1866

Napoleon announced the withdrawal of troops from Mexico. He told America he would withdraw between 11/66 and 11/67. Hamerow: the end of the US Civil War and renewal of the Zollverein in 1865 had stimulated the demand for credit at the time when the Paris Bourse was buzzing with news of the Mexican fiasco and several important London firms were declaring bankruptcy. The growing threat of an Austro-Prussian conflict kept money markets disrupted until the war was resolved. Mid-March to end of May the discount rate on the Berlin stock exchange rose from 6 to 9% and Prussian bonds declined ~10% March-June. The political uncertainty kept finance wobbly until the final resolution of the conflict in 1871 after which there was another boom. (Cf. Keudell p412)

Bismarck had Wilhelm present the Black Eagle to the Italian king, as part of his seduction. Clark: Vienna was 'as usual ... too late and too half-hearted' to counter his moves — making even a pretence of contemplating recognition of Italy might have kept La Marmora out of Bismarck's clutches for months.

During January (WAF) Bismarck speculated to Goltz that the Mexican affair could embroil France with America and help Prussia, and he forbade Goltz from exercising a restraining influence on the American ambassador in Paris.

Ludwig von Gerlach spoke with Bismarck and concluded that the latter had abandoned Christian morality in his pursuit of political victory.

Revertera-Mensdorff: 'In his intimate outpourings, however, Prince Gorchakov does not hide the fascination that Bismarck's enterprising policy exerts on his mind. He confessed to me, not long ago, if he had the means and the opportunity, he would also like to play politics à la Bismarck; but as Russia has no more imperial needs than peace, the first rule of her conduct will be to abstain from questions which do not touch the vital interests of her existence.'

Napier to Clarendon: 'There never was a period in [which] England was an object of so much dislike to all parties in Germany, as at present... [A]ll join in repugnance to England, in noting her prosperity, & in undervaluing her power... France is hated too. But France is watched with anxiety and respected.'

Karolyi returned to Berlin after an extended vacation since July 1865. Clark: his orders were to preserve Gastein, be calm, friendly and firm and prevent Prussia from rushing into annexation.

Gablenz-to whom?: 'I would rather attack a battery than stand here morally in the breach ... [which is] endless crossfire', I have asked Manteuffel to 'leave me in peace, as I leave him' but conflict is constant. In December he'd written: 'In all my life I've never served under such frightfully irritating conditions ... the intrigues of the Prussians and the Augustenburgers are ceaseless and not a day goes by in which I have one single peaceful hour'.

(EF) To Usedom (ambassador in Italy): He stressed he'd always seen Gastein as provisional, Austria has allowed Augustenburg supporters to agitate and is agitating itself across Germany. We don't have to worry about Russia or France intervening. Prussia might have to call for a German parliament.

Manteuffel suggested to Bismarck that he demand the expulsion of Augustenburg again but this proved unnecessary because of Altona (below).

The Prussian Landtag opened for another session. Bismarck said the government would not resubmit the military bills. The Landtag appointed a commission to investigate the legality of the railway budget operation. Unruh expressed the frustration of the liberals: 'We are able to unite only in negation or on phrases.' Hoverbeck replied, 'If that were only the case!' (OP implies this was in a meeting, not on the floor of the house.) Liberals were divided over whether to go through the long process of amending the budget or reject it outright without debate. Many of the famous names — Twesten, Lasker, Hoverbeck — were in favour of the extreme option but they were a minority. Waldeck and others did not want to intensify the conflict. When the budget bill was introduced, conservatives, left centrists and Waldeck progressives voted down the extremists and the bill was referred to committee. Cf. 21/2.

Bismarck negotiated with Hanover about a royal wedding as part of trying to win an alliance. But it went wrong — in March/April they began mobilising reserves. In his Memoirs, Bismarck said Austria persuaded Hanover to side with her. Clark: Around this time [I think this must refer to 21/1] Bismarck spoke to Count von Platen, Hanover foreign minister, about Austria's bad situation in a war with 150,000 Italians threatening in the south, Prussia seizing the railroad centre in Moravia, Prussia's superior equipment including the needle gun. Platen concluded that Bismarck wanted war and quickly. (Clark: Bismarck wanted Platen to mediate but Platen committed himself to nothing.) This was passed on to Karolyi who informed Mensdorff on 26/1.(This is one of the few references I've seen to Bismarck discussing military issues in 1866 — I assume this was a much bigger feature of his discussions than we can now see.) He also told Saxony that if Austria refused to eject Augustenburg she'd have to decide 'whether she had more to fear from the Prussian army or the outcry of the liberal press'.

Bloomfield-Clarendon: I had dinner with FJ who 'seemed under the impression that in Europe there was no present appearance of any serious complications arising; he trusted the year would pass over quietly and peacefully, and that Austria might be able to devote itself more entirely to her internal organisation'. Same day, Mensdorff wrote to Duke Ernst of Coburg (cousin): 'In politics there is a lull - but the atmosphere is heavy ... plenty of inflammable stuff is lying about, and on the thrones, little insight and strength.'

Napoleon gave his annual Speech from the Throne to Corps Legislatif (in the Louvre). 'Abroad, peace seems assured everywhere', he told them. Regarding Germany he said he would keep his policy of neutrality and stay out where 'our interests are not directly engaged'. In February-March there was growing heated debate in Paris about this as Thiers stirred opposition.

The Austrian governor of Holstein, Gablenz, allowed a demonstration in Altona in favour of Augustenburg. Bismarck sent a very sharp note to Vienna (26th) demanding the suppression of all 'revolutionary' and 'democratic' agitation in Holstein. A 'negative or devious answer' would compel Prussia to consider the alliance ended and to assume 'complete freedom for our entire policy... If Austria continues to provide a haven for the activities of the republican democracy ... then the king will prefer an open breach to this kind of struggle.' Pflanze: 'It had the sound of an ultimatum' and spoke of Austrian 'aggression'.

EF: he told the ambassador in Vienna to complain about Austria allowing 'revolutionary tendencies, inimical to every throne, to spread themselves under the sign of the Austrian double eagle', to ask for assurances that all anti-Prussian agitation in Holstein is suppressed, and to threaten an open breach.

(Gall refers to an 'ultimatum' that sounds similar but on 31 July 1865!? — is Gall confused or a misprint referring to something else?)

Lerman: Bismarck wrote to Gerlach enraged by the Crown Prince again saying the monarchy appeared finished.

Supreme Court ruled (majority of 1) that deputies could be prosecuted for speeches on the floor of the Landtag, after packing the court with two 'relief' judges.

A letter to Wilhelm: interesting glimpse into the daily intricacies... Would you attend a confidential soirée with Benedetti, I think it would be useful, if Yes then 'the Ambassador would be very grateful if I could let him have a hint as to whether the fact that your Majesty will be present may be intimated by mentioning “Uniform” on the invitations'...

Duke of Cambridge complained to Russell about the lack of spending on the Army. Russell did not support increases in spending and neither did Parliament.

Bismarck in Landtag rejected the suspicion that he was using foreign policy for domestic ends: 'Foreign affairs are for me an end in themselves and rank higher with me than the rest. You gentlemen should think the same and if you should give some ground domestically, you could regain it quickly under a liberal ministry, which might come about.' (Gall: '... And you, gentlemen, ought to be thinking on the same lines, because after all any ground you lost at home you could very quickly make up under, say, a liberal ministry, such as might possibly ensue.') EF: the liberals laughed at him, it was the last time in the history of Prussia that distinguished liberals could proclaim liberal principles with equal boldness and confidence.

Karolyi-Mensdorff: 'If it comes to war then it is Bismarck's work; if he falls, then collapses the policy of active hostility towards Austria.' The Austrian military attaché also reported (3 & 17/2) that there was military activity, Roon has been heard saying Prussia must strike 'before the enemy has time to think about it', Silesia is well prepared with railways and cavalry is moving towards the border.

General Gablenz: 'Prejudice, rusty ideas, failure to recognise the needs of the times, postpone everything, never take action, always just waiting - it is this which is so disastrous for us.' On 10 May his brother Anton Gablenz wrote: 'the perplexity and inactivity in Vienna is fearful, and for anyone who tries to get things done it is a desperate situation.'

Gala evening at French Embassy. Royal Family attended. Bismarck trying to be friendly to Benedetti (and fix misunderstandings over some court etiquette issues, WAF p45).

Biegeleben drafted a reply about Altona from FJ: it rejected Bismarck's demands, reiterated Austria's right to administer Holstein. Clark: Mensdorff saw Altona had been a mistake and sent a second message accompanying the formal note, quietly telling Bismarck he regretted Gablenz's error, as did Gablenz and FJ. Bismarck had been winding Wilhelm up again for weeks.

OP (p267) Bismarck was now resolved to escalate. For two years he had made progress. 'Constantly aggressive, he invariably depicted himself as on the defensive; always injuring, he continually assumed the role of the injured; ever working for the upset of the status quo, he steadily posed as a genuine conservative. For Austria it was a long story of futility and frustration. Her protests were met by declarations of innocence and indignation, her attempts to temporise and delay by the threat that Prussia would act alone, her efforts to halt Prussian encroachments by the charge that they endangered the monarchical cause.'

Karolyi-Mensdorff: Bismarck has unleashed the official media against us. There was retaliation.

(Pottinger) Benedetti-Drouyn: Bismarck says that if things go badly with Austria, 'We will move quickly ... and perhaps we will move far.' The first step will be bringing back Goltz for discussions.

(Clark) Bismarck interview with Benedetti: 'All ties with Austria are now broken and Prussia is free again to act according to her own interests.' He said he was contemplating bringing liberals into his ministry and leading the German national movement, forcing the middle states to follow him to escape revolution. Benedetti reported back to Gramont who read it to Mensdorff who informed FJ on 19/2. He was also briefing the press against Austria.

He instructed his envoy to talk to Pfordten about Bund reform.

(OP, JS says 19th) Loftus arrived on 15th taking over from Napier in Berlin until 1871 then St P (Vienna 1858, Berlin 1860, Munich 1862). He described the atmosphere as 'loaded' and 'smelled of powder'.

Bismarck was reticent and calm with Karolyi in contrast to the violence of his words and actions elsewhere — there is an 'ominous stillness' in the Wilhelmstrasse, 'the calm before the storm' reported Karolyi.

21 February (OP p317ff) The Landtag committee completed a preliminary report on the budget composed by Virchow. It recited the history of the constitutional conflict and concluded: 'It is clear as day that absolutism has been restored in Prussia and indeed absolutism without the self-imposed limitations of the pre-March [1848] period. There is no longer any control of the finances or any legal budget; the Staatsanzeiger has replaced the statute books; the superior accounting office no longer has any function; the treasury and property of the state are at the free disposal of the government. One point alone has not been attacked. This is the one upon which the old absolutism failed and constitutionalism was won in Prussia. Still in effect is the clause in article 103 of the constitution reading: “treasury loans may be raised only through legislation”.'

Austrian Council of Ministers presided by FJ (in Budapest): decided to push diplomatically and not make more concessions, but neither developed a new approach to solving the problem nor decided to fight.

Gall: this 'as good as decided to go to war' (p280). (Wrong.)

Carr gives the opposite impression to Gall: 'No one at this meeting wanted war or thought there was any cause for war.'

Barry: FJ said they should 'leave warlike preparations for the time being' and focus on 'diplomatic means'.

Showalter: they decided to start military preparations but they weren't seeking war or thought it imminent.

Clark: 1) FJ had been stung by press criticism of Gastein that he had abdicated Austria's position in Germany. The Allgemeine Zeitung, Austria's defender in south Germany, attacked. 2) Bismarck made hostile and insulting comments to everybody and was engaged in endless intrigues — comments such as about Lauenburg ('the honest man buys, but it is the scamp who sells cheap'). He complained about appointments and Austrian breaches of friendship. He encouraged the Zollverein to recognise Italy. In Vienna they thought he'd also tried to sabotage Austria's loan in Paris and even that he was talking to Hungarian revolutionaries (he was). 3) Domestically things were improving — finances better, Hungary better. Many important figures were pushing FJ — either do a deal with Prussia or take a stand.

(Clark p337ff has by far the most detailed account of the meeting.) FJ opened the meeting — does 'the honour, dignity and security of Austria call for warlike preparations'?; however lamentable the conflict, the Prussian army is more mobile and their railroads more advantageous than ours while our army has been reduced and needs time to rebuild.

Mensdorff: Prussia has no outward grounds for a quarrel but her precarious internal situation makes her next move uncertain. He stressed diplomacy rather than military preparations.

Esterhazy stressed diplomacy but said 'Austria must show her teeth', show her German allies that there will be no more talk of concessions, and secure the peaceful neutrality of France — though he still said that 'in time the reversion of the Duchies to Prussia cannot be prevented'. (If so, then do a deal don't escalate towards a war you don't want or think is sensible!)

The ministers of finance and commerce strongly advised a peaceful settlement and pointed out the financial consequences of a war.

Belcredi spoke last. He did not try to persuade towards peace or war, he just seconded Esterhazy's suggestion to gain the German middle states and warn them against 'revolution'.

FJ summed up expressing agreement with the general view that 'military preparations [should] be held off for the time being, and that further attempts be made by diplomatic means to preserve the honour and dignity of the country, as well as its interests. The preparations could all be drawn up on paper, and the necessary orders had already gone to the war ministry.'

Clark: 'the result of the council was a victory for the peace element in the cabinet' but the diplomatic approach was the same as had failed at Gastein. They put too many chips on the chances of Bismarck falling. And FJ had unjustified confidence in the army despite military advice against fighting Prussia and Italy.

Blome reported that Pfordten could not be relied on to bring Bavaria onside until action commenced. Beust was always ready to fight against Prussia but stressed the importance of Vienna going through the Bund. In Berlin, Bismarck threatened Saxony — either neutrality or we'll occupy you. This 'shook Beust to the core' (Clark) and moved him to stress again in Vienna the importance of acting through the Bund and not pushing him to make an anti-Prussian declaration.

Many rows between Bismarck and the liberals over the constitutionality of various issues came to a head, including the report of the commission on the legality of the railway funding deal (obviously it concluded it was illegal) and the prosecution of Twesten. Prosecuting members for speeches made in parliament was a breach of the constitution. The case failed in the first and second court but the supreme court ruled the contrary by a majority of one after it had been packed with two 'relief judges'. (Bleichröder said this created 'the most painful sensation in all responsible circles'.) Three days later Hoverbeck introduced a motion that the Landtag declare the act of the court illegal and invalid. It passed 263-35. There were protests in some cities dispersed by police but the deputies did not have a plan.

It all came to a head on 22/2. Bismarck climbed the rostrum and read a royal decree proroguing the Landtag again after its shortest ever sitting. Bismarck had the police seize the deputies' documents as it was closed. It did not meet again before the war with Austria.

EF: it was the last time in the history of Prussia and Germany that an array of distinguished speakers could proclaim liberal principles with 'equal boldness and confidence'.

(Barry) Memo by Moltke: Austria could assemble 100,000 in 21 days in Bohemia, 200,000 in 36 days and would need another 8 days to get to the Prussian frontier: i.e 6 weeks to get to the Prussian frontier. So long as there's no large scale horse purchases and regiments in Italy are 'not placed on a war footing [then] we need not believe that there is a serious intention to attack us.'

Karolyi-Mensdorff: Bismarck is more entrenched, he is not bluffing but plans 'a great Prussian action in the foreign field'. Clark: Karolyi was trying to avoid meeting Bismarck to avoid giving him a chance to intensify the crisis.

Prince Couza of the Romanian Principalities (capital Bucharest) was forced to abdicate (internal reforms had alienated powerful interests, a scandal over a mistress). Some soldiers broke into his palace (11/2) and forced him to sign his abdication then he was escorted out of the country. Italy had had ideas around Austria ceding Venetia and getting Moldavia and Wallachia in return. There were discussions in Paris with Nigra about the idea of pushing Vienna into such a deal by threatening a deal with Prussia.

Karolyi-Mensdorff: Bismarck plans to demand the sale of the duchies and if refused he'll send troops into Holstein hoping to spark war.

Eyck (unmentioned by (almost?) any others): Usedom telegraphed that Victor Emanuel and his minister were expecting Prussian proposals for an alliance against Austria.

Karolyi-Mensdorff: 'Bismarck has determined on extreme measures. He intends to send to Vienna at once a decisive dispatch; it is already discussed and prepared; only the King's signature is lacking... But the King ... waivers and is subject to the opposite influences... Bismarck seems to calculate on winning His Majesty over to decisive measures by arguing (against his own conviction) that Austria will yield at the last moment. Perhaps the only chance of shaking the King, therefore, would be to pick up the gauntlet with determination, if it is thrown down, and not for a minute allow a suspicion of a retreat to appear.' On the same day, a letter from Blome arrived with Mensdorff. He had switched and now argued for war — 'the war against Bismarckian Prussia still is better than peace with Bismarck's fall and a “New Era” [and we should] stand firm to the last ditch'.

Clark (p329ff): Mensdorff had opposed Gastein and been prepared to risk war in summer 1865 but he now opposed war. He thought the political situation much worse — with France less friendly and allies in south Germany less clear — and he thought the Austrian army was not ready to fight a Prussia-Italy alliance. He also preferred to continue cooperating with Austria in Germany — he had been brought up to believe in the unity of the German powers, and he opposed both democratic revolution and autocratic/religious reaction. He preferred to make concessions to Prussia and maintain Venetia. He thought a war would only help France and it would be better to be cautious until Napoleon died. Also like Bismarck he was thinking about linking the Duchies to the bigger question of federal reform.

He discussed with FJ and others over winter 1865-6 ideas about trying to lead the national movement with some sort of representative body, like Schmerling in 1863. Biegeleben, Blume, Beust and others discussed schemes — Beust had been urging Mensdorff to offer a parliament since December 1864.

Mensdorff thought Rechberg had made a mistake in November 1863 by closing the deal with Prussia against the Bund instead of leading the outcry for Augustenburg. Now he thought he might be able to pull the princes away from Prussia with 'independence for Schleswig-Holstein' and appeal to the people with 'a German parliament'. He had discussed these ideas with FJ before the February crisis and when he heard rumours of Bismarck's plans he raised them again. Belcredi was hostile to the parliamentary initiative, Esterhazy was sceptical, only Biegeleben supported him and that half-heartedly as he doubted support in south Germany, even Beust wanted to avoid provoking Prussia. FJ was temperamentally unsuited to such a dramatic move.

Lerman (p104, she cites Zimmer, 1996): 'some evidence' for a meeting in the Foreign Office at which Bismarck convinced Wilhelm of 'the necessity of preparing for war', so maybe the meeting on 28th was 'for the purpose of informing' others. (Sounds iffy, and I haven't come across other references to Wilhelm going to the FO for meetings.)

CRUCIAL Prussian Crown Council.

Pflanze (p292ff): the diplomatic corps noted the presence of Moltke, Alvensleben, Goltz (recalled from Paris), and Manteuffel (recalled from Schleswig). Wilhelm opened the meeting complaining of how Austria had undermined Gastein and was blocking Prussia's rise. Bismarck: war with Austria will come 'sooner or later', better now than to let Austria pick the timing, she is determined to resist Prussia's 'natural and very justified' policy of leading Germany, we must seek 'more definite guarantees' from France. Eulenburg: War would help deal with domestic problems. Bismarck: NO, this would be a useful by-product but cannot be the motive for a war. Moltke: we are ready, Austrian troops are moving into Bohemia but there is no sign of Austria buying horses, an alliance with Italy is crucial. Only FW spoke for peace. NB. unmentioned in any of the books I've seen, the letter from Wilhelm to Bismarck on 23 April is also important evidence re this meeting.

There are 3 accounts of the meeting (one by Moltke, one by Muhler). Some historians have wrongly attributed Eulenburg's remark to Bismarck. Moltke's version quotes Bismarck saying 'the domestic situation does not require a foreign war, although it is an additional reason that makes war appear advantageous'. An account by Muhler reads: 'Bismarck took exception to this assumption [by Eulenburg] that domestic questions can be the motive for war, [although] their solution may be a fruit of it.'

Gall (p280ff) says Bismarck argued that Austria has 'always jealously opposed Prussia's natural and legitimate strivings in this direction by not allowing pressure to assume control of Germany, although incapable of doing so its self. He returned to his argument at the time that 1848 had been a great missed opportunity: 'Had Prussia then sought to lead and control the movement not from the platform but with the sword, it would probably have succeeded in bringing about a more favourable outcome.' Gall implies the Eulenburg comment was Bismarck and does not record Bismarck's objection.

JS (p.237) is also confused re Eulenburg (he quotes Eyck as his source) and quotes Bismarck saying: 'a forceful appearance abroad and a war undertaken for Prussia's honour would have a beneficial effect on the solution of the internal conflict'. He says that Moltke reported there was no sign of Austrian horse purchases. He devotes just a paragraph to this crucial meeting and does not go into crucial details about the different sources and accounts, including the Moltke and Muhler quotes.

Barry: Bismarck said — 'A war with Austria must certainly come sooner or later. It is wiser to undertake it now under these most favourable conditions than to leave it to Austria to choose the most auspicious moment for itself.' (Carr, p127 gives a similar translation of key lines.) Goltz: Napoleon will stay neutral. Moltke: it is vital for Italy to attack and thereby limit Austria's force against Prussia. Bismarck suggested Moltke go to Florence to negotiate and this was agreed (EF: this was agreed after the meeting). Wilhelm: annexation is worth the risk of war but it should not be declared too hastily.

Stern implies that Eulenburg's remark was said by Bismarck and does not explain the details (p.70).

EF: Manteuffel was more bellicose than Bismarck. Only FW spoke against war.

Lerman: Goltz said after this that Bismarck succeeded in pushing Wilhelm towards war until 5pm when he dined but then the guests invited by Augusta all argued for peace.

Eyck: after this 'war was indeed inevitable' (p.111) and p126-7 he argues that although Bismarck was not set on war in all circumstances, and would have been happy to attain his ends without war, in practice war was 'unavoidable' because the only alternative was Austria seeking and Prussia granting compensation elsewhere (e.g Italy) which was not a viable path. Eyck gets the attribution to Eulenburg right and makes the point that this fits with Bismarck's often repeated idea that 'foreign policy is an end in itself'. (So JS is doubly wrong!)

OP: Bismarck had not abandoned his approach of keeping alternative paths open and knew France might suddenly throw a spanner in the works, the Italian alliance might not happen etc. (War was not 'inevitable' in February-March 1866. He still had to make the Italian alliance and ensure Napoleon would keep out, hence the Gablenz initiative and keeping options open to the last minute. He was determined to push Austria out of north Germany, undermine the Bund, and force a decision with Austria. Many possible events might have pushed things in a different direction. E.g Any of the key players might have been assassinated (and Bismarck nearly was). Italy might have rejected a treaty and wobbled Wilhelm. Austria might have tried better approaches but probably only with different people — it is hard to see how the actual players in Vienna might have played their cards much differently (they might have picked a better commander than Benedek but duffing this decisions seems highly characteristic of FJ).

But given Bismarck's priorities — and assuming the same players, Bismarck keeping sufficient control of Wilhelm and so on — then in summer 1866 increasing tension and crisis on the brink of war (like summer 1865) was guaranteed and the only two realistic possibilities were a) an Austrian diplomatic collapse (like 1865) and acceptance of a radically changed setup in North Germany (including the likely collapse of the Bund) or b) war.

It's important to remember how Bismarck thought about how politics works. He knew his grip on Wilhelm was wobbly, he knew there were international intrigues to remove him, he knew that to stay in power he might have to bank some gains but retreat from maximalist goals, he couldn't be sure if Vienna would fight or fold, and so on.

As the crisis developed he was trying to:

• split the liberals further;
• split the Confederation with carrots and sticks;
• keep the other three Powers neutral with carrots and sticks;
• keep Wilhelm and army in line with his policy (with multiple royal intrigues against him);
• face Austria with a two-front war after an alliance with Italy;
• threaten Austria with revolution (via Hungarian revolutionaries etc).

By this time, the liberals were seriously divided: many supported annexation; business supported the government's economic line; many liberals were demoralised and knew the public was not with them; Bismarck was looking for compromise but the King was still not keen.)

OP: In March Goltz returned to Paris with a letter from Wilhelm suggesting a 'more intimate entente'. Over the next 3 months, Napoleon tried to play off Prussia and Austria but could not decide what he wanted and was worried about over-reaching on the Rhine and provoking a hostile coalition. He 'sought to entice from Bismarck a concrete offer without raising a concrete demand' (OP).

Austrians began some mobilisation, Prussia began preliminary steps. (NB. Pretty much all the different books use different dates for these steps, and often different definitions, and they are irreconcilable. Someone should be given the job of providing definitive dates with links to the original documents, or their closest links.)

Wawro: Austria 'triggered the mobilisations of 1866' on 28/2 by ordering cavalry regiments to make themselves 'march ready'.

Barry: the 'first steps' taken in Vienna — mobilising some regiments — were 2 March 'in response to news that the Berlin Landwehr had been called out' and on 7/3 the decision was taken to move troops into Bohemia.

Carr: Austria needed 7-8 weeks, Prussia 4 (p128).

Gordon Craig: Austria needed 7 weeks to mobilise (p7), Prussia 'less than half the time required by the Austrians' (p17).

Wawro: Austria required 'at least 12 weeks' for mobilisation, Prussia 'half that'.

Clark: Austria required 7-8 weeks to mobilise (the official historian says 7 weeks, the chief of staff estimated 8 after a week of preparing orders, cf. Henikstein memo 17/3), Prussia 4.

Clark (p577ff): FJ ordered written preparations on 21/2, on 28/2 he approved the plan with minor changes and ordered other preparations including regiments in Transylvania (the most distant province) to be ready to march, cannon and gun carriages bought, and Benedek to report to Vienna from 6 March. 2 March the war office ordered 6 regiments and six batteries in Galicia and Transylvania to be 'ready to march'. Clark: it is 'highly probable' that before or during the meeting on 7 March the struggle began between Mensdorff and the military over troop movements, though there is no record of such discussion on 7th. Austria's recent economising made her more vulnerable. Moving faster was the best move if war was coming, but also made it more likely — holding back made it more likely to win the diplomatic battle and stop war. Now, at the start of March, FJ sided with Mensdorff.

At a lunch, the wife of the Saxon Ambassador asked Bismarck if it was true that he planned to fight Austria and conquer Saxony.

Bismarck: 'Certainly it is true my dear Countess. From the first day of my ministry I have entertained no other thought. Our cannon have been cast already and you shall soon see how much better they are compared to the Austrian military.'

Countess: 'Horrible! But give me some advice since you're talkative. I have two country places, my estate in Bohemia and my castle near Leipzig, in which shall I take refuge?'

Bismarck: 'If you take my advice stay away from Bohemia, for just there, if I am not mistaken, right in the neighbourhood of your estate we shall beat the Austrians. Go quietly to Saxony, ... [your castle there] does not lie on any military road.'

This was reported to her husband who told Beust who told Vienna. When asked about it Bismarck spoke as if he might have been joking. (This was characteristic — was it candour, fake candour, bluff, misdirection? His opponents were always scrambling to figure out what such comments meant and it undermined their resolution.)

Mensdorff-Apponyi, read to Clarendon: Please use your influence for 'moderation and calm' in Berlin and Florence; declaring a strict British neutrality would 'tip the scales' in favour of Prussia; Britain has 'a great interest in not jeopardising the political balance of Germany and Europe'; 'If the English Government still intends to find in the Imperial Cabinet an auxiliary who will assist it in the efforts to maintain the Ottoman Empire, England must help us on its side to ward off dangers whose approach could paralyse our influence in the Orient or give another direction to our policy.'

(Clark) Mensdorff-Karolyi (drafted by Biegeleben as usual): 'We share your opinion unreservedly, that we must not for one moment allow the impression to arise that Austria would retreat before a threatening ultimatum from Prussia... We would consider a war between the German Powers an immeasurable misfortune, a simultaneous war against Prussia and Italy a danger demanding the utmost exertion — but Austria is not a Power to be deprived of honour, influence and prestige or to be pushed from well-earned positions without drawing the sword... and if Count Bismarck wishes to appeal to arms to win the Duchies, to which Prussia has no right, or at least no more right than Austria, then there surely must be men in Berlin, who hold this beginning to be a wanton and unrighteous playing with human welfare... We are not writing this to challenge or to attack Bismarck personally. And we know that you will not use our words except to keep the peace, our warmest desire... Everything depends on restraining the Berlin Court from raising possible demands, before which we would not bow.'

Karolyi communicated this at the court. Mensdorff's first consideration in March was building the diplomatic alliance against Prussia and blocking any casus belli. Later Vienna switched to an effort to have Bismarck removed.

Mensdorff-Metternich: 'It is essential for us to be on a friendly footing with France' and this is 'so important' now don't worry re our traditional policy in Turkey.

Benedetti reported to Paris Bismarck's account of the 28/2 Council — Bismarck stressed that all agreed on annexation. Goltz would bring a letter to Napoleon about a possible entente.

Benedetti was invited to a dinner with Wilhelm and Goltz who was going to Paris the next day. Goltz took with him a letter from Wilhelm to Napoleon asking him to discuss with Goltz the terms of a deal. Pottinger: Wilhelm said to Benedetti after dinner, 'We are coming to the moment when we will need to distinguish our true friends.'

(Barry) Bismarck and Moltke meeting to discuss the Florence mission. Ideas drafted, finalised on 12th but as he was about to set off news arrived that General Govone would come to Berlin to discuss an alliance and he arrived on 14th. (This does not fit with Clark saying Austria knew on 8th that La Marmora was sending Govone to Berlin — unless one assumes that Austria could know secret Italian decisions about their dealings with Berlin before Berlin, which is possible and maybe likely?)

Eyck refers to 'his really masterly instructions for Moltke' written on 12 March (p.113). He told Moltke that he wanted an alliance which obliged Italy to fight if he started a war but did not oblige him to follow Italy. He told him to discuss with Italy his goal of a new constitution for north Germany. This mission was dropped because Govone came. GW vol 5 has a document to Moltke in March: 'The goal ... is the agreement of Austria to the new German constitution we are striving for. Limiting our ambitions to northern Germany also offers the ... possibility of an understanding with Bavaria'. Is this the document Eyck refers to? (Probably.)

Bismarck revived the idea with Karolyi of Austria asking for compensation, but Karolyi (rightly) half-sensed a rat.

(Pottinger) Although he paid a courtesy call on Drouyn, Goltz said little and spoke to Napoleon on 5th without Drouyn. Goltz-Bismarck 6/3: Napoleon wants time to consider a deal, asks that I don't speak to Drouyn. Goltz told Napoleon that Prussia was seeking an Italian deal for joint action and intended to create a federation north of the Mainz with links to the south: what does France want? Napoleon was supportive but stressed that French opinion demanded compensation, but he was vague about it.

Bismarck-Goltz: make clear, no concession of German territory. Cf. 17/3.

Clarendon replied to Apponyi of 1/3 that Austria had not taken advice two years ago and Britain would 'preserve a strict neutrality' — of course we want peace but 'we know by experience of how little avail such good offices were with the German Governments if we acted singly and had not the support of other Powers.' We will not threaten Prussia but will 'hold the balance as equally as possible between the Belligerents'. Privately he also wrote to Bloomfield: '[W]e shall be neutral & we shall endeavour to prevent our neutrality being in any way injurious to Austria, but it wd be a departure from the rigid rules of neutrality to menace Prussia in the way indicated in Ct. Mensdorff's despatch, and moreover if we took such a course single handed it wd probably do more harm than good. Our experience of 2 years ago has taught us how little the advice and cautions of England are regarded in Germany... [However] 'if [Austria] cd give the Prussians a licking I am sure that Europe wd be glad'. (Hammond also wrote to Bloomfield on 20/3 that 'I confess I should like to see the Prussians well licked'.)

Clarendon also wrote to Loftus on 7th. The letter was informal and stressed that fact — Britain was not making a formal complaint. He told Loftus that in his discussions with Bismarck he should a) make a moral case to Bismarck against war: 'in the name of all that is rational, decent, humane, what can be the justification of war on the part of Prussia? She cannot publicly plead her greed for territorial aggrandizement & she cannot with truth say that the administration of Holstein by Austria has been of a kind to constitute a cassus belli... Bernstorff has just told me that the license allowed in Holstein [by Austria] and the hostile articles of newspapers under the inspiration of Austria have produced a state of things intolerable to Prussia'); b) point out to Bismarck that Prussia would be seen as 'an aggressive and unreasonable power' and 'Setting aside family ties, Prussia is the great Protestant Power of Europe, with which we naturally have kindred feelings it would be with deep regret that we should see her regarded as a common enemy, because a wilful disturber of the peace of Europe; and still more if, in the course of events, we found ourselves compelled to take any part against her'; and c) suggest to Bismarck mediation by a third power to resolve the arguments with Austria.

Also on 7th, Clarendon received news from Crowe (stationed at Leipzig) who reported to Clarendon that at the Prussian Cabinet meeting of the 28th February 'most of the members of the Council declared for a breach and a war with Austria'.

(Clark, unmentioned elsewhere) There was a meeting in Vienna with FJ, Benedek and generals to discuss the state of their forces. The meeting was reported and exaggerated in the press. This was 'unwise' (Clark p360).

Showalter: Benedek had been ordered to come from Italy to Vienna by 6 March. On 7 March FJ ordered the completion of preparations for mobilisation.

(Pottinger, p71) There was a French ministerial meeting. Separately there was a meeting with Napoleon, Goltz and Drouyn. Drouyn read to Goltz, in front of Napoleon, a draft of the reply to Wilhelm. It was vague, stressed benevolent neutrality and further consultation. Napoleon was keeping his cards very close.

Pottinger: a) Napoleon did not tell Drouyn about the Prussian discussions with Italy, b) Drouyn did not discover it until the end of March, when Nigra asked him what he thought about it, at which he was noncommittal and went to Napoleon, who had been encouraging him in March to reassure Metternich about continued cordiality and told Drouyn to remain guarded (much of which it seems Drouyn told Cowley who reported it to London on 2/4) — a very tangled web! NB. Most of the books refer to Govone's arrival in Berlin 14 March as prompting Europe-wide discussions about a Prussia-Italy deal: did Drouyn not notice?!

[Napoleon was lying to everyone. • He told Vienna he would not encourage Italy but he did encourage them to join Prussia. • He told Prussia he was friendly but he was really hoping for a stalemate in the war from which he could dictate peace. • He told Italy he favoured them but he was willing to sell them out (see his comments later). • He lied to London about wanting peace when he really wanted a stalemate conflict. • He was lying to Drouyn, his own minister. • As AJP Taylor said, the widespread 20th Century idea that Bismarck was responsible for a 'moral degradation' of diplomacy is fanciful, the Napoleonic regime was a gangster regime, Napoleon was a perpetual liar, and Bismarck simply outplayed him at his own disreputable game.]

(Pottinger) Paris contacted London re the scheme for compensation in the Danube Principalities. But London was not keen (e.g it would bring Austrian and Russian empires into contact) and thought Austria wouldn't bite, and Russia was extremely hostile. When Napoleon had raised this idea with Metternich during the Polish crisis, it had offended him so deeply that Napoleon had promised never to raise it again (Pottinger p74), see 12/3.

Clarendon-Cowley: The French are talking about a deal in which Italy gets Venetia and Austria gets compensation.

Revertera-Mensdorff: Gorchakov says Russia will not intervene, her neutrality is 'réelle et parfaite' (real and perfect).

Pfordten sent a memo to several German states: do everything to avoid war, if it comes stay neutral until the issue is decided in the Bund. This was bad news for Vienna. But also cf. 18/3.

(Clark) Austria knew on 8th that La Marmora was sending Govone to Berlin to negotiate. (Clark says some old books think this news arrived in Vienna on 11th but this is wrong, p363.)

(Clark) Metternich-Mensdorff: Napoleon and the Empress suggest that they could not keep Italy from exploiting Prussia's temptations and they encourage us to conciliate Italy. Pottinger adds: ... and Napoleon is holding open the possibility of a Franco-Austrian entente. (A sign of how complex all this is — Clark writes that at this time Napoleon was encouraging Italy to do the Prussia deal while Pottinger writes that he was trying to discourage it!)

Loftus spoke to Bismarck regarding the Clarendon message of 7th. Bismarck dodged the mediation suggestion and replied that 'in his opinion there were no means of deciding the difference with Austria but by the sword, and the present was the most favourable opportunity for Prussia, which might not again offer itself for a century'. (Loftus to Clarendon, 17 March). (Mosse refers (p227) to another telegram from Loftus-Clarendon on 11th straight after this discussion, in which Bismarck said that he might accept Oldenburg.) He said on 11th of relations with Austria: 'I might use the words of Richelieu to his discarded mistress: Nous ne sommes pas enemis: mais nous ne nous aimons plus' (we are not enemies: but we no longer love each other) [I can't tell whether this was reported on 11 or 17].

Russell-Queen: We don't want Prussia humiliated or to grab the duchies, we don't want Austria crippled by a war, the best outcome now is probably for Oldenburg to take SH. I will suggest this to Cabinet. The Queen strongly objected and Russell dropped the plan. In February-March, London was focused on a new Reform Bill and the tensions within Cabinet and Parliament, Gladstone's controversial manner. Derby had another bout of ill health and was thought close to death.

