensdorff says that 'There is only one way of forcing a termination ... and that is menace. But we are not going to menace Prussia and have no reason to do so. We must therefore carry on the negotiation and hope that we shall in the end arrive at a satisfactory conclusion.'

Karolyi, returned to Berlin, talked to Bismarck on the basis of Biegeleben's instructions of 4th. 'When the Prussian people comprehend that Prussia's just demands are disregarded,' he roared, 'they will claim them with weapons in their hands. The matter had better not be forced to a head, nor the Prussian national feeling aroused with Bavarian resolutions.' (Reported to Vienna 11th) Friedjung reported (p70) what presumably was an earlier comment in the discussion. Karolyi urged a final settlement. 'Why? Why cannot our joint possession be a final settlement? However do not disturb yourself, we shall keep faith and submit our conditions... You see, we stand before the question of the Duchies like two men at a well-spread table - one of them has no appetite and therefore energetically forbids the other, whose mouth is watering, to sit down and eat. Well, we can wait, we are quite comfortable as we are and we shall not move until we are offered satisfactory terms.'

Benedetti reported discussions with Bismarck over SH. Austria will resist Prussian expansion but does not have the leadership for another Olmütz. Bismarck has persuaded Wilhelm and will pursue annexation but would accept less than this if he can get conditions such as Kiel.

Bismarck: 'It will be seen when there is a storm that we can swim better in heavy seas than others can.'

Friedjung (p70): Bismarck replied to Goltz re Napoleon's hints of a deal, 'It seems to me better for the time being to stick to the marriage with Austria in spite of a few family quarrels and not to do anything until a divorce becomes necessary, to sever the tie now would invite all the disadvantages of infidelity.'

Bismarck finally replies to Vienna's requests to state his intentions with the 'February conditions': a permanent military alliance; effective absorption of the S-H army and navy by Prussia and an oath to the Prussian King; cession of land to Prussia for coastal forts and bases; complete control of the proposed Baltic-North Sea canal; amalgamation of postal and telegraph system with Prussia; the duchies to join the Zollverein.

A shocked Mensdorff called them 'without precedent in all history'. FJ called them 'quite unacceptable' and rejected them.

In his Memoirs, Bismarck says that Augustenburg 'by declining the so-called February conditions had also neglected the favourable moment.' Pflanze: the liberals soon adopted the conditions as the minimum acceptable deal. Around then Bismarck leaked his version of his discussion the previous summer with Augustenburg (who issued no public denial) which further alienated the liberals.

(Stern) Bleichröder, approved by Bismarck, was looking for some sort of'compensation formula' by which Prussia could buy the duchies. Bismarck declined to make an offer and simply encouraged Vienna to make an offer.

Clark also discusses how a financial deal was quietly discussed in Vienna - Werther discussed with Austrian ministers how gold could help plug their deficit. Esterhazy was also in favour of a buy-out, still favouring a deal with conservative Prussia that would allow them to fight together in a future war for counter-revolution against the democratic movement in France, Italy and south Germany.

(undated), Wilhelm wrote that a land trade 'is against my honour, so that it is honour against honour [i.e FJ saying 'honour' prevented a financial deal], and gold is certainly more malleable than the welfare of human beings!

(OP, p.26). Eyck: it was important that Bismarck fixed the most senior court (the Syndics of the Crown, chaired by the reactionary Lippe) to consider the legality of the SH situation and they ruled that the Danish King had been the only lawful Duke and he had ceded all his rights to the kings of Prussia and Austria in the peace deal so...! (Date of this judgment?)

(Clark), Chotek, who understood Bismarck and his relationship with Wilhelm better than Karolyi, suggested to Vienna the idea of an administrative partition of the duchies, months before Blome presented the idea to Bismarck at Gastein (Chotek-Mensdorff, 18/8/65).

(WAF) While dining with Bismarck, Benedetti learned that Austria would not accept Prussian demands.

(WAF) Goltz-Bismarck: Drouyn will accept the borderline Flensburg-Tondern as Prussia's minimum demand if the northern parts of Schleswig are returned to Denmark.

Roon, prompted by Bismarck, asked Moltke for briefing on: the state of the Austrian army and speed of its mobilisation. At this time Moltke still assumed France the most likely enemy and Austria a possible ally (Barry pl36). (Friedjung puts this on 27/2.)

(Clark) Vienna formally rejected Prussia's demands, though accepted four: Rendsburg to be a federal fortress; Kiel a federal naval station; Prussia to construct a canal; duchies to join the Zollverein. Bismarck was unperturbed: 'Austria will not accept. Very well. Wir können warten' [we can wait] he said, paraphrasing Schmerling.

Vienna now shifted: I) it would support an Augustenburg resolution in the Diet; 2) it would more aggressively resist the Prussianisation of the duchies (see above, November, re propaganda). In a note Mensdorff-Karolyi, Karolyi was told to tell Bismarck: your approach endangers our alliance and peace in Europe; have you thought ahead to how Napoleon will use a crisis in Poland against Prussia; returning to a path of alliance with Austria will bring advantages for Prussia 'though less than they wish' while the annexation policy will lead to disaster.

(WAF) Benedetti told Bismarck that annexation would meet with no objections provided the retrocession of north Schleswig took place. Bismarck said that public opinion would not allow him to give up territory but sidestepped a clear answer (must speak to Austria, the King etc). Another discussion on 8th.

Karolyi reported to Vienna: Bismarck is suggesting we consider territorial compensation in Silesia. 'Organise a movement for annexation. Stir up demonstrations in favour of joining Austria!

Clark says he added 'I will gladly keep my eye on them', Stern says he said 'I will happily close one eye'. Bismarck persuaded Karolyi that he was in favour of the scheme and was trying to win over a reluctant Wilhelm.

Clark says that it was 'highly improbable' that Bismarck was actually trying to persuade Wilhelm to make territorial concessions. I think it's essentially inconceivable. There is no other evidence to suggest it and much counter-evidence: eg when annexation was discussed in the Prussian Crown Council 29/5, Bismarck did not propose territorial concessions. This was surely a classic Bismarck trap: encourage Vienna to do something that he could then use to wind up Wilhelm — 'see, I told you, now they're agitating for our territory which is impossible, we must toughen up...? (Similar to his indirect encouragement of Danish intransigence — i.e his method of trying to get his enemies to provide energy which he could use for his own ends.) Karolyi was repeatedly too ready to believe Bismarck. Cf. below June.

Napier (Berlin) to Russell: 'the true policy of Prussia is now to secure what she has gained, to be satisfied with moderate advantages, to avoid great adventures, and to close an account which at this moment exhibits a satisfactory balance in her favour'.

(Clark) Mensdorff submitted to Berlin his plan for a resolution in the Diet which backed Augustenburg but was barely within the letter of the alliance. Karolyi reported on 23rd that Bismarck was angry at the move and vowed to resist it. Mensdorff sent envoys around Germany to canvass support. 'They had neither originated the Bavarian action nor encouraged it at first. But they had finally, under the provocation of the colossal February demands, seized upon the strongest resolution short of actual recognition, and labored for its success with every power at their command, in order to rally public opinion on behalf of a certain solution of the pending problem. Thus they had in reality used the Mittelstaaten against their ally. While correct in the letter [of the alliance], their action was therefore morally questionable; whether it was also politically questionable remained to be seen' (Clark p211).

Biegeleben was pushing for aggression. He argued that Austria should protect the Bund's position and that the duchies were a German issue that should be decided by the Bund. Esterhazy would have preferred a financial deal — Prussia gets the duchies for cash — and possibly Mensdorff too would have taken it around now. But given FJ would not do it, Esterhazy preferred to keep the dual possession going until something turned up that would allow a deal (p213).

(Friedjung (p71): Biegeleben also undermined Mensdorff — e.g after Mensdorff hinted to Augustenburg via the Duke of Coburg that he might be interested in discussing the February demands with Prussia, Biegeleben told Augustenburg's representative that 'The Minister's letters and casual remarks may have a certain significance but the Duke should base his policy only on the public Notes and acts of the Government of Austria'.

Bismarck letter to von Savigny: 'Our financial balance for the last year (1864) shows that we need only 2 (two) million from the state treasury for the Danish War. Everything else is covered by the surpluses for 1863-64. This information, though very gratifying, is to be kept secret because of the legislature. The financiers are pressing loans on us without parliament's approval but we could wage the Danish War twice over without needing one.' (Cf. 12 June 1864 — how to reconcile?)

Benedetti-Drouyn: Bismarck says he's been misled by Austria, the Diet has no competence to dispose of the duchies, Austria has violated their deal, he'd told Karolyi he would oppose the motion.

Stern (unmentioned by others): Landtag rejected 1865 budget by overwhelming majority and concluded that proposed military appropriations should be reduced.

Bloomfield-Russell: 'I am assured that the Emperor is less under the charm of Bismarck and the King than he was, and that he has now received intelligence from Berlin which has profoundly shaken his confidence... Mensdorff, I believe to be sick of the work but the Emperor will not let him slip, and the Countess is so happy in her exalted position, that she will keep him at his work. He would be a great loss, for though not clever, he is an honourable man and I believe can be trusted. He is popular in Austria with all parties and his manners are so courteous towards everybody that he has gained many supporters.'

(Reported 1/4) Biegeleben talked to Werther, suggested: the two powers should decide on the sovereign of the duchies, if you let Augustenburg in, then you can make demands of him and we will 'assume a passive stance'. Bismarck probed whether he was speaking for Mensdorff — he had not spoken to Mensdorff about this. When Werther brought it up a few weeks later (reported 27/4) Biegeleben prevaricated, partly because in the meantime Augustenburg had secretly agreed most of the February conditions, to Vienna's anger (Clark p229).

Roon worn out: 'I can only prophesy for myself Stafford's fate and the onrushing revolution will triumph over the flag... I am at the end not of my strength but of my patience and sang froid. And hence I am dispensable and it is time to go.'

'Palmerston said that the government could not be the ruler in Austria, since the Emperor did nothing but mediate between his own ministers.' (London, Gastein and Sadowa 1864-66, by Karl Friedrich graf Vitzthum von Eckstadt)

Roon introduced a Bill authorising government spending on naval purposes including a naval base at Kiel. (Clark: Wilhelm had decided to shift the Prussian naval station from Danzig to Kiel on 24 March but it only became public on 5/4.) It was seen across Europe as an aggressive response to Vienna's move with the Diet. Vienna protested sharply. Clark (p221, not mentioned in the main books): Bismarck did not see Roon's speech in advance, it was overly aggressive, and he was 'certainly embarrassed by it' because he was not ready for a crisis. He accepted a 'slight defeat' to get the Kiel fracas out the way and branded the false step a counter-stroke. (Clark references Napier-Russell 15/4, Bismarck-Werther 17/4.)

A resolution passed the Diet (9:6) calling for the dual powers to hand over administration of Holstein to Augustenburg. On 8th (WAF) Bismarck told Benedetti that this seemed to be part of a tougher Austrian attitude, though Bismarck did not seem worried by the move. (Bismarck wrote around then [to whom, when; cf. footnote 63, Pflanze vol 1] that 'We are approaching a bifurcation... Unfortunately our tickets are on diverging lines').

