1867

Reports in London re Bismarck's alliances with south Germany. Loftus told Stanley he believed that Bavaria and others are bound in the event of an attack by France on Prussia to put their militaries at Prussia's disposal. Lots of rumours buzzing around about the status and terms of such deals.

Beust-Metternich: The Treaty of Paris is out of date, we should propose a conference to discuss the East and the rights of Turkey's Christian subjects, we should impose a plan on the Porte, the Black Sea clauses should be lifted. This was not welcome in Paris. Moustier feared too close an understanding with Austria and Russia and Napoleon didn't want a general congress on the Eastern question — he preferred a conference in Vienna on the immediate problems of Crete and Serbia. When Gorchakov heard of the back-and-forth between Paris and Vienna later in January, he thought that Beust's suggestions about the Black Sea were inopportune, he disliked the idea of a conference which would be too slow. By the end of January it was clear Gorchakov and Beust could not agree on a plan for the East and discussions between Gorchakov-Moustier/Napoleon also seemed to flounder in February — Napoleon wanted Russian support in the west but would not be specific, and was keeping his plans on Lux/Belgium secret (Mosse p259-61).

German Commercial Association statement to members: the most important task is free markets, common legislation for industry, commerce, communication. Twesten: free movement and industrial freedom should be 'one of the first tasks of the new Reichstag'. On the eve of the February election, Bismarck nudged his spin machine to tell the papers — the new constitution provides many fruitful opportunities for commercial, industrial and legal reform.

Rouher told Goltz that France must have Luxembourg.

Queen-Stanley: We must ensure Paris and Berlin understand that England 'will never stand quietly by, or remain a passive spectator of any attempt against the integrity or independence of Belgium.'

Stanley to Grey: 'I have no doubt that [Bismarck] ... would be glad to see Belgium sacrificed, if that act would avert the jealousy so generally felt in France ... and thus save Germany from being involved in war, which, as matters stand, seems to be a very possible event... I do not mean that it seems to be probable. I should say the chances were considerably against it. Still it is on the cards: & I do not believe that a French invasion of Belgium is'.

Benedetti-Moustier: Bismarck says Wilhelm is opposed to withdrawing the Prussian garrison and Bismarck repeats that France should organise demonstrations there. Bismarck stressed he still wanted a deal, complained of illness and the king as usual. Benedetti: we can't proceed in Luxembourg unless we have a guarantee from you. Benedetti was not encouraged. But in Paris they decided to press on with an initiative in Luxembourg.

Bismarck wrote to Bernstorff: Belgium is of little importance to Prussia and is a pawn to be used either by offering it to Napoleon in return for further Prussian gains, or by using the threat of such a deal to win British support against France. When asked by Stanley if Bismarck and Napoleon had done a deal on Belgium, Bernstorff said no.

In Upper House: 'A great state is not governed in accordance with party opinions; the sum total of the parties existing in the country has to be carefully weighed and out of that a line drawn that a government as such can pursue.'

Benedetti told Bismarck that France would organise some manifestations in Luxembourg, Bismarck warned they should not be of an anti-Prussian character. He said he'd asked Moltke to consider the importance of Luxembourg for Prussia's defence.

(WAF) Bismarck informed Goltz that Moltke saw Luxembourg as a key railroad centre between France and the Rhine. Goltz told Moustier who told Benedetti.

As the Cretan problem rumbled on, Austria suggested to England and France the abrogation of the demilitarisation of the Black Sea and a conference on the Eastern question. Stanley replied on 30th that 'England and France would never consent to abandon the principle of the neutralization of the Black Sea.' He had a problem as, given he would not help France in the west, he had to worry about Franco-Russian action in the east.

(OP p383ff) Bismarck outlined his plan for a constitutional alliance to von Spitzemberg, Bavarian minister at Berlin (cf. 31/12/66). Varnbüler was favourable. Bismarck hoped to pressure Hohenlohe through him. Although Hohenlohe was personally favourable, opposition in Munich was too strong and he rejected it. In February Hohenlohe began to insist that for Berlin the key to the south lay in Vienna with regard to Bavaria's acceptance of the wider confederation and her support in the Luxembourg crisis. The fear of Prussian hegemony and a Franco-Austria alliance would be allayed by agreement between Berlin and Vienna. (Of course, this development was an example of exactly why Bismarck had made such a generous peace with Austria, to allow such possibilities to flourish. Cf. his comments to Wimpffen in December about his regrets about the failure of the Gablenz mission.)

The British government was consumed with debates over a new Reform Bill. Also in the first half of the year Derby had to worry about Victoria's increasing isolation, refusal to participate in events, public hostility, rumors about her relationship with John Brown etc.

After months of complaining about waste and stupidity in the Admiralty, Disraeli had concluded that only the PM, nobody else, could enforce serious change: 'The Admiralty is beyond the control of a Chancellor of the Exchequer, or any other subordinate Minister. It is the Prime Minister who alone can deal with that department ... It is useless to attempt to reason with them. The whole system of administration is palsied by their mutinous spirit.' Cf. 17/10/66. During February the government found itself moving towards a Reform Bill that session though it had been their intention to delay to 1868 (Blake). A month of chaos was resolved at Cabinet on Saturday 2 March.

A conference in Stuttgart among southern states to discuss military coordination with Prussia. They agreed to increase and reorganize their forces on the principles of the Prussian system to make possible 'the defense of the national integrity in common with the rest of Germany' though important elements (including length of service and training) were not agreed. Even in Baden there was hostility to the three year period and the cost. Elsewhere hostility was stronger. In the south the Swiss militia system was popular. Prussian practice, training, and equipment spread (all but Bavaria adopted the needle gun) but there was patchy resistance.

(WAF) Benedetti complained to Thile that he had got nowhere in the last few weeks. 'Rien ne marche, we make no progress — and we have so little time — only eleven or twelve days before the opening of the legislative session... I tell you I am frightened.'

The final draft of the Constitution was agreed.

First elections to new Reichstag. Turnout was high. The old conservatives won 59, the Free Conservatives 39, the old liberals 27, the National Liberals 79, and the Progressives were just 19. Half the 297 deputies were noblemen. Progressives criticised the willingness to sacrifice liberty for unity and insisted on a cabinet of responsible ministers and full budget rights for the Reichstag. (EF: NLs got 80. Twesten, Forckenbeck, and Lasker joined and Bennigsen (Hanoverian) was leader.)

Free Conservatives: 2 dukes, 3 princes, 9 counts, 11 barons. Hamerow: Followers were mostly Prussian but not from the rural north-east which remained loyal to legitimist orthodoxy. Strongholds were in Silesia and Rhineland. No statistics on participation were published but estimates suggest about 64%, roughly double the rate of the Prussian election June 1866.

Wilhelm note to Bismarck granting him 400,000 thalers.

Bismarck told Benedetti that the military had concluded the Luxembourg fortress must remain in the Prussian defence system. He also suggested Moustier did not want a treaty anymore. Benedetti rejected this. Maybe, said Bismarck, things could improve if Wilhelm and Napoleon met at the exhibition in Paris. Benedetti was more convinced nothing would happen quickly.

Napoleon speech. He tried to distract attention from his failure to win compensation. OP: it was boastful but 'his delivery was uncertain, his manner melancholic'.

To Goltz: Every delay in dealing with French demands is good 'for we shall win time thereby for the consolidation of our relationships in northern Germany and with southern Germany.' 'We would already see the ... Triple Alliance between France, Italy and Austria ... as a danger, an even greater one, but in a closer connection between France and England, whose predominant naval power would destroy our trade in such a case and support France's land operations.' (Latter quote Mosse, p263)

Bismarck approached the southern states for informal discussions about the Zollverein. Prussia favoured either a Zollparlement or southern deputies joining the Reichstag when customs and commerce were discussed. Cf. 11/3.

Moustier again told Benedetti to relaunch the effort on LUX.

Although Bismarck was playing everyone off against each other as usual, and succeeded in bullying the states into resisting most Reichstag amendments, he also prepared for the Reichstag imposing amendments he could not tolerate. On 19 February he invited some of the state governments to negotiate a secret treaty 'providing that in such a situation the governments would dissolve the Reichstag and decree their own version of the constitution' (Pflanze). As the conflicts with Parliament played out over the next few months, Bismarck pushed them into signing the treaty (second week of April). Thus he used the liberals to rally the states behind the draft that he wanted and they had not wanted while he also got them to accept some liberal amendments he did not mind.