Benedetti delivered Napoleon's letter to Wilhelm then called on Bismarck who stressed to him his plan for federal reform. Benedetti described it to Drouyn: 'I call your attention to this combination, and in the mind of Bismarck it is exclusively destined to become a weapon of war, an expedient to sow confusion in all of Germany, but if he were to miscalculate, and if the central authority, chosen by the German people, should succeed in constituting itself despite him, he would have involuntarily laid the bases for the German union. I do not wish to have suspected him of having calculated on this eventuality and having accommodated himself to it in advance, in the conviction that it could not but further the elevation and aggrandisement of his state and realise Prussian hegemony. I must however bring to your attention an attempt whose consequences could touch us in a most regrettable fashion.' Benedetti also politely complained about being kept in the dark and the difficulties it was causing him — it seems Bismarck did not believe that Benedetti was being kept out of the loop.

Karolyi reported menacing news about possible mobilisation (sent 9th, reached Vienna probably 11th): Bismarck is rousing public opinion to war, he's calling the military levy in Berlin 'in the very manner, speed and schedule, and with the very same strength as would be the case in regular mobilisation' — i.e a rehearsal of mobilisation in Berlin. (Clark: 'Bismarck later claimed, probably truly, that this levy was called by the war department unknown to him.') Karolyi learned from English sources that Bismarck was stirring trouble in Belgrade and from Count Hohenthal, the Saxon envoy in Berlin, that he'd been warned that the Prussian general staff were contemplating an invasion of Saxony and the seizure of passes into Bohemia 'at the instant war was decided upon in principle before the mobilisation of the army was complete'. (Clark thinks Hohenthal probably learned this because Bismarck wanted him to.) Karolyi therefore advised immediate military discussions with Saxony. This alarming news was confirmed by reports from Beust who also urged immediate action and criticised Austria for being slow.

Gladstone introduced the new Reform Bill. House unenthusiastic. Thought it would give ~400k the vote. Disraeli was determined to resist.

Eugénie spoke to Metternich (they were close) and urged him to do the deal — this would then solve Venetia then France and Italy could rally to Austria. Metternich listened in horror then complained it would 'cut off our arms and legs'. So cross was he that he then described Napoleon's repeated errors and said he lacked 'diplomatic finesse'! A few days later Eugénie brought it up again, said that she had reported Metternich's words exactly, and that she and her husband 'admitted frankly that they understood nothing of diplomacy and that in effect the Emperor repented of certain mistakes of bad timing committed by him' (Metternich, 22/3). They discussed a variant of the plan in which Austria gained in Bosnia and Herzegovina but this was no more pleasant for Metternich. Cf 22/3.

(Clark) A note circulated in strict confidence to Stuttgart, Dresden, Karlsruhe and Darmstadt, in which Austria promised for the first time — if Prussia fights, we will 'refer all further deliberations in the Duchies question to the Confederation, to recognise its decision and to support it with our entire strength'. Mensdorff asked in return that the states discuss military issues as Vienna had to know whether to defend Saxony and Mainz. Her friends took heart at this leadership.

Mensdorff-Gablenz: 'It is highly essential that we give Prussia no handle from which to derive a formula for a declaration of war.' He wanted to blame Bismarck for hostilities.

Buchanan-Russell: Gorchakov says we should threaten Prussia with siding with Austria, this would stop her 'attempt to realise her ambitious projects by violence'. Buchanan declined.

FJ was persuaded by the generals, against Mensdorff's advice, to mobilise some regiments for Bohemian defence. (Wawro & Clark: they used a pretext of stopping some pogroms.) The reports were used by Bismarck to frame the coming conflict as one of Austrian aggression and to wind up Wilhelm. According to Wawro, Bismarck and Moltke wanted to treat this as a casus belli and declare war but Wilhelm would not.

Clark: There were two military conferences on 14th in Vienna: a) they decided to move regiments to the Bohemian border, b) troops were sent to guard passes from Saxony, and a few other battalions were ordered to move gradually over coming weeks; c) arrangements were made to receive the retreating Saxon army. Dealing with pogroms was a pretext as the moves couldn't be kept secret, though the press was ordered not to report the troop news.

Why did FJ do this and give Bismarck the pretext he wanted? Memories of Frederick the Great were powerful. They were anxiously awaiting Bismarck's bomb of federal reform which hung 'like the sword of Damocles over Austria's head' (as Karolyi put it to Mensdorff 21/3). They knew Govone was coming to Berlin.

General Govone arrived in Berlin. Suspicious negotiations with Bismarck at the Italian legation. Govone was looking for a deal in which, as he put it, 'the adder bites the snake-charmer' (Eyck: 'the viper will have bitten the charlatan', Et la vipère aura mordu le charlatan). His presence was noted by the diplomatic corps and Karolyi reported back to Vienna on what he heard. OP: Karolyi watched the comings and goings from his window across the street! The negotiations dragged on for a few weeks partly because Italy wanted a time-limited deal but Bismarck wanted an open-ended one, fearing Italy would take a deal to Vienna and use it to coerce Vienna into concessions than leave Bismarck in the lurch. Similarly Italy feared that an open-ended deal would allow Bismarck to use it to pressure Vienna into getting what he wanted then leave Italy in the lurch.

(WAF) That evening Benedetti spoke to him briefly at a party given by Bismarck but little was said.

In mid-March, Prussia's envoy in Florence, Count Usedom, had initiated secret contacts with Hungarian revolutionaries. Bismarck had been in touch with Hungarian revolutionaries since 1862. He met some revolutionary Hungarians himself, despite his denials (Feuchtwanger). Gall: this was Usedom's idea, first proposed to Bismarck in mid-May and his response was 'a notable lack of enthusiasm'. (Nobody else I've seen takes this line.)

Friedjung (p110): Govone at first did not want to do a deal with Bismarck but was gradually persuaded. Bismarck said to him one day, 'I hope to drag the King to war but I can't absolutely promise it.' Govone also told Marmora (22/3) that if Bismarck fell he would be replaced by pro-Austrians.

Manteuffel in Schleswig went after the Augustenburgers with new laws punishing agitators with hard labour. Gablenz warned Vienna he could not suppress the inevitable polemics which would in turn be used by Bismarck. This news 'aroused resentment in Vienna to a terrific pitch' (Clark) and was accompanied by Beust in Dresden urging Austria to declare publicly that in all circumstances she would abide by Article 11 of the Confederation pact and expected others to do the same — A11 gave a threatened state the right to demand from the others protection against attack. Beust urged that Vienna act before Prussian mobilisation intimidated her neighbours.

Bismarck instructed Goltz: prevaricate in the conference over the Danubian principalities so that Austria will have to keep some troops on the Rumanian border as long as possible. (An example of how he used every bit of leverage he could.)

Rumours in Berlin that Bismarck was trying to sell the Saar coalfields.

(Clark p366ff) With tensions very high in Vienna, Mensdorff 'dashed off' a telegram to Karolyi in his own hand: News of military preparations is alarming, 'We can therefore no longer postpone a demand for the certain elucidation of Prussia's intentions.You will therefore at once interpellate [Bismarck] as to whether Prussia harbours the object of tearing up the Gastein Convention with forcible hands. Point out that only a completely precise and unambiguous answer can reassure us. See that [Wilhelm] is informed of your step, the basis of which is the urgent desire to try to uphold the peace in Germany. Report by telegraph at the earliest possible moment.' Without waiting for an answer, the 7 main German courts were informed of the demand, and if no 'satisfactory answer' is given, Austria will place the Duchies in the hands of the Bund and appeal against Prussia under Articles 11 & 19. 'Thus the interpellation was widely announced even before Karolyi had made it!' (Clark).Vienna added another dispatch to the effect that she would propose mobilising non-Prussian federal forces and their union with Austria's army. Mensdorff insisted on an extremely pacific passage added at the end.

Karolyi went to speak to Bismarck. Clark: Bismarck wanted to keep the situation tense but not spark the war now. He answered Austria's question with a laconic 'No' but with a cynical smile added, 'But, my dear Count, you don't really think I should have answered any differently if I did intend war, do you?... If a power intended the next morning to march across its frontiers, it would also reply with a 'no' the evening before.' Karolyi reported the exchange at 21:00, received Vienna 23:00. Karolyi was unaware of the communication to the German courts and reported that Bismarck had given a precise answer to the question.

(Clark) Bismarck realised he'd made a mistake with his cynical joke and downplayed his comment. Karolyi reported that he'd been invited back and told that, contrary to his comment, if he really were intending to cross the frontier he would have given 'an evasive reply or none at all' and he denied any warlike purpose behind the trial mobilisation ('it was called by Prince Friedrich Carl without his knowledge for purely technical reasons'), Prussia had done nothing to give cause for fear while Austria was beginning to arm. When Karolyi said that all Europe knew that Austria would never fire the first shot, Bismarck replied that the Austrian public would drive the Emperor to attack Prussia.

Beust regretted Vienna's mishandling — you can't catch a man like Bismarck with a telegraphic and oral question, he complained. Clark — FJ and Mensdorff had again acted 'without visualising clearly enough the outcome', it had not pinned Bismarck down or created tension between him/Wilhelm. Broadcasting the news was a 'greater mistake'. The act worried the scared states (e.g Hanover, Bavaria) and the failure worried the more zealous! Ironically, the failure of the plan was beneficial as the threat to place the matter finally in the hands of the Bund would have been seen in Berlin as an act of war. On 18th Mensdorff told German states that Prussia had denied aggressive intentions so Austria would not make the declaration.

A few days after his discussion with Bismarck on 11th (but before 17th), Loftus met Wilhelm and told him the gist of Clarendon's message. Loftus reported that Wilhelm was 'well- disposed to accept the good offices of England'. Bismarck made a vague suggestion to Loftus that he would inform Bernstorff of the King's view. Then Bismarck was blindsided by Wilhelm asking the Crown Prince to write to Victoria asking her to mediate, which he did on 17th. Bismarck, enraged, when he found out told Bernstorff (20th) to regard it as unofficial. (The Crown Princess was writing to Victoria in March that 'Fritz' was 'completely against' the King's/Bismarck's policy.) Clarendon did not want to seize the bull by the horns and commit himself particularly as he kept changing his mind about the likelihood of war — on 13th he thought 'the fear of war has rather abated', so did not want to back Oldenburg as a possible compromise.

Mensdorff's sister-in-law wrote: 'There is unanimity here that Bismarck is simply mad and has so jammed himself up in domestic and foreign affairs that he has lost his head and wants war a tout prix, to get himself out of the affair and maintain his position.'

(Stern — haven't seen reference to this meeting elsewhere) Ministers met, told (by who) Austria won't take money for the duchies, the Cologne-Minden share deal is in trouble.

The Austrian Chief of Staff submitted his estimate re mobilisation timetable: two weeks notice for the railway authorities, one more week to write the orders for them, mobilising troops before then would just create chaos. Henikstein: railway orders are almost equivalent to open mobilisation and we should not counter-order once they're given.

Goltz-Bismarck: Napoleon 'talked with me in a manner which does not directly encourage the initiation of [war with Austria], but does not discourage it either.'

(Clark) Mensdorff telegraphed the German states: Prussia has denied aggressive intentions so Austria will not make the proposed declaration. Over the next ten days he tried to get Pfordten to bring the matter before the Bund. He argued that it would make it harder for Bismarck to create a war, raise the status of the Bund, and mobilise European opinion against Bismarck. Pfordten was not keen on jumping into Bismarck's crosshairs. Cf. 26/3 Clark (p390ff): Dalwigk (minister of Hesse) had offered Austria an alliance on 4 March. Württemberg seemed solid (Queen Olga pushed her father, the Tsar, to intervene against Bismarck, which Wilhelm reminded her of after the war). Saxony and Beust were obviously onside. Mensdorff therefore used these 3 to try to corral Bavaria and Baden.

On 17th Beust began to take military preparations, on 19th the reserves were called six weeks early, 'thus Saxony was the first of the secondary states to take the same steps that Austria was so soon to regret' (p393). Bismarck remained optimistic about persuading Pfordten to keep Bavaria neutral, against the prediction of his envoy there. (Clark: Bismarck handled Pfordten much better than Biegeleben did, speaking to him honestly, inflating his ego, disclosing confidences, and offered him the chance to be a partner in presenting the plan for epoch-making reform. I suspect the dramatic and tyrannical stories about Bismarck — e.g the cynical joke to Karolyi above — were kept alive more than the flattering and charming stories.) Vienna was more accurate in predicting Bavaria would ultimately support her. Pfordten had told Vienna on 2/3 that Bavaria would support her if she were attacked but he wanted to watch the negotiations before making his stance public. Bavaria's three leading military men thought Prussia was better prepared and were cool towards Vienna. Blome urged Mensdorff to send secret agents to run a propaganda campaign to fight Prussia's, it's unclear if this happened.

Hammond to Bloomfield: 'I confess I should like to see the Prussians well licked'.

Crown Princess-Victoria: Bismarck, the 'wicked man', was 'frantic that the K. [king] shd have desired F. [Fritz] to write to you' and would now do all he could 'to pin the K. to his politics and paralyse any intervention from elsewhere'.

(Mosse) Bismarck-Bernstorff: The Crown Prince had written to Victoria without his knowledge. Bernstorff should ignore communication on the matter until receipt of a private letter. On 22 March he got 'an enormous long letter' from Bismarck.

Zerber (unmentioned by almost all): Moltke briefed Bismarck on the war plan. Moltke planned a speedy attack on Dresden with the 1st Army and the centre of mass of Prussian forces would be near Gorlitz. Bismarck knew what the deal with Italy meant and what Moltke planned but he 'double-crossed' the Italians and Moltke (p112).

(Pottinger) Moltke told Bismarck that Italy could put ~200k in the field (and was exaggerating numbers) and the effectiveness was dubious. But he had also stressed, e.g 28/2 Council, that the fact of Italy creating a two-front war and requiring a large Austrian presence in the south was 'indispensable' (28/2) to Prussian success. Bismarck had said 28/2 that he doubted Italy could afford to keep her forces at the 1866 level for long.

Having suggested mediation to Bismarck via Loftus, now that Wilhelm seemed keen Clarendon pointed out that he had not officially offered to mediate. He also told Loftus, 'If we act at all in this matter I entirely agree with you that it must be in conjunction with France.' On the same day, 21st, the Cabinet decided that Britain should offer 'good offices' if Prussia asks and Loftus was told this. On 21 March Bernstorff told Bismarck that Clarendon had told Apponyi (on 7th) that Britain will stay neutral.

(Pottinger) Napoleon told Nigra to go ahead with the Prussian treaty. Around this time he told Nigra, 'Don't cherish any illusions. Austria will not cede Venetia unless she is forced to it by war.' This was passed on by Goltz to Bismarck on 23rd.

, morning (Mosse) Bernstorff read out Bismarck's long letter full of accusations against Vienna but also making clear his goal was annexation — the duchies were 'politically & militarily indispensable' to Prussia. Clarendon told Bernstorff that helping on annexation 'was not to be thought of for a moment'. Millman's account is unclear on timing around this. NB. Bismarck did not reject mediation entirely. Clarendon considered 'all question of good offices ... at an end' and relations with Prussia 'remained as before'. In Berlin, Bismarck told Loftus that London should try to moderate the Austrians who were the aggressors.

Metternich reported to Mensdorff various discussions with Eugénie et al, including about the Principalities (cf. 12/3). Realising they'd erred, Napoleon had brought Drouyn into the picture to calm Metternich. Drouyn had reassured him:Venetia will not be raised again unless circumstances cause a general redrawing of boundaries, and relations have not been damaged by the episode with Eugénie.

(JS 26th) In a letter to a friend, Roon wrote: 'Things are not good here. Our friend Otto Bismarck in Herculean day and night efforts has worn down his nerves ... The day before yesterday he suffered such hefty stomach cramps and was as a result yesterday so depressed, so irritable and annoyed — apparently by little things — that I am today not without anxiety, because I know what's at stake.... Complete freedom of thought does not combine well with a bad stomach and irritated nerves.'

Goltz to Bismarck: Don't push for war, here in Paris everyone is suddenly anti-Prussian except Napoleon, 'You must know better than I ... that Rothschild refused you the Saarbrucken coal business.' Bismarck noted: 'It has not been offered to him.' Clark: Goltz was also secretly part of the Coburg Intrigue (cf. 27/3) and wrote at the time he hoped for a letter from FJ to 'break Bismarck's neck'. He wrote to Bismarck 29/3 and to Wilhelm 3/4 that there was growing hostility to Prussia in Paris.

Cowley reported to the FO on growing hostility to Napoleon in Paris, he and Eugénie had just been booed on a trip through Paris to the theatre, there was growing muttering about public opinion and the failures of the regime, and Napoleon had likened the atmosphere to 1848.

Mensdorff to the Duke of Coburg (his cousin): 'I did not invent the stupid Schleswig- Holstein question and am suffering for the sins of past years. Whether we shall get out of this most tedious of tedious questions without a conflict I cannot yet say' (Friedjung). (I feel his pain!)

To Goltz: The problem of neutralising Napoleon requires opening 'the German question' and establishing for Prussia 'a firm and national foundation'.

Bismarck to Bavarian Minister-President Pfordten: 'Direct elections ... and universal suffrage I regard as greater guarantees of a conservative stance that any artificial electoral system designed to produce contrived majorities.' Similarly see his comment to von Coburg-Gotha on 26 March and to Bernstorff on 19 April. Gall: also on 24/3 Bismarck shared with Pfordten his motion for the Bund and asked for his opinion.

Bismarck issued a circular to the Bund members portraying Austrian troop movements as a hostile act against an innocent Prussia. Clark: This persuaded Pfordten to agree with Beust that the two courts remind Bismarck of his federal obligations. By now FJ realised that Mensdorff had been right about ordering troop movements on 14/3. Mensdorff planned: 1) a public challenge to Prussia (cf. 31/3); 2) seek neutrals' support, 3) a secret plan to have Bismarck removed. He had to deal with growing warlike mood in Vienna from generals, his own department etc. Gablenz, Karolyi and Esterhazy encouraged his attempt to keep the peace. (Clark p374).

(Stern) Bodelschwingh told Prussian Cabinet that he might raise 40m thaler but thereafter would need a loan. End of March he tried to sell the Cologne-Minden shares but could not sell them all without incurring a loss. Market was sagging.

Victoria-the Crown Princess of Prussia: Clarendon is 'most disagreeable & unmanageable'.

(WAF, p56) Bismarck negotiated the Italian deal with Count Barral because Govone did not have full powers.

(Pottinger) Nigra telegraphed that he had heard that Napoleon had said that France could not support an offensive attack on Austria, and Drouyn was saying similar but that things might be different if Austria attacked. La Marmora was worried and sent a secret emissary, Count Arese (who knew Napoleon), to Paris. At roughly the same time (dates are confused), Napoleon's cousin (known as Plon-plon) rushed to Paris from Italy to tell his uncle that Italy was close to signing the deal, and he, Plon-plon, thought Italian unification was best served by supporting Austria and doing a Silesia/Venetia trade after a war with Prussia (much discussed in Vienna). Napoleon told Arese he supported a deal with Prussia but this was advice 'without any responsibility' for the consequences.

Friedjung talked to Nigra after the war and wrote (p113) that Nigra told him Napoleon had told Nigra: 'In this way [Italy-Prussia alliance] Italy will get Venice and France will benefit by the conflict of the two powers whose alliance hems her in. Once the struggle has begun France can throw her weight into the balance and must obviously become arbitrator and master of the situation. By occupying the Rhineland with 100,000 men I shall be able to dictate the terms of peace.' According to Marmora, Napoleon said, 'Sign a treaty with Prussia, however vague and noncommittal it may be, for it is very desirable to furnish Monsieur de Bismarck with the necessary means to push the King into war.' Bismarck passed on flattering remarks about Napoleon to Govone, knowing they would be reported via Italy to Paris.

(NB. Napoleon was not telling Drouyn much of what he was thinking and doing viz Italy/Prussia and was more pro the deal than he let on to Drouyn.)

An anti-war protest in Solingen that spread. Wilhelm found this 'very unpleasant' but the liberals remained divided about how to oppose Bismarck.

Bismarck to von Coburg-Gotha (private): 'A German parliament is of more use to us than an army corps.'

Pfordten suggested he mediate on the basis of: Prussia to accept Augustenburg and a modification of February demands, Austria to allow Prussia greater voting rights in the Bund and to exercise preponderant influence in North Germany. Clark: this was 'unfortunately never taken seriously by either German power' and came too late — proposed formally on 31/3 but by then Prussia had started partial mobilisation. Bismarck did not dismiss Pfordten though — he 'showed deference' to Bavaria's wishes to try to neutralise her (Clark p378).

The Crown Prince to the Duke of Coburg (his uncle): 'Bismarck ignores me completely. Since the autumn manoeuvres in Saxony he has not vouchsafed me a single word on the burning questions of the moment... His foolhardiness is absolutely inexplicable to me... We are handing ourselves over to blind faith with our hands tied! For my part I shall leave no stone unturned to warn against and ward off disaster. But you know how powerless I am.' Elsewhere that spring he described Bismarck's policy as 'a wanton gamble with the most sacred ideas'.

Revertera reported on discussion with Gorchakov: The Tsar has written to Wilhelm who had replied in 'excessively cordial' terms. Bismarck's conduct has irritated the Russian Court. Austria has 'gained a lot of ground' here and Russian neutrality 'is already beginning to tilt in our favour'. Revertera suggested offering a 'cordial understanding' on the Principalities to buy Russian help. Mensdorff replied that Vienna could not support Russia in the Principalities, nor support Oldenburg and discussion of an alliance is premature. (Such diplomatic confidence, or inflexibility, could only be justified if her military confidence were justified, which it proved not to be.)

Gramont reported: Mensdorff says he would 'consent to the annexation of Schleswig, if absolutely necessary to avoid a war, provided that Holstein ... conserved its federal independence'. This illumines what Mensdorff was suggesting on 1 March — an international conference could give Schleswig to Prussia while the Bund gets Holstein, half a loaf (Clark p358).

Russell wrote to Victoria that 'There is but one remedy — one certain ... [way] of preserving peace — it is the dismissal of Count Bismarck'. He was probably hoping that Victoria would suggest this to Wilhelm. Victoria did write to the Crown Prince and his wife but to no effect.

(Clark) Werther sent to Bismarck details of what Mensdorff had told him, honestly, about troop movements so far. Bismarck scribbled on the telegram: 'Ich glaube nur nichts von dem was Mensdorff sagt!' (I just don't believe anything Mensdorff says!). He sent a copy to Wilhelm, without comment, who wrote on the note: 'Unsere Projekte von heute scheinen deinem gegenüber sehr übertrieben. Dass Beurlaubten in Mahren wieder entlassen sind, meldet auch Thile, Winckler und Feldman.' ('Our projects today seem very exaggerated compared to yours. Thile, Winckler and Feldman also report that those on leave have been released in Mahren.' I don't understand this, maybe bad translation?)

Crown Council at which William agreed on partial mobilisation but the orders were not issued. Bismarck got Roon to fix a meeting for them to get Wilhelm to sign 'definitive orders' and on 29 March (the Wednesday before Easter) Wilhelm signed the orders for partial mobilisation and a call up of reserves (Steinberg, p239, Pflanze p294).

Steinberg: 'The Prussian King and his ministers had opted for war'. This is clearly wrong. Bismarck urged Roon on 28th to push the king to sign on 29th.

Barry dates this Council on 28th (typo?). Moltke had prepared a detailed paper for this meeting on mobilisation, pointed out Austria was diminishing Prussia's advantage, and was 'very disappointed' (Barry) by the meeting. In coming days he sent notes to Roon and Bismarck with intelligence on Austrian troop movements and urging action. On 2 April Moltke wrote to Wilhelm that the chance of victory depended 'essentially on the determination to undertake it being reached sooner than it is by Vienna and, if possible, at once': we have 5 railway lines to the frontier allowing a concentration within 25 days (NB. 25 days is very different to the 6 weeks claimed by Wawro), Austria only has one line into Bohemia. On 3 April he told Roon that the Austrian start meant that assuming general mobilisation started on both sides on the same day it would take 18 days for Prussia to catch up then from the 18th to 42nd day Prussia would have the advantage.

Stern: on 28th he persuaded Wilhelm to buy horses for half the field artillery.

Zerber: Moltke argued that Austria had gained an advantage from early mobilisation and Prussia must mobilise. The Crown Council (Zerber also dates it to 28th) decided to take no mobilisation measures and Moltke repeated his argument on 29 and 31 March and 2,3,5 April. 'In fact, between 24 March and 13 April the Austrians had taken no mobilisation measures at all.' Zerber presents Moltke's comment on 5 railway lines (above) as 'a momentous discovery' (really?!). On 3rd, Moltke concluded that Prussia's best chance lay around 18-42 days after mobilisation.

Clark: It was 28th when Wilhelm ordered partial mobilisation, start buying horses etc and this gave Prussia 'a considerable military advantage'.

Friedjung (p107): Wilhelm signed the orders on 29/3. Bismarck and Roon feared he would change his mind and had the orders sent off. Wilhelm then wrote to Roon saying 'I had quite forgotten Easter, would it be possible to postpone the despatch of the orders until Saturday? Ask Bismarck and let me know.' But the orders had already been sent. Friedjung writes that Prussian intelligence passed on some duff reports of Austrian troop movements to Moltke who repeated them to Roon, Bismarck and Wilhelm. (This would explain why some of the accounts of what Moltke said at various points does not seem to have been right with the benefit of hindsight, and would, obviously, be totally normal for a war so I believe it.)

Duke Ernst of Saxe-Coburg 'struck the spark' (Clark) for 'the Coburg intrigue', an attempt by various people across Europe to get Bismarck fired. The intrigue involved inter alia: the Crown Prince and his wife Vicky (Victoria's daughter), Wilhelm's wife Queen Augusta, Wilhelm's sister, the Dowager Queen Elizabeth (sister of FJ's mother), Baron Schleinitz, Count Goltz whose brother was an adjutant to Wilhelm, and the ambassador in London. There were rumours that the Rothschilds were also agitating for his dismissal and they refused to help finance the war. (Baron James had written to Bleichröder a few years earlier that 'it is a principle of our Houses not to advance any money for war'.) (Roon thought Vicky was the prime mover but Clark says there is no evidence for this.)

On 27/3 the Duke sent his trusted secretary, Baron von Meyern, to Vienna to urge FJ to write personally to Wilhelm stressing his desire for peace. FJ feared a flat refusal so Mensdorff composed a reply to Ernst, intended to be read by Wilhelm. Without naming Bismarck it aimed at him. Ernst forwarded it to Wilhelm (a full copy is attached to a Bismarck note to Redern 5/4) with a letter of his own and his wife wrote to Victoria. Both Augusta and Vicky wrote to Queen Victoria around this time. The Austrian court mobilised various personal connections to Wilhelm's court and many letters were sent to sisters, brothers, cousins etc.

EF: Bismarck briefed papers including Kreuzzeitung attacking the Duke to smoke out the plot, leading to further strains in his relationship with Wilhelm (below).

Bismarck spoke to Benedetti. We're mobilising Guard units, agreed to buy horses. Those who oppose war still influencing Wilhelm. 'I hope that my master will hold fast, but I would not want to be obliged to guarantee it.'

(Pottinger p78ff) Nigra telegrammed that Napoleon (after the discussions with Arese) would aid Italy if Austria attacked or Prussia and Austria buried the hatchet. The result was that La Marmora, already worried about Bismarck, made a new effort in Vienna. He suggested again to Vienna (via Baron Anselm Rothschild on 30th) some sort of deal for buying Venetia. Rothschild conveyed the message to Mensdorff and Esterhazy on 30th but was firmly refused. This convinced La Marmora to do the deal despite his worries. (This episode is unmentioned almost anywhere. There are multiple strands, conflicts in evidence, and it seems impossible to untangle what Napoleon was saying to everybody but the important point is: Italy pressed on with the Prussian deal.)

Queen Victoria proposed to Russell and Clarendon that Britain and France threaten Prussia with intervention. Clarendon opposed — he thought that Britain had declined to intervene in 1864 and now British interests didn't justify the blood and treasure. The Cabinet agreed with him. Clarendon wrote to Victoria (31 March) that even with French support Britain could not 'use the language of menace wh. might entail the necessity of action'.

He argued:

1. France wasn't interested in intervention (Cowley had reported that Napoleon was not unhappy at the prospect of war).
2. Prussia has already rejected an unofficial approach about mediation, an official attempt would merely incur an 'insolent refusal'.
3. Given the 'menacing aspect' of relations with America and Ireland, British military and financial strength must be husbanded.
4. The country would not support 'any direct intervention in a quarrel with which we had no concern'.

The Cabinet agreed. On 31 March Clarendon referred to the dispute to Russell as a 'banditti quarrel' not worth British blood and treasure. Cowley confirmed (3 April) that Napoleon also did not think such a joint warning was a good idea. I.e it is not true that Britain failed to act for want of an ally — she would not threaten Prussia even if France wanted to because she did not think it in her interests to intervene.

Clarendon-Cowley: 'Prince Napoleon's advice to the Italians was very wise and sound, and all Europe would rejoice if they got Venetia, and Austria Silesia, and Prussia a licking.' (Mosse version, but cf. 3/5) Cowley should try to get Napoleon to push this proposal with Metternich, Napoleon 'would gain great popularity in Europe by helping to take the shine out of Prussia and by getting a fresh guarantee for peace by the cession of Venetia, and Austria would get the money she wants'. Cowley should also push this line with Metternich.

Mensdorff declares publicly that Austria's intentions are peaceful and challenges Prussia to say the same.

There were further Prussian notes on 6/15/21 April and Austrian notes on 7th and 18th. Prussian notes were watered down by Wilhelm.

(WAF) Prussian military attaché in Paris, Loë, was recalled to Berlin for discussions with Bismarck and Moltke. Loë advised: France would struggle to mobilise a major force in the Rhineland. Moltke agreed. Pottinger: Loë also argued that Mexico was a serious distraction. Moltke did not position forces in the Rhineland and gambled all on Bohemia.

Friedjung (p124): Loë told Berlin that the Mexico adventure/debacle plus the reinforcement of Algiers after the rebellion of 1864 had left only 100k soldiers in France, 37 batteries had been disbanded over the winter 1865-6 because of the budget, and the mobilisation system was poor. (Loë's reports and their effects seem very important and almost universally unnoticed. He apparently divulged some of his memories in 'Erinnerungen aus meinem Berufsleben', Deutsche Revue, i.295. Someone should find it and get it translated.)

Clarendon wrote to Russell that 'there is a chance of Prussia giving way' if the minor states 'exhibit moral courage & protest [against] the war as groundless'. He was encouraged by many reports regarding strong opposition to Bismarck's policy in south Germany and Millman writes that given the opposition of Bavaria, Saxony, Württemberg, Baden and others it was 'reasonable to conclude' in London that Bismarck would fail to persuade Wilhelm to go to war. On 3/4 Clarendon wrote to Victoria that Bismarck's case for war was 'so utterly groundless' that surely Wilhelm will realise 'the truth'.

Crown Prince wrote to General von Schweinitz (then military attaché to St Petersburg): 'The King wants no war but for months now Bismarck has twisted things so that the old Gentleman has become more and more irritable and finally Bismarck will have ridden him so far that he will not be able to do anything but commit us to war, which will stir up Europe. Bismarck's talent to manipulate things for the King is great and worthy of admiration. As an expression of his bottomless frivolity and piratical policies some sort of Reich reform idea will be dumped on the carpet, probably with proposals for a Reich parliament and that in the light of our domestic parliamentary conflict! That is a rich irony and bears its failure on its forehead. With such a man everything is possible.' (In November 1865 he had referred to 'Otto Annexandrovich's piratical policy'.)

The Tsar gave Schweinitz (Wilhelm's military attaché, treated with great confidence by the Tsar) a letter advising the installation of Oldenburg with whatever concessions Prussia needed to make it work. On the same day he wrote to FJ suggesting that he withdraw troops from advanced positions in order to help a peaceful solution. Schweinitz arrived with the letter in Berlin on 5th and after discussions with Abeken (Bismarck's assistant) and the Crown Prince, realised attempts at mediation were doomed (Mosse, p234). He didn't head back to Russia until 17th. (On 9th (he wrote in his Memoirs), he learned of Bismarck's dramatic move: 'I was told about it in the morning in the ministry and I felt like covering my head and strewing ashes on it. I still remember quite distinctly my feelings at that moment and how, leaving the building, I met Privy Councillor Hahn [editor of a newspaper]. I knew him only by sight and through his excellent writing. But just as even strangers embrace in the street on occasions which bless or convulse the entire life of a nation, so I went up to Herr Hahn and shook his hand. We exchanged only a few words in the way mourners at a funeral generally do.') FJ replied on 7th in a moderate way that caused the Russian court to look more favourably on Austria, according to Buchanan-Clarendon 11/4. According to Mosse, most of the senior Russian court were anti-Prussian and the future Alexander III was 'violently anti-Prussian' (Mosse). NB. All members of the Imperial family were German or half-German but while the Tsar's mother was a Hohenzollern princess many others in his family had German relations from other states (Mosse p234).

Stern: in April, von Schweinitz returned to Berlin with a message from the Tsar. After seeing Wilhelm, he went to Bismarck's offices. 'I found at first only Keudell and with him Herr Bleichröder, which then still struck me as novel and offensive. Bleichröder occupied a position of confidence with Bismarck at that time, although as Bismarck once said to me later, “I never had a thought in common with him.”' (This was, obviously, a lie. Was it told simply because he knew aristocrats like Schweinitz were anti-Semitic or because he wanted to downplay Bleichröder's access given all the rumours, a bit of both?)

(Unmentioned in the books but I found in the correspondence) Wilhelm sent a note to Bismarck worrying that a reply to Karolyi is too 'blunt', asking if it can be 'softened', and worrying that Bavaria has shifted to opposition that could lead to another 100k soldiers against Prussia. Bismarck replies urging no softening and no delays for redrafting: 'Any irresolution on our part encourages Austria and increases the chances of a situation arising from which we should emerge with honour only through war. In my most humble opinion Bavaria has not yet veered around...' (This is clear evidence Bismarck was not telling Wilhelm, we must have a war — he was arguing, we must get what we want and not back down and lack of clarity makes it more likely Austria resists and the whole thing tumbles into war.)

Wilhelm insisted on changes which he says soften 'the tone' but not 'the sense'. Bismarck sent another note replying to Wilhelm about a letter from the Duke of Coburg: he condemns the many iniquities of Coburg who has been 'concerned in every intrigue during the past four years' against Bismarck's policy and is 'one of the most implacable antagonists of your Majesty's policy'. He also pointed out that there was a clear connection between the Coburg letter and 'the intelligence which reached your Majesty from Queen Victoria through the Crown Prince, and similar insinuations will no doubt have reached your Majesty also from other quarters.' All of it aims to make you 'more compliant towards Austria' and portray me as the problem. 'I would at any time willingly ... retire' but 'I see no possibility of any other Minister recommending with honour to your Majesty another policy than that hitherto pursued and sanctioned in the Council of 28 February, for this policy is independent of every party colour, is prompted only by Prussian interests, and is rendered inevitable by the situation.' Coburg is an enemy and 'Should your Majesty also answer this present letter, with its insulting and untruthful enclosure, your Majesty would encourage your adversaries and dishearten your servants.' You should 'leave it unanswered and not conceal from the Adjutant the fact that the forwarding of the enclosure has not had a pleasing effect on your Majesty.' In a note on 4th to Coburg's adjutant, Wilhelm referred to 'Austria is arming and sending troops to its northern frontier against Prussia.'

At the gates of the Summer Palace in St Petersburg (on the day depicted in What Is To Be Done?) Karakozov, part of a socialist cell that chose its assassin by lot, tried to kill the Tsar but his arm was jostled at the crucial moment, the Tsar survived. (He was assassinated in 1881.)

Moltke to Roon: The crucial thing is not the total numbers, which will probably be roughly similar, but 'the time in which both sides can bring them to efficient deployment' and we will have an 'evident advantage in which we will find ourselves for three whole weeks if we take the initiative or at least mobilise at the same time as the Austrians' (Steinberg). (Is this the letter that Barry dates to the 3rd, above?)

The democratic campaigner Franz Ziegler: 'Legitimacy, Caesarism, republic etc, all of that is intertwined with cotton, brandy, coal, and iron. A terrible time is coming for thinking men, but the bourgeoisie will wallow in rapture and bliss... People want to trade, earn, enjoy, and get along; they want not a state but a trading company.' On 17/4 though, he said that the proposal for universal suffrage was 'a brilliant victory after so many defeats... Even if the Prime Minister is not serious about the Parliament, which I deny, I think it wise to support him, for then he will be hoist with his own petard.'

(WAF) Govone-Marmora: Benedetti suggests withholding our signature until Prussian mobilisation is complete, to give extra leverage and keep open the possibility of getting Venetia without war. Govone told Benedetti — the war will be short, maybe 6 weeks, and the alliance is important in persuading Wilhelm to strike, hence he believed Italy should do the deal. Benedetti says war will only become probable 'if the mistakes made on the opposite side legitimise' Prussian escalation, he's still not sure it will happen, Wilhelm is dependent on Bismarck in the domestic struggle and this may be decisive. Also on 6th Bismarck told Benedetti of the Tsar's letter urging peace (above) which also made Benedetti wonder if war would happen.

Clarendon 'The Missus [Victoria] is in an awful state about German affairs.'

Clarendon was trying to get the Duke of Coburg to suggest a letter from FJ to Wilhelm exposing Bismarck's tactics. He hoped, says Millman, that if war could be delayed then either Bismarck would be fired or a Prussian revolution would break out, either of which would stop war.