Mensdorff told Austrian ministers that Bismarck would be less aggressive, annexation had suffered 'a blow', Prussia may retreat and they should accept this. The police minister remarked that the situation was unsettled. Mensdorff replied 'with more conviction than he really felt' (Clark p216): 'Unsettled situations are the proper terrain for diplomatic negotiations.' After the Diet vote Pfordten was keener on an understanding with Bismarck while Beust wanted Austria to lead the Great-German national movement and formally recognise Augustenburg and accredit his representative in the assembly. He could not persuade Pfordten to go along with much of his plans. (There's a lot of detail about Beust's schemes I haven't gone into, and much doubtless lost to history, which must have absorbed Bismarck's time. Some is in Clark but it's largely dropped in the modern history books.)

Bismarck moved to summon the SH Estates (17th) mainly because Paris wanted this. He knew that if Austria accepted it would cause her trouble in Hungary, if she rejected then it undermined her in Germany (Clark). Vienna went along with the idea.

Bismarck responded aggressively telling Karolyi (8th) that 'I can assure you Prussia won't retreat: only a lost war, only an Austrian army of 300,000 men, victoriously entering Berlin, could change our resolve'. Discussions over a cash-for-duchies deal stopped.

Lee surrendered to Grant at Battle of Appomattox.

(Clark) FJ cross, Karolyi told to protest formally the breach of the alliance viz Kiel. To emphasise Austrian rights, two ships were soon sent to Kiel.

Thiers sharply criticised French policy towards Prussia and warned of a change in the balance of power that would threaten France.

Lincoln assassinated.

(Clark) Wilhelm sent FJ a friendly note on the anniversary of Düppel, FJ responded in friendly spirit saying politics shouldn't spoil the alliance.

(WAF) Bismarck assured Benedetti that he was trying to agree with Austria re a representative assembly for SH (the sort of thing Paris had been urging). He suggested now was not the time for Prussia to risk war. Benedetti was trying to figure out Bismarck's true plan and was worried about the possibility of Prussia and Austria reconciling their differences. At a subsequent meeting Bismarck suggested that he was now repairing relations with Vienna and could not risk a war because he'd heard France was considering opposing Prussia and doing a deal with Vienna over Italy. Benedetti reported this to Drouyn on 28/4. Drouyn suspected that the real reason for Bismarck's shift was the more determined policy in Vienna.

Wilhelm to Roon: 'Every concession to Austria is met by a new ingratitude and pretensions.' Karolyi-Mensdorff: Bismarck is edging back viz Kiel and implicitly apologising for the Roon speech. Together with the popularity of Austrian resistance over Kiel in the duchies, this incident was seen in Europe as a victory for Vienna (Clark p223). There were also discussions between Vienna and Hanover about the future of naval power, and complex trades involving Kiel, Lauenburg etc (p224).

GC (unmentioned by others): There was a suggestion by a liberal deputy for a compromise involving 'trifling' concessions from the government, Bismarck 'seized upon it, convinced Roon of its workability and submitted it to the king with the approval of the whole ministry' (GC). Bismarck still wanted to end the conflict before war with Austria. He had a two-hour meeting with Manteuffel to persuade him to back the plan but failed. EM et al again persuaded Wilhelm to reject it.

EM wrote to Wilhelm that his ministers 'live only in the atmosphere of the Chamber' and he should not have any discussion but simply 'write to Minister Bismarck saying “Now that I have read the proposal I have decided that the government will not agree to it.”' Wilhelm did this. (JS suggests (p.227-8) this note from EM a) concerned compromises over Kiel, not the domestic row, and b) Wilhelm rejected EM's advice. Is he confused or is Craig (or me)? JS also says that this period 'has been the subject of more historical debate than any other' in his career, which is nonsensical.) On 28 May, EM wrote to Wilhelm arguing that in the event of Prussia acquiring new territory in a war, the enlargement would render the constitution unworkable and he should use the opportunity to ditch it. After he had wrecked the latest compromise, Bismarck and Roon agreed that they should try to get EM moved out of Berlin. Roon's relations had deteriorated as EM had repeatedly cut him out of the loop on decisions that Roon should have been involved in as War Minister.

Around this time ('spring 1865', Hamerow) Manteuffel wrote: 'All European alliances are broken. The system on which the European balance rested has been violently shaken or has, properly speaking, already collapsed. Revolutionary tendencies have gained power in all states. The movements against the old Europe and the old dynasties which began with the year 1789 find support in a great part of mankind... These crises must lead to a great European war or to socialist revolutions which will overthrow the present dynasties.'

(Clark) Bismarck made a formal request that Austria join him in expelling Augustenburg from the duchies so as not to disturb the calling of the Estates (!). Without waiting for a reply he drew up aggressive notes attacking Austria for failing to act and siding with the Diet and liberal forces. He planned to have Manteuffel take them to Vienna — either Vienna would cave in and give him the February conditions or a duchies-for-cash deal, or Manteuffel would have to explain to the King that Vienna was determined to resist and only war would get him what he now thought he was owed. Wilhelm prevaricated and ended up calling the Council on 29/5.

Kreuzzeitung, which had backed Bismarck against Austria, suggested Prussia should compensate Vienna for annexation by admitting all Austrian territory to the Bund. Conservatives in Berlin were discussing various compensation schemes.

(reported next day to Drouyn, WAF) Benedetti asked Bismarck — what do you want and what do you offer? Bismarck: 'We ask you for benevolent neutrality both during the negotiations with Austria and later, should they lead to a rupture.' But did not offer a specific deal. He suggested that he was more interested in getting the February conditions than risking war with annexation, but that if he could not then he might need to do a deal with France — 'we know that we would have to pay the price for the assistance which you would lend us' — but he warned Benedetti, the King won't contemplate discussions re abandoning German populations (i.e Rhineland). Cf. 4/8 — Bismarck thought Benedetti had offered benevolent neutrality 'without compensation'. Benedetti added to Drouyn: '[O]ur abstention, I would say even our indifference, can by itself contribute to the development of the dissensions which separate the two great Germanic powers... Before thinking of making an accord of any kind with Prussia, we must wait until she is fatally condemned to it by her ambition or by her mistakes. I add that the most essential interests of Austria safeguard us against the success of her rival, with whom we would then have to preoccupy ourselves.'

Metternich-Mensdorff: Drouyn says that Bismarck is trying to ascertain what France will do if war comes, France would not allow Prussia to get a war loan in Paris, the press is more favourable to Austria than Prussia. Clark: Drouyn had been hinting to Metternich about closer relations over previous few months.

End of US Civil War.

Zollverein formally renewed for 12 years. Carr: Austria only got MFN status and lost concessions made in 1853.

Anglo-Prussian trade treaty signed and a treaty of navigation 16/8/65. Britain had drafted an agreement on imports, exports, transit, and an article on patents (an interesting sign of growing Prussian competition). It included a MFN clause 'affirming the principle of equality in the largest sense and including every point which might arise but which might not strictly fall under the categories of import or export duties'. Bismarck and Delbruck resisted the universalist commitments this implied. They pointed out there were specific border issues that Britain could not expect to extend to itself and Prussia suggested a more restrictive replacement.

Bismarck countered London's universalism with the reminder that Prussia 'was in a peculiar position at the head of a susceptible complicated commercial organisation with which it was not always easy to deal' and stated that the British approach would 'arouse a multitude of undefined apprehensions and suspicions'. Prussia did not and could not work on the same universalist basis as Britain.

A compromise was reached (Davis p167-8). The British approach up to 1866 was dominated by: superiority post-1815 encouraged unilateralism, lack of thinking in London about German dynamics, lack of coordination between the FO and BoT, moralising. London was 'pitifully unaware of developments in the Zollverein until 1866' (Davis). The 1848-66 period was one where unilateralist free trade dominated, unlike before or after, and it was bound up with a clear sense of British commercial superiority. While this was seen as un-political in London, it was seen as intensely political in Germany/Europe. (Cf. Conclusion chapter in Britain and the German Zollverein 1848-66, Davis.)

Twesten speech in Landtag denouncing Lippe and the government for using the courts for political intimidation. Cf. 19 June.

Prussia-Belgium trade deal, 30 May Prussia-Britain trade deal, liberalising trade. 30 December, a deal between Zollverein and Italy.

Werther reported that Mensdorff was willing to allow annexation of Lauenberg in return for a reduction of Austria's war costs which OP suggests (rightly I think) may have influenced Bismarck in what he said on 29th — i.e it encouraged him to think: no war if Austria keeps conceding and we can get get most of what we want without war (OP, p.262-3, cf. below 21-23/7). Cf. Clark, p233-5.

(WAF) Benedetti told Drouyn that no deal was at hand. WAF: Also the Manteuffel visit planned for May had been abandoned for the time being which also was interpreted generally as a sign of deteriorating relations.

(28th — Stern) The Crown Council agreed annexation was the goal of Prussian policy, and the King made clear he now supported it. Bismarck stressed that war would come 'sooner or later' and the current situation was favourable, but that if he could get the February conditions — even if they had to drop the two most objectionable conditions, which he said he was prepared to do (the oath and amalgamation of the army) — this would be tantamount to annexation and he would accept that rather than have war. A war, he argued, should have a 'higher aim' — the 'creation of a constitutional relationship between Prussia and the German small and medium states'.

Moltke said the army was ready for war if necessary (unmentioned by Pflanze or JS).

Gall: Moltke said that the aim should be annexation and 'to accomplish this objective Prussia must not shrink even from the prospect of war with Austria'. Bismarck said that in the event of war between Prussia and Austria, 'France and Russia would presumably abide by a benevolent neutrality' (Bismarck), with 'Britain clearly not even rating a mention anymore after its conduct in' the S-H affair (Gall, p266).

Steinberg gives a different account to Pflanze. Wilhelm supported annexation and said the 'nation' supports it. Bismarck said that war would come sooner or later but that the best path was to eliminate the two most objectionable conditions and look for a deal. JS does not say that Bismarck would have accepted the February conditions instead of war and a war required 'a higher aim' etc. 'He offered various courses of action and seemed not to opt for any' (p228). This seems clearly WRONG. JS then says that 'the trouble [for Bismarck] was money' but cf. 24 March above.

Gall: Manteuffel attended this meeting and was now pro-war. JS agrees he attended.

Barry: Moltke made a note of the meeting. Bismarck outlined three options: February conditions, buying the duchies from Austria maybe with some territory thrown in (Wilhelm ruled out), annexation. Apart from the Crown Prince the ministers supported annexation. Moltke: 'My personal conviction is that annexation is the only beneficial solution for the Duchies, as for Prussia. The gain is such a great one that very considerable sacrifices must be made as well as the chances of a war be tolerated... [The army] is for annexation... [Re war with Austria] I can declare that, besides the excellence of our army, numerical superiority can be attained at a decisive point.'

Lerman (p72): Wilhelm invited his military advisers to this meeting without consulting Bismarck. EF: Wilhelm invited Manteuffel and Goltz without consulting Bismarck.