In the Reichstag, he pointed out that the treaties that obligated the states to consider the constitution would expire on 18 August 1867 and the states had a right of approval of the Reichstag's work, therefore the Reichstag had to move quickly and avoid amendments unacceptable to the states. Although his backup treaty remained secret, he allowed hints to spread. He did allow some amendments (e.g to give deputies some legal protections against the government) and took a relaxed view of the Kompotenz-Kompotenz issue — whether the Reichstag and Bundesrat could extend their own competence. An amendment that other heads of administrative branches could countersign laws in addition to the Chancellor affected his own position: he informed the Reichstag that the states opposed it, and it was dropped. He accepted a secret ballot but rejected pay for deputies (he wanted only people of means as deputies, and the pressure of their own affairs would keep sessions short); the Reichstag called his bluff with a majority of 6 on this but he forced them to retract it. (He had even thought of putting the Reichstag in a provincial city to discourage journalists from political careers.)

Bismarck told Benedetti that Wilhelm was willing to come to Paris for the exhibition in the summer. Cf. 22 March.

Wilhelm speech.

Stanley-Loftus: There are fears in Netherlands re a Prussian attack, such an attack would 'be regarded with extreme dissatisfaction in England' and 'all moral support would be given' but 'more I could not at present promise'.

Moustier suggested to Netherlands a defensive alliance against Prussia and the cession of Luxembourg, with the consent of the people of the duchy a precondition.

Luxembourg crisis. Luxembourg had been a member of the Confederation and Zollverein. It was the property of William III, king of the Netherlands. Under a 1816 treaty, Prussia garrisoned the fortress. Bismarck used the crisis to nudge the constitution through so the momentary crisis left a permanent mark on the Reich's institutions. It was also another classic example of how his fluidity allowed him to play off multiple forces against each other. The clumsy moves of Paris were encouraged to further both his foreign policy goals and his domestic goals.

After weeks of tortuous discussions, a British Cabinet ends with Cranborne and others resigning over the Reform Bill. The government continued to push the Bill through. Cf. 13/4 and August.

(WAF) Benedetti learned from Bismarck about the military alliances agreed with south Germany in 1866.

Benedetti returned to Paris for 10 days as La Valette was ill.

Bismarck described his Zollparlament idea to the Reichstag, hoping it would generate support for further political steps. 'German national feeling in the south was chiefly the property of middle-class liberals who were prejudiced against the aristocratic-authoritarian regime in Berlin' (Pflanze). Only in Baden was there enthusiasm for joining Prussia. Others responded coolly. The Zollparlement experiment would show the serious obstacles to further unification and generally things didn't proceed as well as he and others hoped 1867-70 in south Germany. He kept lots of schemes in mind, including a 'wider confederation' in which the constitution of the NGC would extend to the south other than in military matters. This would have stopped any independent foreign policy by the southern states and stopped the reinforcement of northern liberals by southern liberals in future attempts to overthrow the iron budget. The expansion of the Zollparlament might also create such a wider confederation. As always he had a clear picture of the priority of goals — maximally: the extension of the NGC to the south without war and without any important amendment, minimally: military alliances plus a Zollparlament — and was extremely flexible in how to make progress given events. (OP p382)

Cowley rightly warned Stanley that he was 'almost sure that there is something in the wind' about Luxembourg.

Stanley unconcerned about Luxembourg: 'Prussia will be furious. I do not see ... that England has any reason to object.'

Thiers launches attack on Napoleon's foreign policy which had abandoned the balance of power and allowed Prussia to expand. 'There is not another single mistake to commit.'

Cowley-Stanley: 'I inquired about Luxembourg with Napoleon but he clearly found the subject disagreeable'.

Note Wilhelm-Bismarck: I have been told that 'beyond a doubt' as a consequence of a discussion between you and the former Hanoverian minister 'you have challenged him' and if true 'I hereby forbid you most explicitly to take any step in the matter before you have communicated to me ... details of the whole affair.' (No trace of what this refers to in any books I've seen!)

While negotiations between Gorchakov and Paris were dragging on, the former learned of the secret dealings over Luxembourg (reported by Revertera-Beust on 15/3) and this made Russia less keen on committing to helping France in the west.

Stanley, after being told privately by Bernstorff about the treaties with the southern states (Bismarck was tipping Britain off before publication on 19th), telegraphed Loftus that he 'was glad in the interests of European peace, to hear of the union of Germany for defensive purposes'.

After months of frustration and internal attacks, France said to William III that they must have Luxembourg and in return would give him a treaty guaranteeing the integrity of the Netherlands.

The King of Holland agreed to sell Luxembourg to France accompanied by a treaty. The same day, Bismarck's secret treaties with three south German states (agreed in August 1866) were published to dramatic effect at home and abroad. Publishing these treaties also helped him show the Reichstag that he had made more progress than they had assumed and helped his arguments with the Reichstag over the Constitution. 'He is as smart as a snake but hardly lacking in deceit like the dove,' said Bennigsen. It was a big blow in Paris where there was 'a great explosion of irritation' (Cowley). On 26-27 March there were crucial debates on ministerial responsibility, 30 March a vote on renumeration of deputies, early April debates on the budget. But publication also created pushback. In Stuttgart (Württemberg), Varnbüler consented to publication under protest and requested a public declaration from Prussia that the treaty was purely defensive. Bismarck's reply 'was an irritated refusal' (OP) and he feared what was happening between Württemberg and France.

Benedetti presented a formal invitation to Wilhelm for the summer exhibition in Paris. Bismarck inquired in St Petersburg whether the Tsar would visit. The reply was that the Tsar would if his uncle did. (Mosse: The Tsar wanted to visit his mistress, Princess Catherine Dolgoruky — a fact well known to diplomats.)

Hammond to Cowley: France will seek 'to break lances with Prussia without more delay' and is behaving with its 'usual insincerity'.

La Tour-Moustier: Stanley told Apponyi that Luxembourg 'does not affect the interests of England'. Millman: Stanley was sympathetic to France's desire for Luxembourg and was not opposed to a deal but neither was he willing to press for it to happen. As the prospect of a sudden war increased, he did not get more involved to try to stop it — he withdrew further so as not to be involved. On the other hand his genuine aversion to commitments meant he was unlikely to cause trouble by misleading signals.

William III asked Wilhelm for his consent to sell Luxembourg. France thought this would not be a problem.

Gall (p318-19): Bismarck probably got an old school liberal and friend of Max Duncker, Carl von Saenger, to propose the amendment by which political responsibility was imposed on the Chancellor. It was 'thoroughly ironical' (Gall) that it became known as the 'Bennigsen Amendment'. Bennigsen tried to extend accountability to other federal ministries, Bismarck refused, on 27 March the Diet accepted an amendment and Bismarck had what he wanted and only what he wanted.

Lyons-Cowley: Russia and France can do 'almost anything they please with the Porte, unless we interfere to prevent it, wh. I suppose we shall certainly not do.'

(WAF) Bismarck told Benedetti that Wilhelm had replied to William III that he could not give any advice until he had ascertained the views of the other signatories of the London treaty.

He denied to the Reichstag any 'deeply laid plot against freedom of the bourgeoisie in association with the masses to set up a Caesarean type of government'. Gall: he wanted alliance with the middle classes, not further conflict.

Vote on pay for deputies. Bismarck had been adamant he would reject it. It passed by 6 votes. But he forced them to u-turn in April.

Bismarck suggested to Britain and Russia that they intervene in the Hague to stop William III signing. By now Stanley, though determined to stay out of the row, felt some sympathy for France. Loftus thought on 30th that the sale either had been or shortly would be effected.

evening (WAF) Moustier learned the Luxembourg government had been authorised to refute formally that the duchy had been ceded to France.

To Goltz: French clumsiness has aroused public opinion, 'stoked by our opponents, the excitement is growing to critical dimensions'.

(WAF) Bismarck spoke to Benedetti. Said that his political opponents were making a big noise, discussions should be postponed. He would say that the government had been informed of the negotiations and the King would discuss the situation with the other Powers. (This is a bit different to other accounts of this discussion, cf. below.)