The Prussian note sent in reply to Mensdorff, having been toned down per Wilhelm's demand, is still sufficiently 'barbed' (OP) that Mensdorff foolishly sent a caustic reply 'within twenty-four hours' (OP — it was drafted by 'the acid pen of Biegeleben'). Bismarck saw immediately this was a 'crude and clumsy error' and used it to inflame Wilhelm.

Wilhelm complained to Bismarck that the Kreuzzeitung had an 'abusive article on the Duke of Coburg' which is 'very unpleasant for me as only you [Bismarck], and the Queen and Crown Prince knew of the Duke's letter to me so that the source of the article is at once guessed. You always told me that the Government has no influence on the Kreuzzeitung but it seems to me that this is a case which proves the contrary... Such articles ... must make him more inimically disposed towards us and that is not politically correct at the moment. Please, therefore, put a stop to the mischievous procedure of the Kreuzzeitung in respect of the Duke.' Picture: Bismarck's reply of 7th which breathes some of the atmosphere from the time, one can feel the fury as Bismarck read Wilhelm's note and drafted his reply!

Bismarck signed a secret treaty with Italy. Italy was obliged to fight Austria if war broke out within 90 days. It guaranteed Austria had to commit a significant force (about a third) to the south. Barry: La Marmora had sought and got Napoleon's agreement to this.

Eyck (p114-5): Victor Emanuel had sent Count Arese to talk to Napoleon who met him without the knowledge of his ministers and encouraged him to sign the treaty with Bismarck — adding that his advice was as a private person without taking responsibility! (Cf. 24/3 and 29/3 for Arese.) This treaty was a complete breach of the Confederation law which explicitly forbade such deals with foreign powers. This is why Wilhelm did his best to keep it as secret as possible his whole life and when asked about it by FJ, when war was imminent, he gave his word of honour that it did not exist. Bismarck to Benedetti: 'I have induced a king of Prussia to break off the intimate relations of his House with the House of Habsburg, to conclude an alliance with revolutionary Italy, possibly to accept arrangements with Imperial France, and to propose in Frankfurt the reform of the Confederation and a popular Parliament. That is a success of which I am proud.'

Clark: Metternich had been trying to get Napoleon to pressure Italy and tried to frighten Napoleon with the scenario of an Austrian defeat (in March). He failed. Napoleon told Nigra to encourage Prussia's warlike policy while he would suggest to Austria that she exchange Venetia for Danubian territory, and he did suggest this to Metternich.

1. Austria would not turn to France unless desperate.
2. Austria would not cede Venetia unless forced and as part of a deal for German land.
3. Austria would not allow France to grab German land.

[I.e They could not gain Italian neutrality without ceding Venetia but they would not yield Venetia without getting Silesia, and they could not get Silesia without war and they did not want war — and the Vienna imperial system could not think through their priorities!]

Pottinger writes that around the signing of the deal Napoleon embarked on a fling with the young Countess Mercy-Argentau. (You never know what leaders are really focused on as questions of war and peace are escalating.)

Times leader: 'The inference from these proceedings is that there is a fair chance the peace of Europe will not be violated. As for the precise degree in which the honour of the two antagonists is preserved, we profess very little anxiety indeed. The truth is the nature of the transaction leaves very little honour to be divided between these two great monarchies, for the quarrel is most vulgar, commonplace, and discreditable. ... The question is like most German quarrels; it rises into some degree of interest as soon as there is a chance of either party coming to blows, and subsides into tameness and insipidity as soon as the crisis has passed away.'

Bismarck announced his plan for the Bund to have a Parliament elected by direct universal suffrage, in order to consider proposals of German governments for the reform of the Federal Constitution. General amazement, Gerlach et al appalled. Kleist to Gerlach: 'We are absolutely stunned. I am in despair' (10th). 'Bismarck had aligned the Prussian monarchy with the revolutionary tradition' (Pflanze). Wilhelm protested, 'Why that is revolution you are proposing to me.' Bismarck replied, 'But there is no harm in that. In the general storm your Majesty will be seated on a rock above the flood. All who don't wish to perish will have to seek safety there.' (Source: General Govone's record of his chat with Bismarck shortly after). Cf. his comments to Pfordten on 24 March, to von Coburg-Gotha on 26 March and to Bernstorff on 19 April, and similar comments long ago, e.g in 1854, he had written to a colleague: 'The advocates of the three taler census have obviously not yet learned that the bourgeoisie has always been the curatrix of revolution while below the three taler mark nine-tenths of the people are good royalists.'

Bernstorff reported that in London the idea was seen as 'completely revolutionary' and Westminster was worried about its effect on discussions of Gladstone's Reform Bill. Bismarck told Petersburg and London that it had 'greater guarantees for the conservative conduct of parliament than any of the artificial electoral laws that are calculated to achieve manufactured majorities.' When he got a report from London about Clarendon's horror at the universal suffrage idea, he wrote in the margin, 'In England only the higher classes are loyal to the monarchy and the constitution, because these embody their privileges, their rule over the country. The masses are brutal, ignorant, and their attachment to the crown is not of the same kind as it is in Prussia.' He was also talking to Hungarian revolutionaries. In Dresden around this time (or was this in 1865 after Gastein?), Bismarck told Beust, 'You would not know how to place yourself at the head of the revolutionary party in Germany. As for me, I could at any time become its chief.' EF: Bismarck misjudged this, the masses became synonymous with the industrial proletariat, a large scale trade union movement emerged. See discussion after Sadowa re the new North German Confederation and its constitution.

(He hoped to split the liberals (with whom he was also conducting secret talks) and mobilise public support. Interestingly the word 'equal' did not qualify 'suffrage'. This, says Pflanze, was because he still had some doubts. He also spoke privately of rejecting a secret ballot and prohibiting state officials from standing as deputies. Austria and the medium states did not dare oppose it, rightly fearing Bismarck's response. (Gall (p289): Bismarck had sent drafts of the motion to Pfordten on 24 March in an attempt to get some sort of Bavarian support. It was clear from around the 9/4 that the overwhelming majority of the Confederation would support Austria. Further the leaders of the Lesser German national liberal movement remained immune to Bismarck's threats and bribes — they still would not engage with his plans and hints. Gall's discussion of this, or the translation, is confusing.)

After the 9 April initiative the famous satirical magazine, Kladderadatsch, said it would shut as 'we aren't up to such competition'. A liberal newspaper (Kölnische Zeitung) said, 'If Mephistopheles climbed up in the pulpit and read the Gospel, could anyone be inspired by this prayer?'

(Bucholz) Moltke discussed Austrian war plans with Bernhardi who told him two armies would go north but would not attack Berlin. Bucholz writes that Moltke 'apparently discounted Bernhardi ... Or did he? If true, it confirmed his strategy: what appeared risky and incomprehensible to the Prussian war elite looked very different if Bernhardi was right.' (??)

Clarendon instructed representatives at all German courts: 'so long as the war is confined to Germany there is not British interest of sufficient magnitude to render imperative the tender of British good offices'.

Clarendon-Cowley: 'I know of no parallel to Bismarck or any precedent for such a war as he is determined upon except some of those of Napoleon. He told Loftus that Attila was a much greater man than John Bright and had handed himself down to history, that the Duke of Wellington would be remembered as a great warrior and not as a pacific statesman — and that he meant to be remembered also by making his country great and stamping out all opposition to her supremacy in Germany.'

Russell and Clarendon continued to suggest to Victoria that the best solution was for Bismarck to be removed. On 10 April she wrote to Wilhelm (according to Mosse this was 'without consulting her ministers') that he was being 'deceived, you are made to believe that you are to be attacked, and I, your true friend and sister, hear your honoured name attacked and abused for the faults and recklessness of others — or, rather, of one man!... [P]ause before you permit so fearful an act as the commencement of a war, the responsibility for which will rest on you alone' (different books give different versions of the crucial lines). Wilhelm replied citing Austria's faults and sticking to Bismarck's line (the reply is dated 12th but was not sent until 21st, Mosse). There were other attempts during April to broker a deal but they went nowhere. Russell and Clarendon both wanted to see Prussia beaten and thought she would be. (Clarendon had written on 7 March that if Austria were to give Prussia 'a licking I am sure that Europe wd be glad' and Hammond had written to Bloomfield on 20 March that 'I should like to see the Prussians well licked'.)

Clarendon-Cowley: 'Except for reasons of humanity, which must weigh lightly enough with him, he [Napoleon] can't see with displeasure the prospects of war in Germany, for the abatement of the military means of Austria and Prussia will relatively increase the military Power of France, and out of such a shindy as those two might get up and into which they will draw all the Minor States it is impossible to say that Francis will not reap some advantage, and I believe the territorial extension will be a good basis for his son's throne. Our great care must be for Belgium and our resources of all kinds must be husbanded for fulfilling our Treaty engagements respecting that Country. Russell is very anxious that I should impress this on you and beg that he will miss no opportunity of giving the Emperor to understand it. He will probably admit our position and not try to embarrass us by meddling with Belgium.'

The Nationalverein met and refused to support the plan of 9th until constitutional government was restored. However, by now Twesten, Lasker and others 'longed for a reversal of [the Government's] internal policies that would enable them to support it on the national issue' (OP p322). Until the end of June, Bismarck had a string of secret talks with the liberals including Bennigsen, Miquel, Duncker, Bernhardi and Duke Ernst of Coburg, Twesten, Unruh. He would often start by confessing he might have to resign, and ask them which liberal should be foreign minister, bringing home to them their lack of talent trained for top jobs. He spoke (dishonestly) of national unity being his goal since his Frankfurt days. He tried to persuade them that they should support the government during the war, not insist on resolving the constitutional conflict now, and make progress after victory.

They resisted. E.g Bennigsen and Miquel thought he had to offer something more specific on the constitutional crisis to get their support. (He told Miquel, 'Don't worry about the constitution now. Later, after we have been victorious, you will have constitutions enough.') But they were not generally confident, e.g. Twesten wrote around then of his fears about Bismarck mixing 'a Napoleonic regime with a general franchise and similar tricks. I also dare not deny that it might be possible, through stirring up and mixing foreign and domestic affairs, finally to dissolve the liberal parties in indifference and desultoriness, as happened with the conservatives.' Treitschke thought that over the summer there would be 'a great deal of dust stirred up and in the fall we will stand exactly where we were two weeks ago, namely on the threshold of war with Austria... Bismarck made a very agreeable impression on me personally, but politically the impression was all the worse... I could hardly contain my astonishment at these fantastic follies [concerning federal reform].'

Hamerow: most newspapers, including those pro-unification under a parliamentary system, attacked Bismarck's proposals, some as too radical, some as too reactionary, some as dishonest, some as naive, some as premature, some as belated. The liberals he spoke to agonised but were 'too hungry for success to refuse and too fearful of failure to accept' (Hamerow). Merchants and industrialists, municipal authorities all over Prussia spoke out or sent messages to the King opposing the imminent war. The reluctance of reservists to report was a worrying sign. After a dip, Hamerow says support grew as war approached and more elements of the middle classes saw it as inevitable and forced by Austria, but overall there was clearly no great enthusiasm (vol 2, p275ff). Bucher and Keudell (Bismarck agents) worked among the radicals to gain support and funnelled money to radical democrats who were also pro-Prussian victory in war. They had more success among the extreme Left than among the liberals. Results were meagre — 'the predominant movement among the German people in April-June 1866 was anti-war and anti-Bismarck' (Pflanze). In May, the general view of German parliamentarians remained hostile to Bismarck's plan and a Nationalverein meeting 13-14 May condemned the war and avoided commitment to the parliament proposal (OP p324).

It did not slow him down. When Bernhardi suggested this might stop him going to war he replied, 'One doesn't shoot at the enemy with public opinion but with powder and lead' and his parting words to Miguel were the reminder — 'We don't need you at all.' He wrote to Goltz that, 'At the moment of decision the masses will stand by the monarchy, whether it follows the liberal or conservative stream.' He was proved right: 'Bismarck's confidence was thoroughly vindicated' (Pflanze).

Two weeks after announcing the plan he spoke to Bernhardi who recorded: 'The demand for federal reform ... is by no means “a shot in self defence”... It is rather a program, ... a plan which he adopted already a long time ago when he came of age politically... When he entered into public life from the country ... he conceived the essence of conservative interests and the policy of Austria to be quite different from what they are. He believed that honest cooperation with Austria was possible and was a condition of the might and security of Germany and of the peace of Europe. But as envoy of the federal diet he soon became convinced such cooperation was out of the question because Austria simply is not honest in her relations with Prussia and because Austria's policy regarding Prussia is a policy of envy. Since the time he perceived this, the reform of the confederation and the German parliament are his program.'

Hammond to Cowley: 'England stands as isolated as she stood during the great European War [against Napoleon]'. Hammond strongly opposed cooperation with France.

Letter from Wilhelm to Bismarck: 'The popular agitations against the war are assuming very unpleasant dimensions!'

Clarendon privately told Cowley that he and Russell did not see completely eye-to-eye: 'He thinks it quite right that Prussia should have the military disposal of the North of Germany — I cannot say I agree with him, though we of course should not interfere to prevent such an arrangement'.

(Barry) Moltke warned Bismarck about Austrian mobilisation.

Zerber (unmentioned by others): Austria began horse purchases.

(Clark) Mensdorff-Karolyi: Propose mutual demobilisation. Clark: This was Karolyi's idea. At this moment FJ and Esterhazy thought they'd made a mistake in earlier agreeing with the generals.

(WAF) Pfordten sent identical notes to Prussia and Austria proposing both cancel war preparations. Bismarck told Wilhelm its phrasing was an insult to his honour.

Clarendon-Cowley: 'The whole thing might be déjoué [foiled, evaded?] at once by the cession of Venetia, but I expect that as usual the Austrians will be 24 hours too late and that the sacrifice, evidently contemplated, will not be made until it is useless.' Re Drouyn's question re the British attitude to Prussia's proposal for federal reform, he was noncommittal ('have to consult colleagues').

On 12th Cowley and Metternich had discussed in Paris the idea of Austria ceding Venetia in return for compensation. On 14th Clarendon told Cowley to push the issue and told him he'd said the same to Bloomfield. On 16th Clarendon wrote to Apponyi in London [Mosse says this was Russell not Clarendon] on the same theme: if Austria would cede Venetia voluntarily she 'may at this moment circumscribe the cession she will make, and establish a frontier Europe will respect'; and win support in England and France. Gladstone supported the idea.

Zerber: Moltke sent a memo to Wilhelm (and Bismarck??). Now he proposed putting the maximum force in Silesia, not Lausitz.

JS writes (p.240) that Moltke's picture of the future on 14 April, ~10 weeks before the crucial fight, was bang on. This is wrong — Moltke had to change multiple plans over the next 6 weeks.

(Friedjung p126) Wilhelm had been alarmed by the prospect of Bavaria joining with Austria, Roon had asked Moltke to send the king a 'reassuring reply' but Moltke had replied that it was not his job 'to argue the King into a war, but only to simplify his decision by a clear and accurate statement of the situation'. On 14/3 though, Moltke emphasised Prussia's advantages and concluded: 'Once we mobilise we must not shrink from the reproach of aggression. Every delay will definitely injure our position.'

Prince Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen elected to the Rumanian throne. Mensdorff complained in Berlin about Napoleon and in Paris and London about Bismarck. Both Paris and Berlin denied involvement. Cf. 22/5.

Bismarck's reply to Mensdorff offered to demobilise if Austria does. (Friedjung says (p127) that Wilhelm twice edited Bismarck's draft to tone it down.)

Clarendon appealed to Bismarck that Prussia and Austria should reduce their armies. Ignored.

Mensdorff offered to begin the process a day before Prussia on 25th if Prussia did likewise. Clark: FJ even wanted to suspend all military operations but his military entourage 'prevented him' (p380, how??). Mensdorff also wrote to Napoleon suggesting they discuss a possible alliance, and asking whether Napoleon had any commitments that would prevent an entente. (This letter is lost but can be partly reconstructed from other documents including Metternich's 21/4, Clark p410.)

Clarendon-Cowley: Metternich and Apponyi seem reluctant to push the idea of ceding Venetia and 'from all I hear the Emperor [FJ] is unapproachable' on the subject. If only Austria could see that this move would avoid the threat from the south, and provide a chance to beat Prussia and 'help herself if she chose to some of her old Silesian territory'.

Schweinitz was back in Russia and spoke to the Tsar. Tsar and Gorchakov had been shocked by the declaration on 9th — 'This is no longer politics, this is Revolution' Gorchakov told Revertera. The Tsar stressed that Austria was being reasonable while Bismarck was acting as a dangerous revolutionary. Cf. 2/5.

To Bernstorff (Ambassador in London): 'In a country with monarchical traditions and a loyalist mentality, universal suffrage will, by doing away with the influence of the liberal bourgeois classes, also lead to monarchical elections.' Cf his comment to Pfordten on 24 March.

Barral, Italian Ambassador in Berlin: 'Bismarck is very dissatisfied with the peaceful turn events seem to have taken... The essence of the question has not changed but for the moment there is definitely no prospect of war. It is said that England and even France have exercised pressure in Vienna to achieve this result which has also been assisted by the obstinate illness of Bismarck.' Gavone too thinks 'Bismarck is definitely discouraged by the Austrian proposal and the peaceful turn of the crisis.'

Austria's Chief of Staff, Henikstein, presented a memo to FJ arguing to put the entire army on a war footing. He cited Prussia's 4 week advantage and Italy's preparations. Mensdorff commented (20/4): militarily it makes sense but our policy is to rob Bismarck of reasons for aggression, if we succeed it has great advantages, we should at least await the result of our latest initiative.

Clark: By now the minister for war and Belcredi did not believe Bismarck would be caught in diplomatic traps, they feared he already had agreements with Italy, France and German states, and did not have confidence in Mensdorff's diplomacy. Powerful military elements similarly distrusted the diplomatic strategy and were clamouring for war along with influential newspapers and street demonstrations [does anybody now know how significant these demonstrations were, has anybody analysed the Vienna and Berlin press?]. Clark adds that the pressure had got to Esterhazy who was at home with a fever and Mensdorff had injured his foot and was also confined to home (Bloomfield reported to Clarendon 19/4).

Also on 20th, Belcredi got a report from the director of police in Vienna: the Italians are massing near Bologna and buying all available horses. He hurried with it to FJ, alarmed, FJ telegraphed to the commanding general in Verona for confirmation, while waiting for a reply he called a Council for the next day. (I've seen no reference to this in any other book except OP.) The Chief of Staff started drafting plans for a mobilisation just against Italy. Another telegraph arrived with Belcredi at 21:15 saying trains to and from Bologna are being reserved for Piedmontese troops. Belcredi took both telegrams to see Mensdorff, at home nursing his foot. Mensdorff refused to agree on calling more men to arms in Vienna but grudgingly agreed to summon border regiments. He did not want to abandon diplomacy and after Belcredi left he telegraphed Karolyi asking for an update before bed that night.

(Clark's account is confusing — 1) he implies that Belcredi went to see Mensdorff very soon after the telegram arrived at 21:15 on 20th, but 2) says Mensdorff's telegram to Karolyi, 'dashed off ... as soon as [Belcredi] left' was sent 10am on 21st. My hunch is Belcredi went to see Mensdorff on the morning of 21st, not evening of 20th, but needs checking.)

The Gablenz initiative. Anton Gablenz was a Prussian landowner and Landtag deputy, brother of Ludwig Gablenz, Austrian proconsul in Holstein. He left Kiel for Vienna at the start of weeks of secret backchannel negotiations between Bismarck and Vienna. His brother introduced him to Esterhazy who sent him on to Mensdorff. He kept the interview and the whole affair secret from everybody, including Biegeleben, except FJ, Esterhazy and later Belcredi (Clark). Mensdorff was prepared to negotiate secretly with Bismarck if the latter was interested. They 'received only encouragement from Bismarck' (Pflanze) who accepted the plan with some alterations as 'a basis for negotiation' (Bismarck). Anton shuttled back and forth with counterproposals for a month of secret meetings. (Clark: Anton had been working on it since summer 1865 and his brother played a supporting role.)

The plan was roughly:

• an independent S-H would be ruled by a Hohenzollern prince independent of the Prussian government;
• Austria would be reimbursed for the costs of 1864;
• Prussia would get the most important of her demands;
• the command of all German military forces would be divided between the two;
• federal reform would be on this dualistic basis;
• Austria would get support from Germany against France in Italy.

Cf. Clark p425 for FJ's stipulations articulated in a letter between the Gablenz brothers, 10 May: it had to include security against Italy.

Bismarck proposed changes. It morphed into a detailed treaty. There were attempts to get the Grand Duke of Weimar to stand sponsor, failed ~25-26 May. The initiative collapsed at the end of May when Mensdorff told Gablenz that FJ would only back it if at least one medium sized German state backed it. Pflanze p.297

Gall (p275): 'it is quite wrong' to describe Bismarck's conduct as 'a policy of calculated risk', this was a 'legend' he nourished and historians have repeated, the reality was that for all his 'shrewd calculation and skill' he staked absolutely everything on a single card in a game in which ... chance and luck tipped the scales at the crucial moment; it was no accident that even on the Berlin stock exchange most people reckoned right up until the war that Vienna would emerge as the victor.'

Wrong. And the Gablenz intrigues are clear evidence. As he often said, it was not his approach to leave himself a single path. He kept open the possibility of another deal where he made gains short of his maximum ambitions. Cf. 25 May for more on Gablenz, which involved a series of secret meetings over the next 4 weeks.

(OP, p296) Wilhelm insisted that the reply to Mensdorff's offer to de-escalate (of 18th) is conciliatory and accepted the idea of both sides backing down: Austria must take the lead but Prussian would 'keep in step'. Pflanze writes that Wilhelm was influenced by the Coburg intrigue and the lack of popularity for war in Prussia. Bismarck was furious and ill, mobilised Manteuffel and Roon to stir up Wilhelm. To Roon he wrote he could 'no longer bear this awful friction'. Manteuffel warned Wilhelm of a 'second Olmütz' which provoked the response Bismarck wanted, a 'magnificent display of anger' at Austria. Roon similarly chimed in.

Bodelschwingh was trying over coming days to get Wilhelm to cancel the horse purchases as a pacific gesture.

Austrian Council of Ministers agreed further mobilisation. Both Esterhazy and Mensdorff, the two strongest advocates for peace, were absent. FJ announced his decision to take 'further military measures' if the 'alarming news' — i.e the intelligence from Italy given him by Belcredi the day before — were verified by General Benedek in Verona. There was little serious discussion. FJ asked whether Mensdorff objected. Belcredi stressed his own support for military moves without reservation and said that Mensdorff agreed with calling up the frontier regiments but had 'some doubt only over the absolute urgency of the calling up of the fourth battalion'.

Wrapping up FJ said that if the news were confirmed they should mobilise the navy too. There was no vote and no opposition voice was raised. The real decision 'beyond a doubt' (Clark) had been taken the night before by FJ in discussion with Belcredi, the military, Franck, Crenneville and probably Henikstein and Archduke Albrecht.

The Council must have finished before Benedek's reply arrived 11:35 and 'at once the orders went out to mobilise the army corps destined for Italy' (Clark). Mensdorff learned of the decision and Benedek's confirmation and telegraphed Karolyi 15:40. The Vienna public, Clarendon, the Tsar and others thought that the Italian preparations were a Bismarck trick to smash the agreement to de-escalate. FJ, Mensdorff and Karolyi referred to this idea at the time. In Berlin, Karolyi telegraphed the good news that Wilhelm had accepted the demobilisation plan but it arrived in Vienna at 18:00, a few hours after the mobilisation orders had been given. As Clark says, it is ironic that the two peace ministers were confined to their beds in Vienna the same day that Bismarck was in bed consumed with rage about the possible success of the demobilisation initiative! And FJ was usually late, here for once he was early, and it was a disaster.

Clark is the only account I've read that explains this chronology with overlapping telegrams on the fateful day (p384ff). Mensdorff later (21/9/66) said that not resigning after this episode was his second great error. (But Mensdorff also said after the war, 'I did not understand politics at all and had often told the Emperor so. But I was a general and my commander-in-chief ordered me to take the post, whether I liked it or not I had to tolerate the assistance of a trained diplomat [does he mean Esterhazy or Biegeleben?] who lacked the courage to accept responsibility himself.' When Mensdorff was asked by the Saxon diplomat Vitzthum why he had not resigned rather than sacrifice his convictions, he replied 'It's no good your talking, you are not a soldier.' Friedjung, p137)

Carr: FJ mobilised the southern army on the insistence of his generals.

Gordon Craig: 'the first mobilisation orders' were issued in Vienna on 21/4 and had 'an electrifying effect in Prussia', accelerated on 27/4 (p30).

OP: 'alarming reports' arrived in Vienna on 20th and FJ agreed on 21st to order mobilisation of the southern army 'on the advice of his generals and with Mensdorff's reluctant approval'. Clark does not suggest 'reluctant approval' but he also does not record Mensdorff writing anything to try to influence the Council.

Barry: The Italian movements were 'later found to be inaccurate'. Clark agrees: most of what Belcredi 'learned' on 20th turned out to be false — Italy was in fact determined not to strike first and 48 hours made no real difference.

Loftus to Clarendon: 'I think the King [of Prussia] might be induced to part with B[ismarck] for he is now aware of his dangerous policy.'

(WAF) Benedetti dined with Roon who told him — if there is an agreement on disarmament, we'll sell as few horses as possible because 'in fifteen days we have to start to buy them back'. Benedetti realised that even if there is an apparent climbdown by both sides it may well not last, but that given the King has partly 'escaped' Bismarck's control for a moment he 'could very well escape again'.

Bismarck to Wilhelm: '[I]t is contrary to my feelings, I may say my faith, to desire to influence in an officious manner the highest sovereign determinations on war and peace; that is a domain in which I confidently leave to God alone the direction of your Majesty's heart ... and would rather pray than advise. [!!] At the same time I dare not disguise the conviction that if peace is maintained now we shall be threatened with the danger of war later, perhaps in a few months' time, under more unfavourable conditions. Lasting peace is maintained only when both parties desire it... Anyone who ... has for sixteen years been most intimately concerned with Austrian policy cannot doubt that hostility towards Prussia has become the chief, one might say the only political aim in Vienna. It will be actively prosecuted as soon as the Vienna Cabinet considers the circumstances more favourable than at present.' (Italics in original, bold is me.)

Wilhelm to Bismarck (re a letter from Manteuffel): '[W]e have now intentionally exhibited a minime preparedness for war of a defensive nature... In the Council held on February 28th, you yourself defined the policy as being that war should not be allowed to break out on account of the Duchies alone, so that the higher prize, the German question, must be brought in. This has been done...' (I've seen no reference to this letter in any of the books but it seems important to me — also if some of the historians had read it, they would have been less confused in their reports of the meeting of 28/2.)

(WAF) Napoleon proposed to Goltz an international congress. It seems Benedetti discovered this in Berlin not from Drouyn but in discussion with Bismarck (i.e he was out of the loop again) who made clear he intended to push for war and a conference should come after.

Instead he preferred to come to a direct understanding with France. Benedetti wasn't notified formally from Paris until 3rd.

Pottinger: the Goltz discussion was reported on 25th, and Napoleon also mentioned it to Metternich at roughly the same time.

Metternich-Mensdorff: Napoleon still coy re discussing an entente.

(Clark) FJ decided at a meeting that 'it was urgently necessary to end the present tense and increasingly unendurable situation by a decisive diplomatic action which might draw war behind it' ('... even if it might result in war' in a different translation).

In translator's notes to Friedjung (p133), it describes this meeting as a confidential discussion with advisers, not an official Council. Esterhazy was still absent but Mensdorff was here for this one. They discussed two drafts — draft A) agreed to cancel armaments mobilising in Bohemia; draft B) prepared to submit the issue of the Duchies to the Bund, and Mensdorff said this 'would not be favourably received by the Prussian Government and that the possibility of war could not therefore be ignored'. FJ decided on B. (On 26th Esterhazy wrote to Mensdorff, 'Our enemies have achieved their object. We are arming — and for a prolonged peace, which will probably compel us to fire the first shot!... This war cannot be a defensive war, or still less a conservative war for us. You can console yourself with the thought that you have struggled bravely and with self-control for peace to the very last moment'.)

Bloomfield-Clarendon: 'The Austrians are driven wild by the danger of their position.'

Loftus-Clarendon: Bismarck says that 'my illness and possible death may prevent war — nothing else will'.

Austria told Prussia that it would allow the Duchies' fate to be decided by the Confederation (Clark: made public effectively on 28th). This effectively abandoned Gastein and provided Bismarck with a pretext to reply that Prussia had been wronged and Austria had taken the initiative in undermining Prussian rights in Holstein. (JS refers to this blunder by Mensdorff as 'at this point' referring to 5-6 June, p246.)

Mensdorff-Apponyi, re Russell 16/4: 'our very existence' is threatened by the idea of ceding Venetia, 'if Europe must be rebuilt according to the system of nationalities, I do not see the place that Austria can occupy ... and we are not yet resigned to give the signal for our dismemberment'.

Clarendon told Cowley (5/5) this reply was 'so well-argued and so conclusive' that he could not believe Metternich had been authorised to broach the issue in Paris.

Carr: Italy ordered general mobilisation. Eyck: this was 28th.

Stormy debates in Parliament over the Reform Bill. Gladstone warned Disraeli, 'you cannot fight against the future. Time is on our side.' But the liberal majority was crumbling. The Times withdrew support from Russell. Speculation through May of a Stanley coalition. Through May-June, the British Parliament was focused on the collapse of Russell's government over Reform and the scrambling for a new one.

Pottinger: Ollivier announced his intention to give a speech on foreign policy during the session of 3 May, which worried the government.

Zerber: Moltke updated Wilhelm on plan. Assumed Austria would defend Bohemia, maybe raid into southern Silesia. Moltke aimed to gain numerical superiority in Bohhemia with main attack from Silesia. Now Prussia would have numerical superiority and could hit Austria in the flank.

FJ ordered mobilisation against Prussia and ordered further strengthening on 1 May. Showalter: The Austrian generals said that mobilisation plans since 1859 were so integrated that they could not mobilise against Italy without accelerating in the north. On 27th mobilisation was ordered for the North Army and 'around that date' FJ seems to have abandoned any lingering hopes of peace. (Showalter gives Wawro p.330ff as reference for this (p148).)

Clark: As Mensdorff had told Bloomfield (reported 29/3), FJ would delay then 'go the whole hog'. If everything went according to schedule, the southern army would be in position by 12 June, the northern army a week later.

Mensdorff asked the five southern German states to catch up with Prussia's armaments as speedily and quickly as possible. Saxony moved almost immediately.

(Clark p410) Metternich-Mensdorff (cf. 18/4): Napoleon, the Empress and Drouyn have signalled that they now want to talk and he advised that the congress, with a previous Austria-Britain understanding, would be a good counter-attack against Bismarck. Clark: Napoleon feared that disarmament would succeed and proposed a Congress to keep control of the situation in his own hands.

Mensdorff replied to Metternich: no good will come from a congress: 'it will achieve either nothing, or a settlement the cost of which we shall have to pay by the cession of Venetia without equivalent compensation in Germany'.

Clarendon told Bernstorff that if war came 'the person who would be responsible in the estimation of mankind for the evils ... would be Count Bismarck'.

Mensdorff wrote a private letter to Napoleon, with no record for the archives, and he kept it secret from almost everybody. (The original letter is lost but the main ideas can be reconstructed from other references, Clark p411.) If France is helpful,Venetia might be abandoned after the peace in return for a) equivalent territory in Germany, b) the Pope's position is re-established on a solid basis — and France may get some unspecified annexations. In the details of the idea there was an assumption that Napoleon would trade Italian unification to get Italian independence from Vienna. Discussions in Paris did not get anywhere for the moment. (Cf. Pottinger p113-14 for a different account and apparently different chronology to Clark p410-11.)

Bismarck had a first secret meeting with Anton Gablenz. Gablenz had repeated interviews with Mensdorff, Esterhazy, Bismarck and twice with FJ.

Bismarck told the Prussian cabinet that they might have to give Napoleon territory in the Saar so they should consider how to safeguard state-owned coal mines (worth ~60 million thaler) to avoid loss: the property should be so 'metamorphosed that even in case the territory is ceded, it [property] would remain in our hands'. This shows, says Pflanze, that he was as always being flexible and realised that in some circumstances he might have to give Napoleon something. (Cf. apparent meetings on 2 June and 4 June below.)

EF (p139): Bismarck advised the mines be sold to private investors, which seems different to OP's account.

When Napoleon put out feelers for a congress at the end of April, Hammond opposed it ('a French trap, a very clumsy one' 29/4) while Clarendon was sympathetic. Clarendon insisted on maintaining the status quo as a condition for a Congress. Napoleon then pitched ideas for French gains (privately and publicly). Napoleon also opposed a general declaration by Britain and France asking Prussia and Austria to step back from war. Cowley told Clarendon (4 May) that the French argued that they could not cope with the internal pressure if Austria and Prussia were to ignore such a declaration. Further, Napoleon was set on Italy getting Venetia so could not accept the status quo. Britain had secretly urged Austria to cede Venetia voluntarily during April but could not be seen as forcing such a breach of treaties publicly.

Insurrection on Crete starts against Ottoman rule, occupied the Powers until 1869.

Partial mobilisation in Prussia. OP: FJ concluded war was 'unavoidable' and orders went out to strengthen the northern army (Wawro: 27 April). This news reached Berlin on 'the evening of 3 May' (OP) and a furious Wilhelm 'ordered mobilisation' (OP). Barry agrees with Wawro that the Austrian order to mobilise in the north was 27 April and agrees with OP that it was the 3rd that Wilhelm issued 'the first of a series of orders for mobilisation'. BUT — Barry says this was only partial mobilisation of the five corps nearest the frontier and although Moltke could now get going 'he did so in the knowledge that the long period of delay would cost him numerical superiority at the outset of the campaign' (Barry p151). Barry p162ff: after 3rd, a week of further instructions 'completed the order for the general mobilisation of the whole of the Prussian army'.

Stern: Wilhelm proposed general mobilisation, was supported by Moltke and the CP, but Eulenburg and others objected and only partial mobilisation was ordered.

Carr: Wilhelm ordered mobilisation of 5 corps on 4 May and on 7th mobilisation was ordered for the rest.

Gordon Craig: 3 May 'first Prussian countermoves' to Austrian action on 21st and 27th April and not until 12 May 'a reluctant authorisation for something resembling complete mobilisation'.

Zerber: Prussia mobilised 'in increments over a nine-day period from 3 to 12 May. Bismarck did not even attempt to coordinate Prussia's political and military measures. In the three days before mobilisation was ordered, Moltke was not consulted and kept completely in the dark. Due to the disorganised nature of the Prussian mobilisation, Moltke was forced to jettison his pre-war deployment planning and organise an ad hoc deployment.' Rail deployment started on 16 May and ended on 6 June. The battle happened somewhere between 53rd and 62nd day of mobilisation (8th-9th weeks) depending on whether you count from 3 May or 12 May.

Showalter: the news of 27th took 'a week' to push Wilhelm into action and then it was 5/9 corps. He still refused to approve their 'concentration' against Austria. Only in mid-April was Wartensleben transferred to Berlin to run the General Staff's railway operation and only on 1 May did he present a specific proposal for military-civilian coordination of routes leading to the theatre of operations. There were 9 separate orders between 3-24 May 'to bring the whole army under the colours and set it in motion.'

Friedjung (translator notes p133): On 1 May the Austrian Council was told that the army in Italy was completely mobilised and complete mobilisation would take place in the north as soon as Prussia began to mobilise. Money was needed and should be publicly committed. Mensdorff opposed because of its diplomatic effects: 'it will be said that Austria has burned her boats and wants a war à tout prix'. Esterhazy supported Mensdorff and said the war would 'become a European war and create circumstances which will make the existence of the old Austria impossible and will result in the establishment of a new.' Belcredi favoured aggression and argued that 'the present situation was unbearable and could only lead to the ruin of the monarchy'. FJ himself concluded, 'war must now be regarded as unavoidable and duty only consists in preparing ourselves well for it in every direction.' (This quote from FJ seems a) crucial (if real) and b) appears nowhere I've seen except in the translator's notes to Friedjung!?)

Bismarck to Wilhelm: 'I submit the enclosure in support of my urgent ... entreaty that your Majesty will not longer leave the country in the danger to which ... it is at present exposed in view of the superior Austrian armaments which, notwithstanding all assurances of peace, daily assume larger dimensions. The Minister for War will submit ... tomorrow proposals for further precautionary measures and ... I venture to hope that your Majesty will graciously take into consideration my entreaty to accelerate measures to be adopted'.

Wilhelm scribbled in the margin: 'Without waiting till our note, which is to be presented today, is received? That seems to cast all the torts again on us...' (Unmentioned in the books?)

YOU CAN READ OVER A DOZEN ACCOUNTS OF THIS WAR AND NOT BE CONFIDENT ABOUT WHEN PRUSSIA ORDERED PARTIAL OR GENERAL MOBILISATION OR A CLEAR DEFINITION OF THESE TERMS (even weirder given the importance of mobilisation to 1914 debates).

(Clark) In Council, FJ told ministers: 'Retrospective views are no longer in place, one must look at things exactly as they stand ... [they] develop independently of all human calculation, and all efforts to avert them prove vain.'

(WAF) Napoleon told Goltz that Austria was looking for a deal but he preferred a deal with Prussia and hinted at the Rhineland. Goltz told Bismarck that Napoleon didn't want Benedetti to know about this idea. On 5th Bismarck told Goltz he could not offer the left bank of the Rhine.