Eyck points out that records of the meeting survive including Motlke's account but there has been a very wide interpretation by historians. Bismarck said that although the international situation was favourable his advice was 'to try to obtain the moderated February conditions and only if this attempt failed to fix our eyes upon a higher goal'. All other speakers were in favour of war apart from CP who said it would be 'a German civil war'. Bismarck disagreed: 'If war in alliance with France against Austria is banned then a Prussian policy is no longer possible. But if war is waged against Austria it has to bring about not only the annexation of the Duchies but a new arrangement in the relations of Prussia with the German medium and small states.'

Clark: Halbhuber's pushback and barbed words (some exaggerated or invented by Bismarck) had annoyed Wilhelm who was under pressure from the army for annexation. (Baron Halbhuber had been appointed by Vienna to push back against Bismarck's campaign in the duchies, see above, end 11/65.) Bismarck exploited Austria's counter-moves to wind up the King. Most ministers supported the February conditions or annexation at the cost of war if necessary.

Clark quotes Bismarck: 'A war with Austria is inevitable. It would be safer now than later. It would not only give Prussia the Duchies, but also settle the German question in Prussia's interest. The King could be sure of the joyful support of his counsellors. Nevertheless only the King could take the responsibility for a war. If he does not wish to do that, an agreement with Austria could be purchased by giving up the military clauses. But the Prussian public would consider this a defeat and war would merely be postponed.'

Clark: Bismarck weighted the arguments for war strongly and on the other side the King was asked to give up the one condition he desired above all, military control of the Duchies. But the King refused to choose. He 'lost his nerve' and 'Bismarck's crisis had to be postponed until he could commit the King more deeply against Augustenburg.' Bismarck was prepared for this and said: 'Should events lead to a war with Austria, then not only the absorption of Schleswig-Holstein into the Prussian monarchy, but also a political [subordination] of the German secondary and small states to Prussia should be considered as the rewards of such a conflict.' (Clark reproduces the official Protocol of the meeting p542ff.)

Moltke wrote on his copy of the 29/5 protocol: 'An important point that has not been discussed is how to do justice to Austria's well-founded claims.' (He was less pro-war than his remarks on 29/5 suggest, cf. letter to brother 24/6 and Manteuffel 2/7. Roon similarly was less keen, cf. letter to Bismarck 29/7.)

JS: Manteuffel wrote to Roon after the meeting: '... keep your eye on Bismarck... I fear this hot-headed approach... This is a game for high stakes and the state is the main thing.'

(WAF) Benedetti-Drouyn: The situation is deteriorating, Bismarck is hinting about possible deals and said, 'France might think about annexing countries which would be easy for her to assimilate like Belgium or the French part of Switzerland' (i.e he was encouraging Paris to focus more on Belgium than the Rhineland). Benedetti replied that he needed instructions from Paris before discussing such ideas further. In June Benedetti went to Corsica for a few weeks via Paris (5 June), returned via Paris on 19 June and spoke to Napoleon, back in Berlin on 22/6. Records do not suggest a change of approach on his return.

Karolyi-Mensdorff: Bismarck seems set on intransigence, he says 'in view of their radically different interests, an accord would hardly be attainable'. He was preparing to treat any declaration by the Estates in the duchies for Augustenburg in autumn as treason and an excuse for martial law. He was helping Italy extend commercial discussions in Germany.

(Clark, unmentioned elsewhere) Belcredi submitted to FJ his conditions for taking over from Schmerling. Esterhazy was plotting to replace Schmerling and didn't want a foreign crisis now. Cf. 26/6.

He gave a speech to Parliament about the navy and Kiel and suggested the Parliament approve the naval budget on condition of Prussia acquiring Kiel. He recalled the German fleet being sold off after 1849 and said it was because 'party passion was more potent than a sense of solidarity... I cannot deny that it makes a painful impression on me when I see that, in view of a great national question which has occupied public opinion for twenty years, that very assembly which passes in Europe as the concentration of the intelligence and patriotism of Prussia can rise to no higher altitude than impotent negativism. That, gentleman, is not the weapon with which to wrest the sceptre from the hand of the monarchy, nor is it the means whereby you will succeed in giving our constitutional system that stability and further development which it needs.' The Budget was rejected.

EF: during this debate Virchow challenged Bismarck's veracity in his account of arguments over the fleet and was threatened with a duel — it was settled without one but worsened relations and alarmed some of Bismarck's supporters. He also said during this debate that 'If we could explain to you the likely course of our policy in the duchies with the same clarity as I can to HM the King, then I believe the vehemence of your opposition to what we are doing would be considerably reduced.' (EF dates this to 2 June but others say the Kiel debate was 1 June. Friedjung dates it to 13/6.)

In his Memoirs, he reflected on party psychology regarding this episode (2, p24, see quotes at the front).

Bismarck inquired of Roon about the state of the army's readiness. 'Austria is supposed to be able to place a hundred and eighty thousand men on our frontier within four weeks. Can we do the same?' Roon answered 2 days later: Within 4 weeks 250,000 could move into Bohemia and another 50,000 ready for operations in north Germany. (Why assumption of 4 weeks possible for Austria given most historians say Austrian mobilisation needed much longer??)

Augustenburg-Wilhelm: a polite but firm refusal to leave Duchies.

Landtag prorogued again after the liberals had voted against Bismarck's naval bill. He scorned their behaviour in voting against what they had advocated for 20 years. Over the previous few months of fighting over the budget, the liberals had tried to capture some ground by advocating savings from the military go to various projects they thought would win them support from the masses, but they did not know how to do this effectively and Bismarck introduced various economic measures (e.g bank and railway bills) that divided and discredited them.

OP: Divisions growing among liberals: over annexation, over various bills, over the priority of the constitutional fight against progress on the national question, all while the feeling grew that the masses were moving behind the Crown and commercial interests increasingly wanted a resolution, not a fight on principle. Bismarck had been proved right that the government could continue governing without parliamentary support or a legal budget. The 5 July move on the naval budget and the summer operations to secure funding for a war deepened liberals' fears that they were losing. This suspicion grew in the second half of 1865 that they were losing public support.

Bismarck to Max Duncker — if the next session is like the last, we either revise the constitution or 'simply the reestablishment of direct and equal suffrage'.

(Clark) According to a letter of 17 July, Bismarck told the Crown Prince on 18/6 that the February concessions had been designed to make them unacceptable to Augustenburg.

Crown Council discussed finances. (Little mention in most books but Stern has an account p60.) Bismarck said that 'for a long time it had been his conviction that Prussia could not be governed for any length of time with the existing constitution and that a major and far-reaching alteration of it was unavoidable.' The 'blow' must come over the next 18 months. He wanted to avoid elections and let Parliament 'wither away': reconvene Parliament in January 1866 then dissolve at its first misstep and delay elections as long as possible. He suggested 'financial operations to weaken the present inclination of the money market toward an Austrian loan.' He also advocated the prosecution of Twesten for his speech of 20/5, bringing his use of the courts against political enemies into Parliament itself. Wilhelm supported Bismarck's exposition (Stern). Stern says Bleichröder met Bismarck in Carlsbad shortly after to discuss the Cologne-Minden operation (p60ff.)

JS account: the minutes state: '... for a long time it had been his [Bismarck's] conviction that with the existing constitution Prussia could not be governed for any length of time... [he referred to] the opportunities which a complication of the foreign situation could yield and noted that it might be advisable by proper financial operations to weaken the present inclination of the money market toward an Austrian loan.'

Von der Heydt wrote to Bismarck about the financial situation: 'there will be no lack of immediately realisable assets' if the goal is 'making liquid considerable sums of money without actual state loans as a floating debt or through their sale': e.g substantial holdings of railway shares. (Bismarck was pleased with his ideas and attitude and after the 1866 war he became finance minister.) Bismarck was also discussing many financial plans with Bleichröder.

A mining law passed which liberalised regulations for mine owners. Popular with commercial middle class, chambers of commerce etc.

(WAF) Bismarck left Berlin for Carlsbad. A few days later Benedetti went to Bad Kissingen where he intended to holiday.

Schmerling resigned as Interior Minister, replaced by Count Belcredi who restored the Hungarian constitution of 1848. (Carr & Showalter — 30 July, WRONG. Seems Schmerling resigned 26/6 but stayed in post for a few weeks until Belcredi was appointed in late July, different books give different dates. WAF: the Austrian Cabinet except Mensdorff resigned on 27th.)

EF: This indicated the anti-Prussian group in Vienna was losing ground.

Eyck: Belcredi was 'a member of the old Conservative aristocracy ... justly reputed to be an enemy of constitutionalism and certainly no friend of German ascendancy in the monarchy', and this was another 'blow to Austria's position in Germany' (p.104).

Clark: Esterhazy had been secretly plotting Schmerling's replacement for weeks, unknown to his colleagues except Mensdorff.

Schmerling hated politics. He once said, 'I have no real interest in politics. I am a soldier by nature and have got involved in politics against my will. I can't stand this perpetual turmoil. In the evenings I like to read a good book or go to the theatre, but these political fellows live in a state of constant excitement, something has to be happening all the time.'

Friedjung: Mensdorff stayed but the new administration was divided from the start. Esterhazy was deeply influential and highly secretive. Belcredi shared Esterhazy's belief in aristocratic government and wanted to devolve legislation to local assemblies and undermine representative government and the German bureaucracy that alienated Hungary and Slavs. Esterhazy owed 230,000 florins in death duties since 1856 and the Minister of Finance under Schmerling had finally put in an execution against him; now the interest and 90,000 florins was knocked off and he was given a decade to pay(!). Taxes were amended to help the aristocracy.

Bismarck persuaded Wilhelm to write to FJ asking him to help 'remove' Augustenburg to help 'a quiet evolution in the Duchies'. He then started pushing Oldenburg again and complained that Augustenburg would sway forthcoming elections (while he continued his own propaganda campaign!). Meanwhile he was also negotiating with Oldenburg for the latter, if installed later, to sell his abdication and sovereignty to Prussia(!). Clark: this Machiavellian scheme was a route to annexation that also gave Austria a way to avoid war - 'Otherwise, why would he have drafted an installation-abdication agreement, when the Grand Duke himself really preferred simply to sell his claims?' (Clark p244). Vienna had an inkling of some such deal though Bismarck was evasive when asked by Chotek.

Bismarck told Roon (letter from Carlsbad, JS) that if necessary he would violate the constitution by raising a loan without Parliament's consent but would prefer not to. He resorted to various other schemes of questionable legality instead such as the Cologne-Minden railway deal and actions to manipulate the money markets to drive up interest rates to Austria's detriment. He was studying comments by Austrian officials about how their lack of credit was undermining their Great Power status. He was also warning Roon around this time that Austria's 'conservative position at home will demand a more forceful one abroad, just as with us.'

JS: his letter of 3rd also said, 'Our task remains by means of our own money operations to block those planned by Austria and this to assure the maintenance of peace.'

Bismarck wrote to Eulenburg that 'things with Austria stand badly' and military reports from Holstein 'tell the King that the situation of troops has become impossible in the face of the press and social chicanery.'

Cabinet published a budget approved by the King including naval expenditure which had been rejected by Parliament. 'It had the appearance of a royal decree' (OP).

Bismarck wrote to Eulenburg that the King was as convinced of 'the necessity of a money operation as I am. He feels himself free of constitutional reservations. He said to me today his duty to preserve the Monarchy is more binding than his duty to the constitution.' (Rohl found in the late 1960s 62 hitherto unknown letters from Bismarck to Eulenburg including 11 between 27/6 and 18/8.)