Goltz protested that French clumsiness was making the deal impossible; involving Wilhelm made it hard to get agreement; the French-arranged demonstrations of the mob were not the sober petitions of bankers that Bismarck had advised and had aroused German public opinion etc. According to Millman, Goltz asked France to drop the whole plan because German opinion made it impossible. The same day, Benedetti reported from Berlin that Bismarck would be questioned about it the next day in parliament and wished to say he was not aware of the sale of Luxembourg. Moustier was furious and told Benedetti that he would not drop it even if it led to war, and that Bismarck would have to tell the Reichstag that he had discovered the sale too late to object.

Bernstorff read Stanley two telegrams. Will Britain seek to stop war by influencing William III not to sell? Bismarck considers Luxembourg as well as Belgium to be under the 1839 guarantee — does Britain agree? Stanley said that he needed time to consider and consult but (he wrote to Loftus) that he said he 'did not consider that the arrangement, whatever might be its precise character, was one of a nature to call for the intervention of England. Though the principle involved might be questionable, yet if by so small a re-arrangement of territory the irritation now undoubtedly existing in France could be allayed and the peace of Europe thereby secured, I should have thought so great an advantage cheaply purchased'. The next day (Mosse 2 days later) Stanley replied that if William III sold it then 'the question of protecting his interests would not arise'; 'it had certainly never been contemplated by England to guarantee the integrity of Germany'; 'It did not seem ... that the possession of Luxembourg would materially affect the future of Belgium'; while Germany might dislike a sale, that was not an issue for Belgium or for Britain.

1867 Bismarck buys estate at Varzin in Pomerania, 14,000 acres (he expanded it to ~20,000), 8 hours by rail and 2 by road from Berlin. In August 1869 he wrote to Motley that 'Leaving Berlin at 9 you are here [Varzin] for dinner.' Cf. August 1872 for a description of it by Motley. (JS: he bought it in June.)

Russia sold Alaska to USA (Alexander feared it would fall into British hands in another war). Russia also reduced her naval budget around then.

In the first week of April, Bismarck further explored opinion in Britain and dangled the dangerous position of Belgium. Britain was distracted by discussions over the Reform Bill. Loftus to Stanley (9 March 1867): 'Continued agitation on the subject [the Reform Bill] would do great harm and be dangerous. The final settlement of the Question will very much tend to increase the Weight of England abroad'. Buchanan (in St. P) agreed. London was also distracted by the Cretan revolt. The FO saw Napoleon as the more dishonest and dangerous in this crisis, pushed by domestic tension and court intrigues.

Bismarck very likely arranged Bennigen's raising of the Luxembourg question in the Reichstag: 'let us show that we do not fear war ... and if it breaks out the responsibility will be with France... Is the Prussian Government in a position to inform the Reichstag ... that they in common with their confederates are determined to secure the connection of [Luxembourg] with the rest of Germany?' Nationalist sentiment ran high, the applause was long. Bismarck's reply was moderate: The King of the Netherlands has asked us what we think, 'for the moment' we are saying nothing, and before we answer we will consult with our German allies, with the 1839 signatories, and with German public opinion. EF: he told the leader of the Free Conservatives (March) he thought a war with France inevitable but he would not bring it about, he saw out of his window war cripples from 1866 looking up at his window blaming him.

WAF: The Nationalverein saw Luxembourg as German and was adding to the clamour. There is conclusive evidence Bismarck welcomed Bennigsen's interpellation — Bennigsen wrote to his wife (1 April) that Bismarck had told him on 30th he wanted to keep Luxembourg and so did the generals. Moustier still wrongly thought (31st) he'd fixed a fait accompli. Benedetti met Bismarck on his way to the Bundestag building on 1st. He invited Benedetti to accompany him and told him on the way that he would not accept a fait accompli. It seems Benedetti did not tell him of Moustier's telegram. In Paris they remained determined to press on.

Goltz told Napoleon that Germany favoured war over giving Luxembourg to France. Goltz was told that France would not withdraw even if the result were to be war. Bismarck also pressured William III not to sign the deal. 'As things stand in Germany we must in my opinion dare the war rather than yield, despite the fact that the object, Luxembourg, is in itself hardly worth a war' [to whom?].

Further meetings between Goltz and Napoleon in which Goltz is told that Napoleon now regards acquiring Luxembourg as necessary for his survival. Bismarck told Benedetti to stop negotiations with the Dutch. [My impression is that many if not all the books compress / confuse the different meetings between Goltz / Napoleon around this time.]

(WAF) Bismarck told Benedetti that the military were adamantly opposed to ceding LUX and it was 'impossible for Prussia to lower her flag in Luxembourg at a summons from France'. (Benedetti maintained to the end of his life that Bismarck had not been duplicitous over Luxembourg and the problems arose from Moustier's indolent slowness and the King of Holland's indiscretions. This shows what a great job Bismarck did in his relations with Benedetti as it is clear that he had been duplicitous.)

(WAF) Unknown to Benedetti, that day Bismarck began moves for a Prussia-Austria-Bavaria alliance against France. Beust undermined discussions: 'Picturing to our minds France as vanquished, can we expose ourselves to the chance of having the parchment on which the Treaty of Prague is recorded thrust into our hands and be thanked for a successful defence?' (to Wimpffen, 19/4).

Bismarck telegraphed to the Hague, 'After the excitement of public opinion, war would scarcely be avoidable if the affair proceeds.' The Dutch government requested negotiations be suspended.

(WAF) Benedetti advised Paris that Bismarck would fight, not accept a deal, and therefore the question is — are we ready to undertake war and should we do it or try other diplomacy first? Bismarck's success in threatening the Hague on 3rd threw the question of war onto France.

Bernstorff told Stanley that Bismarck thinks war is likely, and if France does start a war what would Britain do, particularly given the position of Belgium may become 'exceedingly precarious'? Again Stanley said that it was not British business — Britain had 'nothing to do' with the causes of the dispute and no British minister 'would venture to propose to Parliament' armed intervention on either side. Stanley also encouraged Cowley to get Napoleon 'spontaneously to renounce views of aggrandizement at the expense of Belgium'.

Bismarck's telegram to Bernstorff of 3 April suggested that if he had to do a deal with France then he would use Belgium to buy off France. Stanley rightly guessed (letter to Grey 3 April) that 'Bismarck has held out hopes to [Napoleon] of Prussia giving her consent to the transfer, which hopes will be disappointed by the general feeling of Germany being too strong for [Bismarck] to disregard' (accurate other than the idea that Bismarck would really be forced by public pressure, rather than use it as an excuse as usual). Stanley told Bernstorff that no British minister could justify getting involved in a Franco-Prussian war over Luxembourg. Cowley told Stanley that Napoleon regards getting Luxembourg as essential to his survival, after which Stanley thought war probable. Disraeli told Stanley that the Rothschilds had received information that Napoleon had told Bismarck the deal with Holland is done and he shall act on it.

William III declined to sign with France.

Stanley-Grey: 'I fear the state of things is not improved by this unsuccessful negotiation. Luxembourg would have been a small price to pay for a reconciliation between France and Prussia. As matters stand, the feeling of exasperation in France will be aggravated by this fresh failure — and the prospect of permanent peace seems to me very gloomy.'

Cowley-Stanley: even getting Luxembourg would not solve Napoleon's problems or 'calm the irritation felt against Prussia' and 'Altogether the horizon looks very black'.

The French Council of Ministers met. Although they thought they could barely survive another humiliation they decided on peace. It was decided that 'a pacific declaration should be made to the Chambers today'. Napoleon knew that the reorganisation of the army had just begun, forces withdrawn from Mexico had not arrived in Europe, he had no dependable allies, and he had just opened a grand international exhibition in Paris to which Wilhelm and Alexander had accepted invitations. (Mosse says this was 8th. Was it 6th?)

Stanley to Cowley: France getting Luxembourg is 'a small price' for peace, our only priority is to make sure France realises we are 'in earnest' about Belgium.

Bernstorff reads to Stanley a message from Bismarck: Stanley thinks Bismarck hints he would not mind a conference to avoid war (Bismarck later denied this).