Berlin stock market panic on mobilisation rumours. Stern: there was a ministerial meeting at which Bismarck repeated his argument about the Saar coal mines. All opposed except Roon. Did not happen. Rumours persisted for weeks, Bismarck lied and denied anybody was thinking about it.

Bismarck to Wilhelm: The latest Austrian note 'affords no prospect that Austria will disarm' but suggests it will string us along while she strengthens her preparations to gain 'an advantage over us which we cannot recover. I am informed from the Bourse today that [Austria is making financial preparations for war] and that the merchants here ... find the inactivity of the Royal Government, in view of Austria's surpassing armaments, incomprehensible, and in the highest degree disquieting and dangerous for the country. This feeling, which does not dominate your Majesty's ministers for the first time today, has become general in the town now that the facts which were previously known to the Government have penetrated to the public. The outbursts among the public will, should it transpire ... that the protection of the country has actually been neglected, undoubtedly be very animated.'

At 12:30 that night (i.e morning of 3rd) the King scribbled on this: 'General Mutius reports that it is certain that 12,000 men are stationed ... immediately on the frontier. This, taken with Werther's telegram, proves that the final moment has come for us to order great armaments which, therefore, is to be deliberated on at 3 o'clock.'

This is a pretty extraordinary letter essentially accusing the King of neglecting his duties and endangering the country. It is not (?) mentioned in the books. While Pflanze says the news prompting Wilhelm's shift in position arrived on 'the evening of 3 May' this letter clearly suggests it was the evening of the 2nd.

Separately on 2 May there was a memo from Bismarck to Wilhelm summarising recent developments. It said that there was 'what appears to be an unauthenticated offer from Vienna to conclude a treaty'; a message from Goltz that Napoleon 'considers the time has now arrived for the understanding with Prussia' and if this doesn't happen 'he thinks he cannot refuse the offers made to him by Austria' and suggests 'the eyes of France are directed to the Rhineland'; information continues to arrive re Austrian mobilisation on the frontier 'and of the fears that they will at once invade'. We must take immediate military steps; re France we should not make a clear answer but send 'a special mission with a Royal confidential letter couched in general terms' to seek information and 'to gain time'; we should explore how serious the Austrians are without 'betraying our readiness'. (In general the correspondence gives a different picture. The history books portray Bismarck generally as more in control, the correspondence shows much more the friction, the involvement/interference of the king, all the restraints he put on Bismarck's freedom of action etc.)

Tsar sent Schweinitz back to Berlin with another letter. When he arrived he found Prussia mobilising. He left on 10th empty-handed. (Mosse p236).

Some time on 2nd he spoke to Govone again and said that he would resign if Wilhelm abandoned Italy (Govone Memoirs). WAF: they spoke about the idea floating around that Italy may do a deal for Venetia then abandon Prussia. Bismarck agreed that Prussia was morally, but not technically, obliged to fight for Italy if the latter alone were attacked. WAF: an oddity is that Benedetti was trying to keep Prussia and Italy on good terms while Napoleon was suddenly thinking of ways to exploit pushing them apart — but his double dealings ran into the sand.

(Clark) FJ wrote to his mother: 'Only a fundamental and durable understanding with Prussia could be of advantage in our situation, and such an understanding seems to me absolutely impossible without abdicating our position as a Great Power. One must face the war with composure and trust in God, for since we have gone so far, the monarchy could better endure a war than a slow disintegrating and dishonourable peace.' This sounds like a man who thinks the war is close to inevitable at this stage and the risks of defeat worth taking.

Rouher (a French minister) called for peace, the avoidance of entanglements and the maintenance of 'entire liberty of action'. France would disapprove highly of an Austrian attack on Italy but Italy would attack Austria 'a ses risques et perils'. Ollivier gave his place to Thiers who gave a speech.

'One will see a return of the Empire of Charles V, which formerly resided in Vienna, and now will reside in Berlin which will be close to our border and will apply pressure to it... You have a right to resist this policy in the name of the interest of France, for France is too important for such a revolution not to menace her gravely. And when she [France] had struggled for two centuries ... to destroy this colossus, is she prepared to watch as it re-establishes itself before her eyes? [France should oppose Prussia] first in the name of the independence of the German states... second, in the name of her own independence, and, finally in the name of the European balance, which is the interest of all, the interest of universal society.' He argued that Prussia would create a new North German bloc, control it, annex states. He rejected any idea of compensations in a Prussian trade as 'shameful'. Italy had been wrongly encouraged and should be told that France would not support her even if Austria attacked.

It lasted a couple of hours. Pottinger says it caused 'a sensation'. Although the government rejected the arguments and the official media attacked Thiers, he had the support of most of the country especially the middle and upper classes.

Napoleon firmly rejected Thiers' argument. (Clark p265 seems to confuse years and suggests this was given in 1865.)

(WAF) Drouyn informed Benedetti of the congress proposal he'd discussed with Goltz, Cowley and Metternich. But by 6th he was telling Benedetti that the congress was abandoned for the time being. WAF: Bismarck at this time thought that Napoleon was trying to delay war so that Austrian preparations were complete and Italy's obligations terminated, so that Prussia would be under greater pressure and forced to accept Napoleon's demands.

Prince Albert to Ludwig von Gerlach: 'I have not been able to see or speak to Count Bismarck. He is still unwell... There is much very doubtful about it but I have such boundless confidence in Bismarck that I suspect that it forms parts of his long-term, well-thought out plan and is neither a momentary inspiration nor a political chess move.'

(Pottinger p114) Many meetings with Napoleon and Eugenie about how to reply to Vienna. Rouher and La Valetter urged peace, Drouyn favoured Mensdorff's plan.

Eyck (p119): Napoleon told the Italian Ambassador, Nigra, that Austria was willing to cede Venetia to France, which would transfer it to Italy soon, on condition Italy would give Austria a free hand to acquire territory in Germany. La Marmora 'saved Prussia' (Eyck) by rejecting the deal: 'For us it is a question of honour and loyalty not to let Prussia down' he wired to Nigra.

WAF: on 5th La Marmora telegrammed Nigra in Paris saying that he would stick to the Prussian treaty and not do a deal with Austria. This possibly was not known by Napoleon when he gave his speech on 6th.

(Pottinger) Napoleon told Metternich that Vienna should cede Venetia when the first shot was fired instead of waiting for compensations to be won from Prussia. In return Napoleon would not ask for compensation. And promised to keep Italy neutral. Cf. 8/5.

Further exchanges between Victoria and Clarendon. She pushed for action with France. Clarendon: Napoleon doesn't want to act, naval demonstrations by us alone are pointless, we could appeal for mediation etc but that only emphasises we don't agree with France etc. (I assume these exchanges occurred before news of the Auxerre speech arrived.)

Napoleon's inflammatory speech at Auxerre attacking the 'detested' 1815 Vienna settlement. It went down like a lead balloon in London. It 'was interpreted in France as favoring Prussia and Italy and [implying] the possibility that France might join in the war on Austria. That thought elicited a sharply adverse reaction in French public opinion and a steep decline on the Paris bourse. [It] was yet another attempt ... to coerce Austria into surrendering Venetia. But the reaction revealed the depth of anti-Prussian and pacifistic sentiment in France' (Pflanze, p301). Napoleon also sent a backchannel agent, a Hungarian, to Bismarck with proposals for a deal: Italy gets Venetia, Prussia gets North Germany, France gets the triangle of German territory lying between the Rhine and Moselle rivers belonging to Prussia, Hesse, and Bavaria. Bismarck rejected the last but sent back a counter-offer possibly involving Belgium and Luxembourg. This too fizzled out. (Barry wrongly dates the Auxerre speech to 15 May.)

Pottinger (p117) The paragraph that caused such ructions was never actually spoken, it was added by Napoleon to the written version published the next day in Moniteur, and the ministers didn't realise until after it was published! (I haven't seen this anywhere else but it's very plausible to me, having participated in similar episodes.) On or before the 5th the Prussian military attaché in Paris received secret overtures, from a disreputable character Vimercati, regarding the Rhineland. We can't prove Napoleon's direct connection to this move but it seems likely. The attaché guarded his position by telling Goltz, who notified Berlin. Bismarck thought Vimercati an untrustworthy adventurer. The discussions went nowhere. French reaction to Napoleon's speech was hostile. Business circles were anti-Prussian and pacifist. The Paris stock market dived. The Rothschilds urged peace in Paris and Vienna. The speech's hints about the Rhineland also annoyed Bismarck, so it generally annoyed everyone!

(Pottinger p137ff) A Hungarian expat living in Paris, Kiss de Nemesker — a colonel in the revolutionary army of 1848-9, brother-in-law to former French foreign minister Thouvenel, adviser to Prince Napoleon — arrived in Berlin. Met Bismarck on 12/5. There were further letters and discussions. It's hard to tell how seriously Bismarck took him. The discussions involved another version of — Venetia to Italy, duchies to Prussia, Rhineland to France. Cf first week of June.

Bismarck note about the alternative approaches to France: 'the easier way' was to show Napoleon that 'what Austria can offer him at our expense is more readily obtainable from us'; the 'harder way' was to threaten Napoleon with a nationalist war to the knife. (Written before or after he was nearly killed that day?!)

Assassination attempt by Ferdinand Cohen-Blind (stepson of the 1848 revolutionary Karl Blind) as he walked back from the palace along the footpath of Unter den Linden to his Wilhelmstrasse office. Five shots were fired: two with his back turned, one as he advanced on the attacker, two more point-blank as he grappled with him. He initially thought he had been badly if not mortally wounded. '[T]hose who witnessed the assault and its aftermath ... described his composure as remarkable' (Pflanze).

There was no evidence of a conspiracy but Bismarck used it to close some newspapers and associations; he 'appears to have acted alone' and wanted to prevent the coming war by killing Bismarck (OP). While under police interrogation he slashed his own throat and died. Bismarck kept the pistol, loaded, on a table in his office as he would the pistol from the 1874 assassination attempt. At a soirée Bismarck hosted for parliamentarians years later, someone accidentally discharged Cohen-Blind's pistol not realizing he kept it loaded (nobody was hurt).

Gall: That evening he instructed the Prussian ambassador in St P. to point out to Gorchakov and the Tsar that 'the attempt upon my life was made by a Württemberg republican and that accordingly the revolutionaries of southern Germany at least regard me not as a promoter of their plans but as the representative of the monarchical principle and are trying to get rid of me, seeing particularly my German reforms as I see them myself, namely as an obstacle to their plans, that in other words my position is not after all what it has been represented to the Emperor as being'.

KL: He hounded the police investigating and eventually was so cross about their work that he instituted disciplinary proceedings against them. He sent word to Gerlach that his article had wounded more than the assassination attempt.

EF: Keudell wrote that in general over the spring-summer period Bismarck did not talk politics when he left his office and spent time with his family and this helped him preserve equanimity. After the assassination a crowd formed outside his official residency and he briefly addressed it (some biographies say he NEVER addressed a public meeting but there must have been quite a few informal occasions like this?). He noticed no note from Goltz and remarked that Goltz had never been good at hypocrisy!

Eyck: A story that spread about that day: a famous professor of physiology hurried into a Berlin bookshop and said crossly, 'How bad revolvers are in this country.' (Four years later the same professor described Berlin professors as 'the spiritual life-guards of the House of Hohenzollern'.)

Same day — Ludwig von Gerlach's article for Kreuzzeitung 'War and Reform' (Gall: 'War and Federal Reform') published: 'The justified mission of Prussia to develop her power in Germany is opposed by the equally justified mission of Austria to maintain her power in Germany. This dualism is the vital fundamental characteristic and the real basis of the constitution of Germany. It has matured and gained strength more and more during the last three hundred years, and after the glorious liberation of Germany in 1815 it was sealed by solemn treaties. It has given Germany fifty years of peace, flourishing prosperity, and, as almost never before, of freedom from foreign intervention. Germany is no longer Germany if Prussia is absent or if Austria is absent... The German Confederation has great defects but I do not destroy my family or my fatherland because they have defects... Let us take care not to fall into the dreadful false belief [alternative: the abominable heresy] that God's holy commandments stop at the field of politics, diplomacy and war, and that these areas have no higher law than patriotic egoism. Justitia fundamentum regnorum [justice is the foundation of kingdoms]... Universal suffrage means political bankruptcy. Instead of vital legal relationships and political ideas, instead of concrete personalities, [it recognises] only numbers and sums... Let us therefore hold firmly to our recognised truths and most of all to the divine and eternal content.'

Gerlach defended the strict legitimist position, made clear his opposition to a war with Austria, and insisted that the principles laid down by God for personal behaviour must govern diplomacy too. Bismarck never forgave him.

(Hamerow: before Wagener fell under Bismarck's spell he said many similar things. 'The principle of nationality ... is not justified but is lawless, unrighteous, and unchristian, seeking to dissolve and disintegrate the Christian community of peoples and simply to lead the peoples back to the natural pagan basis of blood and descent... We have ... no right to tear a province away from another state because its inhabitants speak the same language we do and are of the same descent as we are.' Leopold Gerlach had also condemned 'the vice of patriotism': 'Why do I detest patriotism, “the dearly beloved Fatherland” and things of that sort? Partly because of the hypocrisy and emptiness, but there is also something wrong with them. Loyalty to the king and love for our fellow man, which can just as well be extended to Russians, Englishmen, and Frenchmen, are quite enough.')

Gall says this article hit the newsstands on the afternoon of 7th 'at almost exactly the same time' as the assassination attempt. Lerman: it was on 8th. JS — 5th.

EF: 7th and Gerlach sent Bismarck a copy of it attached to a note congratulating him on his escape and went to see him and found him 'abrupt, pale, passionately excited, incapable of a friendly word ... there was something restless and desperate about him. He spoke of God, of prayer, as if to say that he would make his case with God, with God alone, but not with friends or party colleagues'. (It seems clear it was 7th. How do historians get this wrong?! Some careful historians footnote it 8 May. A theory: perhaps the official date on the newspaper was 8th but it first appeared on the streets in the afternoon of 7th so a) it is correct to say the newspaper is dated 8th but b) in fact it appeared early, just as newspapers are today dated day-T but they are first seen on day-T-1?)

Hamerow: around this time he said to von Below-Hohendorf, 'They will not prevail on me to abandon my plans. But they will force me to seek my collaborators in places where I would not otherwise seek anything, so that I may thus arrive at my goal by roundabout ways which are not unobjectionable.'

Clarendon in Lords: 'There is now little of that secret diplomacy which in former days so much prevailed. There is on the part of every Government — such is the power of public opinion — so great an anxiety to appeal to it and obtain its support, that despatches of the most important character and entailing the gravest consequences are no sooner delivered than they are published; and the telegram secures that there shall be no priority of information. We are, therefore, all placed on the same footing... [As he said this, obviously 'secret diplomacy' was underway with Bismarck-Gablenz and the Coburg shenanigans.] Up to about a fortnight ago there was an appearance that moderate counsels would prevail, and that the calamity of war would be adverted. But within the last fortnight this hope has become less and less felt, and, although each Power declares that it has no aggressive intention against the other, and although each declares that it has only armed against an attack which they all declare they do not meditate, yet when three large armies are marching to their respective frontiers there is too much reason to fear that war is at hand. If we had the least reason to hope that our good offices would have been of any use, they would have been freely offered and conscientiously employed. That we have taken care the Powers in question should know. I should not be discharging my duty if I said too much; but, my Lords, we have stood alone, and alone we could do nothing against the determination that war was the most effective means — the only effective means of giving effect to an ambitious policy. This determination may possibly be carried into effect — we must hope that until war is actually declared it will not be carried into effect, but more than a million of men are now armed and prepared for the conflict. And I must say that it is a melancholy sight in this enlightened age, and in the present state of civilization and progress, that Europe should be even menaced with war for which no casus belli can be said to exist, and for which there is no justification.'

Earl Grey replied: 'It seems to me that what has now taken place in Europe is the natural consequence of that conduct which we thought it right to pursue some two years ago. Your Lordships will remember that it was at that time ostentatiously laid down as the political rule of conduct of this country that we were never to interfere with foreign States except when our own interests were directly and immediately threatened. The rule or principle of nonintervention, which had been understood in a very different sense by great statesmen in former times, was abused to this extent. In former times, when the principle of non-intervention was invoked, it meant this — that no State had a right to interfere with the internal affairs of another; that it was an abuse and scandal if any nation prevented another from settling its internal Government in the manner it thought best for its own welfare and its own prosperity. But in these days no man ever dreamt that the principle of non-intervention applied to the case of the disputes which arise in the civilized world, or that it meant that a great country like this had no duty to perform in endeavouring to prevent the oppression of weak States by the strong, and in maintaining, not only peace, but the interests of justice throughout the world. My Lords, I say this is a new doctrine, for the first Time put forward and for the first time acted upon in a manner which has left a stain on the fair fame of this country some two years ago. We then not only acted on this principle, but acted on it in this manner — we deluded unfortunate Denmark by intimations, if not promises, of support, until we brought her into a false position — and then we abandoned her. I then foresaw that if we were to proceed on the purely selfish principle of thinking of our own interests only, it would very soon happen that some strong and unscrupulous Power would avail itself of the new principle to be guilty of acts of spoliation, that the peace of Europe would be in danger, and that sooner or later we should see those deeds of wrong and violence which we had encouraged by our sufferance rise to such a height and be applied in such a manner as to fill the world with blood and misery. I ventured at the time to express to your Lordships my conviction that this would be the consequence of the policy pursued; that, encouraged by our sufferance, scandal, wrong, and robbery — what we stated in our official papers to be wrong and robbery — would result; and I am certain that a single word said at the right time and with proper firmness would have stopped the entire mischief without danger of war. We are told that it was a great triumph for the Administration of that day that it kept us out of war. I ventured then to say that they ought not to boast until we had seen the end of it; and, looking now at the threatening state of Europe, will any man tell me that we are not now more in danger of being drawn into a contest than if we had at that time taken a bolder course? My Lords, I say the consequences may be put off for a time, but they will come; and for those consequences I hold Her Majesty's Government to be responsible.'

Russell replied to Grey: 'I never heard it laid down — I know not whether anybody laid it down, but certainly Her Majesty's Government did not — that this country was not to interfere where the peace of Europe or the interests of justice might require. What I said was that if neither your honour nor interests were concerned you must consider long and with great deliberation before you enter into a war. If you enter into a war merely for the sake of preserving the general balance of power in Europe, without your interests or honour being involved, you ought to see whether you are not likely to produce much more evil than you are likely to remedy. My noble Friend, on the other hand, says it was no question of Germany being in the right or of Denmark being in the right, but that there was an opportunity of entering into a war and we ought to have accepted it. I differ entirely from my noble Friend, and I certainly cannot accept his representations of the conduct of Her Majesty's Government.'

Derby attacked Russell for 'misrepresentation' and also connected the current situation to 1864: '... when Denmark depended on your moral if not your material support, then you took an opportunity of withdrawing from the contest which you had yourselves encouraged, and abandoned the ally whom you had led by your encouragement to maintain her own rights.'

Cowley reported that the French Finance Minister, Fould, expressed himself very strongly to Napoleon that his speech, and encouragement of a Prussia-Italy alliance, was a disaster. The speech went down very badly in London — 'the worst & most ominous thing he has done since his accession' said Clarendon.

(Pottinger) Goltz saw Napoleon just after his discussion with Fould. Napoleon stressed he wanted peace and a conference to sort out Venetia, the duchies, and the German question. The same day, Drouyn wrote to his ambassadors in London and Saint Petersburg suggesting that the French, English and Russian government issue invitations to a Congress. Cf. 15/5.

Mensdorff-Metternich: Napoleon's suggestion of 4/5 is no good — we cannot promise to cede Venetia unless the campaign in Germany has brought compensation and cannot make commitments re the postwar status of Italy.

A majority of representatives to the Diet voted in favour of a resolution demanding that Prussia explain its mobilisation. (Clark & JS) OP — 10-5 vote.

Landtag (prorogued since February) dissolved and new elections announced. 'For or against the soldiers' was Bismarck's slogan.

In England, failure of the great banking house of Overend and Gurney, followed by a crash on the Stock Exchange and a rise in the bank rate to 10 per cent.

Pfordten announced that the entire Bavarian army had been ordered to the colours. His example was soon followed by Württemberg, Darmstadt, and Nassau.

Prussia raised discount rate to 9% in response to market fears (connected to the problems in the City?).

Clarendon to Cowley: '[W]e are willing to do anything for the maintenance of peace except committing ourselves to a policy of action that we cd. not justify & wh. wd. not be sanctioned by public opinion at home...[W]hat wd. please everybody in Europe wd. be that Italy got Venetia, Austria, Silesia, & Prussia a licking.' (Cf. 31/3)

Bloomfield-Clarendon: Mensdorff says, 'Count Bismarck's plans have been too long and too deeply laid to admit of sufficient modification at the last moment ... to be reconcilable with the interests of the Austrian Empire.'

Hohenlohe noted of the military parade on 12th that 'The King's appearance horrified me. He was ashen-grey and there were deep lines on his forehead. His dreadful seriousness and deep anxiety showed that he was trying to make up his mind to some vital decision'.

Conference of middle states at Bamberg including Hanover.

Clark: by now Bavaria, Saxony, Württemberg, Darmstadt and Nassau had mobilised forces. Within a week Dalwigk told Vienna 'we are completely mobilised and will fulfil our duties to the last moment'. Vienna proved unable to organise serious coordination of German forces. Beust had proposed at Bamberg a coordination plan but Pfordten wouldn't agree and returned from Bamberg 'more pacific than ever' (Clark). Pfordten kept changing his mind and would not commit. He wanted to keep relations with Bismarck and his own role as a potential mediator open and his own generals thought Prussia's army superior to Austria's. (So not all shared the consensus view that Austria would win.) King Ludwig was thought to be mad by many. Pfordten had rejected neutrality but would not prepare seriously until after the war had been going a week. He continued talking about possible ways out of the war. (Clark p447 and p457ff for lots of detail re Vienna's dealings with the middle states.)

(WAF) Bismarck spoke to Benedetti. Bismarck was concerned about the confused/ confusing signals coming from Paris. Bismarck let drop that Napoleon had suggested to Goltz (1/5) about compensation on the Rhine, while there were also rumours of Napoleon doing a deal with Vienna. Benedetti, embarrassed by being kept in the dark again, suggested that his own impressions remained that Paris was not looking for a deal with Austria. He did not reveal that he had no idea what was going on between Napoleon, Goltz, Metternich and Nigra in Paris. Bismarck told him that a Major von Burg had been sent to Paris with a letter from Wilhelm to Napoleon asking for clarity. (Pottinger p136ff: he sent Burg because he was unhappy with Goltz's reports and wanted a direct route. Goltz sabotaged the mission and this worsened relations with Bismarck.)

Werner-Mensdorff: 'A confidential report from Count Hohenthal yesterday, which I saw, speaks of negotiations that were secretly held between Austria and Prussia on the question of the duchy; Count Bismarck, when asked about this, is said to have stated that they only took place in order to compromise Austria with regard to the medium-sized acts...' Cf. 25 May re Gablenz.

(Pottinger) There was a meeting in Paris with Drouyn and the English and Russian ambassadors in Paris about the proposed congress. And after much to-ing and fro-ing formal invitations were sent on 24 May.

Zerber: Prussia's rail deployment started.

Metternich-Mensdorff (possibly as a consequence of the constant intrigues around Napoleon who lied constantly to everyone): 'I have the feeling of a man who, involved by duty and by patriotism in the events of the day, understands nothing, nothing at all, of the situation.'

Schweinitz (back since 12th) found the Tsar in bad humour after reading despatches from Berlin. Gorchakov was still talking about an Austro-Prussian understanding on Bund reform but clear he would maintain neutrality.

Moltke given a paper from staff warning that 'Public opinion ... is increasingly hostile to the idea of the war. Unless the army is set in motion its morale will be seriously affected.' In Berlin in May lots of institutions lobbied for peace such as the Chamber of Commerce.

Lerman: Last meeting with Gerlach. Gerlach reported he looked 'strikingly serious, pale and agitated'.

(WAF) Bismarck spoke to Benedetti: Major von Burg has returned without delivering the letter (cf. 14/5), Goltz says that Napoleon is preparing a conciliation program with British and Russian ambassadors. Bismarck attacked Napoleon's behaviour saying he was setting up an Austrian grab of Silesia in compensation for Venetia and stressed that Prussia would fight. Bismarck suggested that Benedetti knew about Napoleon's nefarious schemes. Benedetti was alarmed — actually he was in the dark but he feared that he would lose Bismarck's confidence. He complained to Drouyn (19/5): 'they all [all the ambassadors] imagine, and Bismarck with them, that I am in the possession of all your secrets'. Bismarck said to me yesterday that France's other ambassadors are speaking in an anti-Prussian sense 'and how can one believe that they are authorised to speak while you are asked to remain silent'.

(Pottinger) There was a ministerial meeting in Paris. According to Persigny, Drouyn eloquently set out the history of the crisis but proposed nothing. Rouher babbled and pulled out document after document suggesting he was conducting a parallel diplomatic operation, and also proposed no plan. There were discussions about the possibility of stripping Prussia's Rhineland provinces but ministers preferred to aim for the congress. The next day Drouyn told Metternich that he thought an alliance would happen if war broke out or the congress failed.

Goltz-Bismarck: Drouyn says the French military think Austria will win.

Mensdorff: mobilisation is less than half complete. Clark: in early May it was not a third ready, the earliest date for completion was 10 June but that kept getting put back.

A panicky Bodelschwingh told Bismarck that he did not have enough money for war or even enough to guarantee sufficient funds beyond 2 months.

(Pottinger) There was a court ball where Napoleon and Metternich talked in a side room for an hour (reported by Metternich on 23/5). Metternich explained his opposition to a congress based on cession of Venetia: 'Your Majesty has just thrown on the gaming-table a card which we had furtively passed You ... the congress is the first act of hostility undertaken against Austria.' Napoleon said — you will beat Italy but I don't want to have to fight to save Italy or see it destroyed. He asked whether Vienna would accept that Venetia would be given up even if the Austrians won. Metternich was 'horrified' (Pottinger) and Napoleon said this is why we can't do a deal.

On 30 March a provisional offer of the Rumanian throne had been made to Prince Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen. It was confirmed by a referendum 15 April. On 22/5 Prince Charles entered Bucharest. His election was contrary to the Treaty of Paris and a sign of the crumbling old order (Mosse). It had happened with the tacit support of Bismarck and Napoleon. The acceptance by the Powers 'contrasted strikingly' (Mosse) with the Russo-Turkish occupation 17 years earlier in similar circumstances.

Oddly, Vienna missed the fact that the Prince travelled through Vienna by boat down the Danube and missed a chance to arrest him! It turned out the Prince was too scared to do much and Vienna did not have to divert troops to deal with him, contra Bismarck's hope. (Clark p443)

The Times said that Prussia was mistaken in relying on its army and on 23 May, Italy and Prussia have made 'a strange and almost unnatural alliance'; Bismarck's policy of war is unpopular across Germany; 'the Prussian army, which is popular in its constitution and contains a large proportion of educated men, has no spirit for a war condemned by the nation, a war which can give no real glory, and the ultimate consequences of which are likely to be a great national misfortune.' The proceedings of the Bund show how the German people oppose Bismarck's policy. If war starts it is a 'probability' that it is checked by 'some political movement in Germany'. If Austria ignores 'the advice of Europe' on Venetia, 'we assume' that she will remain on the defensive, not attack. 'It is almost needless, however, to repeat that the course of events will be in the main directed by the French Emperor.' During the crisis The Times ran a series of editorials predicting disaster for Prussia. The Manchester Guardian also predicted success for Austria.

What Wawro calls 'a truly spectacular intelligence coup' (p64, footnotes 52,53 for sources): FJ's spies reported that the Prussian General Staff had ordered 150 linen maps of Saxony and Bohemia which highlighted an invasion route through Görlitz and Dresden to Königgratz. Belcredi informed Mensdorff on 22nd and Benedek was told but he ignored the report. (Not in OP, JS, Gall, or I think G Craig.)

Metternich-Mensdorff: 'The Emperor wants to induce us at all costs to yield Venice, and expects to get it either through the war or by means of the congress.' See above 21/5.

Napoleon announced that Britain and Russia supported a congress. (The French accepted that Britain could not commit in advance to forcing anybody to give up territory. Clarendon felt he could not refuse an invitation provided there were no pre-conditions.) Bismarck accepted on 29th, Austria insisted on pre-conditions that doomed it 31 May.

Moltke met Wilhelm: the deployment on the borders of Saxony and Bohemia will be done by 5 June and 'from then on we must not wait a single day before acting.' Austria will not have transported all their forces by then but 'with every succeeding day they will become stronger' and we have to worry about the French intervening. 'Military considerations make it highly desirable that our diplomacy action should come to a conclusion by 5 June.' Blumenthal attended the meeting and recorded that he thought Wilhelm was still hoping for peace but was fearful of an Austrian strike at Berlin.

FJ told Gablenz: 'it was regrettable that these proposals had not been made six or eight weeks earlier, when they would certainly have been accepted'. 26/5: FJ discussed the draft treaty with Mensdorff, Belcredi and Esterhazy and decided not to continue further negotiations unless Gablenz could persuade Bavaria or Saxony to sponsor the deal. Gablenz talked to Beust but obviously he had no interest in the plan. The Gablenz initiative was dead by the end of May. Of course, Bismarck argued to the King: Austria has abandoned negotiations and clearly wants war.

There are three records of him telling people years later a fascinating detail about the secret conversations: that he proposed that Austria and Prussia join forces, attack France, capture Alsace, and make Strasbourg a federal fortress with an Austrian garrison with Prussia garrisoning Mainz. (The 3 accounts: 1880 to Dr Cohen, 1883 to Busch, 1890 to Friedjung: all three accounts agree, says Clark. This seems underweighted by historians.)

In December 1866, Bismarck spoke to Count Wimpffen, sent by FJ to Berlin: '“I wish that we had shot the stag together” was Bismarck's expression. He had believed, he said, that there was a chance in the last hour before the war, when he sent Baron Gablenz to Vienna. That moment seemed to him the most appropriate time to clasp each other's hand and with guns loaded to face in another direction' (Wimpffen-Beust, 6/12/66). At the time Manteuffel was let partly into the secret and he wrote a memo 21/5 on the idea concluding: '... should France object [to this settlement] then we will have a fine war and Austria has the prospect of Milan.'

Bismarck worked seriously on the draft treaty in May amid all the other demands on his time and sent the section on military arrangements to Moltke for comment. Would he have done so if it were not serious? Clark points out he went to the trouble of drafting a treaty between Prussia and Augustenburg in February 1865 despite thinking it would be unnecessary, and a treaty with Oldenburg in June 1865 for the improbable contingency that Austria would accept Oldenburg. Bismarck was an obsessive character who left no promising path unexplored — that he worked on it seriously does not mean that he thought it 'more likely than not to work out'.

On 15 May Werner-Mensdorff: 'A confidential report from Count Hohenthal yesterday, which I saw, speaks of negotiations that were secretly held between Austria and Prussia on the question of the duchy; Count Bismarck, when asked about this, is said to have stated that they only took place in order to compromise Austria with regard to the medium-sized acts...' This is a characteristic comment.

On 25 May Bismarck told Karolyi: Prussia, Austria and Italy should exchange views upon a common attitude in preparation for a possible congress. He urged that Mensdorff 'appear in Paris with the most extensive powers for concluding an agreement with Prussia' and hinted that Mensdorff should not take Biegeleben to Paris. (Karolyi was not in on the secret negotiations so did not understand the significance of the discussion.)

Anton Gablenz told FJ (25/5): 'Your Majesty will presently send a representative to the congress, at the same time conclude the treaty with Prussia in Kiel and quickly ratify it. As soon as the Venetian question is brought up at the congress,Your Majesty's envoy will leave the conference and your Majesty will reply with the ratified treaty. Napoleon of course will be surprised but the sword of justice is taken from him — but history will label the Treaty of Kiel with the motto: revenge for Villa Franca! and revenge will be sweet and sure, for behind the Kiel treaty will stand a million soldiers'. This further shows that Bismarck had been talking in May to Gablenz about possibilities dependent on the congress happening.

Clark thinks Bismarck's main motive was to show Wilhelm — see, I've done all I can to avoid war but Vienna wants it, we have no choice. Further that if Napoleon suddenly tried to intervene, Bismarck had an escape route. The congress was looming at this time, he could not be sure what Napoleon might do (as Napoleon did not know himself!). He was perhaps also thinking he could use the document to incriminate Austria at some point, as he did later with Benedetti. (Clark p419ff).

What do I think? This was a classic example of Bismarck keeping multiple possibilities open as long as possible and some historians' analysis is distorted by forgetting how in May multiple possible futures still seemed possible to Bismarck.

1. This secret backchannel provided him an escape route if various things happened such as a) Wilhelm wobbling again, b) Napoleon and/or Britain intervening, c) a Congress proving unavoidable because of Great Power pressure etc. I think because the Congress did not happen, historians have not considered properly the fact that in May Bismarck had to take seriously the possibility it would happen, and that a significant part of his motive in May was using the Gablenz initiative to weave new combinations for this scenario.

2. One of his core operating principles was: try to make opponents seem unreasonable to key audiences. This gave him a great chance to show Wilhelm and others that 'Austria wants war'.

3. It gave him a means to undermine Austria further with the middle states by making it public if he chose, as per the Benedetti document in 1870.

4. Taking it seriously had no obvious downside. Why turn it down and let Vienna whisper more strongly to Wilhelm via different channels 'you are being dragged into a dishonourable war by Bismarck'?

Clark: It was perhaps a missed opportunity. If the Gablenz initiative had started 2 months earlier before the generals and armies came to the foreground then perhaps it could have worked. For FJ prestige ranked higher than a province and he felt he could not give in to threats, though he might have done a secret deal that allowed him to claim his honour intact. In the end, FJ was right to reject the deal that emerged. Bismarck watered down then removed the secret protocol giving Austria defence against France. The deal was much more skewed to Prussia. It would have alienated Austria's German allies without solving the Italian problem, overstretching the empire and leaving FJ vulnerable to revolts everywhere. But the manner of the rejection was not adroit. Clark thinks Mensdorff and Esterhazy probably did not take the talks too seriously and were stringing them out to buy time and prevent a surprise attack. E.g Mensdorff to Bloomfield 12/5: 'Count Bismarck's plans have been too long and too deeply laid to admit of sufficient modification at the last moment ... to be reconcilable with the interests of the Austrian Empire.'

Clark also quotes a letter from Anton von Gablenz to Wilhelm on 25th in which he wrote that FJ had told him with a sigh that Bismarck had many traits he 'regarded highly' but 'one must never trust him and in this country one cannot forgive him for setting Italy upon us'.

Mensdorff told UK and Russia: we cannot accept Venetia as part of the discussion in a Congress, and said it should first discuss the duchies which were the source of the problem.

Blome-Mensdorff: Pfordten considers his mediation ended and now wants the long- postponed diplomatic initiative.

Crown Council. Stosch attended and wrote his account in a letter to his wife: 'Bismarck gave hints that the war must decisively achieve the rounding off of Prussian territory. That caused the Crown Prince to ask whether there was an intention to annex territory... The King answered angrily that there is no question of war yet and still less of deposing German princes. He wants peace... Bismarck was by far the clearest and sharpest. I became convinced that he had brought about the whole situation in order to encourage the King to be more warlike... The meeting went on for three hours and as we came out the Crown Prince said “we know no more than we did before. The King will not, Bismarck will.”' But Stosch added that Bismarck would soon go to the conference in Paris and 'people see that as decisive because by his absence he loses his power over the King and his opponents, whose number grows each day, gain ground'. (JS, p245)

Gordon Craig dates this Crown Council as 25th. Moltke wanted Wilhelm to declare war as soon as rail movements were complete on or about 5 June and Roon urged this to the King but Wilhelm not only turned this down but refused Bismarck's request to send an ultimatum to Saxony offering neutrality or invasion (p33). (I suspect different accounts are confusing one meeting on 25th.)

G Craig: Benedek arrived at Olmütz HQ, stayed there for 2 weeks. This wasn't appreciated by Prussia until 10 June. Showalter: he arrived on 27th.

Bismarck, 'circular to the missions' (Gall): 'If we were to face a major crisis with the Confederation in its present form, a wholesale revolutionary upheaval in Germany is the most likely outcome, given the instability of circumstances as they are present. That kind of catastrophe can be precluded only by timely reform from above.' (On 14 April 1891 he said, 'German unification was a conservative achievement.')

(WAF) Benedetti met with Bismarck to discuss the Congress. Bismarck suggested Wilhelm would probably accept the invitation but said that the danger of war came from Austrian armaments, not the duchies issue. Benedetti reported to Drouyn that although Wilhelm may prefer to avoid war, probably only the threat of isolation would make Bismarck pull back, otherwise he would try to wreck peace initiatives.

Bome-Mensdorff: Bismarck wants a surprise attack to shorten the war and save money. Cf. Bismarck-Manteuffel 9/6.

Barral-La Marmora: Bismarck said 'with a mark of deep discontent, “The French emperor now wants peace at all costs.”'

(Mosse) Bismarck accepted the invitation to the Congress.

To Goltz: 'In the decisive moment the masses stand by the Monarchy without distinction whether it has a liberal or conservative direction at that moment.' (Barry: in the build up to the war Goltz was telling people like the British Ambassador in Paris that Bismarck had screwed up and 'will be eventually driven from power'.)