Palmerston dissolved Parliament, election

Mensdorff (drafted by Biegeleben)-Werther: Does Prussia guarantee to install and maintain Oldenburg? Overall the note was conciliatory but also said they could not expel Augustenburg, though FJ said he would not regret his voluntary departure.

Bismarck sent further messages to Vienna demanding: subjection of press, liberal political clubs, Augustenburg demonstrations, punishment of officials and professors. Briefed friendly media — we will insist on our view, military preparations underway. Mensdorff replied on 19th in conciliatory reasonable spirit, said they would act where reasonable, and urged Berlin not to let the alliance be spoiled by minor things.

Clark: Mensdorff was under a lot of pressure in July as Vienna struggled with the domestic situation and forming the new government. By the ~20th he was prepared to be tougher with Bismarck, he was angry at Bismarck's demands and tone, and Queen Victoria had discretely urged him to resist Prussian pressure. But FJ was keen for reconciliation provided his 'honour' was not touched.

Prussian government agreed to sell its options for Cologne-Minden railway shares, settled by 13 September with all the money settled by 2 January 1866. (OP: he thus acquired 5.7 million thalers, 3m payable by 1/10/65, rest by 2/1/66, plus negotiable railway shares worth 7.3m thalers and the disposal over 17m thalers held in escrow for interest payments, ~30m total.) Bleichröder and Oppenheim executed the deal. Bleichröder was the company's banker and a director. In retirement, Bismarck said that Bleichröder 'put at my disposal the necessary money for the war. That was an undertaking which, under the circumstances of those days, when I was almost as close to the gallows as to the throne, compels gratitude.'

(WAF) Wilhelm arrived at Regensburg on his way from Carlsbad to Gastein. He had summoned Goltz who was holidaying at Bad Kissingen where Benedetti was also on holiday.

Cabinet meeting (at Regensburg) at which Wilhelm agreed to various measures including providing finance for a possible army mobilisation.

Eyck: Goltz reported that Bismarck had said to Roon that war with Austria was only a question of time. While at Regensburg, Mensdorff asked him (via Ambassador) whether he would receive an envoy from FJ, Bismarck agreed, Blome was sent. Re Blome, Eyck judged that 'no man more unfit for this work could have been found. [!] He was a strong conservative..., had no sympathy either with the German national movement or with the Prince of Augustenburg. He regarded Bismarck as a Conservative statesman, nay, as a champion of the common Conservative struggle against the revolution. He fell into the trap of Bismarck's slogans more easily than any other man with whom Bismarck ever had to deal... nobody made things easier for him than Count Blome.'

WAF: When Goltz returned to Kissingen he told Benedetti about the discussion on 21st: the situation was more serious than the public impression given in Berlin in June, if no agreement were reached then Prussia may mobilise and would open discussions with Paris; Goltz had been told to return to Paris by the time Wilhelm met FJ. Benedetti passed back the intelligence but did not abandon his holiday. WAF: his sense of duty in winter and spring makes it 'difficult to comprehend his behaviour' during the critical summer weeks of the crisis — his failure to remain in contact with Bismarck and to keep in touch with the details, staying on holiday — 'his indifference suggests a lack of responsibility and good judgement' at a crucial time.

Clark: At Regensburg Bismarck told Goltz: 'the war with Austria was simply a question of time and he considered the present moment most favourable. Austria was to be put in such a position that she would have to accept a deep humiliation or pick up the gauntlet' (Goltz).

(Clark) Werther met Bismarck in Salzburg then returned Vienna on 24th.

(OP; 21st Stern) Bismarck telegraphed the Crown Prince: 'The decisions made by His Majesty in the Cabinet meeting at Regensburg [21/7] have made available about 60 million thalers in funds for a complete mobilisation and a one-year military campaign'.

OP: By now Austria was 'nearly bankrupt' with debt about five times GDP. Cf. Roon, 1/8. OP (p262): Prussia's financial situation seems to have been 'better in 1865 than in 1866, when a slump in business activity depressed the stock market, impeded the marketing of Cologne-Minden shares, and made bankers generally wary. By contrast, Austria's position improved in late 1865' thanks to the French loan (below). 'What saved the peace that summer was not lack of money but Austrian concessions. If Vienna continued to yield, war was unnecessary... Yet he would have gone to war in 1865 if the Austrians had held their ground. Again they retreated' (p262-3). (Cf. Stern 71-80.)

Breuilly: 1847-59 Austrian debt increased almost three-fold compared to near-doubling in Prussia. The 1859 war meant Austria was paying ~25% of state revenue to service debt, viz 11% in Prussia. This had implications for army expenditures 1860-65. The superiority of Austria dropped from 3.5:1 in 1850 to 1.5:1 in 1860 and 1.3:1 in 1866, but in 1866 this advantage was overtaken by Italy's involvement plus Prussia spent more per soldier (more training etc).

Word reached Vienna from Pfordten, who had 'come under the magic spell of Bismarck's personality at Salzburg' (Clark) that day, that Vienna should seek to conciliate Wilhelm with real concessions and a humble apology from Augustenburg. Pfordten had an 'intuition, rare at that time, that the Prussian army was superior to the Austrian' and was struck by Bismarck's firmness and preparations for war, and Bismarck 'probably' (Clark) held out the hope of Bavarian hegemony in the south in return for neutrality. Around then Vienna also intercepted Prussian telegrams referring to the financial measures, that military preparations were underway and that Bismarck was talking to Italy re joining a war. E.g Vienna intercepted Usedom to Bismarck 27/29/30 July and Bismarck to Usedom 31/7 which reassured Vienna that Italy was reluctant to support Bismarck.

Austria possessed the cipher in use Berlin-Florence and others so captured 'about two-thirds of all wires sent and received by Bismarck July 23 and August 16'. The outcome was FJ was infuriated and Vienna encouraged by Italy's hesitation. News came of Prussian provocations in the duchies and the Austrian press called for action. The prospects for Blome's mission seemed bleak. (Clark p254).

Palmerston increased his majority in UK election. Derby concluded a Conservative majority was impossible until Palmerston died, Gladstone took over and 'alarmed the middle classes'. Disraeli said the shift of London and Scotland to the Liberals was ominous for their long-term prospects. Fed up of opposition, he offered to give up the leadership in the Commons. Derby refused.

Count Blome took an evening train for Gastein, arrived there the afternoon of 27th. Blome's biographer writes he 'seriously underestimated' Bismarck who thought him an idiot with an 'outmoded Byzantine-Jesuitical method of negotiating, full of tricks and dodges'. Bismarck told Tiedemann years later that he played cards with Blome at night to scare him with the violence of his play.

Clark: Blome told Werther his plan before he went (!): reject Oldenburg, say nothing re territorial compensations, press for Augustenburg, promise an apology from him if necessary, if all arguments fail then argue for 'a continuation of the provisorium under new regulations'. Blome picked up an idea from Hofmann (an official): Austria controlling Holstein, Prussia Schleswig for administrative purposes, while keeping joint ownership. This was to be deployed as a last resort to avoid war. (Implication of Clark p256-7 is that Mensdorff was aware and kept Biegeleben in the dark.) In a last interview with FJ, FJ made it clear that he wanted peace at almost any price. (See 1 Aug)

Usedom (Florence)-Wilhelm: 'The chances have never been so favourable for Prussia and for all the plans she might be making for her military, political and territorial grandeur, because never will one see on the French throne a sovereign more disposed to remain quiet, or who would sell his neutrality at a more modest price to Prussia.'

Reports had come to Vienna over months about Bismarck's overtures to Italy. Drouyn had been friendly to Metternich and suggested France might help relieve pressure viz Italy. Mensdorff-Metternich: 'Try to secure a warning to the Florentine cabinet not to encourage Bismarck's war fancies... Postpone your vacation and await the result of Blome's mission. In case it fails we might have important overtures to address to the French government.' He got a reassuring reply from Metternich, confident France would not encourage Bismarck or Italy.

Bismarck and Blome negotiated at Gastein. Blome still championed Augustenburg but got nowhere. Bismarck dragged in Oldenburg, whom Blome refused to consider. Bismarck described his financial and military preparations for a war and explained that General Herwarth had orders to imprison Augustenburg. On 30 July discussion shifted to a temporary compromise: withdrawal of Austrian troops from Prussian command and the de facto division of the duchies for administrative purposes while maintaining joint sovereignty. Bismarck insisted that since Schleswig was smaller than Holstein, Prussia should also get Lauenburg for free. They agreed on need for strict secrecy. Blome left on 1 August to take the possible deal and a personal letter from Wilhelm to FJ at Ischl.

Blome claimed in his report that 'The thought then [after the failure of the first 2 days] came to me to propose an entirely new solution...' Clark says it is not possible to reconstruct from sources who raised this first. The idea had been knocking around in Berlin and Vienna, it had been discussed at Schönbrunn, Bismarck had suggested it and discussed it in Berlin. The idea was championed by Esterhazy, and both he and Hofmann may have got it from Chotek who might have got it from... Bismarck! So it definitely was not Blome's idea and it seems clear that a few people independently came up with versions of it. Clark thinks that Bismarck either suggested it to Blome or led him to it and was happy for him to present it in Vienna as his own idea as it was more likely to be accepted. (I think that Bismarck led Vienna into this 'compromise' knowing that a) he could bank some gains and b) it allowed him to reopen the quarrel at will and keep pushing Vienna.) See Clark p254ff for intricate details.

Mensdorff telegraphed to FJ for permission to join him in Ischl, FJ replied 'Come'. Clark: Mensdorff was humiliated by Balcredi's promotion and angry about Bismarck's tactics. Mensdorff was worried Blome had failed and might persuade FJ to accept a diplomatic defeat. Mensdorff was preparing to stand firm even at the cost of war — we should try to meet Prussia with 'a more determined stand'. Instructions for bringing the Duchies issue to the Diet were already drafted. At Ischl, Mensdorff 'heard with dismay' (Clark) Blome's compromise, said Austria should stand firm and offered to resign if such a policy failed. FJ had been persuaded but was 'thrown into confusion' by Mensdorff's position so decided to return to Vienna and have a ministerial meeting. Cf. 5/8

Roon wrote to von Blanckenburg: 'There is money, enough to give us a free hand in foreign policy and, if necessary, to mobilise the entire army and pay for an entire campaign. That gives our conduct toward Austria the necessary aplomb, so that we may hope the Austrians will yield to our justified demands even without a war, which none of us wishes... Where does the money come from? [We get it] without any breach of the law, principally through an arrangement with the Cologne-Minden railway'.

Bismarck warned Wilhelm: any leak, via the Queen, of the proposal about dividing administration of the duchies could wreck relations with Austria and provoke a war.

Bismarck also reflected on social policy. A few days after Gastein (OP p284), Bismarck turned to social affairs (cf. 12/64). In May 1864 a delegation of weavers had come to Berlin. Weavers were suffering mass unemployment and destitution from the collapse of the Silesian textile market because of the American Civil War. Bismarck had ensured they were favourably received by the King, against opposition. There was a committee appointed to investigate. But their report was favourable to the factory owners. The ministries of interior and commerce accepted it, largely unchanged. It came to Bismarck summer 1865. A few days after Gastein he took time out of diplomacy to read it and wrote a 57 page critique (OP: sadly the original document was not published in full. Can someone find it and translate it?)