Loftus to Stanley: 'Now a mere declaration of our neutrality will neither avert the War ... nor will it secure us hereafter, either from an eventual War, perhaps single-handed, in defence of Belgium, or from a moral humiliation in passivity witnessing the destruction of the Belgian Monarchy.'

Hammond to Cowley: faced with a choice between a) a Franco-Prussian war and b) France seizing Luxembourg, a Franco-Prussian war is preferable because if two signatories to the 1839 Treaty go to war 'there could be no question of the guarantee [of Belgium] of 1839' (!). (Foreshadow of debates pre-August 1914 and see 17/4.)

Benedetti still believed Napoleon would insist on Luxembourg and therefore war was coming unless Prussia backed down. He suggested to Wimpffen that a victorious war could allow Austria to regain losses. Wimpffen reported to Beust that Benedetti was 'exasperated' with Bismarck about the last year and 'believes himself to have been fooled' (inconsistent with WAF saying Benedetti thought Bismarck had not been tricky on LUX — maybe this refers to 1866 or maybe Wimpffen confused?)

Cowley-Stanley: Napoleon said (on 6th; Mosse 7th afternoon) that Bismarck has 'played him false' and Napoleon wants a way to get his hands on Luxembourg that we will support — e.g if Luxembourg is 'made over to the Grand Duke, Prussia withdraws the garrison'. Cowley wrote that unless something could be done war was 'inevitable' (despite the decision of 6th).

Bismarck warned Bavaria that if deserted, the north would seek allies elsewhere and consider only its own interests. Cf. 12/4.

Gorchakov and Moustier swapped messages around this time probing each other to see if there was common ground on the East.

(WAF) Moustier made a pacific speech in the French chamber. He lied through his teeth about the whole affair, saying there was no diplomatic correspondence as the whole thing had been unofficial, and no reference was made to discussions with Prussia about compensation.

Stanley discussed 3 options with the French Ambassador: the duchy ceded to Belgium, duchy remaining with Holland, and the people of Luxembourg to decide their own future. Stanley-Cowley: 'I am quite willing it should be understood that we will do anything that may be in our power — short of steps which might commit us to armed intervention to bring about a better understanding.' He told Cowley that Bernstorff is hinting that Bismarck will do a deal with France over Belgium.

Cowley-Stanley: the French minister of war (Niel) told Napoleon (night of 7th, Mosse) that it was 'out of the question' to fight Germany now, 'it would take eight months to get [the army] ready' but it then would be ready — this 'probably' persuaded Napoleon who was 'wavering all Sunday [7th]' (Cowley). Cowley didn't want to see Luxembourg fall into French hands, partly as he thought it would increase French leverage on Belgium, but he thought this preferable to war.

France instructed its Ambassador in The Hague to drop negotiations, it seemed war would be averted but France was still badgering Britain for help in getting something out of Prussia. France was casting around for options — e.g the garrison leaving and the duchy declared neutral.

Victoria-Stanley: We shouldn't yet again help Napoleon get out of a 'scrape', which we have often regretted, nor get dragged into the quarrel. We are committed to Belgium and if France gets Luxembourg then the danger grows. She urged him not to take a new step without 'the full consideration of the Cabinet' with whom she wanted her letter shared.

Bismarck was worried about opinion in the south and the possibility of some of his enemies there doing deals with Napoleon. On 12th he sent a note to all German capitals warning of inflaming national opinion and not guarding Luxembourg: 'If a people feels its honour injured, then it is injured and must be dealt with accordingly. National feeling and national honour are potencies that do not lend themselves to logical measurement.' Were those who refused support ready to make their case for the loss of Luxembourg to the public?

OP: Karlsruhe (Baden) and Hesse-Darmstadt were supportive but Munich (Bavaria) and Stuttgart (Württemberg) were equivocal. On 12th he also outlined to von Tauffkirchen (an intimate adviser of Hohenlohe) an idea — not a constitutional alliance but the revival of the German Confederation without the Diet. Austria would get a defensive alliance and a guarantee of the security of her German provinces. The Holy Alliance would be revived.

Beust knew that such schemes from Bismarck were aimed at grabbing the south. He declined. This made it impossible for Hohenlohe to accept offers. Gorchakov also suggested that the Balkans prevented any revival of the Holy Alliance. Around now Bismarck also suffered defeat on another plan, an invitation to Hesse to join the NGC which was successfully resisted by Bismarck's enemy and staunch opponent of Prussia-dominated Germany, Baron Dalwigk (Minister of Hesse Darmstadt) who worked with Beust.

Loftus reported to Stanley that Bismarck had told him: while Luxembourg may be irrelevant to Britain, so Belgium was irrelevant to him and he would not mind Napoleon grabbing it, BUT he would also throw Prussia's weight behind defending Belgium in all circumstances 'if in return Great Britain should make common cause with Germany in a defensive war against France' (Loftus). Again, Stanley could not be tempted and made clear Britain would not get involved in any conflict over Luxembourg. Stanley guessed reasonably accurately that Bismarck had tricked France into pursuing Luxembourg only to shut the door. On 13th he wrote to Grey that Prussian evacuation of Luxembourg could be a solution, but if Prussia objected there would eventually be war. Stanley summarised to Grey: France will accept almost anything so long as the Prussian garrison is removed; if Prussia accepts then we'll have peace, if not 'war must probably follow'; 'the decision is to be made in Berlin'.

Disraeli won the vote on a Gladstone amendment after epic Parliamentary battles going on for weeks. He rode home, declined a celebratory dinner at the Carlton, and his wife gave him a pie and a bottle of champagne: 'Why, my dear, you are more like a mistress than a wife.' The battle continued through the summer.

(WAF) Wimpffen reported that Benedetti was enraged and displaying an embarrassingly vindictive temper towards Prussia. While Benedetti had steered clear of Bismarck over the previous few days, the latter knew Benedetti had been stirring up trouble among other diplomats in Berlin.

France suggested to the Powers (in a note from Moustier) that Prussia evacuate the Luxembourg fortress. Bernstorff told Stanley that Bismarck rejects withdrawal. Briefly around mid-April Stanley favoured the idea of Luxembourg going to Belgium but Belgium itself objected and he dropped it.

Baroness von Spitzemberg wrote in her diary that 'Bismarck is suffering so badly that he can scarcely hold out any longer.'

Bernstorff told Stanley that Bismarck would not and could not evacuate Luxembourg, he would prefer a war than to lose the confidence of Germany.

Stanley-Cowley: It's all up to Bismarck, if he'll negotiate over evacuating, 'all is plain and easy' but if not 'we are landed in a war. The Prussians are evidently very anxious to drag England into the affair by creating an alarm about Belgium.' Cowley-Hammond: 'I wish that Lord Stanley could be induced to propose some scheme for neutralising or razing the fortress.'

Reichstag passed Constitution 230:53. The biggest problem was the military budget. The Progressives wanted the right to set yearly the strength of the army through the budget. The National Liberals (?) were willing to accept the iron budget until 1870 when it would be subject to legislative approval for an additional period of years. Even this was rejected by Wilhelm and the generals.

Bismarck worked out a compromise. The peacetime strength was fixed at 1% of the population until 31 December 1871 thereafter it would be subject to legislation. The amount per soldier was also fixed until the same date but with the proviso that the states must continue to provide money at the same rate until the army's size should be changed by law. Also the Reichstag could not use military appropriations after 1871 to alter the army's organisation. Bismarck did not fear a renewal of the constitutional conflict in 1871 as the liberals would have to attack the constitution itself. He also rejected the incorporation of the Prussian Bill of Rights and won the vote. The German constitution was therefore 'the first in the history of European constitutionalism not to include such a bill' (Pflanze). Neither the head of the military cabinet (a Prussian post) nor the head of the General Staff had any controls on them under the NGC constitution. Under Manteuffel's successor, von Tresckow, the military cabinet became increasingly independent from 1867. There was no Confederate ministry of war — the Prussian Ministry was in charge. 'Unity over freedom and power over law — this was the constellation under which the German Reich was born' (OP p361). He now also insisted on them abandoning their vote of 30/3 on pay for deputies. (EF: this was finally introduced in 1906.)

The Prussian Landtag accepted the new NGC constitution by 227-93. Some democratic liberals maintained their opposition to the end both in the Reichstag and Landtag. Bismarck was prepared to throw the whole Prussian constitution overboard if he did not get what he wanted. EF: the Reichstag did win the change that the rest of the budget was subject to an annual vote and this became important.