Bloomfield-Clarendon: Mensdorff says the Austrian reply 'would contain a declaration that Austria did not seek any territorial aggrandisement or increase of power, and that She trusted the other states would be disposed to make declarations in the same sense. The Roman question would be alluded to.' FJ's approval would be sought the next morning. Bloomfield expressed the fear that the reply would not aid the congress and indicated an intention not to attend. Mensdorff replied that he was ready to set out for Paris, but would not do so 'until he heard further'. (Bismarck had told Karolyi that 'there is a better chance of their coming to an understanding at Paris than elsewhere'.) Either during the afternoon of 30th or the morning of 31st, FJ went over the draft and tightened the reservations. FJ felt he could not cede Venetia under pressure in a Congress and selling it would be dishonourable. There was no formal council but he was 'probably' influenced by Esterhazy (Clark p431).

Wilhelm to Russian Ambassador: 'I feel trapped like a fox indoors. In the end I will have to bite my way out.'

Bodelschwingh resigned ('nervous collapse', Stern), Heydt took over. (They hated each other.) He was distrusted by liberals and conservatives but had good connections to banks and business. He took the job on condition that after the war Parliament would be asked for an indemnity. Bismarck agreed. (Bismarck said of Bodelschwingh: 'I never underestimated how dangerous Bodelschwingh was. Do you know what he is? He's the fox that you think you've shot, throw over your shoulder to take home, and which then bites you in the arse.')

early afternoon (Clark) Vienna informed UK, France, Russia that Austria accepted with pre-conditions: that all powers should renounce any territorial gains and she refused to discuss giving away territory like Venetia on principle. (The official reply went the next day, hence books using 31/5 and 1/6. According to WAF, Bismarck first learned of the Austrian reply on 4th, via Goltz. True?)

Mensdorff hoped the congress would be dead but continued making travel plans. Clark: this was another error, FJ should have attended at least to buy time and improve his diplomatic position. (I agree.) The secondary states complained about Austria's reply. Clarendon and the Tsar expressed disapproval. Napoleon was not really bothered as by now 'his trap had worked and now it could be discarded', as Austria had to press for his alliance (Clark).

The FO were pleased that the failure could not be blamed on England (Millman p.21). Mosse: Even at this stage Napoleon could probably have ensured peace but he hoped to pick something up from the chaos and had 'the mistaken belief that the contestants would be evenly matched'.

Crown Council (Stern). Heydt urged war as soon as possible before anti-war agitation undermined the army. (Around then Marx and Engels predicted the army would mutiny and refuse to fight. Petitions arrived from all parts of Prussia clamouring for peace.) After this, Heydt organised with Bleichröder and Hansemann to sell the Cologne-Minden shares. Other bankers pulled back and Bismarck 'never forgot' this (Stern). 'The Berlin haute finance did not feel strong enough as regards capital to muster the courage to risk what they had for the sake of the nation' (1889). Heydt sold the shares gradually and waited until news came in of Prussian victories so the price rose.

Instructions and notice were sent from Vienna to German courts, on 1 June the Austrian ambassador to the Bund denounced the Prussian occupation of Holstein as illegal and in breach of the terms of the Convention of Gastein and in breach of the Diet's rules, and proposed a resolution calling for the Bund to decide the Duchies — and accused Prussia of plotting with Austria's enemies and intending to use force. Austria had thereby renounced the deal of January 1864 and Gastein. Pflanze misdates this as 11th. When did Bismarck find out this had happened?)

At this point it was still thought the Congress might happen. At the same time, Gablenz was told to call the Estates of Holstein to give their opinion. (This had been discussed in May but delayed until now because of the Gablenz affair and the military timetable.)

Bismarck pushed preparations for various national groups to start revolutions to destroy Austria if necessary.

Cf. meetings with Kiss de Nemesker around 7-12 May. He met an agent from the revolutionaries 'in late May' (Pflanze).

On 1 June Bismarck telegraphed approval for the recruitment of a Slavic corps in Serbia. On 3 June some veterans of the 1848 Hungarian revolution were summoned to Berlin.

Gall (p294): Bismarck, via Usedom, invited Türr to Berlin and together with him and another Hungarian revolutionary from 1848-9, General Klapka, discussed the formation of a Hungarian legion. Türr arrived in Berlin on 10/6, on 11/6 Bismarck told Usedom to make a commitment to the Italian government to reimburse half the costs of such an undertaking and to ask them for an advance in order to get things moving from the Italian end immediately. (According to Pottinger in June Bismarck sent Türr to offer Paris a deal with Belgium and Luxembourg replacing the Rhineland.)

He also discussed another force under Garibaldi attacking the Dalmatian coast and had agents contact Rumanian nationalists.

(When Prussian troops entered Bohemia they tried to provoke a nationalist uprising but the response was 'limp' (Pflanze).) Clark: The Rumanian attempt led nowhere.

To a French journalist 'around this time' (Gall): 'I am pursuing my objective with the clearest of consciences as it seems to me to be right for my country and for Germany. As far as means are concerned, I use those that in the absence of others present themselves to me.'

A royal edict gave Moltke the authority to issue orders directly to troops rather than via the Ministry of War. Wilhelm's note to the Ministry of War informed it that 'from this date my orders for the operations and the movements of the main army and its isolated detachments will be communicated to subordinate commanders by the Chief of the Great General Staff of the Army [Moltke].You will, for your part, at the same time keep the Ministry of War informed of developments' (Wilhelm to Moltke).

GC: there is no sign of Bismarck objecting to the partial sidelining of his ally Roon, and later claims that Bismarck opposed this move are wrong. Moltke did not have Roon's appreciation of the primacy of politics.

Bismarck met Govone. According to a document that leaked years later when Bismarck was still alive, he suggested that being 'much less German than Prussian' he was willing in some circumstances to cede the region between the Rhine and the Moselle but Wilhelm would not agree. (He also told Govone what a nightmare Augusta was and that 'If I could do what I wanted with the king, ... if I could sleep with him as the queen does, everything would be fine'.)

Eyck: Govone asked him if any frontier would satisfy Napoleon and he replied: 'Oh yes, the Moselle. I am much less German than Prussian. I would have no objection to ceding to France the whole of the territory between Moselle and the Rhine: the Palatinate and part of the Prussian Rheinprovinz. But the King is under the influence of the Queen, he would have the greatest scruples and agree to these cessions only at a moment when it is a question of either gaining all or losing all.' Two days later (4th) he told Benedetti that he would try to influence Wilhelm over the Upper Moselle and Luxembourg.

Metternich met Napoleon at Tuileries (reported to Mensdorff on 6th). Napoleon said: 'We must frankly discuss the Venetian question for without its solution, at least in prospect, we cannot reach an understanding.' He took from the drawer of his desk a 'petit projet bien court et bien simple'. Napoleon offered Metternich French neutrality on two conditions: 1) the cession of Venetia after the war in all circumstances, 2) the promise not to make territorial changes without French consent, if the balance of power in Germany were threatened. 'If you accept what I propose nothing will embroil us anymore, if you think you must refuse, I shall be forced to arm and eventually to intervene.' Metternich protested 'Your Majesty holds the knife at our throat.' The meeting ended on a personal and friendly note but the demand was clear. (Clark p434-5).

Pottinger: Napoleon admitted he'd been discussing options with Bismarck including the Rhineland but it had come to nothing.

Napoleon summoned Drouyn and Gramont (who had come to Paris a fortnight earlier ostensibly on a family matter) and asked the latter to start secret negotiations on the basis of his petit projet. After back and forth (Clark p435), FJ called a council on 11th.

Bismarck sent a note to the Powers saying that Austria's response to the Congress offer was 'a deliberate, direct provocation and a desire to force a rupture of relations and war'. (Presumably this is after the telegram from Paris below?)

Bismarck met Benedetti. He suggested that Wilhelm wanted French compensation to be confined to French-speaking areas but he may be persuaded France should have the region of the upper Moselle and Luxembourg, but would definitely not give up the lower Rhine. (When these documents (re 2&4 June) emerged years later, he denounced the first and the second was explained as an offer he knew Napoleon would not accept, designed to smoke out the terms offered to Austria (OP, p302). Surely Pflanze is right — Bismarck was never the dogmatic type who would have said 'never' to the sacrifice of German soil. His comments on the 30 April about selling the coal mines in the Saar to avoid loss in the event of having to cede them to France suggest his true view — try to avoid it but prepare for the worst. OP — if Napoleon had responded cunningly to Wilhelm's March letter about a 'more intimate entente', Bismarck would have had to offer the frontiers of 1814 and would have done so (p303). I agree.)

(WAF) Benedetti was in Bismarck's office when a telegram arrived from Goltz announcing the conditions Austria had attached to the congress.

(WAF) General Gablenz in Holstein ordered the convocation of the estates of the duchy, which was seized on by Prussia as a pretext for military deployments.

Zerber: Prussian rail deployment ended (JS agrees on 5th/6th, citing Roon's papers). Moltke wanted the war to start now. This is roughly 'four weeks' from the first week of May, cf. 7 June 1865 correspondence between Bismarck-Moltke.

Craig: Beck arrives at HQ, suggests to Benedek an aggressive push north to try to persuade south Germans to get involved. Benedek says No. Around this time, a successful operation tapped telegraph wires and Austrian agents in Silesia read signals between 2nd Army and Berlin. These persuaded Benedek that Prussia was massing for an attack from Silesia.

Prussian troops entered Holstein, encountered no resistance from the Austrians who withdrew into Hanover. (The 'first act of war' on 10th, JS; 8th Wawro, 9th Gall & EF). JS — Bismarck was enraged that Manteuffel had let them march out with full honours. Writing angrily to Manteuffel he remembered that Manteuffel was an admirer of Schiller's Wallenstein: he quoted one of the characters that 'now it is time for alarm' and copied some lines under his signature ('Lingering irresolute, with fitful fears / I drew the sword — it was with an inward strife... I fight now for my head and for my life.'). OP — this was the first skirmish, to the 'mutual distress' of those in the Ballplatz and Wilhelmstrasse the Austrians withdrew. (No mention in OP of the exchange with Manteuffel.)

Clark (p463ff) There was confusion between Gablenz-Vienna with telegrams and messengers crossing. Gablenz thought his army would be destroyed or forced to surrender and he wanted to retreat. Vienna wanted a skirmish to trigger the conflict so she could ask the German states to get going. Manteuffel also did not do what Bismarck wanted. Manteuffel told the Austrians on 11th that he would march into Altona the next day regardless of their actions, Gablenz withdrew across the Elbe in the dead of night, cheered by Holsteiners with whom he was popular. (Great example of the fog of war — neither set of local leaders did what those in the capital wanted!)

Prussia presented a text of a new German constitution which would exclude Austria and with a lower chamber elected by direct (but not yet 'equal') universal suffrage. It included proposals for federal authority over:

• tariffs
• commercial legislation
• weights and measures
• coinage
• banking
• patents
• intellectual property
• freedom of movement
• German shipping
• German railway system
• navigation on waterways
• postal and telegraph system
• a common code of civil jurisprudence

Hamerow: Bismarck was articulating the desires of liberal businessmen for years. Even now on 10th Wilhelm held back from war. Bismarck said to a Hungarian General: 'I have not yet succeeded in convincing the King that war is immediately necessary. But what does it matter — I've led the horse to the ditch. Il faut, qu'il saute' (he has to jump).

The acceptance of universal suffrage was a weapon in the war against Austria and other foreign countries, in the war for German unity, as well as a threat to use the last weapons in the struggle against coalitions. In a war of this sort, when it becomes a matter of life and death, one does not look at the weapons that one seizes, nor the value of what one destroys in using them: one is guided at the moment by no other thought than the issue of the war, and the preservation of one's external independence. The settling of affairs and reparation of the damage has to take place after the peace.'

The next day (11th) he asked Treitschke to draft a speech for Wilhelm to give on the declaration of war. JS — by now Treitschke supported Bismarck's desire for a small German state excluding Austria, and thought it 'terrible' that Bismarck was 'the most hated man in Germany' whose ideas had been met with 'such humiliating coldness', though after they finally met he wrote in shock: 'Of the moral powers in the world he has not the slightest notion.' (At some point, possibly after Sadowa, Bismarck encouraged Treitschke to put some details in the public domain: '[I]t is not politically useful to leave the genesis of contemporary history in the dark' he wrote to Treitschke.)

JS: Bismarck 'miscalculated' and 'overestimated the power of these monarchies [Saxony and others] and the loyalty of their subjects. Had he known how easily the princes would surrender their sovereignty (Hanover was a stubborn exception) he would never have introduced universal suffrage' and by the late 1880s he was considering ending universal suffrage to fix his error. (True?? Cf. his comments in Memoirs on this subject.)

Eyck: 'There is no longer any doubt that Bismarck's foresight was at fault and that his calculations were completely wrong' viz universal suffrage (p115). He did succeed in weakening the liberals but the real winners were social democracy and the Centre Party.

Gordon Craig: Moltke told by 2nd Army that Austrians seemed not to be planning drive into Bohemia but massing at Olmütz.

By 11 June Moltke was 'irretrievably committed' to concentrating on Austria and leaving commanders in the west with modest forces and Bismarck was supportive of this (Barry).

Council in Vienna, agreed a deal with Napoleon on Venetia. FJ summarised negotiations with Paris. If we don't agree an alliance, then France will sign an alliance with Prussia, which has agreed to cede Rhine provinces and is negotiating with Italy to extend their alliance beyond 8 July. 'Under these circumstances, with the pistol at our breast, there seemed no other choice but to enter the negotiations'. FJ asked Mensdorff to summarise the current proposal. No one questioned whether Prussia really had offered Rhine provinces. Only Esterhazy questioned whether Napoleon's pistol was really loaded, pointing out that the suggested text was so loosely drafted that a different interpretation was possible (i.e. that Austria might escape the obligation to cede Venetia). Nobody opposed signing the deal. FJ concluded 'with an expression of regret for the soldiers who would have to fight in vain for Venetia' (Clark p437), emphasis added).

Mensdorff and Gramont signed a secret treaty with Napoleon (and exchanged some explanatory notes) to buy his neutrality (which he had already decided). Agreed to cede Venetia even in victory. Austria also agreed France could have Belgium. France agreed that Austria could gain territory in Germany provided it did not 'disturb the European balance by establishing an Austrian hegemony'. FJ told Gramont he expected to take Silesia and let some south German states grow, he would not oppose a new independent German state in the Rhineland, and there was some haggling over compensation for potentially dispossessed princes and dukes.

This deal bought French neutrality and got hazy French support for Vienna's war aims. But it made a fight with Italy meaningless — Austria fought a two-front war for 'honour'! If she'd accepted the loss of Venetia when everyone was telling her to sacrifice it months earlier, she could have bought peace with Italy, wrecked Bismarck's plan and perhaps have preserved peace — but if war had somehow come anyway it would not have been a two-front war. Clark points out that although it looks very foolish now, having made the errors she had made over the previous 3 years by June she was boxed in — it was not stupid to worry that if Vienna refused Venetia, then Napoleon could throw his lot in with Prussia and Italy, as most contemporaries thought at the time this would happen. But Vienna failed to check a) if Bismarck really had offered the Rhineland (he hadn't but had let Paris fool itself, as it would soon discover), b) if Napoleon really were seriously contemplating mobilising the army (he actually wasn't) (Clark p437).

NB.This sort of disaster is what happens when you a) can't face reality and can't prioritise among conflicting goals and b) face an enemy who does both.

Over May-June Napoleon focused more on Austria than on Bismarck. His advisers were 'nearly unanimous' (OP) that Austria would win. Showalter writes (p153) that it was 'the almost universal conviction of French military experts that Prussia and Austria were an even match' [emphasis added] therefore France would have a great opportunity to step in and grab what it wanted. Barry writes that Napoleon's military attaché in Berlin was one of the few who advised that Prussia would win. EF also says Napoleon thought Austria would win. (Wawro dates this Austrian offer to 9th, and with much understatement describes this move as indicating 'a lack of brilliance in Austrian diplomacy' p43.)

Pottinger: the general view in 'almost all circles in France' in spring and early summer was Austria would win, and both Bismarck and Metternich thought Napoleon believed this. In May General Desvaux gave Napoleon glowing accounts after touring the Austrian army. Eugénie and Drouyn agreed. There were two groups, a) around the Minister of War (Marshal Randon, a veteran of Napoleon's invasion of Russia!) who thought Austria would win, and b) around some younger figures, such as the able Bourbaki (who had observed Prussian exercises), who thought Prussia would win. When the Prussian military attaché left Paris on the outbreak of war, both Randon and Bourbaki made their views clear to him and the latter said that France might pay highly for her error. The French attaché in Berlin had reported on Prussia's intense training and preparation since December, and he estimated Prussia could mobilise in just 25 days. He also said that Prussian troops did not appear enthusiastic and the public were unhappy about the war. In contrast the French attaché in Vienna [clearly useless and distracted by his wife's health] reported great Austrian morale, many volunteers and great support in Vienna. It was also thought in Paris that Austria being a bigger country could muster further reserves, so even if Prussia won some early victories Austria would wear her down. The idea of a single knockout blow does not seem to have been seriously considered (p103).

Showalter, very confusingly, suggests (p154) that 'Despite operating under the gun, Mensdorff managed to make the cession of Venetia contingent upon Austrian victory over Prussia' — as if this was a diplomatic success!? He seems to misunderstand completely the point that Austria's diplomacy rendered the war pointless.

Mensdorff instructed Karolyi to ask for his papers. He and Bismarck exchanged polite farewells and Karolyi left that evening.

(Barry) Bismarck described two scenarios to the Crown Council: if the middle states stay neutral, all the troops scattered in the west will be moved to Silesia and Bohemia; if not, they must take immediate action against the middle states starting with Hanover. (This meeting is unmentioned anywhere else.)

At the last plenary meeting of the diet in Frankfurt, Austria's resolution mobilising the Bund was passed 9:5 (Carr & Showalter: 8:5). (Barry: it was unclear until the last moment how the vote would go.) The Prussian delegate walked out and declared that the Constitution of the Bund had been broken and Prussia saw the Confederation as dissolved. German opinion was pro-Austrian. Saxony was securely on Austria's side. When Austrian troops left Frankfurt, they were cheered; the Prussians left without cheers.

EF: Prussia only had the support of states she virtually surrounded — two Mecklenburgs, Brunswick, and Anhalt.

Eyck: Bismarck's order specified that the Prussian representative should make the declaration regardless of how the vote went (i.e his arguments about legality were spurious).

Showalter: this vote was what finally persuaded Wilhelm there was no alternative to war.

Clark: the diplomacy around this vote was a further clumsy error by Vienna. The situation was so chaotic neither Berlin nor Vienna knew how vote would go. Baden was neutral but Hanover and Hesse-Cassel voted with Austria, Saxony, Wurtemberg, Hesse-Darmstadt, Nassau.

Bismarck advised the heir to the throne of Electoral Hesse — take a special train to Cassel and secure neutrality. He refused. Bismarck — if you don't and we win, Electoral Hesse will cease to exist. He refused and observed that '800,000 good Austrian troops have still a word to say on the matter'.

Ultimatums sent by Prussia to Hanover, Dresden, and Kassel. They were rejected. At midnight Prussian troops started marching. Bismarck strolls with Loftus in the garden behind the Foreign Office. Loftus recounted the drama: 'We had been walking and sitting in his garden til a later hour, when, to my astonishment, it struck midnight. Bismarck took out his watch and said, “At this moment our troops are marching into Hanover, Saxony and Electorate of Hesse-Kassel. The struggle will be severe. Prussia may lose but she will, at all events, have fought bravely and honourably. If we are beaten I shall not return here. I shall fall in the last charge. One can only die once and, if beaten, it is better to die.”'

Saxon troops withdrew to Bohemia.

The Times: 'Whether under Prussian or Austrian hegemony, the country must emerge more consolidated than at present, more capable of preserving peace within its limits and repelling aggression from abroad. If, then, events shall prove that the Confederation is now a thing of the past, there may be no reason to regret the change.'

Bethmann Hollweg wrote to Wilhelm that Bismarck's policy since 1863 has been that of a gambler — 'the steps of a man who proceeds at random, throws everything into a tangle, and brings things to a situation from which he may make his profit, or of a gambler who after every loss only punts higher and finally cries va banque!' He has destroyed confidence in your words, he wrote, 'by a policy full of intrigue'. In the chaos Wilhelm didn't open it until he was at Nikolsburg in July and he wrote: 'I first opened your letter at Nikolsburg and the place and date of my answer should be answer enough.'

Prussian & Austrian mobilisation, June 1866 (Wawro)

By mid-June, Moltke had 'been forced' by the delays and Wilhelm's meddling (Wawro) to split the army into four groups small enough to be transported quickly by rail: one was on the Hanoverian border, two around Saxony and Bohemia, and one ~500km east of Halle in Upper Silesia near Neisse, separated from the other three by Bohemia's Giant Mountains.

The basic plan: invade Saxony and other German states, penetrate Bohemia and envelop Benedek's North Army with three mobile groups. (He had wanted to concentrate more around Saxony.) Moltke assumed Benedek would try to reconquer Upper Silesia and Breslau, lost to Prussia in 1740. It was a surprise when Benedek put his North Army not in Bohemia but Moravia in a defensive formation around Olmütz. The Iser Army was to hold the Iser River to support the Saxons (this was forced on Benedek by FJ).

(some say 17 or 18) Bismarck published a manifesto from Wilhelm, 'To the German people' (others say 'nation' - which was it?). The Bund has lost the trust of the nation by illegal mobilisation against Prussia. Prussia is fighting for the 'living unity of the German nation' and the 'national development of Germany'. Austria 'will not consider Prussia as her natural ally but as a hostile rival'. I've tried to avoid war but Austria refuses to make peace. 'Our opponents deceive themselves if they imagine Prussia to be paralysed by dissensions at home... We are compelled to fight for existence... If God gives us the victory we shall be strong enough to reunite more firmly and more prosperously those loosened ties of Germany which they who fear the right and power of the national spirit have torn asunder.'

FJ, worried by Benedek's inactivity, took the unusual action of ordering him to leave Olmütz and move closer to the Prussians. The order arrived 'hours before the Prussian invasion of Hanover and Saxony on June 16' (Wawro). Benedek headed for Josephstadt.

Clowley-Clarendon: Napoleon will want compensation if Prussia controls north Germany.

Wright-Seward (US State Department): When someone pointed out the number of peace demonstrations, Bismarck replied, 'Events change public opinion and a battle won, or even a battle lost, strangely alters men's minds'.

Austria published a 'war manifesto'. Prussia is 'under the influence of an ungovernable craving after aggrandisement'. (It did not set out a picture of how the German issue would be solved after an Austrian victory.) Prussia did not declare war on Austria but treated this publication as equivalent to a declaration of war by Austria. (Showalter: this was 18th. No.)

(16th Eyck) Usedom (Ambassador in Florence) sent his 'stab-in-the-heart dispatch' in which he urged La Marmora (Italian PM) to march on Vienna to support the Hungarian and Slavic insurgents. Cf. June for Bismarck's contacts with multiple revolutionary groups. (Some of these secret discussions were revealed by La Marmora in the Italian Parliament on 21 July 1868, including reading out the Usedom telegram of 17/6. It caused a sensation. Bismarck issued false denials, claimed forgeries, blamed Usedom. Eyck: The plan was a failure — the Hungarians turned on the pro-Prussian forces. One of the leaders was sentenced to death by Austria and Bismarck threatened to shoot ten prisoners in Trautenau unless he was released. Everybody was released, cf, 8 July.)

On 17, 18, 19 June Prussia occupied successively Hanover, Dresden, and Kassel. Saxons had not been able to agree a policy, now the 32k army retreated over its own border into Bohemia.

(Craig, 1866, p41-2) Benedek began to march towards the Elbe. On 18th Moltke was still unsure whether Austria would aim for Silesia or Lusatia.

Bismarck passed on to Falckenstein a telegram from his representative in Karlsruhe reporting that Federal forces were 'still fully disorganised. A speedy advance by Prussia against Frankfurt would make any organisation impossible and would easily lead to a second Rossbach' (a reference to a stunning Prussian victory over Austria and France won by Frederick the Great against numerical odds in 1757). GC: Apparently under the influence of this telegram Falckenstein, when he lost contact with the Hanoverian army on 22nd, broke off the pursuit and headed for Frankfurt, though Moltke deployed other troops to subdue Hanover.

Zerber: Moltke developed final plan for advance into Bohemia. His hope for a lead in mobilisation had failed. Between Austrians moving on 27 April and Prussia between 3-12 May, Prussia had lost ~6-15 days. Prussia was ready on 6 June but did not move until 16 June, another 10 day delay. Moltke only ordered advance on 23 June. According to Moltke's pre-war calculations, Austria should now have been full strength. His plan 'did not survive contact with the German Chancellor'.

'By optimising Prussia's diplomatic and political situation, Bismarck was endangering the Prussian army's chances of winning a military victory. This was short-sighted. Even Bismarck needed a quick military victory, for a stalemate would allow the intervention of Napoleon III. Moltke had developed a sophisticated war plan to produce a quick victory, which Bismarck blithely ignored. Bismarck had his own conception of war... [He] was oblivious to the fact that mass armies and rail mobility were changing the nature of war and therefore were also changing the conditions of [politics].'

(Zerber seems to me right that the 'Moltke's plan was executed as he foresaw' argument is clearly wrong and some revisionism is needed. But he overstates parts of the argument. He does not address the fact that Bismarck had been constantly trying to push Wilhelm into action but could not do it until Austria clearly mobilised. He did not 'blithely ignore' the plans, as the deal with Italy showed he was trying very hard to combine military planning with the diplomacy — but 1) he could not get Wilhelm to think through and accept an approach that connected the diplomatic game and the military plans, 2) he had no direct authority of any kind over the military and 3) Moltke's own authority was tenuous despite the order of 2 June and there was neither a clear plan nor clear authority on the Prussian side, so both he and Moltke had to devise ad hoc schemes in a desperate scramble.)

Italy declared war on Austria activating the Prussian alliance. (Carr & Showalter: 20th.) Italy committed over 200,000 men to their offensive in Venetia, forcing the Austrians to divert an extra 100,000 troops to the southern front.

Bismarck met Unruh (arranged by Bleichröder). Unruh bemoaned 'the absolute indifference' of the population. He asked Bismarck to restore the Constitution but he replied that he wanted to but Wilhelm would not budge ('everybody thinks he can do everything. He, too, is only human.') After victory he would resign rather than continue the conflict, he claimed. He informed Bleichröder of the conversation, clearly happy for people to realise that he was building bridges (Stern, p87).

Cowley: 'Poor Austria! I cannot but fear that this is the end of her.'

Prussia invaded Bohemia.

Buchanan-Clarendon: Gorchakov agrees that Prussia does not have the right to abolish the Bund alone and says the powers who want to preserve 'right and legality' should jointly 'declare their intentions'. By now this was all hot air. Revertera reported to Mensdorff (20th) that the government's sympathies were with Austria.

Austria defeated Italy at Custozza and there was now a chance that Austria could transfer forces to the north: Moltke's entire strategy 'was dead just as the Prussian offensive started' (Zerber). Moltke had spread his forces to give a chance to attack an under-strength army but delays meant he now had to concentrate his forces as fast as possible against a full strength enemy. The planning documents were not published until 1896 and this allowed the Myth to spread (p132). (But the Austrian forces did not transfer to the north.)

Richard Evans (Pursuit of Power, p259): 'After their defeat by Prussia, the Austrians realised they could not continue to fight the Italians, despite their victory of Custoza, and capitulated, leaving the peace settlement to cede the rest of northern Italy to the the Italian state'. No. Austria had already secretly agreed with France before the war to hand over Venetia in any event, thus rendering the Italian fighting essentially pointless (cf. 12 June).

First round of voting in Prussian election showed swing to conservatives.

Russell's Cabinet resigned (the last Whig government), 28 June Derby replaced Russell as PM and Stanley replaced Clarendon as Foreign Secretary. In June London was dominated by discussion over the Reform Bill, not the European situation. There were rallies in London. On 29 June 10,000 marched from Trafalgar Square to the Carlton Club to vent frustration at the defeat of the Reform Bill. On 2 July a march turned violent in the West End. (Clarendon blamed Gladstone's 'obstinacy' for the government falling and thought 'his temper unfits him for supreme command' (to Cowley 26/6).

When Victoria suggested to Derby that he put Stanley elsewhere ('May he not be inclined to go too far in the line of noninterference'?), Derby replied that the FO was not best suited to Stanley but 'Lord Stanley is better suited to the Foreign Office than any other person whose services he can command', since unfortunately 'so few of our public men give much of their attention to foreign affairs.' Stanley had written to his father in April saying this position 'is that of all others for which I judge myself least fit.' Clarendon refused Derby's offer (on the Queen's instruction) to stay in the role despite the change of government (he disliked Derby and hated Disraeli). Clarendon said that 'the policy of not meddling is of course the right one but it is not necessary that all mankind shd. be let into the secret twice a day': 'he [Stanley] says himself that he knows and cares nothing about Foreign Affairs but he is clever, industrious ... at any rate he must do better than ... Disraeli'. Russell said he felt 'dread' at the thought of Stanley in the FO and thought if he became PM it would be 'a fore-runner of the downfall of this country'. Over the next few weeks the Queen voiced her concern that Stanley's vocal non-interference would lead to a big fall in influence. On 28th in response to news that Prussia had suffered a military reverse, Clarendon wrote to Cowley: 'the Prussians seem to have got a licking and the joy thereat in London knows no bounds — I believe that the Queen will be as well pleased as her subjects'.

The Times: 'it is difficult to believe that any good strategical purpose can be served by an invasion of Bohemia... [W]hatever the plan may have been, it seems to have been defeated.' Interestingly, the second leader says: 'It is a most agreeable feature of the present political crisis that all the foreign relations of the country should be in a satisfactory state. No troublesome embroilment or estrangement exists between our own and any other Government... [O]ur relations with the United States, which in importance transcend those with any European Power, have been gradually brought to a point of more cordial understanding than has subsisted for years.' (The third leader is also interesting — it says that everyone notices speeches in Parliament, few beyond the Cabinet see 'wisdom in council', and 'administrative ability is often rewarded with no acknowledgement at all'.)

Hanoverian army defeated. (29th Wawro, Craig, Eyck). Craig: with small forces and few losses, Prussia had cleared north Germany, linked its scattered territories, and detached states with rich resources from the Habsburg alliance. Occupation of Saxony had been very valuable. Moltke did not have to worry about complications in the west while dealing with Austria.

He wrote to Cathy Orlov: 'I am not allowed to sleep anymore and I nevertheless need a lot of sleep; my energies are being exhausted physically and mentally. After days of hard work without a break I am always being summoned to the king at 1 or 3 o'clock in the night.'

Prussia beat Austria at Gitschin. This 'awakened in the whole Austrian Army the thought that the war was lost' (G Craig). Zerber: now the 2nd Army realised it was facing the main Austrian force and reported to Moltke who now realised the bulk of Austrian forces could not have reached the Iser (p136). Showalter — on 29th Benedek was already defeatist and when the news reached him of Gitschin he ordered a retreat towards Olmütz.

(Stern) Bismarck left Berlin with a hoard of gold coins strapped to his body. Zerber: Moltke and Wilhelm left Berlin, arrived in Bohemia on 1 July. (Were Wilhelm, Bismarck and Moltke together?)

King, Bismarck and others at Reichenberg (check, seems a long way to go to Jicin in 24h?). In his Memoirs, Bismarck said that a sharp operation by the enemy could have captured the King, he pointed this out and suggested changes, and the military were annoyed at his interference. 'This was the germ of a bad feeling towards me on the part of the military authorities on account of my personal position towards the King, which proceeded from departmental jealousy and was destined to develop still further in the course of this campaign and of the French war.' Barry: two days later he wrote to his wife and asked her to send him 'a revolver of large calibre'. (He couldn't get someone to find him one?!)

Benedek, on the verge of nervous collapse (Wawro), telegraphed Vienna: 'Pray conclude a peace at any price ... A catastrophe of the army is inevitable.' FJ telegraphed that immediate peace was a diplomatic and political impossibility and asked, 'Has a battle been fought yet?' (Showalter: the line was not FJ's but was added by an advisor as an insult to goad Benedek into action.) Showalter: Benedek's army lurched into Königgrätz throughout the 1st in chaos. Benedek decided that crossing the Elbe immediately was impossible and he ordered a halt to sort themselves out. When his generals met him on 2nd most assumed the discussion would be about how to continue the retreat, such was the chaos and low morale. By 2nd, his army's staff 'had ceased to function at any level above routine order-drafting'.

Showalter: Wilhelm's HQ arrived at Gitschin/Jicin on 1st. On 2 July Wilhelm, Moltke Frederick Charles and others discussed the situation. Most officers argued for bringing the armies together. Moltke insisted on the advantages of keeping them apart and advancing against Austria's front and flank, and the three armies were close enough together to provide support — whichever Benedek attacked, the other two of the three could join in. Wilhelm agreed with him. Late that night, intelligence arrived of Benedek's position — west of the Elbe, with the river at his back. Wilhelm and Moltke were in bed when the news arrived. Moltke started writing orders: pin the army against the Elbe and destroy it. The royal HQ left Gitschin about 5am and three hours later Wilhelm and Moltke were on high ground near the village Dub.

(Pottinger) Mensdorff cabled Metternich saying — ask Napoleon to affect an armistice on the southern front between Austria and Italy, then Austria will immediately arrange to cede Venetia, thus freeing the army to concentrate in the north. Napoleon asked for a day to think. (Both Vienna and Paris were too late as usual. This also exposes the stupidity of the entire Austrian approach — now they were prepared to ditch Venetia, if they'd done this any time before June...! Why is this cable so little mentioned?!)

Cowley-Clarendon: 'The Emperor is getting alarmed at his Frankenstein.'

Austria smashed at Königgrätz/Sadowa. At the end of the battle, someone in the King's entourage said to Bismarck, 'Your Excellency, you are now a great man but if the Crown Prince had arrived too late, you would be the greatest villain in the world.' After the battle, he rode to Horitz with Wilhelm. There was nowhere for him to sleep. As he entered a courtyard he slipped and fell in a manure pit. He slept outside on a cushion until the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg took pity on him and gave him a bed.

Elections: conservatives rose from 28 to 142, Progressives from 143 to 83, left centrists from 110 to 65 (OP).

JS: conservatives from 38 to 123.

Gall: conservatives from 35 to 136; left centrists and PP down from 247 to 148.

GC: conservatives 38 to 142.

EF: conservatives 35 to 136; PP 141 to 95; centrist liberal groups 106 to 77.

The timing was accidental. If they had come a few days later when the news came through, the conservatives would obviously have done better. The Government's slogan was 'For us or against the soldiers' (OP leaves out 'us'). The earlier round of voting was on 25 June and had already shown a swing to conservatives.

GC: Before the result of the battle was known crucial newspapers had already deserted the liberals.

Hamerow: Turnout 30% (34% 1862). 1.14 million voted in these elections, having fluctuated between 1m and 500k since 1849. This roughly tallies with the number who attended political meetings in the early 1860s, ~1-2m. Conservatives from 36 to 136, liberals from 258 to 172.

'The war of 1866 did not arise from self defence against a threat to our own existence, nor was it called for by public opinion and the voice of the people. It was a struggle recognised in council as necessary, aimed at for a very long time, and prepared with calmness. It was a struggle not for the acquisition of land, the expansion of territory, or material gain, but for an ideal good, for a position of power.' Moltke, ~1880.

First Army (Lusatia) was commanded by Prince Frederick Charles, Wilhelm's nephew.

Second Army (Silesia) was commanded by the Crown Prince.

Factors in the war:

1. More productive agriculture made bigger armies possible
2. Conscription
3. Better maps
4. Spread of watches allowed more time specific orders
5. Railway and telegraph
6. Longer range, faster, and more accurate guns
7. Spreading education (universal in Prussia)
8. Mass opinion. Hamerow (p396): Treitschke said that 'the saddest thing is: only through a mass movement can a revolution succeed, but our masses think of everything except German unity.' Bismarck said near the end of his life: 'I had believed that in the creation of the Reichstag on the basis of universal male suffrage I had found a corrective against the centrifugal force of gravitation of dynastic strivings, and thereby I had overestimated the energy of the national feeling in the mass of the voters.' Hamerow argues the masses of central Europe were largely 'neither nationalist not particularist' but swayed with the wind'. Left to themselves they would have stuck with the status quo but when it changed after 1866 they changed. The great believers in nationalism were among the educated middle classes.
9. Prussian General Staff
10. Moltke: strategic offensive (using railways), tactical defensive (Austria vice versa)
11. Auftragstaktik and trusting NCOs
12. Wargaming and lessons learned
13. Needle gun and training, not relying just on 'shock tactics' (charge with bayonets)
14. Benedek was the type who liked to boast he'd never read a book
15. Austria had no staff to compare with the Prussian and had inferior training (many soldiers could not communicate in the same language as officers and needed mimes).

Showalter: Not until 1858 did Austria make the military use of railways the responsibility of the general staff and even after this the section was 'undermanned and marginalised'. Over two billion florins were spent on the army in FJ's first decade but much went to theft, bribery and corruption as well as sinecures and pensions. In 1862 spending on the army was double Prussia's and almost equal to France's. 45% of Austrian state spending went to the armed forces 'in that decade' [1850s or 1852-62?]. Reductions from 179M florins 1861 to 139M 1862 and 118M in 1863 were not short-sighted but reflected parliamentary hostility to the government's attempts to divert army spending to nonmilitary ends like pensions and sinecures. They didn't start planning for railway use until 1863 and it was not done well. Although there were attempts after 1859 to improve physical fitness, there was little effort to improve marksmanship because it was assumed few of their soldiers could learn. Benedek was terrible but he hadn't wanted the job and had pointed out he understood Italy, not Germany.