Bismarck savaged the committee as biased, attacked the way it had not investigated the owners' profits, and rejected the idea the Government could not alleviate social distress. He attacked the idea that the state could not act on any specific case because it should not generally alleviate social distress. 'Ought it [the state] therefore to help no one? The state can.' He had even experimented with an innovative cooperative scheme and defended it in February 1865 saying 'The kings of Prussia have never been exclusively kings of the rich.' 1865-6 'he repeatedly intervened on behalf of cooperative banks and producers' associations threatened with bankruptcy' (OP). He experimented with other ideas including homes for invalided workers and shifting taxes from the lower classes to merchants and manufacturers. His main target was distressed artisans, the working class of the past, who still outnumbered mine and factory workers.

EF: some time around this he encouraged Wilhelm to meet some unemployed Silesian weavers. Bismarck, in response to criticism, said that, 'The kings of Prussia have never by preference been kings of the rich. Frederick the Great said when he was crown prince: 'Quand je serai roi, je serai un vrai roi des gueux', a king of beggars. He intended to protect the poor... Our kings have brought about the emancipation of the serfs and they have created a flourishing peasant class. It is possible that they will also succeed ... in contributing something to the improvement of the position of the workers.'

Hamerow (2, 213ff): After 1870 he said, 'I don't know whether under the impression of Lassalle's reasoning or under the impression of my own conviction which I gained partly in England during a stay in the year 1862, it seemed to me that in the establishment of producer associations, as they exist in England in a flourishing state, lay the possibility of improving the lot of the worker and of turning over to him a substantial part of the entrepreneur's profit.' An example of his instincts and limits on his power: he suggested to Bodelschwingh that the government subsidise a weaver business, Bodelschwingh wouldn't.

He later wrote: 'It was not my department, I did not have the time for it, warlike conditions came, foreign policy became more active... I for my part ... sought to enlist the most important people and statesmen who wanted to give me their help... I am a man who believes in authorities and who gladly submits to them in cases where I am not of necessity directed toward my own judgement... I did not believe that my opinion must prevail in all things which I do not understand... I had to subordinate economic affairs, so far as they entered into consideration at all, to that task [unification under Prussia].'

Bismarck to Eulenberg: 'As long as the King is here and as long as we have not carried out our money operations, I have to let things hang tolerably in mid-air, because the moment we move in Schleswig-Holstein, the ball starts to roll and the stock market sinks.'

3 Aug Bloomfield-Russell: Mensdorff asked: what would England do if the Rhine or Belgium were threatened? Bloomfield dodged. Mensdorff described Bismarck as 'a wild and daring politician [who] seemed blind and deaf to all arguments except those which facilitated the accomplishment of his object in the Duchies.'

4 Aug Bismarck-Goltz: 'Benedetti said to me while I was still in Berlin [6/5?], “The benevolent neutrality of the Emperor is assured to you without any compensation.” He had received a telegram from Paris which he read to me, and in which the readiness of France to make an alliance with us and to receive our propositions in that respect was pronounced.' (Bismarck blamed Goltz for providing poor information over this period.)

Pottinger: At this time Napoleon thought that new states in Italy would be satellites and that encouraging nationalism in Germany was consistent with French interests in the balance of power. The main reason for Gastein was Bismarck's worries about Napoleon's views (cf. 16th). On 4th he instructed Goltz to find out all he could about his plans, e.g whether he would veto Italian cooperation with Prussia.

4 & 6 Aug Goltz reports from Paris warned that agreement with Napoleon would be endangered by imprisoning Augustenburg. Clark: these reports made Wilhelm nervous. Pottinger: Goltz stressed on 4th that Napoleon wanted the duchies settled in accord with the principle of nationalities, i.e north Schleswig to return to Denmark.

5 Aug Bismarck-Usedom (from Gastein): 'We are not for war at all costs but must be ready for it according to circumstances.' Clark: Bismarck learned from this crisis that to allay Italian fears he had to offer a treaty, which he did in 1866. He was not determined on war but prepared to raise the stakes to win a diplomatic victory — he left Austria with options: a money deal, Oldenburg, February demands.

5 Aug FJ returned to Vienna in the morning to meet ministers. News he'd broken his holiday caused 'panic' (Clark) on Vienna stock market and the press roused against Bismarck. Only half a dozen ministers attended the meeting with FJ who kept the usual secretary out for added secrecy — no formal minute taken though we have some subsequent accounts and leaks (including via Mensdorff to the Baden envoy). (Clark thinks Esterhazy 'probably' attended.) Blome convinced the meeting, except Mensdorff, that there was no alternative to partition or war. They thought Austria would win a war but the army had been shrinking because of financial pressure. They faced a deficit of 80 millions and a foreign loan could only be procured at exorbitant rates. Mobilisation would play havoc with financial plans. War could also upset the delicate situation with Hungary and spread chaos in the Empire. Mensdorff thought Bismarck was cheating them with the partition offer but 'said little in defense of his stand' (Clark). Only he and one other voted for resistance if necessary by war. There was then complex discussions about the form of the partition — Blome's or another. After Belcredi attacked Blome's idea, Blome defended Bismarck — he is a conservative who wants a good understanding with Austria, he argued. A majority supported a temporary over complete partition, it's unclear what Mensdorff said about this. It was a 'counsel of despair' (Clark) hence why Belcredi and Esterhazy could agree: the Bohemian Count Esterhazy was anti-Prussian but wanted a breathing space, the Hungarian Count Blome clung to the 'conservative alliance' and had been suckered by Bismarck's apparitions of a united stand against France. It was agreed to draft a document and Blome would return to Gastein to finalise the deal. Afterwards the newspapers discussed that Mensdorff had argued to take a stand but had been overruled and Mensdorff did not deny it. This raised his status in Vienna and elsewhere in Germany. Clark: many in Vienna were simply putting off decisions and hoping something would turn up, like Napoleon dying or Bismarck getting ousted. (Cf. Clark p275ff)

Documents were drafted. 8th Blome left Vienna on the afternoon train.Vienna was uncertain if a deal would be done. FJ ordered plans to deal with a Prussian surprise attack.

Mensdorff spoke to Gramont and said 'Like Prussia, we look for friends and allies wherever we may find them.' He got reassuring noises from Metternich in Paris.

Bismarck to Eulenberg: We still need time to organise the money and 'secure France', we have 'a stopgap tolerable for us' ... with which for the time being we can live honourably without the war running away with us', and he asked him to tell Bleichröder that 'if any part of my account with him is still invested in securities, which I don't know here, he should by no means unload these because of some premature fear of war.'

10 Aug (Clark) Bismarck and Blome agreed their deal — temporary division. Clark thinks this was partly because of the Goltz reports on 4/6 and Wilhelm's reaction (above). (This is not mentioned in any of the other books but maybe true?) Bismarck agreed to pay for Lauenburg and accepted that Kiel would be a federal, rather than Prussian, harbour. He also promised to drop commercial negotiations with Italy. Blome refused to accept a secret article by which 'the present division of population, being disadvantageous to Prussia, should not prejudice a future final total petition, but rather, in that case, a compromise should be reached by adding a corresponding portion of Holstein to Schleswig'. (Clark p288-90)

Mensdorff was informed by Chotek of Bismarck's financial operations: 'These financial operations... can be justified only by an urgent political necessity, not from an economic point of view.... [S]uch an important supply of money as one usually keeps in readiness only in anticipation of a war.'

, noon Bismarck and Blome initialled the Gastein agreement which was then signed formally in Salzburg. Clark: After they'd signed and Blome dried his pen, Bismarck broke the silence: 'Well, I never should have expected to find an Austrian diplomat who would put his name to that!' At his request it was kept secret until the two kings could formally sign. Ironically two-thirds of the text was drafted by Biegeleben, the agreement's biggest opponent. (Clark, p290)

15 Aug Usedom-Bismarck: In Paris (in the last few days) Drouyn received Metternich, Goltz, and Nigra: 'The Emperor still believes in the possibility of a peaceful compromise between Prussia and Austria; only with unhappiness would he see a war break out. Should this happen however, the Emperor would find no reason to intervene as long as it was simply a question of a decision by force of weapons over Schleswig-Holstein itself. But should the war assume such a character that greater objects and European-French interests were to be played for, then he must reserve the right to act according to the measure of these interests. Specific comments cannot be made before the event.' Goltz warned (15th) that a pledge of neutrality would require a promise of no action beyond the duchies.

Bismarck to Goltz and Usedom: the choice lay between Austrian concessions and war. Bismarck-Usedom: 'uncertainty over the attitude of France and of Italy influenced the decisions at Gastein'.

Bismarck-Goltz: we now have a choice between maintaining the settlement or using its insufficiencies to spark a new crisis, 'Our position ... however, the goals, which we ... set ourselves, and the whole direction which we ought to give to our policy, will be principally conditioned by the greater or lesser trust which we may place in the attitude of France at any given moment... The consideration of France will provide a fundamental, and in a specific moment perhaps the deciding factor in the decisions of his Majesty'. (NB. His extreme clarity about 'the goals which we set ourselves' and his causal model of decisions — in these circumstances the French attitude is 'fundamental' and maybe 'the deciding factor'. How rare it is to see politicians expressing such clarity about priorities.)

Around then Goltz wrote to Bernstorff in London: 'The Gastein Convention puts us permanently on the path of trickery, force, and violation of law'.

Pottinger (p13) — on 16th Bismarck wrote two letters to Goltz explaining the deal and reassuring on north Schleswig, and told Goltz to work for closer relations with the hope France would ultimately support a strong German state north of the Mainz. But Goltz, disapproving of Bismarck's policy, did not inform the French government (!) with the result that the news 'fell on Paris like a bomb', in Emile Olivier's phrase, and the reaction of Napoleon, Drouyn, and the Paris public was fury. (Cf.25/9, when Bismarck learned Goltz probably had not followed instructions.)

Bismarck to Eulenberg: 'In Schleswig therefore from 1 September we will rule alone and as sovereign. Nobody will be able to get us out again and it begins to look as if Austria might be willing to sell us Holstein. That we shall get it one way or the other I no longer have any doubt.'

Bismarck discussion with Beust at Gastein, reported on 20 Sep Dalwigk-Gagern quoting Beust. 'Bismarck ... boasted with the candour peculiar to him of how from the beginning he had conducted the Schleswig affair in accordance with Prussian interests. He had posed conditions to the Danes which he knew they could not possibly have accepted. At the same time, he had by indirect means encouraged them to active resistance. Through his secret agents, he had put before them the certain prospect of English assistance, while he had assured himself in advance that France did not want to go to war and therefore that England too would keep her sword in the scabbard. At the London conference, he had (verba ipsissima) hitched the Duke of Augustenburg as an ox before the plough to bring it ahead. As soon as the plough was in motion he had again unhitched the ox. His own aim is the annexation of the duchies; the difficulty is to bring the King to do it. About Austria and the cleverness of its policy, Bismarck merely smiled'

In his Memoirs, Beust said that one of Bismarck's qualities was one for which only the English language has an adequate expression — unscrupulous'. He described how at Gastein in 1865 he had said to Bismarck, You forget one thing, and that is what would have happened if the Danes had avoided combat? Bismarck replied:' That was all taken care of. I had let it be known in Copenhagen that England, which was not really the case, had threatened us with effective intervention in the case of armed attack [on Schleswig]' A version of this statement appears in Dalwigk's diary of 9/9 (when he was shown a report from Beust dated 17/8 re discussion with Bismarck) and the letter of 20/9.