Stanley to Loftus: Prussia has a long sea coast, France could apply naval pressure leading to financial pressure and thereby weaken Prussian influence and the union 'so lately formed'.

Hammond to Cowley: 'we shall not allow ourselves to be led into the mess out of any apprehensions for the contingencies as regards Belgium'. Interestingly Cowley did not seek assurances from Napoleon re Belgium as he thought that being put on the spot might force Napoleon to renounce the 1839 treaty. Cowley thought that neither France nor Prussia could keep territories seized in a war and that Britain had to worry about a deal between the two to grab Holland and Belgium, therefore Britain should consider a joint mutual declaration with France concerning the neutrality of both. Hammond also worried that any attempt to join with Russia to urge mediation would simply give Russia the chance to hawk her friendship in return for support against Britain in the East. Hammond was overwhelmingly concerned with a) preservation of Belgian independence and b) containment of Russia in East.

Napoleon to Cowley: I want peace and have given up acquiring Luxembourg but Prussia must evacuate 'or I become powerless and war is inevitable.' Cowley-Stanley: people here think we can avoid the war, 'Surely it must be worth while to make the attempt.' Moustier-Talleyrand: assure Gorchakov that we will renounce claims over Luxembourg in return for Prussia withdrawing the garrison.

Cowley-Stanley: Napoleon is being reasonable, 'a calm & solemn representation at Berlin of the facts ... has become a duty, even if the appeal is to be unsuccessful. It is perhaps the last chance for the preservation of peace'.

Stanley to Loftus: tell Bismarck that avoiding war requires Prussian evacuation, and we 'would see with deep regret the breaking out of war, for an object apparently so trifling'. (Loftus reported that Bismarck was not in Berlin then and he had passed the message to Thile. When did he leave Berlin?) By now Queen Victoria is also very worried about Belgium. Her secretary, Grey, urges Disraeli to pressure Stanley for more robust action. She also wrote to Derby stressing that losing Belgium to France would be a disaster and 'disgrace', it would be an abdication as a Great Power, and that it should be made clear that Britain would fight for it alone if necessary. Stanley though, was not sure Britain would fight for Belgium — Victoria was right that he was not committed. (Again interesting foreshadows of 1914 and 1938.)

(WAF) Wimpffen reported to Beust: Benedetti says — If Austria were with us, 'in six weeks we would have reduced Prussia to a smaller power than she was before the last war and would dictate peace in Berlin... I want peace but believe me that if war has not come in two months from now, we shall have missed a unique occasion which might never again present itself. Today one can still benefit from the state of affairs in South Germany; in a year or two Prussia will be so strong that war between us will perhaps become impossible.'

Gorchakov told Talleyrand that the Tsar had written to Wilhelm urging peace. Gorchakov suggested a conference in London.

Disraeli to Stanley: 'Two things seem to me clear: that France is not prepared, & that Bismarck lies to everyone — his explanations prove his perfidy. I think myself ... that we might begin to dictate a little to Europe — Gladstonism is at a discount.' Disraeli also pushed Stanley towards the idea of Victoria writing to Wilhelm, which she and Grey wanted to do. (WAF) Disraeli was with the Queen at Windsor and saw dispatches between 'all the cousins'. He thought 'pressure should ... be put upon Berlin'.

Victoria wrote to Wilhelm urging him to evacuate. (Bismarck was in his newly purchased estate of Varzin for some of this time. Millman says he returned from Varzin on 24 April.)

(WAF) Moustier asked Benedetti to try to discover if Bismarck had gone to Pomerania and if so was he meeting Gorchakov to conclude an alliance.

Stanley to Disraeli about avoiding strengthening commitments to Belgium: 'I am ready to go so far as may be necessary in support of Belgium, short of giving an absolute pledge to fight for its independence. Suppose we gave such a pledge, that France and Prussia came to an understanding. Russia and Austria standing aloof, where should we be. But I say nothing in an opposite sense, lest we should lose our influence'. Disraeli and others urged him to give Luxembourg a guarantee and argued that the public would support it. Stanley reluctant.

Victoria to the Crown Princess of Prussia (her daughter): '[I]t is not France ... who wish for war... It is Bismarck who has for the last 8 months encouraged the Emperor to believe he cd get Luxembourg without difficulty... I fear the time may come when Europe will wish France to be strong to keep the ambition of Germany in check.'

Hammond to Stanley: we should not host a conference unless both sides agree in advance to abide by its decision. Hammond also wanted to avoid a guarantee as much as Stanley but they both gave way to the pressure of Derby, Disraeli and the Queen. 'Hammond was a dominant influence on Stanley throughout the crisis... Many times the foreign secretary merely mouthed Hammond's words' in his memos to others (Millman).

Delane (Editor of The Times) thought that war was imminent and Britain should try to get Prussia to withdraw the garrison.

(WAF) The wedding in Berlin of Princess Marie (a Hohenzollern) to the son of the Belgian king brought many royals and dignitaries. Bismarck was back from Varzin for the wedding. There were political meetings in the margin of the wedding. Guests assured Benedetti that Prussia wanted peace and the next day the papers were calmer.

OP: Having squeezed what he felt was possible for the moment out of the affair, Bismarck agreed to an international conference, held 7-11 May in London. On 26th Loftus told Stanley that Bismarck would evacuate the fortress and accept the duchy neutralised if there were a European guarantee. He suggests a conference at which Prussia could make 'concessions to Europe and to Holland in behalf of peace which she could not make to France.' The idea that Bismarck, who always defied opinion when he wanted, was really pushed in this affair by 'public opinion' is untenable; it was an excuse. If he had wanted a war, he would not have pressured the Dutch not to sign. Some in Berlin were advocating a strike against France before her army was reorganised. OP (p381) says that Moltke was among them. Bismarck said 'the chance of success is not a just cause for beginning a great war.' He'd been trying as always to manipulate pressures to give him good chances across a range of options: either a) give Napoleon Luxembourg and Belgium for further progress in south or b) use the threat of such a deal to get Britain allied against France. He'd now pushed things as far as he could for the moment and did not judge the time was right for a war against France.

Cowley to Stanley: we should not ask Napoleon for a public commitment on Belgium, it would be 'distasteful to France' and 'injurious' for Napoleon and might provoke him to denounce the 1815 borders. He preferred a joint guarantee from Britain and France. He expected the war to be inconclusive.

Gorchakov informed Talleyrand that Prussia had agreed a conference in London in which Luxembourg would be neutralised in return for a European guarantee and the garrison would then be withdrawn.

Stanley to Grey: '[T]here never was a time when the English public was more thoroughly bent on incurring no fresh responsibilities for Continental objects; yet it is expected, and reasonably, that we shall do what is in our power to preserve peace. The difficulty is increased by the impossibility of placing confidence in the Prussian government. That Fr. desires peace, is, I think, as certain as anything can be in the actual condition of the world. I do not feel the same conviction as to [Bismarck]; and still less as to the K. of Pr... The fact is one cannot trust Bismarck, even if he had given a promise, unless it were in a form that could be made public.'

Bismarck complained to the southern states that they had not improved their military preparations since the previous year and he suggested that they summon their parliaments to demand cooperation in remedying these problems. They refused. Bavaria and Wurttemberg resisted any closer military cooperation.

(WAF) Benedetti and Bismarck met at a reception at the Russian legation. Oubril toasted the success of the London conference.

Hyde Park demonstration in England. It was too big for the Government to dare to disperse (Home Secretary had to resign). It encouraged Disraeli to make the Second Reform Act more radical. Passed in August.

First week of May Bismarck pressured Stanley telegraphing threats of withdrawal from the conference within 'three days' and spreading rumours about imminent withdrawal.

Stanley-Cowley: 'I think the European guarantee will be made a strong point of, and that it will not be easy to escape giving one in some shape; but I will certainly give none that amounts to a pledge to take up arms in defence of the arrangements to be made, should they be attacked. Such a pledge would be useless, for opinion here would not allow of its being made good: unless we change more in the next few years than I think likely, and in a direction opposite to that in which we are now tending.'

Bismarck-Bernstorff (a 'long essay', Millman): we can only concede evacuation in return for a European guarantee.