In the morning of the battle at Sadowa, the First Army made no progress advancing against the Austrians and by lunchtime the Prussian high command were worried. Also in the morning the armies clashed to the north in the Swiepwald. A desperate Prussian defence held out and absorbed huge pressure. Moltke refused to commit 1st Army's reserves to help. Mollinary's actions were similar to Daniel Sickles at Gettysburg — a subordinate committed a good part of the army to a sector the commander did not regard as decisive. Arguably Benedek, having lost control, should have reinforced Mollinary. He neither stopped him nor reinforced him. Scholars have wondered whether a full Austrian all-out attack around noon, before the 2nd Army arrived, could have routed the 1st Army.

Showalter: It was a more near-run thing than some such as Wawro think. Moltke's separation of the armies left them vulnerable to a more able commander who could have decisively attacked either the 1st or 2nd Army before they had time to come together. If the 1st Army had been held at Gitschin and the 2nd thrown back into Silesia — if on 3rd the North Army had not had to retreat headlong but still held high ground and was ready to fight another day — then this might have changed the political considerations and forced Prussia to negotiate. Benedek's incompetence meant rapid disaster and no time for diplomacy to help.

Prussian artillery was generally outclassed and did not contribute significantly. The combination of the needle gun and tactical flexibility was decisive.

'Entre une bataille perdue et une bataille gagnée la distance est immense, il y a des empires.' ['Between a lost battle and a won battle the distance is immense, there are empires.] Napoleon before the battle of Leipzig.

Spectator: 'The political face of the world has changed as it used to change after a generation of war... Prussia has leaped in a moment into the position of the first Power of Europe.'

Gordon Craig: Moltke dismayed many by flouting conventional theories about interior lines and concentrating forces.

'If one considers the economy with which Moltke employed material forces in order to achieve results according to a preconceived plan, then the victory of Königgrätz deserves to be regarded as a work of art... [Victory came primarily from] Moltke's operational plan and his strategical sense... [His contemporary critics] all repeated time-honoured shibboleths about the dangers of separation when confronting an enemy on interior lines' (Gordon Craig)

Craig: The Austrians could not afford to enforce universal service so real numbers were much lower than theoretical numbers. Their cavalry was great. Their artillery were roughly the same as Prussia which failed to modernise as they could have done (e.g they rejected Krupp's advice to shift to steel barrels and Krupp sold those mainly to Egypt and Russia for a while). Their infantry were worse. Their staff system was much worse. FJ himself made clear he did not want discussions about new infantry tactics to deal with breach-loading guns. Benedek did not want the command and had to be pushed by FJ. He was then saddled with two unsuitable staff officers: Krismanic, who was ultra cautious, and Henikstein, who was defeatist. (Showalter: Henikstein had 'neither the force of character, the institutional leverage, nor support of his general staff subordinates to alter state or army policy... he was not a man to go to war with.')

Prussia did enforce universal service. Excellent education meant higher calibre of soldiers. The needle gun was an advantage but not decisive. Unlike Austria, Prussia learned from the Danish campaign to avoid old school shock tactics. The chaos of Wrangel's HQ in the Danish campaign had prompted Wilhelm to send Moltke and the lesson learned was: put Moltke in charge. Bismarck: Moltke is 'unconditionally reliable and at the same time cold to the very heart'.

The Austrian inquiry blamed Benedek. He saw it coming but refused to defend himself or use his conversations with FJ to escape blame. When his wife threatened to go public he begged her not to. Various reports and leaks blamed him for everything and rehabilitated others (even Krismanic) but he died without defending himself. He told his wife, 'A beaten commander must bear his misfortune.'

GC: Both sides kept masses of cavalry in reserve, after the war Moltke and others concluded this had been a mistake and cavalry should be used as per Napoleon for reconnaissance etc.

Van Creveld: The battle was 'a last minute improvisation'.

Zuber: 'Moltke never intended to “march separately and unite on the battlefield”, and he especially did not intend to do so at Königgrätz. Moltke's war games had no relation to his war planning. Moltke's vaunted rail deployments were nowhere near as well-planned or well-executed as the Moltke Myth would have us believe, and the rail deployments had little to do with Prussian success in either war... Far from being a great battlefield genius, Moltke had little to do with planning the battle of Königgrätz and at Gravelotte-St. Privat. In both battles Moltke quickly lost control of the Prussian armies and spent the day as a spectator. The real reason for the success of the Prussian army in 1866 and 1870/1 lay in factors over which Moltke had no influence whatsoever: the peacetime training and the battlefield courage of the Prussian infantry, and the skill of the officer corps from company to corps levels. The Prussian infantry managed to win in spite of Moltke, not because of him.'

'None of the six [General Staff rides] Moltke conducted before 1866 bears the remotest resemblance to his concept of the operation either in the 1866 war against Austria or for the 1870 war with France' and 'there was no hint of an offensive “concentration on the battlefield” to encircle the enemy.'

'By 13:45 [on 3rd] Moltke had completely lost control of the overall battle. Throughout the entire day Moltke did not receive a single situation report from the 2nd Army. He did not even know when they had begun their movement...' He wrongly stopped Friedrich Carl from pursuing Benedek. The pursuit by the Elbe Army was hampered by garbled orders form the General Staff. 'Even a year later, Moltke still did not understand the significance of the fight in the Swiepwald.' The supposed encirclement never happened, Benedek escaped and the pursuit was botched. The Austrians had numerical superiority because less than half the 2nd Army was too late to fight.

Friedrich Karl: 'There were no geniuses... Our battles and campaigns were won by our work in peacetime... It is our well-trained, well-oiled mechanism in which each knows his place, a place which even mediocrity is entirely ready to fulfil his tasks (for it is calculated on mediocrity) which has taught us how to win victories.' Moltke's 1869 statement about 'uniting on the battlefield' was a lesson learned from 1866, not a 1866 plan.

Moltke said himself in an 1867 article: 'The union of the Prussian army at the proper time has never been considered, in the Prussian army at least, to be a particularly clever idea or profound combination. It was the sensibly arranged and energetically executed expedient in an unfavourable situation which was necessitated by the original course of events.' (Bold added)

Prussia published The Campaign of 1866 in 1867, a model for future official histories. Moltke wrote Instructions for Large Unit Commanders (published 1869). 1866 convinced Moltke that the army corps (~25,000 infantry, ~70 guns) was superior to the division as the basic operational formation. Corps were permanent organisations and their subordinate units and officers were used to working together. This allowed it to adapt in battle.

Post-battle

Robert Cecil (then Lord Cranborne) wrote to the Danish Ambassador: 'The policy that was pursued in 1864 has undoubtedly had the effect of severing [England] in a great measure from the course of continental politics: & the declared principles of non-intervention, which it was the effect of the policy of that year to establish, have necessarily diminished her influence in the decision of Continental questions. The general feeling in this country is in favour of abandoning the position which England held for so many years in the councils of Europe.'

Wilhelm spent the morning writing letters and drafting a proclamation, in the afternoon he went from Horitz to Sadowa to visit the wounded, attend funerals. Gablenz, an emissary from FJ, told Prince Frederick Charles 'My Emperor no longer has an army, it is as good as destroyed.' His initial attempt to negotiate a three-day armistice failed because he did not have full powers to negotiate and Prussian demands were too high, so FJ ordered the continuation of retreat and summoned armies to defend Vienna (G Craig).

Bismarck agreed with the Crown Prince about settling the constitutional conflict — not, as many conservatives hoped and expected, by suspending or revising constitution. Even on this day Bismarck was already talking of a new settlement for north Germany as a 'stage' and thought that he must use nationalism to strengthen his new creation and this required settling the constitutional conflict, not absolutism (OP p328). He said around this time, 'The power of the monarchy in Prussia must be supported by a powerful army. But it must go with the opinion of the nation. It is the duty of every Prussian minister to regard the will of the king as authoritative, but at the same time to let the will of the king be saturated with the opinion of the nation.'

Lyons: 'We have here [Constantinople], as elsewhere, a great deal to do to recover the loss of reputation entailed by the Danish business'.

Gorchakov suggested to Britain and France that they should jointly reply to Prussia that she could not dissolve the Bund alone nor arrogate to itself the right to reform it; identical notes would warn Prussia and suggest a conference. (Clearly the news of 3rd had not yet reached St Petersburg!)

(evening) Napoleon was preparing to head to Vichy for a holiday and hopefully improve his health when the news of Sadowa arrived. Pottinger: it's hard to establish what happened over the next day or so. Seems clear that in the evening Metternich rushed to Tuileries. Together they drafted a plan for French mediation and telegrams were sent. Gramont was even told that France would intervene militarily if mediation were refused. Drouyn arrived.

Roughly midnight on 4 July (WAF) Napoleon sent a telegram to Wilhelm: Austria has conceded Venetia to us and asked for French mediation.

In his Memoirs Bismarck wrote that before 4th, 'Napoleon had calculated on our being defeated and in need of assistance.' At Nikolsburg, Bismarck asked Moltke — what if France intervenes? Moltke replied: we'll defend against Austria and attack France swiftly. Bismarck thought: if there is French interference, then we'll either a) make peace with Austria with moderate conditions and if possible an alliance with her against France, or else b) 'quickly and completely cripple Austria by a sharp onslaught, and also by furthering disaffection in Hungary and perhaps in Bohemia as well; until then we must maintain a defensive attitude towards France instead of towards Austria, as Moltke wished.'

He feared that it would not be possible to smash France quickly and it would quickly be very bad to be fighting on two fronts with southern states like Bavaria encouraged to join in. 'Under the pressure of the French intervention, and at a time when it was impossible to see whether we should succeed in making headway against them in diplomacy, I resolved to advise the King to make an appeal to the Hungarian nationality. If Napoleon intervened in the war in the manner indicated, if Russia's attitude remained doubtful, and especially if the cholera made further ravages in our ranks, our position might become so difficult that we should be obliged to seize every weapon offered us by the outbreak of the national movement, not only in Germany but also in Hungary and Bohemia, in order to avoid succumbing.' (2p37ff).

To Abeken and Keudell (5th, Gall): 'In a few years' time Louis will probably be sorry he took sides against us like this, it may cost him dearly.'

NB. In 1874 in a speech to the Reichstag, Bismarck said that a serious French intervention 'would have immediately forced us to cover Berlin and abandon all our successes in Austria' and he repeated this when Friedjung interviewed him in 1890 (p390).

Gall: his actions over the next few weeks in concluding the peace and keeping Napoleon out of things without serious commitments showed him 'at the height of his diplomatic powers' and was 'an extraordinary achievement'.

Through July Russia was trying to organise a congress. However, Napoleon did not want one, wrongly thinking he could exploit the situation to get things out of Bismarck. Stanley did not want one and worked to scupper it. Stanley also rejected the Russian idea of a joint declaration with France that no changes to the Vienna settlement could be made without a congress. France also rejected this.

Ministers came to Saint-Cloud in the morning. Drouyn, Empress Eugénie, Marshal Randon et al urged Napoleon to rush 80,000 to the Rhine frontier. Rouher, La Valette, Baroche opposed them. Initially Napoleon agreed with mobilisation. Pottinger says he signed a decree for the convocation of the Chambers and an official announcement and although he postponed the signature of the mobilisation order until the next day the meeting ended with people thinking he supported armed intervention. His cousin urged hostility to Austria. In the evening Rouher and Valette came back and urged him again not to involve the army. Valette thought the public would not support war. Also during the day it seemed Prussia had accepted mediation. Napoleon therefore did not authorise mobilisation. He was caught between fear of Prussian expansion and the danger of him provoking a nationalist surge in Germany against France if he interfered.

Bismarck fed these fears telling Goltz to convey that French threats of intervention would be met by 'a national uprising in Germany' on the basis of the Frankfurt constitution of 1849. As was his way, he also held out possibilities for French compensation. Napoleon was ill with a painful kidney problem: Empress Eugénie told Metternich 'The Emperor can neither walk nor sleep and can hardly eat' (Eyck).

Mensdorff visited Benedek's North Army and reported to Vienna it was a useless rabble.

With everything else going on, Bismarck received two leaders of the Hungarian revolutionary movement and gave them a note for 400,000 thaler payable in Berlin, 100k from FO funds and 300k from Bleichröder. Bucher would deliver the money to a Berlin hotel where the two would stay under assumed names. Cash was for a Hungarian Legion to wage war against Austria. Bleichröder took cash shaken down from the Saxons over the next few weeks and funnelled it to the Hungarians on Bismarck's orders. Bismarck later told Heydt that the Saxon money had been spent on this Hungarian operation because 'the pressure that it will exert on Austria is of such great importance for the conduct of the war and for peace that payments could not have been delayed' (Stern, p90). These fascinating details are absent in pretty much all the main books.

(WAF) Benedetti was informed that Wilhelm had telegraphed acceptance of French mediation. He was still stuck in Berlin and could do little.

Moltke ordered 2nd Army to pursue Benedek to Olmütz.

Cowley-Clarendon (why was Cowley writing to Clarendon when Stanley had taken over, just because they stayed friends?): Rumours and fears about possible French moves against Belgium but we should keep quiet for the moment.

Stanley wrote of discussion with Clarendon: Clarendon 'seemed more alarmed about the Fenian business and its influence on American diplomacy than about any of these European complications'. The Spectator wrote: 'The most audacious man in Europe is in possession of its most effective weapon.'

Stanley-Cowley: It would be best if we could avoid a congress at all given 'our practical power will be exceedingly small'.

In conversation Count Seherr-Thoss, a Hungarian exile, Bismarck said, 'They took me for a Junker, a reactionary... with the king they denounced me as a secret democrat... this fight has cost me my nervous strength, my vitality. But I have beaten them all, all' smashed his fist on the table. (JS —says wrongly this was August. OP1,p316.) EF: a few days later, the Count was imprisoned by the Austrians and Prussia threatened to shoot hostages unless he was released. (GW,VII.139, p140)

Benedetti (stuck in Berlin) telegrammed Drouyn that Prince Henry VII (sometimes referred to as Prince Reuss) would arrive in Paris on 10th with a letter from Wilhelm for Napoleon. WAF suggests this was intended by Bismarck to buy time for him to sort out Austria without French interference.

A desperate Metternich wrongly told Vienna that Napoleon was sending the fleet to the Adriatic and was still talking about armed intervention.

Drouyn ordered Benedetti to go to HQ and seek to speak to Bismarck to hasten an armistice and warn of 'the gravest of consequences'. Benedetti spoke to Werther, got a safe conduct letter and headed off.

Derby to Lords: '... safe and steady progress, strengthening, rather than subverting, the institutions of the country, and maintaining that balance between the various parts of our constitutional system - a monarchy limited, an aristocracy tempered, a House of Commons not altogether Democratic - the consequence of which has been a progressive improvement in our legislation according with the temper and character of the times.' Our policy is 'above all to endeavour not to interfere needlessly and vexatiously with the internal affairs of any foreign country, nor to volunteer to them unasked advice with regard to the conduct of their affairs... Above all, I hold that is the duty of a Government to abstain from menace if they do not intend to follow that menace by action.' In this war 'the honour of this country is in no degree involved and ... the interests of this country are very remotely, if at all, involved... [T]he conduct of the Government with regard to such a war as that now raging is studiously to maintain a strict and impartial neutrality between all the contending parties, only ready at any time to offer their good offices, if there should appear to be the slightest gleam of hope that, combined with other neutral powers such as France and Russia, they might lead to a termination of this bloody struggle.'

Cowley-Stanley: it is not in the interests of any Power other than Prussia for Austria to collapse but 'can it be prevented, and if it can, is it worth while to attempt to preserve what is unmistakably rotten[?]' By 30 July Cowley thought Austria 'done for'.

(Some put it on 11th) Bismarck wrote to his wife: 'Provided we are not excessive in our demands and do not think that we have conquered the world, we shall also achieve a worthwhile peace. But we are as quickly carried away as we are cast down and I have the thankless task of pouring water into the bubbling wine and pointing out that we do not live alone in Europe but live in it with three other powers that detest and envy us... Our men are wonderful. Every man so completely fearless, calm, obedient, well-behaved, despite empty stomachs, wet clothes, wet beds, little sleep, boot soles falling off, kind to everyone, no pillaging and burning, paying what they can and eating mouldy bread. There must indeed be a deep fear of God in our common man otherwise all that could not be.'

Bismarck inquired how Napoleon felt about Prussian annexing some of the northern states and within hours learned that only Saxony was a problem. Bismarck concluded that 'every full annexation attainable without the cession of Prussian territory is better than the half by way of reform.' To Wilhelm he argued that it was better either to take whole states or to leave them intact.

(WAF) Prince Henry delivered Wilhelm's letter in Paris. It was vague enough to deepen alarm. That evening Drouyn urged that Benedetti threaten a Franco-Austrian alliance but Napoleon said No. Benedetti arrived in Reichenberg on 10th and Pardubitz on 11th to find Wilhelm and HQ had moved on to Zwittau (~80 miles from Nikolsburg). The next day Goltz told him that a courier was coming with more detailed ideas for mediation and Napoleon ordered Benedetti to report to Paris.

Pottinger: Napoleon and Henry spoke on 10th, Henry kept things vague and asked Napoleon what he wanted. Napoleon was vague.

General Peel to Derby: 'Any proposal for an augmentation of the army would be most unpopular, and I am sure we could not carry it in the House of Commons unless there is a prospect of war'.

Austria had sent Beust to Paris on 9th, he spoke to Drouyn on 11th. Drouyn told him ministers had agreed that day that armed intervention was off the cards. He pointed to Mexico, Rome and Algeria as reasons for inaction. Pottinger: Drouyn still wanted to mobilise but repeated official policy. After speaking to Beust he again tried to shift Napoleon, who that morning had given the impression to Metternich that the idea was just about dead, but failed. Eugenie was still pushing for action but felt she had lost the argument and was isolated — 'we are not ready for a fight' was the dominant feeling around Napoleon.

(WAF) Benedetti finally caught up with HQ but didn't know what had happened while he was travelling. He found Bismarck, Abeken, von Keudell and other staff in an abandoned farmhouse in Zwittau at about 1am. Abeken told his wife that 'Benedetti had to share my room'.

Benedetti urged no further military action and suggested the other Powers may intervene. Bismarck pointed out he had accepted the principle of French mediation and prevaricated suggesting they await discussions between Goltz and Napoleon in Paris. Their discussion ended at about 4am and Bismarck promised to fix an audience with the King. Keudell wrote that 'Bismarck received the unwelcome guest politely, but his discontent over his visit caused him pains in the left foot which lasted for some time.' On a telegram from Werther informing him that military authorities have been instructed to assist the French ambassador in reaching HQ, Bismarck scribbled 'stupid'. (Evidence of problems with communication then: this telegram informing him that Benedetti had left Berlin and was heading for HQ arrived after Bismarck and Benedetti met at the farmhouse.)

At 10am Benedetti met Wilhelm who told him that an armistice depended on Italy agreeing and agreement with Napoleon. He also prevaricated saying he'd have to consult with Moltke etc. Wilhelm said he'd be moving HQ to Czernahora later that day and Benedetti was offered a place in Bismarck's carriage, which left at 5pm. When they arrived Wilhelm held a council on the terrace of the castle he was staying in. They agreed a three-day armistice (see below).

Karolyi found Bismarck at Zwittau. They discussed terms. Austria would withdraw from the Bund and accept Prussian control of North Germany but Vienna insisted on the integrity of Saxony. 'These conditions contained all we wanted, that is to say, a free hand in Germany' (Memoirs, 2,47).

Prussian council of war. They discussed how to capture fortifications at Floridsdorf in order to reach Vienna. After listening to the plans, Bismarck says 'We cannot spend fourteen days in waiting without considerably increasing the dead weight of the French arbitrium.' He suggested an alternative plan which the king agreed with though it was executed 'unwillingly' (2p41). 'It was my object ... as far as possible to avoid cause for mortifying reminiscences if it could be managed without prejudice to our German policy. A triumphant entry of the Prussian army into the hostile capital would naturally have been a gratifying recollection for our soldiers but it was not necessary to our policy. It would have left behind it, as also any surrender of ancient possessions to us must have done, a wound to the pride of Austria which, without being a pressing necessity for us, would have unnecessarily increased the difficulty of our future relations. It was already quite clear to me that we should have to defend the conquests of the campaign in further wars... That war with France would succeed that with Austria lay in the logic of history... We could not foresee how far the later wars would make for the maintenance of what had already been won, but in any case it would be of great importance whether the feelings we left behind in our opponents were implacable or the wounds we had inflicted upon them and their self-respect were incurable. Moved by this consideration, I had a political motive for avoiding ... a triumphal entry into Vienna in the Napoleonic style. In positions such as ours was then, it is a political maxim after victory not to enquire how much you can squeeze out of your opponent but only to consider what is politically necessary. The ill feeling which my attitude earned for me in military circles I considered was the result of a military departmental policy to which I could not concede a decisive influence on the policy of the state.' (GC: He was 'certainly right' that this clash with the generals outraged the general staff and encouraged them to consider how to marginalise him in future.)

After Napoleon's telegram of 4 July, William sketched what he wanted from peace: reform of the Federation under Prussia's leadership, and acquisition of Schleswig-Holstein, Austrian Silesia, a strip on the frontier of Bohemia and other territories including parts of Saxony and Hanover. 'I gauged the proposed acquisitions from Austria and Bavaria by the question whether the inhabitants, in case of future war, remained faithful to the King of Prussia in the event of the withdrawal of Prussian officials and troops, and continue to accept commands from him, and I had not impression that the population of these districts, which had become habituated to Bavarian and Austrian conditions, would be disposed to meet Prussian predilections... Nevertheless I did not succeed at Nikolsburg in getting the king to accept my views.'

In Holstein's Memoirs, he recounts an interesting detail... After the war Bismarck told him that he was very displeased with, and reprimanded, the Prussian military attaché who did not return to his post in Paris after the battle. This meant that Bismarck did not get good information from Paris and this meant he was not made aware of how little the French had really prepared to intervene.

Stanley-Cowley: 'I have not the slightest faith in Prussia being stopped by words. We certainly will not fight: the Emperor must choose whether to risk a war or to submit to the terms of peace being dictated by Prussia.'

(Pottinger) Napoleon wrote to Metternich: 'I believe I can declare to you frankly that it is impossible for me to aid you by force of arms. My efforts for the armistice will only succeed if you accept preliminaries of peace.'

(WAF) Evening, Goltz received detailed instructions from Bismarck (drafted 8th in Pardubitz and partly outdated).

Goltz spoke to Napoleon and sketched Bismarck's demands: NGC, reparations, some annexations, abdication of King George of Hanover, the SH duchies... Only Saxony seemed a potential sticking point. Napoleon asked Goltz to draft a document he could forward to Austria as basis for armistice. Goltz delivered it on 14th. Pottinger: Napoleon again vaguely mentioned the idea of a Rhine buffer state but did not press firmly for specific compensations at this decisive moment.

Pottinger: Napoleon and Beust talked on 13th. Napoleon tried to put a brave face on and claim he had helped Austria in the negotiations. He said France was not prepared for military involvement. Eyck: Beust was shocked to see Napoleon's condition and reported that 'Like a child, he stammered all the time: je ne suis pas prêt à la guerre.' He did not think French opinion would support it.

HQ moved again to Brunn. Benedetti reported that the telegraph lines were down, couriers were bringing news from Berlin 3 days late. In this environment, Bismarck was happy to tell him that they both had to wait for the discussions in Paris.

Stanley-Cowley: 'in 1859, he [Napoleon] encouraged an Italian war, hoping to establish an Italian confederacy dependent on France. Instead of that he has created a strong united Italy, not even friendly to France. In 1866 he has allowed a German war to begin, hoping various results none of which have been attained. He has created by the side of France a strong compact German empire fully the equal of France in military power. Was ever man so over-reached twice? It must be his chief object to get out of the affair, even at some sacrifice of prestige.' The Cabinet will support France in inducing Austria to accept Prussian terms. A Congress could only 'ratify the decrees of Prussia' and the terms will be 'dictated by events, rather than by the choice of any of the neutral powers.'

(WAF) Goltz delivered the document to Napoleon who accepted it with few changes. It did not specify territorial changes as Goltz felt this was too fluid (also possibly because he disagreed with Bismarck, see below). The document was forwarded to Vienna and Nikolsburg as formal basis for mediation. Pottinger: Goltz's telegram reached Bismarck on 17th.

Loftus was warning Stanley that Prussia's advances would make a war with France likely: 'the [Austrian] war instead of being arrested will only assume larger proportions'. Stanley to Cowley: 'we must make up our minds to consider Prussia as a leading — perhaps as the leading — military power of Europe'. Austria needs a generation of internal improvements.

(WAF) Benedetti-Drouyn (Brunn): Bismarck rejected my argument that he was risking a general war, saying I was mistaken, he thinks that 'France and Prussia, united and resolved to redress their respective borders by allying in solemn engagements, would henceforth be in a position to regulate together these questions without fear of encountering armed resistance, either on the part of England or on the part of Russia.' He will not agree an armistice unless assured of the North German Confederation and what he considers necessary territorial compensation for sacrifices. In the evening Benedetti left Brunn for Vienna. (WAF does not explain well why he thought it would be more useful to communicate from Vienna. On his way he was fired on by Prussians and Austrians. Arrived Vienna morning on 16th. He was informed about the document Paris was circulating and told to return to Prussian HQ.)

Moltke to wife: 'There must be no such thing as an armistice! We must in the first place have some definite propositions and these are not yet forthcoming.'

Barry: Bismarck had a 'particularly violent altercation with the generals' at Czernahora about capturing the Floridsdorf lines in front of Vienna. Nobody else mentions this on 15th and Barry's account of the meeting has quotes which others place on 12th (above).

Frankfurt occupied. On 17th it was ordered to pay 6 million gulden within 48 hours. Bismarck then imposed a further indemnity. There was a furore and Bismarck backed off a bit.

(WAF) Bismarck realised that Goltz had not been forceful enough about annexations and he telegraphed Goltz to rectify his error and get Napoleon's agreement to territorial changes. Goltz spoke to Napoleon on 17th, 18th and 19th.

(Mosse) Prussia notified the Powers of her terms: Austria to leave the Bund; Electoral Hesse, Hanover, Frankfurt, Nassau and part of Hesse-Darmstadt to be annexed. Stanley thought they were 'moderate under the circumstances' and Austria would accept them.

Benedetti left Vienna to return to the Prussian HQ, arrived Nikolsburg early hours of 19th.

Keudell to Bleichröder: peace is not done but seems likely.

Barry: 'Bismarck's confrontation with the soldiers came to a head'. GC: French Ambassador made clear to Bismarck that Napoleon expected Prussia to agree an immediate five day armistice. Goltz had not presented Bismarck's demand for some annexations to Napoleon — to Bismarck's anger and he had demanded Goltz fix his mistake but it was still unclear. Now, acceptance of an armistice meant he could not be sure that Napoleon would not refuse to consider annexations, while rejection risked a two front war. He gambled on acceptance. The generals disagreed. There were violent quarrels with the King, Bismarck and generals. Moltke seems to have agreed with the generals but not led the attack. Roon supported Bismarck who prevailed. (Only Barry and GC mention this on 19th. Keudell seems to be the source for GC's account.)

(WAF) Bismarck talked to Benedetti — explained that Goltz had not followed instructions. He did not reject the Goltz-drafted document but made clear it would have to be amended. After the council with the soldiers, Bismarck told Benedetti: we accept an armistice but we will insist on territorial changes that Goltz neglected to include and we'll fight France if we have to get them.

Napoleon agreed with Goltz on the territorial demands.

Stanley told the Commons: 'Ours will be a pacific policy, a policy of observation rather than action. I think there never was a great European war in which the direct national interests of England were less concerned... [W]ith regard to ... the establishment of a strong North German Power ... I cannot see that, if the war ends, as it very possibly may, in the establishment of such an Empire — I cannot see that the existence of such a Power would be to us any injury, any menace, or any detriment... [I]f North Germany is to become a single great Power, I do not see that any English interest is in the least degree affected...

I think, in the next place, that if we do not intend to take an active part in the quarrel, we ought to be exceedingly cautious how we use menacing language or hold out illusory hopes. If our advice is solicited, and if there is any likelihood that that advice will be of practical use, I do not think we ought to hesitate to give the best advice in our power; but while giving it under a deep sense of moral responsibility, as being in our judgement the best, we ought carefully to avoid involving ourselves or the country in any responsibility for the results of following that advice in a matter where no English interest is concerned. I do not think we ought to put ourselves in such a position that any Power could say to us, “We have acted upon your advice, and we have suffered for it. You have brought us into this difficulty, and therefore you are bound to get us out of it.” We ought not, I say, to place ourselves in a position of that kind. And now, Sir, I have stated all, I think, that it is possible for me to state at this time, and it remains for me only to assure the House — knowing, as I do, how utterly impossible it is for any member of the Executive to carry on his work effectively without the support of public opinion — it only remains for me to say that, as far as the nature of the case allows, I shall always be anxious that the House shall be conversant with everything that is done.

Stanley generally thought German unification inevitable and was more worried re Napoleon and Russia and he told Apponyi that 'the danger of disturbance to the peace of Europe lay in the weakness rather than the strength of Germany'. Gladstone supported the Government's approach in the Commons: 'The influence of England is best maintained by refraining from continued interference.' The French Ambassador in London told Paris that the government had the support of public opinion. On 18th Stanley had told Loftus that the 'feeling for nonintervention' was 'stronger in the House of Commons and among the public than I ever saw it before'. On 21st he told Cowley that in the debate the day before only one voice had been raised for Austria (Sir G. Bowyer) and '“Keep out of the quarrel” seemed to be the universal feeling of the House'.

Italy suffered a naval defeat at Battle of Lissa which pushed her to accept an armistice. It was the first major sea battle between ironclads.

Brunnow read to Stanley a despatch explaining Russia's view that Britain and Russia should not leave France alone to mediate peace. Stanley did not want to get involved and didn't reply.

Apponyi urged that Britain and Russia intervene to 'check the aggressive pretensions of Prussia'. He politely told Stanley that his statement to the Commons, about the formation of a strong north German power not being injurious to Britain, was a mistake as it increased the chance of another war given neither Russia nor France 'were likely to remain long on good terms with a neighbour so powerful and so ambitious'. Stanley replied that he disagreed — the real danger to peace 'lay in the weakness rather than in the strength of Germany'. When Apponyi appealed to the 1815 Treaty, Stanley told him 'it was useless to appeal to those Treaties as being still binding'. Britain would 'not in any case interfere willingly, and certainly we would not do so unless we knew first on what basis Austria was prepared to treat'. It would be hopeless to fight against exclusion from the Bund. (Stanley passed on this account to Bloomfield and Buchanan.)

Hammond: 'if Belgium is left alone, I conceive of no possible circumstances occurring on the Continent which would induce us to take a prominent part'.

FJ capitulated. There was another imminent battle at Pressburg. Bismarck asked Moltke how dangerous it was and Moltke was clearly worried. Bismarck recommended to Wilhelm an immediate 5 day truce starting midday. When the Italians protested, he dismissed them: 'If our troops rest for five days that is nothing more than the Italian Army did for weeks after Custoza.' By Now Napoleon was sick of his allies, and sarcastically told Metternich (reported to Vienna 26th), 'I would ask nothing better today than that you could beat them again, chase them from the Quadrilateral and keep Venetia'(!).

The Austrian delegation arrived at Nikolsburg in the afternoon of 22nd.

GC: Goltz telegrammed that Napoleon accepted Bismarck's annexation list though he did not want Saxony to disappear from the map.

In London, the government was absorbed by demonstrations organised by the Reform League Committee. Walpole, advised by Derby, told the police to close Hyde Park to protestors. Many thousands arrived (some books say 10s of 1,000s, others 100s). In chaos, the crowd overwhelmed the police and occupied Hyde Park. The police only restored order the next day with a regiment of Life Guards. Stanley thought 'there was more mischief than malice in the affair and more of mere larking than either'. Granville made clear the Opposition did not support violent demonstrations. Walpole collapsed under the pressure. Derby made clear the government would not allow a further occupation of the Park.

On 23rd in Lords, Derby said: 'We have not been asked for advice and we have not offered any. We have simply stood aloof.' In the last week of July, Russia inquired about support for a congress but Stanley was not keen and couldn't see the point. Not many books make clear that this domestic issue, not war and peace, dominated the minds of British statesmen.

Prussian Council of War. Bismarck, Memoirs: 'I was firmly resolved to make a cabinet question of the acceptance of the peace offered by Austria. The position was difficult. All the generals shared the disinclination to break off the uninterrupted course of victory and during these days the King was more often and more readily accessible to military influences than to mine. I was the only person at headquarters who was politically responsible as a minister and forced by the situation to form an opinion and come to a decision without being able to lay the responsibility for the results upon any other authority, either in the shape of the decision of my colleagues or superior commands. I was just as little able as anyone to foresee what shape future events would take and the consequent judgement of the world, but I was the only one present who was under a legal obligation to hold, to utter, and to defend an opinion. This opinion I had formed after careful consideration of the future of our position in Germany and our relations to Austria, and was ready to be responsible for it and to defend it before the King.'

Because of a 'painful illness', the meeting was held in Bismarck's room to discuss whether to accept peace on offered terms. 'I declared it to be my conviction that peace must be concluded on the Austrian terms, but remained alone in my opinion and the King supported the military majority. My nerves could not stand the strain which had been put upon them day and night. I got up in silence, walked into my adjoining bedchamber and was there overcome by a violent paroxysm of tears. I heard the council dispersing in the next room. I thereupon set to commit to paper the reasons which spoke for the conclusion of peace, and begged the King, in the event of his not accepting the advice for which I was responsible, to relieve me of my functions as minister if the war were continued.'

There was a meeting at which the military presented options for pushing on to Vienna. Bismarck said sarcastically (Keudell): 'If the hostile army surrenders Vienna and withdraws into Hungary, we must follow them. Once we have crossed the Danube it will be advisable to concentrate on the right bank, because the Danube is such a mighty ditch that one can't march along it on horseback. Once we are across we lose our communications to the rear, then it will be best to march on Constantinople, found a new Byzantine empire, and leave Prussia to her fate.'

Moltke to his wife: 'The results which have been already obtained should not be set in jeopardy if that can possibly be avoided. There should be no necessity to do so if only thoughts of revenge are dispensed with and we fix our eyes on our own advantage.'

Bismarck went to the King. He found in an antechamber 'two colonels with a report on the spread of cholera among their troops, barely half of whom were fit for service.' By now Moltke was losing 200 per day to cholera. Bismarck thought this a further reason for peace as Hungary in August was particularly dangerous for this disease. He explained to the King his reasoning: we must avoid leaving Austria with bitterness and desire for revenge; 'we ought rather to reserve the possibility of becoming friends again, and to regard the Austrian state as a piece on the European chessboard and the renewal of friendly relations with her as a move open to us.' If we continue fighting and Austria is broken up, 'Fresh formations on this surface [the territory ruled by A-H] could only be of a permanently revolutionary nature. German Austria we could neither wholly nor partly make use of. The acquisition of provinces like Austrian Silesia and portions of Bohemia could not strengthen Prussia, and Vienna could not be governed from Berlin as a mere dependency.' Further conquests in the east would weaken our overall position. We must finish off rapidly before France wins time to bring further diplomatic action to bear upon Austria.

The King 'raised no objection' to these arguments but declared the actual terms inadequate. He wanted more than on 4 July and insisted on the cession on territory from Austria. 'I replied that we were not there to sit in judgement, but to pursue the German policy. Austria's conflict and rivalry with us was no more culpable than ours with her, and our task was the establishment or initiation of a German national unity under the leadership of the King of Prussia [italics in original]... I repeated that we were not there to administer retributive justice, but to pursue a policy' and he did not wish to see 'mutilated territories whose princes and peoples might very easily, such is human weakness, retain a lively wish to recover their former possessions by means of foreign help'.

The discussion became so heated that 'I left the room with the idea of begging the King to allow me, in my capacity of officer, to join my regiment. On returning to my room the thought occurred to me whether it would not be better to fall out of the open window which was four stories high, and I did not look around when I heard the door open, although I suspected that the person entering was the Crown Prince, whose room in the same corridor I had just passed. I felt his hand on my shoulder while he said: “You know that I was against this war.You considered it necessary and the responsibility for it lies on you. If you are now persuaded that our end is attained, and peace must now be concluded, I am ready to support you and defend your opinion with my father.” He then repaired to the King and came back after a short half hour in the same calm, friendly mood, but with the words: “It has been a very difficult business but my father has consented.” This consent found expression in a note written with a lead pencil on the margin of one of my last memoranda, something to this effect: “Inasmuch as my Minister-President has left me in the lurch in the face of the enemy, and here I am not in a position to supply his place, I have discussed the question with my son, and as he has associated himself with Minister-President's opinion, I find myself reluctantly compelled, after such brilliant victories on the part of the army, to bite this sour apple and accept so disgraceful a peace.”' (Memoirs, 2p50ff).