Bismarck was happy to leave Gastein ('a gloomy hole') for Salzburg.

(Pottinger) Drouyn talked to Goltz at length. Drouyn assured him that France would be neutral over the duchies, Paris favoured Prussia especially if they would apply the principle of nationalities to the duchies, there was little incentive to help Austria given the only thing they were likely to gain was Italian unification, while more fruitful deals could come via Berlin.

Pottinger: this was odd given Drouyn always took a strongly pro-Austrian line throughout these years, 'the most likely explanation is that he was acting under direct orders from Napoleon', although there is no evidence of a meeting at this time 'it seems inconceivable that Drouyn would not have told Napoleon in person about the news of the conclusion of the Gastein accord as communicated by Metternich on August 14'

Gastein deal signed at Salzburg on a hot Sunday: Prussia would administer Schleswig and Austria would administer Holstein, but with joint sovereignty theoretically preserved; Lauenburg was sold to Prussia. This gave Prussia rights to interfere in Holstein. Bismarck's trap was set.

Prussia also got some special rights (eg. the Kiel naval base, and permanent communications links between Prussia and Schleswig across Holstein). Both joined the Zollverein. Bismarck thought it now certain that he would get his hands on Holstein too one way or another, either peacefully or not. Austria was further weakened in Germany and had accepted Prussian right to interfere in Holstein. In his Memoirs, he wrote that after Gastein, William developed 'a taste for conquest', though he was also happy that his gains had come from a deal with Austria rather than war (2, p20).

In the autumn, financial and political pressures increased for Austria. In September, the constitution was suspended. In November French banks gave her a loan to finance her budget deficit, which helped, but the interest rate of 9% was a sign of fragility.

Pflanze: Bismarck was content to avoid war if Austria kept conceding, which it did, but would have fought in 1865 'if the Austrians had held their ground. Blome 'miscalculated badly' re this deal.

(p263). Gall: this was just 'another temporary halt, the last stage on the road to the great confrontation'.

(It was intended as temporary but NOT necessarily the 'last' — again, this misunderstands how Bismarck worked and it retrospectively imposes a pattern on events the players couldn't see at the time, Bismarck did not know it was the 'last' such deal, it depended on how Austria played it and many other things. NB. Even in summer 1866 he held open possibilities with the Gablenz intrigue.)

EF: Bismarck tried to stop triumphalism viz Austria in the official press, and that people should be reminded that British and French attacks on the Gastein deal were in line with the liberal opposition — i.e they were all on the same side. He also said to Keudell: 'If Mensdorff reverts to [an alliance with lesser German states] we will rub some black-red-gold [i.e colours of the 1848 revolution] under his nose. The Schleswig-Holstein and the great German question are so closely linked that if there is a break we will have to solve both together. A German parliament would confine the particularist interests of the medium and small states to their proper limit... If there were an Ephialtes among the ministers of the medium-sized states, the great German national movement would crush him and his master.'

(Clark) FJ invited Wilhelm and Bismarck to nearby Ischl for more intimate discussions and summoned actors from Vienna to perform for the two kings. The next day Wilhelm and Bismarck left 'on a triumphal journey to sow dismay among the South German states' (Clark). Clark thinks Esterhazy whispered to the Prussians that they would get the duchies, and continued to favour a financial deal. (Clark says that apart from a 'brief greeting' in 1867 they did not meet again until 1871, two wars later!) The agreement was disclosed to other states on 22nd and became public when disclosed to Bund shortly after. There was a 'storm' in the German press. Beust at first thought it was a check on Bismarck. Pfordten thought there was no better way to handle the situation then but admitted to Blome that 'in half a year a new conflict would be provoked by Herr von Bismarck'. Some Prussian papers complained that annexation had been sidetracked and Goltz attacked the convention in private. After the initial news, the settled view was that Prussia had gained revenge for Olmütz (Clark p297).

(OP, II.62: At Ischl, outside his hotel he bumped into Pauline Lucca, a famous opera singer he knew. She invited him to accompany her to a photography studio. They sat for a portrait. He sent a copy to Johanna. The photographer then started flogging copies to the public. To avoid a scandal the photographer was forced to destroy the plates. Pflanze doesn't recount how this was done.)

Bismarck finally got Manteuffel out the way by having him appointed governor of Schleswig. Roon supported him. Manteuffel had not only encouraged Wilhelm to reject all compromises with parliament but had also used his power as head of the king's military cabinet to withhold information from Roon. Bismarck's problems with Manteuffel extended back to 1857 when the latter had 'in effect ordered him out of Berlin ... in order to keep him from influencing [FW4]' (Pflanze).

Clark (p325): Manteuffel thought that in 3 months he would get Austria to accept the Prussian position, if he failed then he would support Bismarck's plan of 'unpleasant alliances'. In October he told Gablenz that he and Bismarck had the same aim — annexation — but different methods: Bismarck wanted to do it with a French alliance (which he described as 'leidenschaftlich, abenteuerlich, und principienlos' [passionate, adventurous, and unprincipled], he wanted to keep the Austrian alliance. But Manteuffel failed in Schleswig and by the end of December was contemplating martial law. It's interesting that a Gablenz-Mensdorff telegram in December described Manteuffel's view that he had arrived in Schleswig 'with the conviction that it would be carried out in a maximum of 10 to 12 weeks.'

27 Aug Palmerston: a goodwill visit to Britain by the French navy would produce 'a most wholesome effect in Yankee land' where it will be taken as an indication of 'a closer union than in fact exists' and thus tend to 'disincline the Yankees from aggression on us'.

(Pottinger) Napoleon held a dinner party at Fontainebleau and had a private word in the garden with Goltz, giving broad assurances of neutrality. This makes the official statement the next day more surprising, the only plausible explanation is that Napoleon was assuring Prussia privately he wanted a deal while making clear if he didn't get what he wanted he would strike out (Pottinger, p16). There was suspicion in France, and many rumours, of secret deals accompanying the Gastein deal, e.g a Prussian guarantee of Venetia. On 1/9 Drouyn wrote that Goltz had assured him there were no secret clauses.

Drouyn issued a circular to French embassies attacking the Gastein deal for violating existing treaties, ignoring German opinion and national feeling in the duchies. 'Violence and conquest pervert the notion of law and the conscience of peoples. Substituted for the principles which regulate the life of modern societies, they are an element of trouble and a dissolution and can only upset the old order without establishing solidly any new order.' [Brazen hypocrisy!] Over the next few weeks Paris received reports that the smaller German states were demoralised by the deal and Austria's diplomatic defeat.

Cowley-Russell: Drouyn is cross at the cynicism of Gastein. It was the first time such an arrangement had been done 'without some attempt at justification'. They are putting aside justice and previous commitments, ignoring the people themselves and the voice of Germany.

Bismarck arrived at Baden morning of 30th. Dinner and audience with Wilhelm.

Gorchakov wrote a memo for the Tsar on the situation. Napoleon preferred to support nationalism in Poland than keep our friendship. We have a big job in Poland and need years of peace. Any general war will spread to Poland. We have to avoid siding with Austria or Prussia and making the other an enemy. Civil war in Germany opens the door to chaos and Polish disasters. Gastein does not change these calculations. Austria will probably make concessions and abandon her position in north Germany in return for Prussian help in Italy [which Bismarck had often hinted at but would never commit clearly to]. We must continue to make internal reform our priority and subordinate foreign affairs to this goal. We are close to Prussia but her goals and ruthless methods make closer relations impossible. Austria is too wobbly to be reliable — even in the Principalities where our interests are identical we can't easily cooperate. Napoleon seems so hostile and so pro-Polish that a return to alliance seems impossible. England like us wants peace in Europe and the status quo in the East but British ministers prefer to work with Napoleon to influence him and this undermines our ability to work together.

Disraeli wrote to Derby that his mole in the Cabinet had told him that Palmerston was seriously ill and may not be able to meet Parliament again. 6 weeks later he was dead.

The Queen complained via Grey to Russell that Napier had been too passive dealing with Bismarck's iniquitous conduct over the Gastein deal. We must protest 'without unnecessarily mixing ourselves up in the question' or 'we shall lower ourselves in the opinion of the world'.

(Pottinger) Lefebvre reported to Drouyn that Bismarck had said: the Gastein deal was a preliminary to annexing the duchies and the eventual dominance of Germany, it was unclear and impractical at many points because that gave him an excuse for further quarrels with Austria 'the day when the general state of things in Europe would permit Prussia to follow a still more clearly defined policy'. On 14th Bismarck told him that his plans were limited to north of the Main and hinted that France and Italy might simultaneously acquire territories which shared a common 'tongue and race' with them (i.e forget the Rhineland and ponder Belgium). Pottinger: this was a success for Napoleon's strategy [?], he'd got Bismarck to spell out his goals, but this also was alarming for those officials who wanted to maintain Austria's position.

Palmerston-Russell: We should record disapproval of the 'selfish and unprincipled conduct which Prussia has pursued and contemplates pursuing' and Austria going along. But it's 'rather late' for Drouyn and the Queen to complain now — what they're doing is 'quite of a piece with what they did in the beginning of that quarrel [SH]', it was 'the wolf and the lamb from the beginning, and no wonder that two wolves were too much for one lamb ... and the two wolves having grabbed what they wanted would hardly be expected to give up their prey out of a mere sense of what may be called posthumous justice.' The Queen didn't mind when the injustice appeared calculated to benefit Germany but now it affects 'petty states like Coburgh [sic]' her 'sense of right and wrong has become wonderfully keen and her mind revolts at the idea of consequences which grow naturally from the proceedings she approved of'.

Palmerston now preferred the duchies to go to Prussia. 'It was dishonest and unjust to deprive Denmark of Schleswig and Holstein. It is another Question how those two Duchies, when separated from Denmark, can be disposed of best for the interests of Europe... [I]t is better that they [the duchies] should go to increase the power of Prussia than that they should form another little state to be added to the cluster of small bodies politic which encumber Germany and render it of less Force than it ought to be in the general Balance of Power in the world. Prussia is too weak as she now is ever to be honest or independent in her action; and, with a view to the future, it is desirable that Germany, in the aggregate, should be strong, in order to control those two ambitious and aggressive powers, France and Russia, that press upon her west and east. As to France, we know how restless and aggressive she is, and how ready to break loose for Belgium, for the Rhine, for anything she would be likely to get without too great an exertion. As to Russia, she will, in time, become a power, almost as great as the old Roman Empire. She can become mistress of all Asia, except British India, whenever she chooses to take it; and when enlightened arrangements shall have made her revenue proportioned to her territory, and railways shall have abridged distances, her command of men will become enormous, her pecuniary means gigantic, and her power of transporting armies over great distances most formidable. Germany ought to be strong in order to resist Russian aggression, and a strong Prussia is essential to German strength. Therefore, though I heartily condemn the whole proceedings of Austria and Prussia about the Duchies, I own that I should rather see them incorporated with Prussia than converted into an additional asteroid in the system of Europe.' Five weeks later he was dead.