Loftus-Stanley: Bismarck says that the evacuation of the Prussian garrison must proceed from the neutralisation of the Duchy under a European guarantee. Stanley replied that he would not 'contract a new guarantee'.

(WAF) Benedetti thought Bismarck was trying to be conciliatory.

Loftus-Stanley: 'Prussia will not withdraw from the fortress unless the Grand Duchy is neutralized and placed under an European guarantee'. Moustier supported a guarantee if it would end the affair.Victoria pressed Stanley to agree. Disraeli supported giving it.

Bismarck told Bernstorff to tell the diplomats gathered that if he did not get his European guarantee there would be war.

Hammond-Stanley: If Derby, Disraeli and Queen press you to give a new guarantee, 'you should give in, but not till after a decent fight recorded on the protocol' and you ought to have Cabinet sanction a new course. If Bernstorff presses you on the guarantee, prevaricate by saying you'll have to speak to the Queen and Cabinet. 'You could then get on record your objections, and show to Parliament and the country that you consented to guarantee only under the sanction of your colleagues and of the Queen.'

Hammond later told Cowley (22 June) that Stanley gave way on the guarantee some time before 6pm on 6th because of a meeting in Parliament.

International conference in London.

Bernstorff to Bismarck 3:25pm on 7 May: Stanley says that if other powers want a guarantee he would not object but thought Parliament would. Loftus telegraphs from Berlin (4pm): Bismarck will mobilise the army if 'peace were not assured' within three days. (Stanley received the telegram between 4pm and 6pm when he sent it on to Cowley.)

Stanley told the London conference, in reply to Bernstorff's pressure, that he did not want to give a guarantee but would discuss with the Cabinet — just as Hammond had advised the day before. The general view was that the guarantee would happen and the affair was already settled.

(WAF) Benedetti-Moustier: Bismarck told Wimpffen and Loftus that he might have to advise mobilisation given French military moves. I called on him late evening. Bismarck said rumours of French plans to invade the Rhineland made Prussian preparation necessary. The Council of Ministers won't meet until 11th so the Conference over the next few days will be crucial. Benedetti also reported he saw the King who said to him that on his desk lay mobilisation orders and he awaited only a report from Goltz.

Stanley, under pressure from Derby, the Queen, and Disraeli told the conference that Britain would give a 'collective' guarantee. However, Hammond commented, 'you might very safely undertake [it] ... as it amounted to nothing'!

On 9th, Stanley told the Commons that war had been averted and that 'we have not incurred any fresh responsibility'! Hammond to Cowley: 'The House of Commons ... received with complacency Lord Stanley's explanation about guarantee to the effect that the choice lay between giving it and an European war, while when given, it involved little, if indeed it involved that... There was no further discussion, and so the affair ended with repeated cheering for Lord Stanley.' Stanley was surprised how little objection there was in Parliament.

Hammond minuted (8th) that the new arrangement was 'in effect merely an extension [of the 1839 guarantee] to the neutrality of Luxembourg'.

Millman (p84-5): Influence can be exercised on the basis of reputation/prestige which depends on expectation of future conduct based on a memory of previous effective conduct. British prestige could not be renewed in the 1860s because 'Cobden, Bright, and the middle-class had temporarily captured opinion, which had already begun to turn away from a policy of commitment as a result of the Crimean war'. It would have been very hard to pursue an active policy and Stanley reinforced the prevailing wind and his popularity was because he 'so closely mirrored the public mood' and to have fought it was 'beyond his capacity and repugnant to his character.' The foreign policy of Clarendon, Stanley and Granville until the Franco-Prussian war was more popular with contemporaries than Castlereagh's, and as popular as Canning's or Palmerston's.

Moustier complained to Benedetti that Bismarck's claims were nonsense or a trick and told Benedetti to inform him that mobilisation would be seen as an act of aggression.

(WAF) Benedetti reported that the King had postponed the ministerial meeting and Bismarck said that reports were hopeful from London and Bernstorff would sign the treaty. It felt like the crisis was waning.

Late afternoon, the Treaty was signed. The sovereignty of William III was confirmed; the duchy was neutralised under the collective guarantee of the Powers; the Prussian right of garrison was withdrawn; the fortress was consigned to demolition. Overall, it was a 'harsh defeat' (OP) for Napoleon with only the withdrawal of the Prussian garrison to show for huge efforts and he'd had other disasters including Mexico. It was not popular among German nationalists but Nationalverein agents reported over summer that 9/10 people in Luxembourg preferred France to Germany if forced to choose: 'Bismarck had known it all along' (OP). Benedetti was bitter and felt duped and now shifted towards thinking about alliance with Austria against Prussia, according to WAF.

In Mexico, Maximillian tried to escape and was captured. Executed 19 June.

In the Lords Derby said that the 1839 Treaty 'was under the collective guarantee of all the powers' and the new guarantee 'is not a joint and separate guarantee, but it is a collective guarantee, and does not impose upon this country any special and separate duty of enforcing its provisions. It is a collective guarantee of all the Powers of Europe.' Actually the 1839 Treaty did NOT contain the word 'collective'. Cf. below 20 June.

Stanley-Disraeli (probably this year but no year on the document): 'We have been lucky in our foreign policy; for what we did involved no risk and cost no trouble, while it has given us the appearance of having helped, more than we really did, to bring about the result.' Millman: the real reason why the crisis fizzled was that neither Napoleon nor Bismarck thought this was the moment to push it, not because Britain/Stanley defused the crisis.

Crete was also causing trouble in spring 1867 during the Luxembourg crisis. Stanley was 'waiting and hoping for a Turkish victory to obviate the necessity for European intervention' (Millman). He feared Crete being separated from the Ottoman Empire. Russia was pushing for Greek annexation. Bismarck supported Russia over the spring-summer.

During May, Bismarck rejected schemes from Bavaria and Württemberg. He declared that a common parliament was an 'indispensable prerequisite' for the Zollverein's renewal and if it was not agreed by 1 July Prussia would serve notice of withdrawing from the Zollverein. The southern states could not cope with this threat and feared Bismarck would extract more concessions if they delayed. On 23 May they suggested a conference and Bismarck accepted. It assembled 3 June.

The Tsar and Gorchakov left for Berlin then Paris. Mosse: Gorchakov complained that he had not been consulted about the visit and had misgivings about it. The influential head of the Asiatic department in the Foreign Ministry (Stremouchov) also posed the visit and wanted a clearer friendship with Prussia agreed in Berlin then signalled in Paris.

(Mosse) The Tsar and Gorchakov met Wilhelm and Bismarck at Potsdam. Both kings expressed their desire for 'peace, peace and more peace' (Wilhelm) but worried about French national feeling and the pressure it exerted on Napoleon. Bismarck explained to Loftus (7/6): The visit was not popular in Russia and Gorchakov wanted some positive news to tell at home. Gorchakov's ideas about European peace were of 'a very vague nature' about a French guarantee not to attack Prussia. 'Count Bismarck appeared to attach no importance to them and to think their practical realization impossible.'

Cowley talked to Bismarck about the situation and said Britain does not want to see the southern states forced to join the NGC or an 'overt act of hostility towards France'. Bismarck said that there is nothing to fear. France wanted British support on the Treaty of Prague and Schleswig. Stanley suggested France drop the issue. Wilhelm also had Augusta, visiting Victoria in June, ask that Britain not support France which might provoke a war. Stanley stuck to his view of saying/doing as little as possible.

The south German states' ministers assembled in Berlin to discuss the Zollverein. Bismarck presented them with a plan drafted by Delbruck and extensively revised by himself. As with the NGC, 'its revolutionary character was concealed by the fiction of continuity with older forms' (OP): the current treaties would remain but Zollverein affairs would be decided by a 'common organ of the contracting states' (organised like the old Diet) and a 'common representation of their peoples' (composed of the deputies of the Reichstag and deputies elected from the southern states). The legislative competence was expressly limited to tariffs, their collection, and taxation of sugar, salt and tobacco. Prussia had a subtle veto. After toing and froing, especially with Bavaria, it was agreed, cf. 8 July.

(Gall) To Catherine Orlov: 'If it comes to war we shall immediately be faced with a whole series of wars: whoever is beaten the first time round will simply wait till he has got his breath back and then start all over again.' Cf. similar comment to Keudell 12/69.