In 1877 he gave an account to Lucius von Ballhausen (who recorded it in his diary) that was similar to his Memoirs: 'I was the only person among 300 or so who had to rely entirely on his own judgement without being able to ask anybody. In the war council, all, with the king at the head, wanted to continue the war. I stated, fighting a war in Hungary in the heat, with the drought and the spreading cholera was extremely dangerous and what was the objective? After all the generals had voted against me I declared, “as a general I have been outvoted but as minister I must submit my resignation if my judgement were not accepted.” The deliberations took place in my room because I was ill. After my declaration I left, shut and locked the door and went to my sleeping quarters and threw myself, sobbing and broken onto the bed. The others deliberated in whispers for a while and then slipped away.

'The following day [24th] I had a stormy encounter with the King ... he called my peace conditions “shameful”. He demanded Bohemia, Austrian Silesia, ... a slice of Saxony, etc. I tried to make clear to him that one could hardly fatally wound those with whom later one would want and indeed have to live. He rejected that idea and threw himself weeping onto the sofa. “My first minister will be a deserter in the face of the enemy and imposes this shameful peace on me.”

'I left him, firm in my decision, and had just slammed the door to my room and laid down my sabre when the Crown Prince walked in and volunteered to go to his father. He wanted peace and could understand and approve my motives. I had made the war and must now bring it to a conclusion. After a few hours he brought me a letter from his father which I have kept. The expression 'shameful' appears twice in it... These shameful conditions became the Peace of Prague.'

(JS says Bismarck may have 'conflated' his memories of summer 1866 and the more intense rows of 1870. This seems very unlikely, particularly given this account from 1877 is so similar to his Memoirs. While details may be exaggerated it's likely the overall story is right. Cf. Steinberg, p254ff.)

In Memoirs (2p81) he wrote of his lenience towards many who had sided against Prussia during the crisis: 'In general I regarded the principle of retaliation as no sound basis for our policy, since even where our feelings had been injured, it ought to be guided, not by our own irritation, but by consideration of its object.'

WAF: On Bismarck's note, Wilhelm scribbled: 'After my minister-president deserts me in the face of the enemy ... and because [my son] shares [his] opinion, I find myself, to my sorrow, forced to bite into this sour apple and accept this disgraceful peace after such brilliant victories of the army'.

Minister-president of Bavaria, Pfordten, arrives in Nikolsburg. Has to depart without a deal with Bismarck because the latter is still fighting with Wilhelm. (WAF: Pfordten was not empowered to agree a deal so Bismarck refused to deal with him, Pfordten turned to Benedetti for help and after 3 days managed to speak to Bismarck. I can't disentangle the Pfordten dates from the different books.)

The Kreuzzeitung started to sound the alarm about Bismarck's tactics. A leak from a Cabinet minister to von Kleist-Retzow led to a push from 'reactionaries' hostile to Bismarck to lobby the King before the speech from the throne was given. The conservatives had been happy with Bismarck's fight with Parliament, the Alvensleben convention, and the Austrian alliance. They were happy with the Bad Gastein deal of 1865. Though some had qualms about the annexation policy they convinced themselves it was a just reward for the army's victories and few supported Gerlach's 'thou shalt not steal'. After Bismarck kicked off the next phase in January 1866, they were worried but Bismarck presented the whole thing as defensive. In April, news of Bismarck's reform plan and the drift to war threw them into confusion. Wagener used the Kreuzzeitung to defend the government. Gerlach wrote his famous article in May and the two soon had their final meeting that ended their lifelong friendship. Only one Cabinet Minister resigned. Most did not take the 9 April plan seriously.

When the Kreuzzeitung and the reactionaries started to mobilise at the end of July/August, he was contemptuous and bitter. 'Lippe [justice minister] talks big against me in the conservative sense, and Hans Kleist has written me an excited letter. The little people don't have enough to do, they see no further than their own noses and like to swim on the stormy sea of phrases. One can cope with the enemy but one's friends!' (to Joanna, 3 August).

(JS recounts (p261) that after the Speech from the Throne on 5 August, Bismarck and Kleist waited until everyone had left, looking at each other. Bismarck walked over. 'Where did you get the speech from the throne?' 'I will not tell you.' 'In this matter I don't like jokes. I shall have to get the state prosecutor onto you if you don't.' 'You can lock me up but you still won't find out.' They parted. They met again later. Bismarck shook his hand. 'It's all forgotten.' An indiscrete minister had confessed. [I can't judge how reliable this story is.] JS says their friendship never recovered.)

The conservatives also split into the 'old' conservatives and the Free Conservatives. The former were Prussian particularists, the latter more open to German nationalism. The former were Lutheran, the latter more catholic or nonreligious. The former were dominated by the feudal gentry (of East Prussia, Pomerania, Brandenburg), the latter were stronger in the annexed territories of Silesia and the Rhineland. After his triumph of 1866, Bismarck promoted the reconciliation of the old aristocracy with the new finance/industrialist class (OP p337ff).

Leopold Ranke had grumbled, 'The concept of real kingship and the understanding for it have already been as good as completely lost in our time. Nothing will remain in the end except radicalism and imperialism facing each other.' After the constitutional conflict was over, Ranke admitted, 'we utilised the victory in order to deny the principles on which we ourselves rest. We submitted ... in order to make our persons and property conditions secure.'

Gerlach had written in his diary over the tumultuous months: 'I reproached myself for speaking out too little before Bismarck for justice, which has been so trampled... I felt in doubt again whether I should not have testified more extensively and more openly against the sins of the Prussian anti-Danish and anti-Austrian policy... God knows that what matters to me is not this or that political view but a conscience made chaste through God's secret law.' But he did not speak out.

Peace of Nikolsburg. FJ accepted terms at ~17:00 (Pottinger) and the formal paper was signed that evening. Peace deal considered in detail below. Basic terms: Prussia withdraws, no territorial gains, Bund is over, Austria accepts a North German Confederation without Austrian involvement, Duchies to Prussia, 40m thaler indemnity.

Cowley to Stanley: France and Prussia 'may certainly pose a check to each other, but they may as certainly combine, If they have any object to attain in common. But these Powers also aim at becoming Great Maritime Powers and ... we ought hardly to look with indifference upon the possible combination of their naval resources'. Italy might become part of this combination.

(OP p312) Benedetti sounded out Bismarck on a secret treaty giving France the 1814 frontiers and Luxembourg (though he raised the issue of how to compensate the king of the Netherlands). Examining a map, Bismarck replied that the 1814 borders offered 'no difficulty' — except getting approval from Wilhelm and the Landtag. Bismarck got the impression from Benedetti that Napoleon would not fight. OP also says that Drouyn put the demands for 1814 frontiers and the left bank of the Rhine to Bismarck on 4/8 (p312) but this contradicts WAF who puts this discussion back in Berlin on 5/8.

OP: According to Benedetti, Bismarck mentioned the possibility of Belgium as compensation on 26th. Benedetti reported back to Napoleon that: 'Bismarck is the only man in the whole kingdom who understands what an advantage there would be for Prussia in forming with France an intimate and lasting alliance at the price of territorial sacrifice.' This document fell into Bismarck's hands after the war of 1870 and reviewing it he scribbled in the margin, 'So he honestly believed it then!'

(WAF) Drouyn sent instructions on 23rd, they arrived on 26th and Benedetti then met with Bismarck. Napoleon had suggested to Goltz that France receive Luxembourg and Landau. Benedetti was told to push for: 1) Saxony remains an independent state, 2) France gets the 1814 borders, 3) Luxembourg 'provided compensation can be arranged for the king of Holland' (Drouyn).

At the start Bismarck replied that these demands would probably mean abandoning the peace negotiations and restarting the war (in fact he hastened the conclusion of peace, WAF). Benedetti replied with resolution to convey that he was not intimidated. They then considered a map and Bismarck said he was happy with the 1814 frontiers but said no mention of territorial concessions should be made to Wilhelm for now. Bismarck rapidly began a media campaign in the German press to combat the idea of Napoleon getting territory (Bismarck-Foreign Office, 31/7) and told Wilhelm that he'd answered Benedetti 'evasively and dilatorily'. Benedetti told Drouyn that Bismarck had a reasonable argument about the difficulty of dealing with the King of Holland viz Luxembourg and had suggested focusing on Belgium instead. Compensation was not discussed further between the two in Nikolsburg. Benedetti's report reached Drouyn on 29th in Vichy where he was with Napoleon (ill in bed). (20/9/73 Bismarck-Wilhelm: 'I could only impede the Napoleonic policy by always letting Benedetti ... presume that I was completely willing to leave the path of virtue [agree territorial concessions]'.)

Metternich cabled Mensdorff that Napoleon was ill: 'He is very pale, very emaciated, and has the air of a man in whom the force of willpower has had to yield before a general exhaustion.' He even suggested that Eugenie was discussing that he abdicate in favour of her. Many contemporaries recorded similar observations before and after this. Interestingly Cowley wrote to Bloomfield (31/7): 'I do not conceive that there is anything seriously wrong with him. He suffers from rheumatism and neuralgic pains, and, like all of us, he is growing older. It is the fashion to say that his intellect is not what it was. I should rather say that it is in energy, not in intellect, that he is the worse for wear.' Historians are vague about how much illness affected his judgement in this crisis.

At Nikolsburg, Bismarck was told that Oubril had formally proposed a congress. The Tsar told Schweinitz that Napoleon had already accepted. 1815 could not be destroyed without the participation of Europe. He would prefer no Prussian annexations. On 3/8 Wilhelm decided to send Manteuffel to St Petersburg (Mosse).

Brunnow spoke to Stanley about a conference (he had on 23 enthusiastic. On 31st he again essentially torpedoed it (accepting with qualifications). On 30rd too). Stanley was notth Cowley said 'what can be done [in a conference] but ratify the behests of Prussia'.

The old Bund voted itself out of existence in the dining room of the Three Moors Hotel in Augsburg.

Crown Prince to mother: 'Without letting myself be in the least blinded or deceived by Bismarck, I cannot deny that I am astonished at the reasonable liberal views which the man is now putting forward and wants to implement.'

La Tour (French Ambassador in London)-Drouyn: Stanley says he won't oppose French push for compensation provided Egypt, Constantinople and Belgium are unaffected.

Gorchakov told Revertera that 'The Emperor ordered me yesterday to telegraph to Vienna, Berlin, Paris, London and Florence that His Majesty could not consent to the map of Europe being changed without the direct participation of the three great neutral Courts. We invite the British Cabinet to a similar declaration and we already know that the Emperor Napoleon is ready to support it.'

Cowley to Bloomfield: 'I do not think that the future is a pleasant look out for England. I have no faith in the friendship of Prussia and if ever she becomes a naval Power she will give us trouble... I look upon her [Austria] as done for.'

Clarendon-Cowley: 'There has never yet ... been recorded in history such a collapse as that of Austria. France is no longer the first military Power.'

Bismarck: 'The population of the country [LUX] is hardly homogenous with ours. In the judgment of military experts the fortress is not of such strategic importance that its possession ought to be bought at the cost of other advantages and couldn't be compensated for by other strategically more important points in our adjacent area.'

1 Aug Bismarck-Herbert: '... in politics, when one has many enemies, one must first put the strongest out of the running and then bleed the weaker ones, which would be a very unchivalrous and low trick in private life' (was im Privatleben eine sehr unritterliche Gemeinheit ware).

Grey to Derby: though it is 'quite right that we should avoid, as much as possible, being mixed up in these continental troubles', the Queen thinks 'it will hardly do ... for England to stand so completely aloof, as to be totally disregarded abroad, and to abdicate her position as one of the great European powers'.

3 Aug Benedetti arrived back in Berlin. Metternich told people Benedetti had consistently helped Bismarck in the negotiations but Drouyn wrote to him, 'I entirely approve of your steps and your language and [the peace is as favourable] to the interests which we have defended as we could hope for under the circumstances.'

Bismarck traveled from Prague to Berlin with the King and discussed the domestic future and Indemnity etc. He sketched the considerations in his Memoirs... There was pressure from the Right to bin the constitution etc. They could have done so but he says: this would have created huge opposition and given ammunition to those trying to undo the victories of 1866, plus Prussia could not have imposed absolutism in her new territories and Austria and the southern states would have exploited the situation. Better to cut a deal.

'I do not consider absolutism by any means a form of government that is desirable or successful in Germany in the long run. The Prussian constitution [with trivial exceptions] is in the main reasonable. It has three factors, the King and two Chambers, each of which by its vote can prevent arbitrary alterations of the legal status quo. This is a just apportionment of legislative power, but if the latter is emancipated from the public criticism of the press and from parliamentary control, there is increased danger of its going astray. The absolutism of the Crown is just as little tenable as the absolutism of parliamentary majorities... Before the victory I would never have mentioned the word “Indemnity”, but after the victory the King was in a position to make the concession magnanimously'. He wanted to build 'a golden bridge either in policy or words, in order to restore the internal peace and from this solid Prussian basis to continue the German policy of the King'. These discussions were 'very trying' and conducted on the train with King and Crown Prince (2,p76). He also had to battle forces wanting annexations in the south. He thought that grabbing bits of Bavaria etc would just encourage them to side with Austria for revenge. OP: the idea of indemnity had been first discussed by the Cabinet in Berlin while the King and Bismarck were at the front in July — only Heydt supported the idea.

Indemnity Bill announced in the opening of the special session of the new Landtag; also an annexation bill and a Reichstag suffrage bill for the new NG Confederation who. In his speech from the throne the King said of the indemnity sought: 'I am confident that recent events will so far contribute towards effecting this indispensable understanding that my government will readily be granted the indemnity in respect of the period of administration without a legal budget for which Parliament is to be approached and that with this, the conflict that has prevailed hitherto will be brought to a close for all time... Government and parliament, working together in harmony, will have the task of bringing to ripeness the fruits that must grow from this bloody seed if it is not to have been scattered in vain.'

Much to everyone's embarrassment when Forckenbeck officially presented the chamber's response to his address, Wilhelm blurted out, 'I had to act that way, and I shall do so again if the same circumstances recur.' OP: this was embarrassing for Bismarck and Forckenbeck and the latter chose to consider that the occasion was unofficial so did not have to be formally reported to the chamber. (The speaker, Grabow, had been a leader of the opposition. He was now replaced by Forckenbeck (a lawyer), a sign the liberals wanted to improve relations.)

Bismarck did not think absolutism was the best path, he knew Prussian conservatives were not popular in the rest of Germany, he knew he had to reckon with a change of king soon, he was already thinking ahead to the psychology of the south German states etc. He wanted a deal with the moderate liberals and 'his interviews with Twesten and Lasker apparently convinced him that the opposition could be reconciled only by sweeping concession' (OP).

Some of his conservative colleagues objected to his idea for an Indemnity Bill. Bismarck never forgave their 'desertion'.

OP (p 333) The liberals mostly wanted a deal. But those who valued nationalism more were more likely to think of the conflict as lost and were willing to ditch it on Bismarck's terms. Those more on the democratic left feared accepting the Indemnity Bill on the basis that it would legalise the 'gap theory' and wanted to fight for future rights. Twesten, Lasker, Forckenbeck, Michaelis and others wanted a deal and feared voters would shift further to conservatives if they held out. Twesten said in the debate: 'No one may be criticised for giving precedence to the issue of power at this time and maintaining that the issues of freedom can wait, provided that nothing happens that can permanently prejudice them.' Mommsen said after victory, '[it's] a marvellous feeling to be there when history turns a corner. That Germany has a future and that this future will be determined by Prussia is no longer a hope but a fact, a mighty fact for all time.' Treitschke: 'Politics is the science of the attainable.'

Bismarck stressed the French threat and played up the national goal. He also allowed the liberals to make some amendments to the Indemnity Bill. On 3 September it passed 230-75. In his Memoirs, Bismarck applied one of his frequent quips to the Indemnity affair — In verbis simus faciles! Liebknecht: 'The oppressors of yesterday are the saviours of today; right has become wrong and wrong right. Blood appears to be a special elixir, for the angel of darkness has become the angel of light before whom the people lie in the dust and adore.'

EF: 'It was a great watershed in Prussian and German politics... His solutions proved to be unstable and his rebundled package [his mix of reactionary, liberal and other elements] unravelled within a time span scarcely longer than his period in power.' Twesten thought it better to cooperate with Bismarck. Bamberger, a south German liberal in exile in Paris in 1848, wrote: 'This act was not the best the government could have offered the Landtag but in fact it was the best it was willing and did offer. Could hostility have secured anything better than what the government condescended to concede?' Lasker, Unruh and Twesten supported the Act. An article by the liberal historian, Baumgarten, is often cited: he attacked the 'extraordinary ineptitude' of liberalism and the middle classes who were 'only in exceptional circumstances able to participate in great political action with success'. This trend 'boded ill for Germany's future' (EF).

Gall: Virchow, Waldeck, Hoverbeck opposed the Bill. Twesten, Lasker, Forckenbeck, Unruh supported it.

OP (p335): 'The constitutional conflict was over but so also was the unity of the liberal movement.' Bismarck nudged the split along by holding out the intoxicating feeling of acting with, and influencing, the ruling power: e.g redrafting legislation, all sorts of little tweaks. Liberals split into the Progressive Party, largely Prussian and trying to maintain traditional liberal ideas, and the National Liberal Party, largely non-Prussian, more national, and less liberal. (Bennigsen and Miquel were Hanoverian.) Economic issues such as the Zollverein had 'no influence on the split' (OP). The priority given to national unity by the NLs appealed to many merchants, bankers, industrialists who shared that priority and looked forward to a united Germany spreading the financial burden of military spending and freeing capital for more productive uses.

'To the small businessmen and artisans of democratic temperament who clung to the Progressive party the financial benefits to be expected of German unity were either less important or not so apparent; hence they were more reluctant than the moderates to surrender or defer the issues of freedom and parliamentary rights for which the constitutional conflict had been fought' (Pflanze).

The democratic left saw the split as opportunists versus principle; the moderate right saw the split as practical statesmen versus naive idealists. 'German liberalism had reached a point of divergence. The moderates took the track that ultimately lead to unconditional surrender, the democrats that which finally ended in frustration and impotence' (Pflanze).

Further, in August 1866 Bebel and Liebknecht founded the Saxon People's Party which got 2 seats in the August 1867 Reichstag election (Hamerow says 3). At the start it was democratic rather than socialist but in 1868-9 it shifted towards the radical program of the Socialist International. It grew into the Social Democratic Workers Party founded at Eisenach in 1869, founded for the 'emancipation of the working-class', and became the SPD in 1875 and is the origin of today's Social Democratic Party.

'The refusal of liberals to accept the political equality of labour through universal suffrage, their unwillingness to face the social issue by questioning the dogma of laissez-faire, and, finally, their betrayal in 1866 of their own highest ideals, began to convince proletarians of the validity of the concept of class struggle. The crack that had opened in the German social structure in 1863 began to widen' (Pflanze).

Sybel wrote a few years later: Waldeck thought the government had offered nothing justifying an expectation of more constitutional conduct; Virchow said he and his friends had a better way of getting Germany unity than Bismarck, namely the way of freedom. The final vote was 230-75 and the practical question, what would happen in similar circumstances in the future, 'was left to future decision and it was considered sufficient to heal the present wound by mutually trusting the royal word'.

5 Aug (WAF) Benedetti forwarded Drouyn's latest document to Bismarck with a cover note. He told Drouyn he'd thought it best to let Bismarck consider it alone before they spoke. It reiterated: Prussia gives up territory that was French in 1814, Prussia gets Bavaria and others to hand over territory to fit 1814 borders, Prussia withdraws from Luxembourg and the fortress of Mainz.

Benedetti was summoned to Bismarck in the evening. They had a friendly but tough chat. Bismarck suggested the King would not give up territory and Napoleon was going back on his promise of friendliness. Benedetti stressed that Prussia was upending the European map and France must be compensated. WAF makes no mention of the harsh words below. After this Benedetti was encouraged to return to the argument by Drouyn. Bismarck told Goltz: the king won't give up territory; he was very unhappy about the Mainz demand; he suggested a deal could be done on Luxembourg; he again encouraged France to think about Belgium.

OP (p312): Having strung him along, Bismarck now said 'If you want war, you shall have it. We shall arouse the entire German nation against you', I will unleash 'revolutionary strokes' against which German thrones are more secure than Napoleon's — OR I will do a deal to give you compensation, he was, he said, prepared to make 'important sacrifices' for French friendship.. Cf. his similar comments on unleashing revolution to Govone on 10/8 and viz Russia on 11/8. In July he had spoken to people about practical steps for such eventualities, he was not bluffing. The French couldn't move quickly enough or deal with Bismarck's double-dealing, and time slipped away.

Bismarck used the French demands for 1814 borders and German territory to pressure Bavaria et al to accept secret military deals in return for generous approach from Prussia. In his first meeting with Pfordten, Bismarck made voracious demands; Pfordten hurried to see Benedetti who offered nothing as he was trying to get the Palatinate out of Bismarck; Pfordten went back to Bismarck who stressed his isolation — then described how he would modify his demands in return for an alliance; Pfordten agreed, Bismarck got what he wanted (OP, p370, dates not given but seems during August). (This is classic Bismarck — diverting the pressure exerted on him by France in order to pressure one of his opponents. The French pressure achieved something for him but not for France.)

Eyck: a few days later Bismarck leaked the demands and his rejection to the French opposition newspaper which caused a sensation and forced Drouyn to resign.

France asked London's opinion on Russia's proposed conference, even though Bismarck had already made clear he opposed. Stanley consulted and replied (8th) negatively. England has 'no cause to object to such increase of power on [Prussia's] part' he told Cowley.

Brunnow again pushed Stanley: Prussia is ripping up 1815 alone, are you going to allow this? Stanley said he would have to consult colleagues.

Stanley wrote to Cowley: 'The growing jealousy of Russia, and, I suspect, of France also, against Prussia is natural. We should feel the same in their position. But to us there is no loss, rather a gain, in the interposition of a solid barrier between the two great aggressive powers of the Continent.' Stanley-Bloomfield: 'if anything wanted to persuade me of what is in our interest in this matter, I should find it in the evident jealousy of the two great nations, between which Prussia is interposed as a barrier'. Cowley informed London that France was requesting the 1814 borders from Bismarck.

A Cabinet was held and Cowley was instructed (10th) to obtain assurances about Belgium and was told by Drouyn that it was safe. (Cf. Cowley of 30/7 — one of the few who predicted the new Prussia 'will give us trouble'.) The Queen, so vocal about Bismarck's methods, now also saw the world differently: '... Germany, a country allied in so many ways... Germany's wish is to be united under the supremacy of [Prussia], & not divided into N. and S., the result of which would be to throw the latter into the arms of Fr. — than which nothing could be worse. A strong, united liberal Ger. would be a most useful ally to [England]' (Victoria-Stanley, 7 Aug). Stanley-Cowley (11th): 'Our line is plain: let German and Frenchman fight, or divide the plunder as they please: but speak out strongly for Belgium if it should be necessary. I hope the necessity will not arise.' Cf. Stanley-Cowley 18/8.

Manteuffel received his instructions (Mosse): he was to stress the pressure of public opinion and how sacrifices must be rewarded, we are taking as little as possible. Wilhelm also sent the Tsar a letter. He arrived in St Petersburg on 9th.

(WAF) A second interview with Benedetti and Bismarck who said the king rejected the demands but he suggested there could be other combinations and said this was not his final word, he was still inclined to make 'sacrifices' for the relationship. He said the military attaché, Loë, would take detailed instructions to Goltz. They met again in the morning of 8th. Benedetti questioned him about Manteuffel's departure for St Petersburg (there 9-24th). He did not push vigorously on compensation as he thought it would lead to a major crisis. Rumours were spreading, he was getting panicky visits from other ambassadors et al, and he thought he had to go to Paris for urgent consultation. Departed on 9th, arrived Paris on 10th where stories were leaking about talks in Berlin (some of them from Bismarck's office to French journalists, p121).

(The whole crisis showed that 1) Napoleon, like FJ, did not have clear priorities before the crisis blew up, 2) this made it impossible to handle coherently the many tactical questions of the crisis, 3) this structural problem was exacerbated by the inevitable chaos flowing from communication failures and delays as people moved, telegrams missed them etc, 4) in such chaos, Bismarck's clear priorities, fluid style and ability to divert pressure aimed at him against others for his own ends meant he was playing at a far deeper level.)

Stanley to Cowley: England has 'no cause to object to such increase of power on [Prussia's] part' and British public opinion sees Prussia's success with 'extreme favour'. England would not join any protest against what was happening. Stanley to Loftus: 'the advantage to England of a strong Prussia is so obvious, that in my judgement it may fairly be set against the disapproval which we would otherwise feel of acts which however useful in their ultimate result, have undoubtedly been violent and arbitrary.' Loftus wrote in August (undated) that he 'could not view with any dissatisfaction or fear of danger to England an increase of power to Prussia. She was the great Protestant State of Continental Europe... She will become a Power of great importance in maintaining the peace of Central Europe... We have much in common with her — our race, our religion, our mutual interests are all interwoven with [Prussia], & our political interests should be identical... A strong Germany will always look to [England] for moral support, & will naturally seek the alliance of a great maritime power.'

Manteuffel met the Tsar in the evening. The Tsar 1) expressed shock at the end of dynasties based on divine right, complained about 2) Bismarck stirring up revolutionaries and 3) about the democratic character of the planned new North German Parliament, and 4) worried that the south German states would fall under the influence of revolutionaries and/or Napoleon. The next day Gorchakov reinforced these arguments and suggested moderating Prussian demands. He also hinted at future Prussian support for getting rid of the Black Sea clauses.

Loftus to Stanley: 'We have no interest in opposing the creation of a strong North Germany in the hands of Prussia. Commercially and Politically it can be only of benefit to us. France and Russia have other views and interests but we may safely keep aloof'. Loftus also discussed the desire for France to get compensation and the possibilities of war between France and Prussia and the consequences for Belgian independence. 'Both will apply for our aid. It is evident that we have no special interest in such a war... There is no object for us to take part in the struggle save and except for the preservation of Belgium'. London should therefore use her leverage and the desire of both sides to get from both guarantees of Belgian independence.

(As the historian Millman wrote, 'Once Bismarck had succeeded in unifying North Germany the means he had used to do so were forgotten in the flush of glorious success. Whereas his conduct had been labelled unscrupulous and without principle, its results were now praised. The expansion of Prussia, instead of alienating England, drew her sympathy.')

Bismarck told Govone that if France came to terms with Austria or Russia 'we would conduct a war of revolution; we would incite rebellion in Hungary and organise provisional governments in Prague and Brunn.'

10 Aug (WAF) Bismarck-Goltz: if France threatens war over compensation we'll need to make alliances with south Germany and Austria.

Stanley confirmed to Brunnow that Britain would not protest to Prussia. It was clear she would not support Gorchakov's efforts to organise the three Powers to interfere and dictate to Prussia. Brunnow accepted that the 'European' policy had failed and Russia would come to terms with 'reality'. Brunnow now 'has quite changed his tone and assures me that nothing was further from his thoughts than to protest against the acts of Prussia! If this is true, words don't carry the same meaning to him as to me' (Stanley-Cowley), (Mosse p246 & 248).

(WAF) Goltz-Bismarck: Napoleon is not pushing the border changes and says there's been a misunderstanding. On or before 12th, Napoleon and Benedetti met. Napoleon was now trying to shift blame for the growing fiasco onto Drouyn. (It's murky quite what Benedetti personally thought re what compensation claims to make.)

Bismarck was angered by Manteuffel's report of discussions with the Tsar and Gorchakov (9/8). In response to pressure from Russia, in his instructions to Manteuffel who was sent to Russia, Bismarck wrote: 'Pressure from abroad will compel us to proclaim the German constitution of 1849 and to adopt truly revolutionary measures. If revolution there is to be, we would rather make it than suffer it.' According to Pflanze, this was even a threat to awaken Polish nationalism against Russia. He was not bluffing and had made various preparations for such events including building his network of revolutionary nationalists (though he also planned to betray the revolutionaries by not granting them the 1849 constitution in full after he had used it to mobilise them for war).

18 months later he said to Carl Schurz that if France and Austria had intervened 'We would have been forced to explode every mine [in Germany, Serbia, and Hungary]. If this primer had been ignited, of course, retreat would no longer have been possible. To treat with Austria would have been out of the question. Her destruction would have been unavoidable. A great empty space would have been opened between Germany and Turkey. It would have been necessary to create something to fill this vacuum. We could not have left our Hungarian friends in the lurch.' However, he thought 'such eccentric means' were only a 'last resort', the existence of Austria was preferable. In his Memoirs he wrote that 'new creations in this area could only be of a continually revolutionary character.' He preferred a lenient peace with Austria and no war with France. (OP p313-14.)

Although he made a few minor concessions to Russian complaints he carried on. Manteuffel told the Tsar and Gorchakov that Bismarck, if driven to desperation, would stop at nothing. Manteuffel reported that everybody in St Petersburg was 'kopfscheu und verletzt' ('scared and aggrieved'?) at Bismarck's threats of revolution.

(WAF) Drouyn offered resignation. (On 11th it seems he sent an agent to Berlin to try a backchannel negotiation with Bismarck, possibly with Napoleon's agreement. The agent got nowhere.) Napoleon offered the job to Benedetti, discussions over a few days, he refused for reasons that are unclear, WAF guesses probably because of his health. He worked with Napoleon on a new set of demands, abandoning German territory and focusing on Belgium and Luxembourg as Bismarck had suggested.

Gorchakov in conversation with Talleyrand made clear he had given up hope of a congress. On 15th Buchanan reported a similar change of tone.

(JS) Heydt presented the Indemnity Bill to the budget committee and said the indemnity and lines of credit should be considered together. Passed on 3/9.

Stanley-Cowley: If Napoleon, after the Mexican failure and surely soon to be followed by the 'inevitable' surrender of Rome, fails to get compensation from Bismarck, it 'will be the most serious shock his dynasty has yet undergone. If he does not give way it is war. We do not want Napoleon upset, nor do we want a new war.'

Benedetti arrived back in Berlin. He found opinion very aggressive against concessions of German territory to France.

Discussions with Benedetti (see 29 August below). Bismarck prevaricated but was irritated by Benedetti's approach and demand for an answer within 3-4 days (WAF). There were further talks on 22-23/8.

Prussia and other northern states agreed in principle a treaty for North German Confederation. Bismarck had used the spectre of French demands to pressure the Germans.

Loftus to Stanley: 'We must look out that France and Prussia do not come to an understanding at the expense of Belgium.' He had got wind of Benedetti's gambits.

Note from Wilhelm to Bismarck complained that he's out of the loop and says 'I wish, therefore, now to be informed daily of the negotiations with Bavaria and Darmstadt.'

Stanley to Cowley: 'I begin to suspect that the German revolution may go farther and faster than its authors intend. Bismarck wants a new German federation. Napoleon wanted an Italian federation. We know what came of that: may not the precedent be followed? In any case the southern states will not long endure exclusion: and then will be seen, whether France and Russia will tolerate a German empire. But as I think you said in one of your letters, it is a question for '68 rather than for '66.'

A letter to the Grand Duke of Baden reported Bismarck saying to Württemberg's war minister, in response to the question — how long might it take for the south to join: 'Perhaps six weeks, perhaps three years.'

Clarendon to Cowley (interesting the former Foreign Secretary was writing to the ambassadors in such a way): 'I think that under his regime [Stanley's] England will become more and more isolated — he will not, like [Russell] create a host of enemies but he will cool and render indifferent such friends as we may still have. It is perhaps best, tho not glorious, that we shd. try to efface ourselves for we are in a horribly defenseless position.' (Cf. discussions over Corry review, December 1867.)

Stanley to Disraeli: 'The only question as to which I feel nervous is the American', re the Alabama claims. During August-September Britain was also concerned about the revolt on Crete (thought vital for the security of communications with India) and the Turkish response. On 13/8 Stanley-Lyons: Urge the Turks to act with 'the utmost forbearance and in a conciliatory spirit', it would be 'a great misfortune for Turkey' if anything excites 'the sympathies of Europe in favour of the Christian subjects of the Porte.'

FJ letter: 'When all the world is against you and you have no friends at all, there is not much prospect of success, but the man must defend himself as long as possible, do his duty to the last, and finally fall with honour... We were very honourable but very stupid... Before the war, we were already betrayed and sold... It is a war of life and death which will not be ended for a long long time.' Clark: he convinced himself that he had been the victim of a conspiracy between Bismarck and Napoleon and that his attempt to behave decently had brought him to ruin. He'd remarked on 3/5 that 'it is becoming clearer every day that each step in Berlin and Italy is ... the link in a chain of measures which have long been agreed upon'. This is why he dismissed his ministers and appointed Bismarck's greatest enemy in Germany, Beust. He had something like a serious spiritual breakdown, he felt everything he tried turned out badly and he had an 'unlucky hand'. He kept this very quiet. In 1867, he wrote, 'I have a bitterly hard crust to eat, and only my trust in God and an honest will to do my best can give me the strength to keep afloat.'

aPeace of Prague and independent treaties were signed Aug-October (Bismarck excluded Italy and other German states from discussions, leaving them all to handle their own peace negotiations).

• The only territory lost by Austria was Venetia.
• Austria accepted an indemnity of 40M thaler (some books say 20M — which number was finalised?).
• Austria accepted 'the reconstruction of Germany without participation of the Austrian imperial state' and a North German confederation (new Prussia, small northern states, Saxony) with individual states retaining their own constitutions but accepting extension of the Prussian military system.
• Austria recognised the 'alteration of possessions', what Pflanze called Bismarck's 'most revolutionary act in 1866': Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, Hesse-Kassell, Nassau, and Frankfurt were annexed. Prussia constituted more than four-fifths of the population and land area of the 1867 confederation.
• Baden, Württemberg, and Bavaria were left intact.
• Hesse-Darmstadt (lost some territory) and Saxony were not annexed but brought into the NGC.
• Bismarck threatened the south German states with France and forced secret military alliances on them (in which they promised that in the event of war they would accept the supreme command of Wilhelm), while publicly urging patience on German nationalists. At Nikolsburg, he described the difficulties of digesting south Germany. He could not annex them now; the military alliances were enough.
• Napoleon's prevarication meant he got very little: a promise of a referendum in the Duchies and a guarantee of an 'independent existence' for the southern German states, neither of which Bismarck thought were important. French policy suffered a basic problem: Napoleon was trying to woo the southern states and get some German territory, and the latter helped Bismarck thwart the former.

OP: Bismarck realized that he should either take states whole (thus helping assimilate as effectively as possible) or leave them alone (thus helping restore relations quickly rather than creating grudges): 'every full annexation attainable without cession of Prussian territory is better than the half by way of reform' (OP p315). France was not the only reason for halting at the Main. He worried about expansion in the south. He was hostile to, and afraid of, the ultramontane influence (cf. his comments to Gerlach in 1854). In July he thought that including the Bavarian, Catholic element would make it impossible to consolidate her gains and that 'for a long time' the south would not consent to rule by Berlin.

Victory changed many minds. E.g Rudolf von Ihering, Professor of Law, Göttingen University... Just before the war he wrote of the 'shamelessness and ghastly frivolity of Bismarck. In August, 1 bow before the genius of Bismarck who has accomplished with great energy a master stroke of political teamwork. I have forgiven this man all that he has done in the past, yes more than that I have convinced myself that what we uninitiated thought was criminal arrogance was necessary; it has since then become evident that it was an indispensable means to the goal... [F]or such a man of action I would give a hundred men of liberal opinions [but of] impotent honesty.

It did not change some conservatives. Ludwig von Gerlach: 'My pain is ... the pain a Prussian German Christian feels that my party and my fatherland Prussia has violated the ten commandments of God in this terrible manner and through a depraved pseudo-patriotism has done damage to her soul and stained her conscience.'

The Tsar, still cross, swallowed his complaints. He told Wilhelm that Prussian behaviour had struck a severe blow at monarchic principles but the two states must 'remain in future what they had been in the past: old and faithful allies'. Russian objections to the peace ended.

Crowe sent to Stanley a copy of a letter he obtained somehow from Napoleon to La Valette. Crowley told Stanley on 28th he was sure it was genuine.

Bismarck asked Goltz to return (via a holiday spot to avoid suspicion) to discuss French demands.

Gladstone wrote in a letter of the 'great events' that'seem ... to begin and complete [the] needed work in the reconstruction of Germany'.

Stanley to Bloomfield: 'We have only as yet seen the first act of the great drama. The more complete union of Germany will probably be next - and then a war with France'.

On 17 August Benedetti had proposed two agreements: a) a public treaty conceding to France the 1814 frontiers and the right to Luxembourg; b) a secret treaty giving France the right to annex Belgium. Bismarck rejected the 1814 frontiers again and suggested that he would be prepared to give Napoleon Luxembourg and Belgium in return for a 'free hand in Germany'.

On 29th, they discussed it further and Benedetti left with Bismarck a draft treaty specifying that France gets Belgium and Luxembourg in return for a 'federal union' between NGC and the southern German states. Benedetti said he was going on holiday to Carlsbad while the king waited for Goltz to arrive. WAF: he was reserved in this discussion as he was awaiting further instructions.

He left 2/9, returned 14-30/9. (For details of French thinking, cf. WAF pl 30ff)

On 7 September (but WAF says he was away then??) Bismarck told him that there would not be a treaty but Wilhelm desired friendship - 'a circumspect refusal' (Pflanze). Benedetti tried unsuccessfully for years to get the draft back, and finally saw its text splashed across the front of The Times on 25 July 1870 as part of Bismarck's propaganda effort to keep Britain neutral. He also failed to report back Bismarck's suggestion that France organise demonstrations in Luxembourg. Benedetti then insisted on going on holiday for a fortnight for his health. When he returned to Berlin on 15th he was told Bismarck was too ill to see him and Bismarck then left for the country. France had missed its chance. Bismarck ruthlessly exploited the errors and carelessness of his diplomatic opponents. (Cf. Pflanze p. 371ff for details.)