Gablenz-Mensdorff: Bismarck is hinting at a compensation deal again, Wilhelm says Augustenburg 'could no longer be considered', I told him we must have compensation. (General Gablenz had been put in charge of Holstein as part of the Gastein deal.) Bismarck was also talking to Bleichröder about financial deals and was telling London and Paris he hoped to buy the duchies. Gablenz was instructed to quell the movement for annexation, treat Augustenburg unofficially and not give binding assurances to him, keep the press quiet, be friendly to Prussia but firm if necessary. Gablenz had not wanted the job and rightly thought it 'nearly insoluble'. Meanwhile in Schleswig, Manteuffel had begun a campaign for annexation, forced officials to swear an oath to Wilhelm, the press was forced to push propaganda. Clark: some accounts say Gablenz changed course in November and this contributed to the growing crisis: FALSE, there were no new instructions given him until the New Year and those amounted to stricter measures in pursuit of the original policy of an equal balance between Augustenburg and Prussia.

(Pottinger) The diplomatic cable of 29/8 was published in French papers. 'The result was dramatic. Bismarck naturally was thoroughly puzzled. King William, always dubious about Bismarck's schemes, was still more upset and ordered Bismarck to give up his plan, formulated during the Gastein negotiations, for a stay in Biarritz.' Napoleon later denied responsibility for the action. It probably (Pottinger p20) came from an official who wanted to sabotage the pro-Prussian drift.

Wilhelm raised Bismarck to the title 'Count' (15th, Gall).

FJ 'suspended' the constitution. This generated criticism from liberals and made it harder for Austria to raise cash. It was an attempt to clear the way for reconciliation with Hungary. In December FJ moved the court to Hungary until March 1866.

(Steinberg), during the military exercises Bismarck had a conversation with the Crown Prince, recorded by Stosch at the time (and written in a letter on 2/10).

CP: Do you want to annex them?

Bismarck: If possible, yes, but I do not want to start a European war over them.

CP: And if one threatens?

Bismarck: Well, then I confine myself to the February demands.

CP: And if these are not accepted?

Bismarck: Prussia needs fear no war over these, the February demands are our ultimatum.

CP: And what is happening about Duke Frederick?

Bismarck: That depends on how the cards fall.

Stosch added in his letter: At the end the conversation took on a very violent character... Bismarck's ruthlessness makes him many enemies in the aristocracy and increases the ranks of the opposition. [JS skips from summer 1865 to February 1866 in 1-2 pages!]

(Pottinger) Napoleon talked to Goltz who told him Berlin was unhappy about the leak of the cable. Napoleon played it all down and ordered Drouyn to write to Berlin to soothe relations. The letter was sent on the 23rd.

(Pottinger) Lefebvre reported that he had given Drouyn's letter to Bismarck, Bismarck had given it to Wilhelm while they watched the opera, the king was appeased, the trip could proceed. In their conversation, Bismarck said that he was pained by the French reaction particularly given he had tried to give a fair picture of his plans and he read out his letter to Goltz of 16 August. Lefebvre said he had not heard that this had been communicated. (Pottinger doesn't say what Bismarck did viz Goltz.) On 27th Bismarck held out the prospect of France gaining French-speaking territories. On 29th Drouyn issued another circular that very much softened that of 29 August. (So bear in mind Bismarck also had to worry whether Goltz was passing on his messages properly, how much fog and friction may be created in Paris by his 'own side' — the sort of practical problem largely lost to history but which looms large for the players at the time.)

Mommsen's open letter (above, September).

After the exercises, Bismarck went to Biarritz with his family to meet Catherine Orlov. She never appeared, she'd forgotten and gone to England, and he was hurt (says Steinberg — others say she was avoiding a local typhus outbreak). He made courtesy calls on Drouyn and Rouher in Paris but told Goltz he made them reluctantly and they discussed little. According to Pottinger, Bismarck did mention compensation in French-speaking territories again and Bismarck reported to Wilhelm (11/10) that Drouyn disclaimed any intention of acquiring German-speaking lands. According to a report by Cowley (3/10), Drouyn said that, viz policy in Germany, 'the tone of Bismarck's remarks indicated an intention of carrying matters as far as he dared'. Goltz wrote a few weeks later that Drouyn had complained that Bismarck wanted 'ready money' while offering in return a note of uncertain maturity which could neither be used nor even shown to deputies and journalists', but generally Drouyn seems to have been positive and friendly with Bismarck. (Nobody gives specific dates for Bismarck's chats with Drouyn but they must have happened between the 1-4/10.)

. EF: he saw Napoleon twice at Biarritz and once at St Cloud. We do not have good records for what was said. Pottinger: the first chat was over lunch on 4th after which Bismarck said, 'For a sauce like that, I would give twenty banks of the Rhine.' Also on 4th, Goltz discussed a possible French takeover of Belgium with Napoleon. The second meeting was a breakfast meeting on 7 October at which Bismarck apparently (according to Goltz) drank a glass of Madeira, one of sherry, a flask of Yquem, and a glass of cognac! While various subjects were discussed, including the spread of cholera by pilgrims to Mecca, the main subject was the price of French support. According to Pottinger (p32) in 1870 Bismarck remarked that Napoleon had missed a great opportunity and when the Austrian war kicked off he should have marched into Belgium and would probably have successfully called Britain's bluff.

Wawro and Eyck think he offered Napoleon support for grabbing Luxembourg/Belgium in return for neutrality in a war with Austria. Nigra thought a trade like this for Belgium was discussed. Pflanze (p265): this is unlikely as Bismarck did not make 'commitments so far in advance'. Bismarck reported to Berlin that Napoleon was willing to forget Gastein and 'dance the cotillion with us, without knowing in advance when it will begin or what figures it will include.'

Stern: He suggested to Napoleon that he might buy the duchies and told Baron James Rothschild the same before returning to Berlin.

Barry: after this trip he was in 'no doubt' war would come. (Wrong.)

Eyck: Before going to Biarritz, Bismarck had dropped hints to Benedetti's deputy (Lefebvre) about Napoleon acquiring Belgium or even some German territory. Before he left Biarritz he showed Lefebvre a map of SH with the northern part of Schleswig (Danish speaking) with Denmark, in accord with Napoleon's wishes, and again encouraged Napoleon to expand 'everywhere French is spoken' — i.e Belgium. On the way home from France, Bismarck talked in Paris to the influential Italian Ambassador, Nigra, whom he told that war was coming and urged him to support an alliance (p.108-9).

Emile Ollivier wrote that Napoleon said afterwards, 'He [Bismarck] talked a great deal ... but in general and vague terms. I couldn't untangle exactly what he wanted, and he didn't make me any formal proposition. On my side I didn't express to him any personal desire whatsoever.' (This is hardly quoted anywhere.)

He telegrammed Wilhelm from Biarritz a short report: the trip is a success, France is OK with Gastein and would not object to Prussia buying Holstein.

Clark: He got from Napoleon a commitment 'that an understanding between [France] and Austria at [Prussia's] expense, so often sought by Austria, had no prospect of succeeding, because all basis for it was lacking' (Bismarck-Goltz, 6/5/66). Clark thinks this version is probably more accurate than that telegraphed to Wilhelm 'because intended for Napoleon's own ear'. By the end of the year he also finalised the Italy-Zollverein treaty (despite his promise not to) and all German states except Hanover and Nassau therewith recognised the new kingdom south of the Alps — which went down very badly with FJ.

After returning from France he told Thile, the undersecretary in the Foreign Office, his plan was: 'We shall tread on Austria's corns, present her with a categorical “either-or”, close an alliance with Italy, castrate the Augustenburger, rape the Bund, and other similar atrocities.'

(My conclusion from the different sources: he was softening French annoyance about Gastein and repairing relations; he was exploring Napoleon's attitude towards a financial deal for Holstein; he was seeking French support for an Italian alliance (crucial to impose a two-front war on Austria if war came); if the subject came up he tried to deflect attention from the Rhineland to elsewhere including Belgium (which he would prefer not to happen but if Napoleon were going to grab something then better Belgium than the Rhineland, plus he knew that a move on Belgium would isolate Napoleon from Britain); he would have hinted in response to threats that French hostility would lead to Prussia and Austria getting closer; he probed for support in the event of a war and an assurance that a Franco-Austrian deal was off the cards.

I suspect Napoleon sounded friendly towards a financial deal and an Italian treaty against Austria; refused to rule out Rhineland compensation which remained on the table; refused to commit himself in the event of war as he clearly hoped to be the arbiter and issue a big bill at the crucial moment; but was vaguely reassuring about the prospects of a Franco-Austrian deal. Overall relations were improved but no real specifics agreed.

There is an important difference between a) 'a formal offer' (or an 'offer' clearly intended to be formalised) and b) hints, and dropping ideas into conversations with a certain smile or gesture, encouraging people to make inferences. Clearly (a) did not happen but (b) did, without it meaning 'he'd decided on war' or 'he'd decided to ditch Austria' — he was holding out possibilities and keeping open the possibility of more Austrian concessions, as usual. He was always throwing out possibilities and helping people believe what he wanted them to without committing himself and surely this was reassurance over Gastein plus the usual noncommittal dangling of temptations.)

While at Biarritz, Bismarck got a letter from Bleichröder in which the latter argued a) Austria's financial situation is dreadful, b) Bismarck could use Prussian money to buy the duchies and keep the peace. (Stern: this Biarritz holiday cost him equivalent to $20,000 in 1974 dollars — which is ~$80,000 in 2019, but it's unclear from Stern quite what was included in this bill — e.g anything he claimed back as an expense for official business, like taking secretaries/officials?)

Lothar Bucher, one of Bismarck's spin doctors, offered Marx employment as a financial columnist for an official Prussian state journal. Marx refused.

Deputies of German parliaments gathered in Frankfurt to protest the illegality of the Gastein deal and a conference of the Nationalverein was expected to do the same on 29th.

At Bismarck's urging both powers protested to Frankfurt (when?) for allowing such a meeting but were rebuffed. Bismarck sought to get Austrian agreement on severe reprisals for Frankfurt but Vienna refused (when?). Mensdorff 'had finally resolved the concessions must end' (Pflanze).

OP (p265-6): Bismarck's reaction was severe, Mensdorff's refusal 'seems to have convinced Bismarck that the usefulness of the Austrian alliance was about over [and] events in the duchies offered further proof'. At Gastein, he had thought Austria might sell Holstein but the French loan (November) eased the pressure. But Pflanze (p265-6) telescopes October-December into a few paras, suggests the 'war to the knife' comment etc happened around early-mid October, rather than the end of November, then suddenly skips to Altona in January.

Some leading Prussian liberals refused to go to another meeting in Frankfurt to condemn the Gastein agreement on the grounds that it was anti-Prussian. Mommsen and Twesten publicly opposed the meeting of delegates and said that Prussia had to unify Germany.