National Liberal Party formed.

Stanley said to the Commons that the guarantee was more of a 'moral sanction' than 'a contingent liability to make war. It would, no doubt, give a right to make war, but it would not necessarily impose the obligation.'

An Austrian Field Marshal reported a severe snub from the Tsar, then passing through Warsaw. It was a sign that relations were at their lowest ebb since 1863 (Mosse).

Debate in House of Lords. Russell said that he hoped Britain had not 'entered into any guarantee involving probable danger'. Derby replied: 'A guarantee of neutrality is very different from a guarantee of possession. If France and Prussia were to have a quarrel between themselves, & either are to violate the neutrality of Luxembourg by passing their troops through the duchy for the purpose of making war on the other, we might, if the guarantee had been individual as well as joint, have been under the necessity of preventing that violation... but the guarantee is only collective ... [N]ot one of those Powers is bound to fulfil the obligation alone... The only two Powers by which the neutrality of Luxembourg is likely to be infringed are two of the parties to the collective guarantee; and, therefore, if either of them violate the neutrality, the obligation on all others would not accrue.' Granville replied that this view ran 'the risk of being considered unfaithful to our agreements'. Russell said that Britain was committed to action if the duchy's neutrality were to be violated.

On the same day, Bismarck expressed to Loftus his 'astonishment and regret' at Stanley's interpretation as it made the guarantee 'illusory'. 'Bismarck said that he could not accept this view of the collective guarantee. In such case all treaties ... would be worthless. He could not imagine that England would undertake to give a guarantee which should be a mere delusion'.

NB. The 1839 Treaty did not use the word 'collective' but 1867 did. On 22 June Hammond said to Cowley that the collective nature of the guarantee meant 'it was no guarantee at all'. It's clear that Hammond and Stanley thought that their insertion of the word 'collective' allowed them to keep the peace by a trick — Prussia accepted the guarantee as the payment for withdrawing the garrison while in fact Britain was not committed to do anything. While Bismarck is rightly seen as a liar and trickster, he would doubtless point to this example as justification for his behaviour — in international relations, people lie and cheat. It also seems Derby at least was mistaken in his view of the 1839 Treaty obligations.

According to Millman, the 1839 Treaty was 'placed under the Guarantee of their said majesties' while the 1867 treaty was 'placed under the sanction of the collective Guarantee of the Powers'. In 1870 a legal opinion re the 1839 Treaty, sought by Granville, was given to the FO and concluded that 'the refusal or incapacity of one or more of the guaranteeing powers to act does not ... liberate the remaining Powers from the obligation to do so' (cf. Millman, p.91). On 1 August 1870 Disraeli told the Commons that the 1867 treaty 'is not so large as the scope of' the 1839 treaty. (Overall watching Whitehall deal with the 1839/1867 treaties and negotiations in 1866/7 and 1870, it is clear that British politicians and officials were more likely to accept a certain amount of fog and confusion that helped them achieve immediate ends than think cold and hard about what they were/not committing to, and this makes it more comprehensible why 35 years later they made such disastrous errors over Belgium.)

A relatively brief holiday at Varzin. While there, Bleichröder wrote him that the market was unsettled by rumours of conflict with France. Bismarck sold shares bought with the public gift because although 'I do not believe in any dangerous political complications ... influential people in Paris are working a la baisse and hotheads are writing dispatches and inspiring newspaper articles' so the markets might go down when I need to find some cash. It seems that he was here by himself over the summer, his father-in-law wrote to him on 28/9 saying he was sending clean linen and napkins so 'there would be no scarcity' when the family arrived. Bleichröder sometimes offered Bismarck loans and pointed out that he was getting no particular favour, presumably to assure Bismarck that he was not somehow getting into his banker's debt? But Stern says it also seems that he sometimes simply leant Bismarck money for short periods without charging any interest and this seems to have been undiscussed (p104). His own wealth was invested internationally in things like US bonds and his relationship with Bleichröder taught him a lot about the economy, international banking and so on.

Bernstorff-Stanley: He repeated Bismarck's complaint of 20th. Stanley tried to argue that it was 'impossible to define with legal strictness the amount of obligation really incurred, but whatever that might be'(!) he did not think the force of the engagement 'was in any degree lessened' by his comments. He also told Loftus that Derby's language 'was, I suspect, not quite accurately reported: but I have admitted to Bernstorff that if he had said what appears in the newspapers [he clearly has not ascertained what the PM had actually said], he went further than I should have done in denying the existence of any obligation — I think I satisfied him; but considering Bismarck's own language on the subject of guarantees, his indignation, if real, is curious'! A German newspaper close to Bismarck a few days later mocked, 'Was it intended to guarantee the neutrality of Luxembourg only against Lichtenstein, Greece, or Mexico?' (sent back by Loftus to the FO). A bit later, the paper wrote that Derby's interpretation would effectively prevent 'any treaties being concluded with England in the future'.

Wilhelm-Augusta (visiting London): You should stress that if England and the North German Confederation push for peace, and 'keep a watchful eye on France', then we will all enjoy peace. Mosse: Bismarck did not want to be dependent on Russia or pressured to support her in the East. He kept putting out feelers to London where he knew he was distrusted. A copy of this letter was handed by Augusta to Victoria and from her to Stanley. Stanley replied in a friendly but distant way, making clear a desire for peace and friendship but also stressing England's role was neutral between Prussia and France and he stressed to Grey/Victoria that England must preserve 'strict and impartial neutrality' which was 'the best guarantee for the preservation of peace: for it is only the reputation for impartiality that can give weight to the advice of a mediator'. Grey and Victoria were keener on some sort of defensive assurance towards Prussia and they sought to enlist Disraeli in support, who hinted that he agreed with them and that Stanley was inclined to lean towards Prussia. Stanley didn't budge: 'If war does break out, we have only one course, that of rigidly impartial neutrality' (9/8).

Late June (Gall) Following the deal with Hungary, Beust was also appointed Imperial Chancellor. Early July Alexander visited Napoleon in Paris but there was 'no serious political discussion' (Pflanze). Gorchakov's hopes of a closer alliance receded. Russia had not helped France much in the Luxembourg dispute, the visit led more to 'coolness' than closer relations (Millman) and Napoleon started to shift more toward working with Britain in the East, according to Millman, who describes this visit as June (so does Otte). The Sultan had 'a warm reception' in Paris and London during a summer visit (Millman). The Cretan revolt lingered on and the focus of Europe returned to the West.

Mosse (p272-3): The Tsar and Gorchakov wanted serious discussions with Napoleon but the latter did not. The Tsar arrived early for the first dinner at Tuileries but he hardly entered Napoleon's study before Eugénie walked in and the conversation turned to 'trivialities' (Mosse). None of the meetings went far. Only a discussion between Gorchakov and Moustier turned seriously to Turkey but they made little progress. Even on the social front it was not a success. Alexander noticed the coolness of the crowds, there were some shouts of 'Vive la Pologne!' On 6 July, returning from a military review in an open carriage two shots were fired by a Pole. As he prepared to leave the Tsar watched the preparations for the arrival of the Sultan. He returned 'fatigué, vieilli et sérieux' (Brenner-Beust). All hope of French support in the East seemed over so the Tsar and Gorchakov had no interest in helping France in the West. Gorchakov distrusted Moustier and Beust and watched with 'disquiet' the 'steady rapprochement' between Vienna and Paris (Mosse). What if England joined this pair? Only Bismarck stood as an ally — and what if he settled differences with France and Austria? Around this time Gorchakov remarked: 'What else can we do? Nobody can rely on France or England, Austria is weak and not well-disposed towards us. If we break with Prussia, we stand alone.' The failure of this trip pushed Napoleon towards Beust and Austria, despite misgivings about their weaknesses. (Why didn't Napoleon make more of an effort with the Tsar? Why didn't he explore options such as — you support me grabbing Belgium I'll support you in the East, at least to put pressure on London? London worried about such possibilities and Bismarck hinted at them.)

To Keudell: 'Luxembourg was the limit of our peaceableness, if that does not secure peace then there is no keeping it.'