Memoirs — after the war was finished, Napoleon thought that Prussia's gains would create a force against unification and he thought that non-Prussian Germany would be better disposed to France. He 'did not realise the national drift of the time and judged the situation in accordance with his schoolboy reminiscences of South Germany, and from diplomatic reports which were only based on ministerial moods and sporadic dynastic feeling... I assumed that a united Germany was only a question of time, that the North German Confederation was only the first step in its solution, but that the enmity of France and perhaps of Russia, Austria's need of revenge of 1866, and the King's Prussian and dynastic particularism must not be called too soon into the lists... I was at that time preoccupied with the idea of delaying the outbreak of this war [against France] until our fighting strength should be increased by the application of the Prussian military legislation not only in [North Germany] but, as I could hope even at that time from the observation I had made, to the South Germans.'

He wrote (Memoirs) that he had 'overestimated' the danger of a war with France at that time because he overestimated the size, skill and organisation of its army, but it was still 'quite reasonable' to postpone the conflict. (2p57-9) The Tsar was friendly to Bismarck and grateful for 1863 and had immediately accepted Nikolsburg but Gorchakov was making trouble. Bismarck thought that Russia would not support a French attack but would probably be happy to see a coalition 'pour a little water into our wine of 1866' — but then intervene after Prussia had suffered defeats.

Lyons warned Stanley that the Cretan affair was likely to become serious and Stanley wrote to Gladstone that there is opposition to Turkish rule in principle and Greek agents are active. At the end of August Russia suggested joint intervention with London and Paris but this didn't go anywhere.

Disraeli warned Derby about 'the obstinacy with which the Admiralty has declined building iron ships'.

Drouyn resigned, replaced by Moustier as Foreign Secretary — cf. Eyck above — this happened because of Bismarck leaking details to a French paper. According to Millman, Goltz informed Bismarck of the change on 30/8. Mosse: Drouyn resigned on 31st and Cowley informed Stanley of the switch to Moustier. Mosse: the change was unpopular in St Petersburg as Moustier was seen as pro-Turk and anti-Russia.

Cowley was scathing about Moustier — he 'prefers the society of ballet dancers to all others' and is a 'bird of a feather' with Napoleon (22/9). (Millman says by now Cowley was old and deaf, disliked Moustier and distrusted Napoleon, and wanted to retire and only stayed at Stanley's request.) Eyck says that Rouher, minister of state, took over the negotiations — not Moustier.

Gorchakov proposed joint remonstrances in Constantinople re Crete.

Bismarck told Loftus: 'Prussia had no personal interest or wish with respect to Luxembourg... Prussia was quite ready ... to withdraw her garrison ... and we are prepared for any arrangement which may be agreeable to the King'.

Bismarck speech to Landtag on Indemnity: 'The more sincerely the Royal Government wishes for peace, the more its members feel the obligation to abstain from any kind of retrospective criticism, be it in the form of defence or attacks. Over the past four years, we have frequently advocated our respective viewpoints on both sides, sometimes with more bitterness than goodwill, and in these four years, no one has succeeded in convincing the other. Each protagonist believed he was correct in acting the way he did. In external affairs, too, it would be difficult for a peace agreement to materialise if one demanded that it be preceded by the one side acknowledging: “I now accept the fact that I have acted wrongly.” We wish for this peace, but not because we are unable to fight; on the contrary, the tide is more in our favour today than it was years ago. We do not wish for peace to evade possible prosecution under a future law on [ministerial] responsibility; I don't believe we'll be charged - but if it does come to that, I don't believe we'll be convicted. Be that as it may, our ministry has been accused of many things, but fearfulness has never been one of them.

'We wish for peace because in our view the fatherland currently needs it more than ever before; we wish for it and seek it especially because we believe we can find it at the present moment; we would have sought it earlier if we had had hopes of finding it then; we believe we can find it because you will have recognised that the Royal Government is closer to the tasks to which the majority of you are also committed than you may have thought it to be earlier; closer than the government's silence about things that must be kept silent would entitle you to believe.

'For this reason, we believe we can find peace, and we are seeking it honestly; we have held out our hand to you, and the committee report gives us the guarantee that you will shake this hand. We will then solve the tasks that have to be solved in cooperation with you; I certainly do not exclude from these tasks improvements in the domestic fulfilment of promises made in the constitution. However, we will only be able to solve them jointly by recognising, on both sides, that both sides are in fact serving the fatherland with the same good will, and we must do so without doubting the other's sincerity.

'At this moment, though, the tasks of foreign policy still remain unresolved; the brilliant successes of our army have only, as it were, raised the stakes, and we have more to lose than before, but the game is not won yet; the more firmly we stick together at home, the surer we are to win it. [...]

'If it is commonplace to say, “What the sword won, the pen spoiled,” then I have complete confidence that we will never have to hear, “What sword and pen have won has been destroyed from this rostrum.”...'

Indemnity Bill passed. Memoirs — he wanted to show the world as united a domestic front as possible. He wanted to remove not just 'internal dissensions' but also 'any appearance of such a thing'. If we could gain independence and security, 'we should then be able to move freely in our internal development and to organise our institutions in as liberal or reactionary a manner as should seem right and fitting.' Until security was clear, he was prepared to pay 'blackmail' to the opposition in order to be able to throw Prussia's full weight into the scale including 'the possibility of letting loose national revolutionary movements against our enemies.'

Malmesbury warned Derby: he had 'been for a long time anxious about the state of our navy which ... does not bear nearly the same relative position as regards other navies which it formerly did'.

Benedetti back from holidays, tried to see Bismarck, told latter too ill to see him.

Stanley thought 'the final collapse' of Turkey in Crete may be near. Lyons told him (19th) this was wrong and the rebel cause was hopeless. On 25 September Stanley wrote to Cowley, 'I do not believe in the Turkish Empire: it seems to be worn out and unable to maintain itself.' Sadly Greece is 'bankrupt, anarchical, without an honest politician or a class which can be trusted with power. I see no natural heir to the sick man.'

Derby-Disraeli: 'I am coming reluctantly to the conclusion that we shall have to deal with the question of Reform.' Possibly influenced by continuing level of protests and meetings from the pro-reform movement (Blake). Disraeli and Cranborne were not convinced. Discussions continued through October-December. They didn't want to say No to any reform, and therefore provoke opponents to unite. So they looked to delay and keep opponents divided. Discussions ran on into the new year.

France issued a circular. It welcomed the destruction of the 1815 system and the breakup of the coalition of the northern courts. It stated: 'An irresistible power ... pushes people to unify in large agglomerations by making the secondary states disappear.' This was a hint that France would push for border changes on the principle of nationality.

Cowley to Stanley: Napoleon is 'a man, who thinks that no promise, however securely made, is binding under altered circumstances' so 'no precautions one can take can be of much avail'.

Wilhelm promoted Bismarck to Major General.

Victory parades in Berlin. (JS & OP: 21st (photo below says 21st. EF says 20th and a note from Wilhelm suggests 20th. Maybe lasted 2 days?!) Bismarck rode with Moltke and Roon in front of Wilhelm's carriage. 22/9 The Times editorial: 'Well may the Prussian people enjoy their round and happy day. The army is part of them. It is “the Prussian nation in arms”. That nation did not go forth impelled by lust of conquest, or even by love of strife and adventure... They thought of nothing but what they owed to King and country.'

Keyserling-Bismarck: Gorchakov is talking very positively re our friendship and alliance. On 15/10 Gorchakov wrote to Bismarck personally, inquiring after his health and stressing 'de notre détermination d'entretenir avec la Prusse les relations les plus intimes' (our determination to maintain the most intimate relations with Prussia). Mosse: this was probably connected to a) the uncertain relations with Austria and France, and b) Gorchakov's plotting to denounce the Black Sea clauses and his view on the likely dismemberment of Turkey. He had drafted notes denouncing the clauses but although the Tsar initially approved them, in a Council with the Tsar, the ministers of war and finance, The Grand Duke et al — his plan was successfully opposed as too dangerous. The date is apparently lost but is believed to be the last week of September. Gorchakov told Oubril (November) that he would return to the issue when the Franco-Prussian war, which he expected, materialised and he did indeed use these drafts in October 1870. (Mosse p257)

Bismarck retreated to the countryside to recover and think. 26/9 he went to his cousin's at Karlsburg then on 6/10 to Putbus (on the Baltic). There he wrote the 'Putbus Dictates' (30 October & 19 November) on the new constitution for the NGC.

The idea that he drafted the entire Constitution over a few days in December is false. He got ideas from Wagener, Max Duncker, von Savigny and others.

EF: Bucher and others had prepared drafts but after Bucher described his work Bismarck hardly listened then started dictating.

In the Putbus dictates he wrote, 'In form we shall have to stick more to the confederation of states [Staatenbund] while in practice giving it the character of a federal state [Bundestaat] with elastic, inconspicuous but far-reaching forms of words... The more easily we continue the previous forms, the more easily can the thing be done, whereas an attempt to have a fully formed Minerva spring forth from the head of the Presidium will run it aground in professorial disputations.' (NB: 'elastic, inconspicuous but far-reaching' — very Bismarck — as was 'professorial' as a term of abuse.) He also insisted on 'no attendance fees, no delegates, no census, unless the latter goes to the lengths described above [very severe property qualification].' He attacked attendance fees: 'Attendance fees mean paying the educated proletariat for the professional practice of demagogy.' In negotiating the details, he was flexible. He was concerned to avoid 'the grave hindrance inherent in the friction of the artificial machinery of the constitutional state' (as he put it in February 1869). See December debates.

(Mosse) Austria appointed a Pole to be Governor of Galicia which was seen as an insult in St Petersburg. 7/11 Revertera reported the noise about this was dying down and the time was good for a proposal re joint action in the east.

Werther reported to Bismarck from Vienna that there were some signs that Austria was reorienting policy to the East: 'Has she finally understood that her future is not in Germany but in the East?'

Loftus-Stanley: Since Manteuffel's return to Berlin (August?) 'a change was apparent in the language and bearing of M. d'Oubril, and this has become more striking since his own visit to St Petersburg... The former sympathy for Prussia appears to have returned, no expression of disapproval of Prussian annexation is heard. “Les faits accompli” no longer find a murmur. The only Legation of a neutral state which illuminated (altho' only very modestly) on the eve of the entry of the victorious Prussian Army was that of Russia. In short, the attitude of M. d'Oubril is no longer one of jealous disquietude but has become one of passive and calm satisfaction.

Stanley sent to Lyons a FO memo on the importance of Crete as, with Gibraltar-Malta-Cyprus, 'one of the chain of sentries which ... keep open this important connection with our Eastern Empire.' Cyprus and Crete are 'the keys of Egypt' and would be 'a great menace' in the hands of a 'maritime power hostile to England'.

Disraeli-Derby: 'It can never be our pretence or our policy to defend the Canadian frontier against the U.S.... Power and influence we should exercise in Asia; consequently in Eastern Europe, consequently also in Western Europe; but what is the use of these colonial deadweights which we do not govern? ... Leave the Canadians to defend themselves; recall the African squadron; give up the settlements on the west coast of Africa; and we shall make a saving which will at the same time enable us to build ships and have a good budget.' Cf. 2/2/67.

'The French must retain hope and especially faith in our good will without giving them definite commitments.'

Disraeli: no department should exceed the estimates of 1866-7. Stanley and Disraeli opposed expanding army despite the summer war.

Goltz told Thile that with Bismarck away he could not provide answers on Luxembourg.

Mensdorff replaced by Beust in Vienna. Beust had been foreign minister for Saxony, Bismarck's refusal to deal with him in negotiating peace led to his dismissal there. (See 22/8 for FJ motives.) In February 1867 he was also appointed Austrian minister-president and in June Imperial Chancellor. He was set on overturning Prussia's success. He worked to create the Dual Monarchy as he knew Austria had to sort out its internal chaos first. He hoped it would appeal to German liberals. However, the Hungarians had no interest in fighting with Prussia over Germany. Few in Vienna wanted another war against Prussia. Most thought instead that Vienna should try to profit from a war between Prussia and France. Beust hoped to embroil Prussia in an eastern war instead. Mosse: his appointment was unpopular in St Petersburg, Gorchakov complained to Buchanan that Beust would try to get an alliance with France and disturb the peace of Europe again.

Bismarck impounded all funds and properties of the Guelph dynasty. He then negotiated a deal with the King then living in Vienna. For the return of millions shipped to Britain before the war, Bismarck offered millions invested in Prussian securities (and some other properties/securities) to remain in Prussian control until Georg abdicated. Georg had no intention of abdicating but accepted the deal. The Bill went through the Landtag (with difficulty) on 18/2/1868. That day, Georg said publicly in Vienna that he hoped God would restore his reign and Hanoverian independence. Bismarck took back control of all funds and declared he would use the income to counter Guelph subversion. This was approved by the Landtag in February 1869. This created 'the reptile fund' which gave Bismarck an annual income of over a million marks to spend as he wished with no supervision. He used it for his espionage network, to bribe journalists and editors, help colleagues, and bribe all sorts of characters (including bishops and cardinals to help end the Kulturkampf). (Pflanze 2p101) Stern: Until 1872 Keudell managed the fund from the FO and Bleichröder was involved. All records were destroyed in 1872 (check) and most of Bleichröder's involvement is lost.

Revertera reported to Vienna that Russia feared an Austro-French rapprochement over Turkey.

Cowley to Stanley: the tension between Prussia and France will probably die down because 'either the most bloody war will be waged ... or the people will revolt against the Gov[ernment]s on account of such heavy taxation'. Lotus agreed about the taxation dynamic. The Palmerston generation was more optimistic. However in the course of 1867 this initial optimism was replaced by a more fatalistic attitude. (Otte)

(WAF) Benedetti returned to Berlin after his holiday and a trip to Paris. On 16/11 he spoke to Thile at the Foreign Office and was encouraged by their discussion. On 19/11 he spoke to Wilhelm and was discouraged. He complained to the new Austrian envoy, Karolyi's successor, Count Felix von Wimpffen, that Wilhelm was blinded by success, not frank in relations with others, he feared closer relations between Prussia and Russia, and said he wanted closer relations between France and Austria. Countess Marie Bismarck-Keudell (19/11): Bismarck does not intend to be disturbed further by Benedetti in whom he has lost confidence.

Stanley to Cowley: 'France and Germany may fight out their quarrel with little harm to us.'

Bismarck told von Wimpffen that he wanted an 'intimate understanding' with Austria, he regretted the failure of the Gablenz mission and that the two had not formed a common front against France and 'shot the deer together', and so on.

Bismarck returned to Berlin and completed his draft Constitution between 1-8

(Pflanze). He presented his draft to Wilhelm et al on 9 December giving everybody very little time to argue before the special conference of governments on 15 December.

'Seldom in history has a constitution been so clearly the product of the thought and will of a single individual... He wished to repeat in the North German Confederation the basic power arrangement of the Prussian state and thereby perpetuate the conservative order in the larger political context created by Prussian conquest [and to] circumvent the collegial structure of the Prussian cabinet in order to build up his own authority as the chief minister... It united the forces of German nationalism and particularism, and solved the problem of uniting states of disproportionate size. Planned as the first stage toward small-German unity, its national features were intended to attract southern peoples and its federal ones to reassure their governments... The essence of the Bismarckian constitution was its perpetuation, by the use of revolutionary means, of the Prussian aristocratic-monarchical order in a century of increasingly dynamic economic and social change... Pressure would be met by counterpressure: the nation against the dynasties, the confederation against Prussia, Reichstag against Bundesrat, parliament against parliament, centralism against particularism, the centripetal against the centrifugal' (OP p342).

The constitution was a practical instrument to manage the forces of German nationalism. Its national features were to attract southern peoples, its federal ones to reassure their governments. It was not based on Montesquieu or America. It derived from his own experience and consideration of forces. It was not intended to provide balance between three equal forces but to provide a fulcrum of power that he could manipulate.

Nobody desired his solution. In getting it passed, he applied to domestic politics his approach to diplomacy — playing off different forces against each other. 'Every attempt to alter the fundamental arrangements of his plan was countered by evoking the opposing interest that stood to lose by the change' (p351). He used his 'illness' (how bad was it?) to keep himself away from the King and Cabinet October-November. He then bounced them with the draft, giving them almost no time to consider it (two days lost to a royal hunt!). He threatened the National Liberals with the princes and vice versa, threatened the smaller states with Prussia, bludgeoned the Prussian cabinet with the states' hostility, used the threat of the February Reichstag elections to pressure the princes, and generally played off all forces against each other to push through what he wanted with his usual mix of charm, threats, bribery, concessions on lower order priorities, blackmail and so on. He often let them have their way on phrases that he regarded as 'mere words' so long as he got what he wanted on the substance. Saxony was his main problem. He told the Saxon envoy his goal was 'to overthrow parliamentarianism with parliamentarianism' but that if he was not supported by the princes he would abandon them and agree a constitution with the radical liberals! The other governments were working against the clock of Reichstag elections on 12 February, after which they feared Bismarck would have even more powerful forces supporting him. 'Yes, Flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronta movebo' he told them repeatedly. (Cf. OP p353ff for details.)

(EF) His threats to ditch the constitution were not realistic, he needed the Reichstag to balance the monarchies. (I think this is overstated.Yes he wanted some sort of Parliament but it's generally a mistake to assume Bismarck was bluffing.)

Prussia encompassed over four-fifths of the population of the new North German Confederation (and two-thirds of the future German Reich). The NGC was a federal entity comprising the twenty-three northern states. The King of Prussia was given a federal 'presidency' (not 'Kaiser'), a title previously held by the Habsburgs. The presidency had full control of foreign policy, could make treaties, and declare war and peace. It could appoint and dismiss the Chancellor and any officials of the Confederation. It could publish the laws of the confederation and oversee their execution. It could summon, open, prorogue and close parliament. On the motion of the Bundesrat it could dissolve the Reichstag (with no provision for new elections or reconvening that body within a definite time). Despite some typical Bismarckian window dressing, the Prussian king controlled the highest officers who swore allegiance to him, as did all confederate troops. He could mobilise the army at will. He could declare martial law. He could authorise an 'execution' against a rebellious state. (OP p343ff)

Bismarck's draft extended the Prussian military system over the NGC, established the peacetime strength of the army at 1% of the population, all males had to serve three years in the line, four in the reserve, and five in the militia. The Prussian king controlled weapons, command, organisation, training — and all these matters were excluded from the Landtag or Reichstag.

Budgetary clauses were scattered through the original draft (perhaps to hide the significance, says OP). There was no provision for an annual budget, the NGC could only raise indirect taxes, and the Presidency could raise sums from the states as it wished. The military budget set yearly appropriations for the army (per soldier) indefinitely and only military expenditure in excess of the amounts determined were subject to regular legislative approval (other aspects were fudged until 1871, see below). In 1868 the military received 99% of the confederate revenues [Pflanze uses the figure of 90% and 99% (misprint, or 89% army plus 10% navy?), Showalter uses 99%].

There was no bill of rights, no independent judiciary, and no responsible cabinet. Many of the laws used to suppress Prussian liberals were copied into the new Constitution. Officials were ineligible for election to the Reichstag (this was changed by the Reichstag and Bismarck conceded). Payment of deputies was expressly forbidden (EF: expense payments were introduced in 1906). The Confederation was given power over things such as weights and measures, banking, transport, communication, commercial law etc. Prussia got 17/43 votes in the Bundesrat which made it practically almost impossible for her to be outvoted. He deliberately left 'gaps' without rules for resolving them, including no process for resolving disagreements over the constitution itself. (OP p347)

There was equal, secret and direct male suffrage for the February 1867 elections and only those in receipt of poor relief were excluded (unlike the old Frankfurt parliament that had restricted the influence of the masses). EF: he had cold feet re this on 30 October. Hamerow: he told Keudell around then, 'I would much rather advise that the members [of parliament] should be chosen by various voting procedures, one half perhaps to be elected by the hundred most highly taxed voters in the election districts ... and the other half in direct elections.' He told Benedetti that, 'If these liberal successes, however, should induce the opposition to create obstacles for us ... which it would not be possible for us to surmount, we would promptly put an end to them by a turn of the key. We would close Parliament. Finishing the story of Red Ridinghood, we would kill the wolf who would have devoured her.' (Interesting quote, Hamerow gives references, 2,p320.) But in the Reichstag he said, 'I can only say that I at least know of no better election law.'

Interestingly Treitschke was very worried by it: 'I consider the general suffrage in Germany a crude experiment... Surely once we have yielded this point then, in view of the envious impulse towards equality in our century, it will be almost impossible to take it back again. I fear that this is the most harmful of all of Bismarck's deeds. It will provide him for the moment with a compliant parliamentary majority but will create unforeseen complications in the future.'

Freytag, a National Liberal elected in February to the new Reichstag, complained about the demand of democracy — 'Oh, this general suffrage ruins a man's character. For fifty years I did not worry about popularity and now I send a bouquet of flowers to a woman in childbed without knowing whether she had a boy or a girl and I shake the hands of 100 good friends whose names I do not know and never will know. Fie, Bismarck, that was no masterstroke... No one now knows whether he will be elected.'

The Bundesrat delegates (who unlike Reichstag deputies could be paid) were representatives of the state governments which instructed their votes. Constitutional amendments required a 2/3 majority in Bundesrat. In the draft, the Bundesrat was not the upper house of a bicameral legislature but a 'cabinet' holding executive and legislative power. Disputes between states were to be settled in the Bundesrat.

The Chancellor role was originally quite minor and it is unclear whether he was determined to take it. In his original version, the Prussian Foreign Minister had the power to direct Prussian delegates to the Bundesrat including the Chancellor which was considered a minor role, and Bismarck would have had the decisive voice in a government of which he had no official role. However, as the negotiations proceeded and amendments were made, and when the Liberals insisted the Chancellor have the power to countersign laws, he then took it for himself. Pflanze writes that during October he also became suspicious that Savigny, a talented and well-connected man, was planning to make the role altogether too threatening, even potentially asking for the right of direct access to the king — so this was killed.

He wrote to Savigny:

'Through the responsibility clause the chancellor has become to a degree — if not legally, yet actually — the superior of the Prussian cabinet... [T]he Chancellor thereby receives the power of final decision in the affairs of the Prussian ministries of trade, war, and naval affairs, of the more important parts of the Finance Ministry, and, if the Confederate constitution develops correctly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs... He receives this authority due to the circumstance that he influences the Reichstag by granting or withholding his countersignature. Because of this amendment therefore the Chancellor must be simultaneously president of the Prussian cabinet if the new machine is to function at all.'

He kept opaque his ideas about how the civil service would work in order to minimise suspicion and attacks. He assumed that departments would develop and a civil service would grow but kept quiet about it to avoid arguments both within Prussia and the other states.

He created an Office of the Federal Chancellor to support himself and made Delbruck its first head, with his job being to turn Bismarck's will into effective bureaucracy. Between 1867-1870, Delbruck helped Bismarck create a single currency, a system of free movement of people and trade within the federation, and a long series of liberalising economic measures (e.g. freedom to establish public companies, anti-guild measures). In 1870, Bismarck said of Delbruck to the Grand Duke of Baden, 'Delbrück is the one man of whom I can say that he is completely orientated in every aspect of his office and has an unusual ability to manage affairs and carry them out.' Savigny said, 'the strength of Delbruck's position is that he is only interested in the things that Bismarck finds boring.'

He accepted some amendments that did not jeopardise the essentials (OP p354). Cf. 27 March.

[See below for details of the 1871 German constitution that extended the 1866 version.]

Gall (p314ff): 1866 was 'a crucial turning point in the history of central Europe, much more so than 1870' and the year 'shows Bismarck at a high-point of his political creativity and effectiveness.' He had an 'absolute determination and readiness to move with the times... To say that in 1866 and 1870-1 Bismarck was erecting a bulwark against the spirit of the age is a piece of well-meaning self-deception that refuses to take account of the realities of historical development in Germany and uses a single figure to create for itself, usually with the aid of the idealised example of Britain, the illusion that things might have turned out quite differently. In fact it is precisely Bismarck's policy, with its primarily power-oriented opportunism often amounting to a complete lack of principle, that reflects those realities with sober clarity. He saw that in his day, of all the conceivable possibilities, a parliamentary majority offered the best foundation for a powerful, effective executive as well as one that was relatively independent of the throne and the person currently occupying it... He saw that in the long run the power of Prussia could be effectively and permanently enhanced only in collaboration with the Lesser German national movement and in particular with the economic interests inside Prussia itself and in the neighbouring countries that the Customs Union had increasingly focused on Lesser Germany as a national objective... Without ever completely ruling out alternatives, he pursued a foreign policy line that in its consequences gradually cut off all other possibilities... The North German Confederation was the expression in political terms of a highly realistic understanding of the way things were going economically, socially and politically; it was much more a consummation of something for which the time was ripe than the manipulative creation of an individual.'

Gall (p322): After the great triumph, the arch-conservative forces, 'the forces of inertia', were greatly strengthened. 'Bismarck's persistent concern ... was therefore to re-trim the ship of state, as it were, by redistributing the weight, not just superficially but in terms of its very substance. That was what the Indemnity Bill was for. That was what the constitution was for... And that was the purpose particularly of the fundamental reforms that were introduced as soon as the new federal state had been constituted.' He accepted the repercussions of the reforms he introduced 'because he regarded the process itself, the process that they helped along and in which they were one factor among others, as inevitable. Here too, as in his approach to politics as a whole, he bowed to the ineluctable “unda fert, nec regitur”. The idea that the ever-accelerating dissolution of the traditional economic and social order could be permanently halted and that order preserved was one he rejected with relentless clarity of vision. Slowing the process down, channelling it, keeping it within bounds — these he thought possible in principle... But to set oneself up in opposition to it was in his estimation to be overwhelmed or simply swept aside by it... As he saw it, it was a question of either placing himself at the head of a development that he deplored but regarded as unstoppable, even of accelerating matters in order to drive that development in his direction and exploit it to his own advantage — or of seeing it sooner or later forcing him on to the sidelines. The fundamental conviction of most liberals, and particularly of those who were prepared to cooperate, was that this would happen anyway. Bismarck, on the other hand, was confident that by making limited concessions and by continually trimming and re-trimming the balance he would be able to hold his own.'

(But they could have 'turned out quite differently'! The decision for modesty with peace terms was his alone; the King's circle was hostile. The decision for Indemnity and a deal with the liberals was his alone; the King's circle was hostile. The shaping of power in the new constitution was dominated by him; if he'd been assassinated in September a new constitution would probably have swung towards Manteuffeul's ideas (or, conceivably though improbably, in a more liberal/federal direction). Gall ignores his secret preparations in winter 1866-7 to ditch the whole constitution and find a different path. His life would have been much easier short-term if he had gone with the flow, as it would have been in November 1863 if he swung behind Augustenburg (which would have had support from King and the liberals!), but he chose otherwise. Of course he was constrained. Of course he saw advantages in bringing the middle classes and the commercial interests into a system where their activities were strengthening a Prussian state still dominated by King and Army. But it is an overstatement to say a) things could not have 'turned out quite differently' and b) that Bismarck felt he had no choice but to accept the 'inevitability' of governing in alliance with the middle classes. And a decade later, watching developments, he decided on a fundamentally new course that shattered the deal with the liberals. The deal proved not to be 'inevitable' nor the product of an irresistible tide.)

'However, we must not let this blind us to the plain fact — which had an effect far beyond all political calculations and crucially influenced the future — that in the years following 1866 it was a government still regarded as conservative that created certain basic preconditions for the acceleration of the process of economic and social change, the process known as “modernisation”, in central Europe. This raised fundamental doubts about whether political progress and social change did in fact go hand in hand. The ambivalence of progress, particularly when speeded up like this, suddenly came to light. Many people began to ask themselves in alarm, echoing the historian Jacob Burckhardt, a liberal of the old school, whether freedom and a life truly fit for human beings had not been very much better provided for under the old systems. “A certain supervised amount of wretchedness, with promotion and in uniform, begun and ended each day with a roll on the drums — that would be the logical next step.” Thus Burckhardt saw the prospects for the future in 1872, speaking of a Europe of mindless “non-stop night trains” that would replace the Europe of old.' Ironically, Gall argues, Bismarck was the driving force of this and benefited from it: 'when the factors that he had furthered after 1866 threatened to become too powerful he made use of the growing pessimism about progress felt by large sections of the middle class to apply the opposite lock, as it were, and once again give greater weight to the other side.'

Further, says Gall, after a career in which he raged against bureaucracy and its arbitrary interference with established patterns, he drove the creation of a modern, bureaucratically centralised state that broke down many parts of the old Prussian system including local powers of the aristocracy. It was not surprising that associates and opponents could 'no longer make head nor tail' of him. Was there any alternative to concluding he was an opportunist who subordinated everything to immediate success and his own power? Bamberger argued — he was the man of the hour because the hour demanded exactly an opportunist balancing act. His obvious opportunism became an increasing problem for him as others saw him as uncommitted to any particular principles.

This pushed him towards the use of the national idea. And, further, the NGC was inherently unfinished business: it 'lacked any truly stabilising and integrating element as long as the state was not at the same time a national state' and 'there was quite clearly an inner necessity after 1866 to make progress in the matter of national unification to revise the results of 1866 to this end' (Gall).

Bismarck repeatedly denied this logic over the next few years and warned (2/69) against the 'wordy restlessness with which people not involved in the business of government search for the philosopher's stone that will immediately establish German unity ... [which concealed] a shallow and in any case impotent lack of familiarity with realities and their effects... We can put the clock forward but time will go no faster for that, and the ability to wait while circumstances unfold as a pre-requisite of practical politics.' However, argues Gall, such rhetoric was a smokescreen, he knew the NGC was unstable and contained dangers for Prussia and himself, and 'his watchword had to be not patience but action' though for long periods he acted reactively.

There were major financial and constitutional battles 1867-69 that I will cover in the next instalment.

'The form in which the King exercises sovereignty in Germany has never particularly mattered to me; to the fact of his exercising it I have devoted all the strength of endeavour that God has given me.'To Roon, 27 August 1869.

Theoretically, there is much that can be said about it [the Constitution]. In practice it was the impress of what was actually present at the time and possible in consequence, given the limited amount of stretching and adjusting that could be done at that moment.' 5 March 1878

Treitschke: 'Our revolution is being completed, as it was begun, from above and with the limited understanding of subjects we are groping in the dark.' Bismarck told Busch 'Only kings make revolution in Prussia' (Busch, I, p568).

Beust-Revertera Regarding discussions about possible joint action in the east, Beust was suspicious and noncommittal. He assumed Russia would seek to maintain her position as protector of Christians in Constantinople. There may be some areas of cooperation in the Balkans but Beust was not pushing much for closer relations.

(WAF) First meeting Bismarck-Benedetti since September, at the Foreign Office. Benedetti urged rapid agreement on outstanding questions. Bismarck prevaricated again saying that he remained friendly to the idea of a treaty but he had to persuade the king and Crown Prince who were not so keen. They agreed to talk again on 6th. Benedetti suspected he was being strung along. Bismarck told Goltz to complain to Moustier about Benedetti's pressing. Moustier agreed to tell Benedetti to be less demanding and limit his push to the removal of the Prussian garrison in Luxembourg. This undermined Benedetti in Berlin and encouraged Bismarck's procrastination.

Revertera informed Beust (via sources in the Imperial family) that at the wedding of the Tsarevich, Greek and Serbian envoys declared that next spring the Balkan Christians would rise against the Turks. Russia started to prepare including her armed forces though her plan was to promise the Balkans benevolent neutrality, and active intervention only with other Powers. Gorchakov approached Austria and France. He told Revertera (reported 10/12) that a crisis was coming and the Ottomans may collapse. Revertera stressed their special interests including Herzegovina. Gorchakov stressed that the Powers should renounce territorial gains, Russia would be content with the restitution (not acquisition!) of southern Bessarabia, and expressed doubts about whether people in the Balkans wanted to join the AH empire or whether administrative autonomy (une existence autonome) might not be better. He was frank with Revertera that Russian interests, particularly making progress in the East, required an alliance with Prussia. In December in Paris Budberg also talked to Moustier re joint action: Crete to be autonomous like Romania, Russia and France to declare non-intervention in Turkish affairs to prevent interference with the free development of Romanians, Serbs, Bulgarians and Greeks.

Bismarck instructed Goltz to express doubt that acquiring Luxembourg would be worth the German animosity that seizing it would 'certainly' cause in Germany. Although he had thought in the summer (cf. 31/7) that it was of little value and its population was anti-Prussian, after his return from Putbus he started referring to its population as 'German'. On 19-20/12 he pointed out that Prussia could not be expected to take the initiative in ceding 'German land' and reaping the 'odium' of handing over 'Germans against their will' to France. An alliance with France is not worth 'a humiliating injury to German national feeling', he told Goltz. OP: While Goltz assumed the next steps in Prussia's advance would best be achieved with friendship with France, Bismarck assumed it would come in conflict with her.

(WAF) Benedetti requested a meeting. Thile declined. WAF: this was a big shock to Benedetti. The Foreign Office was also silent on the situation in Italy where troops were evacuating. Benedetti told Moustier of the change in approach since Bismarck's return and complained he was 'sending plans to Paris and maintaining silence in Berlin'.

The other states got Bismarck's draft Constitution.

Goltz-Bismarck: Moustier says that if Prussia won't sign the draft treaty then France will be forced to seek an alliance with Austria or south Germany.

(WAF) Bismarck and Benedetti had a chance meeting in the street. Bismarck made clear Prussia could not guarantee the Papal States (Prussia was Protestant plus he didn't want to complicate his relations with Italy). When Benedetti complained that Goltz had encouraged Paris to think he supported a guarantee, Bismarck bluntly told him that Goltz had been misled by vanity in wanting to be involved in drafting a treaty! He suggested France should organise petitions in Luxembourg calling for the retreat of the Prussian garrison. (This turned out to be a trap.)

Benedetti: before we do that we must know it will work out. Bismarck: it took me four years to get the king to declare war on Austria, it would not be easy to persuade him 'to serve up Luxembourg to the emperor on a silver platter'. Benedetti suggested a further discussion, Bismarck referred to his work on the constitution and his illness.

Bismarck-Goltz: I saw Benedetti and told him that France should arrange demonstrations in Luxembourg and present Europe with an accomplished fact. An alliance would have to await the Prussian garrison being withdrawn. (Millman p47).

Lyons to Stanley: If Turkey collapses in Europe there will be 'a desperate struggle, and ... in mixed districts we shall have massacres and every kind of horror. Great calamities may probably be avoided, if we can keep the Turks going... If things go on as they have done lately, the Turks will be squeezed out ... by the increase in numbers, wealth and intelligence of the Christians. I am not one of those who look upon the Turkish Empire as a good per se — to be upheld at all hazards — but ... I should like to let it down gently.' Russia, however, is openly playing the role of protectors of the orthodox Christians.

Both Buchanan and Loftus agreed that saving the Ottoman position required 'cutting off its rotten members' (Loftus, 16/2/1867) and this was the position of the Palmerstonians in the FO — Turkey's role is salvageable if it reforms and pulls back.

Stanley to Disraeli: if there is a row with the Admiralty about the naval budget, note that our naval attaché in Washington assures us that 'our seagoing ironclad fleet is far superior' to America's.

Benedetti called on Thile and offered to work with him on the long-delayed deal. There was discussion over Italy. Around this time, regarding Bismarck's excuse of illness, Benedetti remarked to Paris that he was not too ill for hunting in the rain and snow, banquets, speaking in both chambers and presiding over constitutional debates. He was increasingly suspicious that Prussia no longer wanted a deal and was assembling other alliances in secret, including with Russia. On 26/12 he wrote to Moustier that while he could not be sure, 'if I had to formulate the solution which seems most probable to me, I would say that they are resolved not to accept our treaty project.'

(cf. 6 December) Moustier-Talleyrand: 'I told the Baron [Budberg, Russian ambassador in Paris] that our adhesion to this agreement presupposed above all the prior adhesion of [Russia] to the policy that circumstances might lead us to follow in the West.' Moustier was generally favourable to Gorchakov's overture and the latter was pleased. In December Moustier had also probed with Beust about closer relations.

Stanley to Loftus: 'All that Germany can do for us is to act as a counterpoise to France and Russia; and for that purpose she cannot be too closely united. I could wish if it had been possible, that the mediatisation of the small sovereigns had been complete... I only hope Bismarck's health may not so break down that he will be unable to control his Parliament - That would be a misfortune for all the world. - These people would fail in 1867 as they failed in 1849.'

Goltz-Bismarck: Moustier says France will not provoke demonstrations in Lux nor ask for compensation.

Disraeli wrote to Stanley re the latest rumours of a deal between Napoleon and Bismarck over Belgium and south Germany — 'The Emperor is like a gambler who has lost half his fortune & restless to recover; likely to make a coup, which may be fatally final for himself.' Opinion here would probably react against further trouble: 'Reaction is the law of all human affairs; & the reaction from non-intervention must sooner or later set in. I would rather, however, try to prevent mischief — i.e as long as we can.'

Pfordten, who had wanted a southern union under Bavarian leadership, replaced as Bavaria's Minister-President by Prince von Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst who thought Bavaria had to look for good terms in negotiations to join a federal union led by Prussia. Bismarck carefully began to draw the Prince towards a constitutional alliance, see 31/1/67 (OP p383).