On 28/9 Mommsen wrote an open letter dissociating himself from the S-H movement: there must be an end to the 'sovereignty swindle' (a phrase often used by Bismarck!) that is 'sapping the marrow of Germany'. It is now 'written in letters of fire that the choice for us is between subordination to a German state [Grossstaat] and the ruins of the nation'.

Twesten wrote 28/9: there is no reason 'to place any hope in the middle states'; the conference is directed exclusively against Prussia; 'we would prefer anything as an alternative to a defeat of the Prussian state. We do this in the interests not only of Prussia but also of Germany, since we are strengthened by recent events in the conviction that no other power can do anything for Germany but Prussia.'

The liberal movement had been 'split apart by the Schleswig-Holstein question' (OP, p276).

Chotek to Mensdorff: 'the more intelligent majority of the Prussian people' now support Bismarck's policy. 20 November: 'in the domestic question Count Bismarck is constantly gaining ground'.

Palmerston died, Russell became PM. Clarendon Foreign Secretary, Gladstone Chancellor and Leader of the Commons.

Clarendon was charming and suave, Russell blunt. Clarendon was 'an aristocrat whose familiarity with the Continent made him at least as cosmopolitan as he was patriotic' (Millman). Clarendon's 'high place in society have made some people forget that his views were seldom original and not seldom diffusely or imprudently expressed' (H Temperley, 1932). Victoria's dislike of Clarendon 'so pronounced in 1868, was evident in 1865' (Millman). In October she wrote to the King of Belgium that 'I don't quite trust him.' In March 1866 she wrote to the Crown Princess of Prussia that he was 'most disagreeable & unmanageable'. The Queen and Russell were 'more disposed to action than Clarendon' but all three were agreed that 'the disgrace of 1864, the opprobrium of promising more than was delivered, should not be repeated' (Millman, p6-7).

When the crisis with Austria flared up in 1866, Russell (PM) and Clarendon (Foreign Secretary) both wanted to see Prussia beaten and thought she would be. They made clear Britain would stay out even if France wanted to intervene. Clarendon: we will not 'use the language of menace wh. might entail the necessity of action'.

The FO 'favoured strict non-interference' (Otte). The FO was more worried about French adventurism and Napoleon's untrustworthiness. Hammond called him 'the devil's own child' (5 July 1866) and Cowley said that Napoleon thought 'no promise, however securely made, is binding under altered circumstances' (20 September 1866). However, the FO also assumed that France would continue to be generally supportive of Britain's desire to keep Turkey going given Russia would reap all the rewards of a Turkish collapse. The FO was contemptuous of Austria: 'they are in the haziest of hazes, & it is not in the Austrian character to see the way through the fog' (Hammond, 25 October 1865). Morier and others underestimated Bismarck and overestimated the strength of Prussian liberalism. (Hammond thought in 1864 that the Prussian army was clearly inferior to the French.) Napier wrote to Russell (14 October 1865) that Bismarck's 'strange and transitory notions and speeches' may be 'heard with amazement'but 'will probably leave not a trace behind.'

Cowley wrote to Russell saying Russell had left his post 'with not a question of importance to solve'. (Cf. Otte p.31ff)

Mosse: with Clarendon in post, England and Russia were likely to be passive spectators and 'the ring was cleared for Bismarck, Esterhazy and Napoleon'. (Mosse stresses Esterhazy's role more than others.)

Manteuffel had been talking to Austrians including Gablenz about possible deals. On 21/10 he suggested giving Austria some land in return for the duchies and maintaining the conservative alliance.

Gablenz-Mensdorff: 'Hardly a day goes by that [Manteuffel] doesn't turn to me with some petty trouble, and though I've so far parried them with the best form, yet I foresee clearly that my position here is not tenable for long.'

(Clark) Mensdorff sent Count Wimpffen to London to talk to Russell privately and bring a closer entente. Wimpffen reported that 'the bonds which unite England and France are stronger than ever', the path to London lies through Paris. (This is odd as the FO was not pro-French and Clarendon was friendly to Austria. Clark seems to get the dates of Russell/Clarendon taking over wrong.)

Count Malaguzzi, a private citizen, mooted in Vienna the idea of a deal: Austria sells Venetia, a royal marriage, official recognition of Italy. The military hated it. Mensdorff and others thought that Italy would not be properly unifiable — they looked forward to Napoleon's death and taking revenge (cf. 3/8 Bloomfield report). Belcredi and others hated the idea of doing a deal with 'revolution'. FJ thought selling against his 'honour', wife agreed. Discussions went nowhere again. Other ideas re an exchange of Venetia for Danubian Principalities also went nowhere. Bismarck leaked what he heard of such discussions to Russia to discredit Austria.

(WAF) Bismarck returned from his holiday through Paris on 2nd. Spoke to Benedetti who had not been invited to Biarritz, unlike Goltz. Benedetti visited him at Hotel du Douvres but it seems little was said. Bismarck spoke to Napoleon and Drouyn. Little trace of these discussions too but they added little to Biarritz according to Bismarck. Benedetti left on the morning of Monday 6 November to be in Berlin before Bismarck but an accident disturbed his visit and he ended up with Bismarck and his family on the train which arrived in Berlin on 7th.

Pottinger: Bismarck and Napoleon talked on 3rd, Napoleon said an alliance with Austria was 'an impossibility'. Sudden agricultural problems influenced French opinion towards army cuts in autumn 1865, though the cuts were very minor. (This is unmentioned in other books I've read but if Napoleon was thinking 'the public wants a quiet life' autumn 1865-spring 1866, then it's important.)

Hohenthal-Beust: 'At the French embassy [in Berlin, Bismarck's] sojourn in Paris is summarised with the words: “They have been very polite to Count Bismarck. They played games with him, but he has brought nothing back, and the bad impression of the Gastein convention has not been swept away at all.”'

For the first time since Gastein, the Kreuzzeitung attacked Austria and threatened war. Bismarck also leaked a conversation with Chotek, and admitted it to Chotek, justifying his behaviour as a response to the virulence of the Austrian press. He told Chotek: 'There cannot exist between Austria and Prussia a half-relationship. Either sincere alliance or war to the knife' (report 20/11). On 27/11 Thile recorded Bismarck's instructions: keep up a steady stream of complaints in Vienna, 'exercise a slow gradual pressure against Austria without provocative or final steps' (Clark p324).

A loan to Austria was raised in Paris by French banks after help from Napoleon. It carried a 9% interest rate, 'a sign of the fragility of Austrian credit' (Steinberg). (Showalter: it was 90M florins (roughly a year's military budget) at 18% (my hunch is Showalter is wrong about 18%). Bismarck offered to buy the duchies in November for 60M florins.)

Carr: 1848-1866 Austrian national debt tripled and by now was x5 national income.

Clark: FJ could not raise a loan from the Viennese Baron Rothschild except on conditions FJ would not accept. The French deal was a 'staggeringly high' price and within months the finance minister was panicking again. But the political effect of help from France and pro-Austrian press in Paris was considerable.

Pottinger: first the Vienna branch of the Rothschilds demanded terms that were too tough, then an attempt to sell bonds to the public failed, then the English Rothschilds refused despite urging from Russell, then the Paris Rothschilds demanded too much. After last minute difficulties they raised the cash from the Habers: 90M gulden for 37 years, but Austria only received only 61.25 gulden per 100. Drouyn was asked to approve it around mid-November so it could be listed on the Paris bourse. The Finance Ministry was under pressure itself but after a Council of Ministers meeting on 17/11 Napoleon decided to support it. The subscription opened on 27th. Both sides made clear they were thinking of the implications for friendly relations. While its economic value was low it was seen as a success for Vienna and a problem for Bismarck.

(Clark p298-9) FJ moved the court to Hungary until March 1866. FJ made concessions but Deak would not do a deal. On 8 February and a fortnight later, Deak scuppered chances of a deal. The Vienna public were hostile to Deak's demand for a separate Hungarian ministry. 3 March FJ reply closed negotiations for the time being. FJ returned to Vienna without a deal but in a stronger position, they no longer feared a Hungarian revolution in case of war.

In December Vienna also signed a trade deal with UK (taking effect from January 1867) that placed UK on same footing as Zollverein.Vienna was worried about electoral gains for the party of action in Italy and possible attacks by Garibaldi in Venetia. Mensdorff looked for French reassurances that she would not help.

Metternich had returned to Paris after a holiday, spoke to Drouyn before going on to see Napoleon at Compiègne, Drouyn said to him, 'You will find the Emperor very well disposed and such a good boy (et si sage) that you will be astonished' (reported 2/12).

Metternich: I urged a deal, he replied — 'That is not impossible, and if one could provoke a war in one corner of Europe without setting fire to the gunpowder elsewhere that would perhaps be the best way of putting an end to the matter. I would prefer, however, that once the hatreds and defiances have been calmed, one could remain one beside the other tranquilly, but we are not there yet...' Pottinger writes of this impenetrable comment that Metternich was bewildered.

Gablenz reported Prussian spies had been captured stealing papers from Augustenburg's adviser Samwer.

Gramont had dinner with FJ who was friendly and spoke of the commercial and other negotiations, saying he had 'most favourable dispositions toward a reciprocal accord, whose prompt conclusion he ardently desired'.

King Leopold I of Belgium died at Laeken. A momentary worry in Berlin that Napoleon may grab it.

Bismarck told Benedetti with a smile that he was complaining to Vienna 'twice a week' to alienate Wilhelm step-by-step from Austria.

Metternich-Mensdorff: Napoleon wants peace, he's happy to see FJ attempting to satisfy Hungary. Drouyn says: Napoleon wants to see Austria restored to former glory; if Italy attacks you will annihilate them, we will let you act freely in Italy: 'I repeated it solemnly, if things were to go worse in Italy and if you were one day attacked in Venetia — not only would we leave you freedom of action, but a complete entente can be established between us upon a final solution of the Italian question... We want no new annexations, we have become frankly conservatives — that means we resemble you very much. Those who resemble each other assemble... Events may compel us to seek a power with whom we can combine our forces to make common cause against the danger.' Metternich was hopeful. Mensdorff, however, was cooler — do not get into details of an alliance unless/until it seems war is sure. (Clark p305-6)

Pottinger: this was an important difference between Napoleon and Drouyn, with the latter much more anti-Italy, while Napoleon really wanted Italy dealt with before he could imagine closer relations with Austria viz Germany.

Bloomfield-Clarendon: Mensdorff is clear they will not sell the duchies.

To a friend, Andrae Roman: 'Anyone who calls me an unscrupulous politician is doing me an injustice and should start by trying his own conscience in this particular arena... When I stake my life on a thing, I do so in the faith that I have fortified for myself, in long and bitter struggle but also in sincere and humble prayer to God, and that no word of man, not even that of a friend in the Lord and a servant of his Church, is going to overthrow for me... As a statesman I am not ruthless enough but rather cowardly in my feelings, and this is so because in the questions that confront me it is not always easy to gain the clarity that engenders faith in God.' Some place this in 1869 but EF & Gall 26/12/65.

The Italo-Zollverein treaty was signed: members recognised the kingdom of Italy.

By the end of December Manteuffel thought he'd failed in Schleswig, 'he now sees himself forced to a standstill in his proceedings' (Gablenz 31/12), and was contemplating martial law (cf. 24/8).