The Zollparlament deal was agreed. Huge pressure from commercial interests pushed the southern governments and parliaments into ratifying the deal by the end of October (as usual Bismarck set a speedy deadline when it suited him to apply pressure). Bavaria saw great resistance from Catholics, pro-Austrians, aristocratic particularists — but the liberal national press bashed them with warnings about its indispensability and they folded. Bismarck got most of what he wanted but 'the degree of opposition it met was inauspicious for Bismarck's further aims' (Pflanze).

Bernstorff stressed to Stanley again Bismarck's anger re the interpretation of the guarantee. On 18th the Queen complained to Stanley about the dispute and said 'regard for our character for fidelity to our engagements imperatively demands some official notice'. Stanley dodged and assured the Queen (20th) the problem was solved.

Grey to Disraeli: the Queen thinks that Stanley is in 'a somewhat ignoble groove' because of his overly passive attitude. On 29th she followed up by stressing that Britain should support Prussia, France 'can have no right to interfere in the internal organization of Germany', and she will not dare provoke a quarrel with Prussia if she realises Britain sympathises with Prussia. According to Millman Grey 'was more German than the queen'. She wanted to make clear Britain would intervene to preserve Belgian independence.

To Thile: 'I think it neither necessary nor desirable that the King should formally open the Bundesrat's first session. It would give our colleagues in the Federation the impression that their state representatives were in the same category as a Prussian parliamentary body. In reality only the federal budget and the customs treaty should come before the Bundesrat, both already known realities, which need no All-Highest decisions.'

Office of the Federal Chancellor set up under Delbruck. Delbruck began the business of pushing through liberalising economic measures, unifying huge amounts of regulations, and integrating the new economies into the Prussian system:

• freedom of internal migration and settlement
• freedom to establish public companies and anti-guild measures
• common passports (67)
• Prussian military laws replace local (67)
• uniform weights and measures (68)
• equal rights for different denominations (69)
• common commercial code and a supreme court to interpret it (1869)
• an industrial code guaranteeing free enterprise (1869)
• abolition of government control over the establishment of joint stock companies (1870)
• a common criminal code (May 1970)
• common currency (71)
• central bank (1875)

These developments sowed confusion among liberals: some elements of the middle class were already becoming hostile to the rapid pace of change while others feared that the Bismarck approach may succeed in divorcing economic liberalism from political liberalism. The economic direction of Prussia had been resisted in south Germany. Liberal deputies were not docile and amended many bills (Bismarck defeated the abolition of capital punishment, 'this sickly sentimentality of our times').

Delbruck wrote before Bismarck elevated him: 'My relationship to the King and to Count Bismarck was of the sort that I could reckon on the possibility that after a few years I would become the successor to Count Itzenplitz in the Ministry of Trade. As Prussian Minister of Trade I would end my career. But it all turned out differently.'

Second Reform Act got Royal Assent.

It a) 'granted the vote to all householders in the boroughs as well as lodgers who paid rent of £10 a year or more; b) reduced the property threshold in the counties and gave the vote to agricultural landowners and tenants with very small amounts of land. Men in urban areas who met the property qualification were enfranchised and the Act roughly doubled the electorate in England and Wales from one to two million men' (HoC). Franchise extended from 1.4m to 2.5m, a third of adult males (Evans).

Disraeli had made all sorts of concessions and changes, without any real principle except resisting whatever Gladstone argued. Cranborne later summarised the 'success' as 'purchased at the cost of a political betrayal which has no parallel in our Parliamentary annals... Neither the recklessness of Charles Fox, nor the venality of Henry Fox, nor the cynicism of Walpole will furnish them with a case in point. They will have to go back to a time when the last revolution was preparing - to the days when Sunderland directed the councils and accepted the favours of James while he was negotiating the invasion of William.'

Blake, p460: 'Cranborne came to believe that Derby and Disraeli had secretly decided to bring in household suffrage with or without safeguards ever since summer 1866, perhaps even since 1859. This was not true, though some later remarks of both leaders give it plausibility. Certainly Disraeli had been through gyrations so extraordinary that a sinister explanation might well seem called for'.

Blake, p. 464: 'Gladstone's amendments, which would have prevented the indiscriminate enfranchisement of the borough occupiers, were rejected, while Radical amendments which greatly extended it went through with scarcely a debate. And all this was done by a Conservative Government which on principle and past practice had been prepared to concede only the minimum 'safe' increase in the number of voters. Disraeli was assisted in bringing off this remarkable manoeuvre by the general Conservative hatred of Gladstone and by the desire of a large block of members on both sides to get the question settled and done with. He was helped, too, by the ignorance of most MPs when discussing the technicalities of rating law, a dry, tedious and excessively complicated matter which bored the House'.

Derby described the Bill later as 'a leap in the dark' and he never really denied Granville's charge of having said that his object was 'to dish the Whigs'.

Blake: the idea that Disraeli enfranchised householders anticipating it would make the electorate more conservative is wrong: he twisted and turned to keep power: 'All the evidence of his contemporary papers suggests that Disraeli saw the electorate in traditional terms of rural voters being Conservative, urban voters Liberal; and that he thought of politics as a matter of 'management' and 'influence' in the old-fashioned sense, not mass persuasion of a new class' (p. 476). Personally Disraeli's handling of the Commons raised his esteem among colleagues and ensured he was now seen as the natural heir to Derby. Blake: 'Of Disraeli at this time it could be said as Lord Beaverbrook wrote of Lloyd George: “He did not seem to care which way he travelled providing he was in the driver's seat.” For what he did in 1867 he deserves to go down to history as a politician of genius, a superb improviser, a parliamentarian of unrivalled skill, but not as a far-sighted statesman, a Tory democrat or the educator of his party.'

The Second Reform Act was followed by the secret ballot in 1872 and in 1884 the provisions of the 1867 Act were extended to the countryside after which nearly two-thirds of adult males had the vote.

In 1874 the historian Froude would remark that it was becoming assumed that the nation was wiser than its leaders. In 1912 Lord Selborne would remark, 'There is no more a House of Commons than a House of Lords. There is nothing but the cabinet, subject to a continuous but slight check of the Crown, and the violent but occasional check of the electors.' Derby's view of hardship as a call on individual Christian charity gave way to the view that it was government's duty to ameliorate it.

Hawkins: Derby was the last PM to uphold the axioms of Victorian 'parliamentary government', i.e parliamentary parties, discussing at Westminster in a social environment described by Trollope as a 'single special set that dominates all other sets in our English world', defined the national interest distinct from the clamour of the voters. For Bagehot, Parliament was 'the most efficient instrument for expressing the practical opinion of cultivated men the world has ever seen' but it changed fundamentally from 1865: 'The change since 1865 is a change not in one point, but in a thousand points; it is a change not of particular details but of pervading spirit' (1872).

Reichstag elections. Turnout down roughly a third. 84 National Liberals, 70 conservatives, 36 free conservatives, 30 progressives, 22 federal-constitutionalists (mostly Saxons and annexed Prussians), 15 old liberals. (Hamerow: Cons 59 to 68, NL 79 to 83, FC 40 to 34, Centrists 27 to 16, PP 19 to 31. 3 socialists were elected, the first ever in a German legislative body.) Prussian Chamber of Deputies also elected in 1867 (when?): 125 conservatives, 48 free conservatives, 99 National Liberals, 48 progressives. In both parliaments state officials were most strongly represented (42% Prussia, 46% Reichstag). The number of deputies who classed themselves as merchants, industrialists, businessman was about 5% but this is misleading because of the significant number of big landlords in both chambers heavily involved in coalmining and other industrial projects. No majority could form without the National Liberals but neither could they dominate. The NLs wanted: to complete German unification, expand the competence of central government, increase budget rights for the Reichstag and Landtag, responsible ministers in the legal sense, more economic and personal freedom, judicial reform, and local government reform at the expense of corporate institutions.

The leaders of the national parties met in Stuttgart to agree a common platform calling for the extension of the powers of the Zollparlement.

[^1]: Before industrial manufacturing guilds were crucial institutions. They controlled training of apprentices, their transition to journeymen then masters. They maintained standards. They provided welfare. But they also suppressed innovation. They'd declined in England in the 18th C, in the French Revolution they were abolished. They never recovered. They declined 1815-48. They retained most influence in luxury goods. The number of 'masters' in Prussia grew rapidly and their incomes declined.